There are three power dynamics within Russia that allow Vladimir Putin's administration to resist sanctions, writes Ali. A. Ghareh Daghi, PhD scholar and recipient of an Irish Research Council scholarship in the Department of Sociology.

    Sanctions are a key tool that countries or international organisations use to push other countries to make political changes by restricting their economic interactions, like trade, investment and finance.

    Sanctions are divided into primary and secondary categories. In the former, the sanctioner restricts its own companies from engaging with a sanctioned country, while the latter extends this by urging other countries to obey sanctions rules.

    Sanctions play a crucial role in US foreign policy and increased from 912 in 2000 to 9,421 in 2021 —a remarkable growth of 933%. Washington has imposed sanctions against 21 countries, with Russia being the most heavily sanctioned, facing more than 14,000 punitive measures.

    The academic and media debate around sanctions against Russia centres on whether they work. This question relates sanctions success to Russia's access to financial resources. The goal is to impede Russia’s ability to finance the military invasion of Ukraine that began in February 2022.

    It's clear that sanctions have failed to compel Russia to alter its behaviour towards Ukraine, as Moscow refuses to withdraw its forces from the southern and southeastern regions. Therefore, the primary objective of sanctions has not yet been achieved.

    But by prioritising the question of whether sanctions work, the analysis blurs a comprehensive understanding of why Russia has not made political changes. To address this challenge, let's shift the focus towards the question of why, specifically asking why sanctions succeed or fail. To answer this question, I argue that there are three power dynamics —ideological, economic, and military— within Russia that empower it to resist sanctions to a certain extent without altering its behaviour.

    Ideological power

    Some argue that Russia, while experiencing highly transformative changes over 500 years, lacks a singular 'Russian’ ideology. However, nationalism, not exclusively, prevails in Russia. and Russian nationalism has been on the rise since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Over half of Russians (53%) believe that their homeland should be exclusively for Russians. During the last stages of the Soviet Union, only 26% agreed with this idea.

    Russians are largely nostalgic for the Soviet era, with half considering its absence a great misfortune. About 48% believe it is natural for Russia to have an empire, and three-quarters of Russians express support for the invasion of Ukraine. It seems that Russians nationalism overlaps the state’s desire to extend influence on abroad, as it did during the Soviet empire. This is evident in the invasion of Ukraine, reflecting a desire to build a "modern Russian empire."

    Economic power

    Russia has vast energy resources and substantial deposits of various minerals. Russia is one of the world’s foremost oil producers, contributing around one-fifth of the global output. It also plays a substantial role in the production of natural gas, responsible for the largest gas reserves.

    Sanctions against Russia were intended to deplete the country’s financial resources and this has been achieved to a certain extent. The Russian Royal Academy of Science institute has acknowledged the widespread impact of sanctions on every sector of the economy. In January 2023, Russian oil export revenues dropped by 38% compared to January 2022.

    But despite this, higher prices have lessened the impact on export value. Russia also continues to find new customers, notably China and India, to supply oil and gas at discount rates. By considering the impact of sanctions on Russian economy, the state is motivated to prioritise domestically produced goods over Western imports, aiming to enhance economic resilience against sanctions.

    The report highlighted challenges in obtaining raw materials as a significant issue. In January 2023, Russian oil export revenues dropped by 38% compared to January 2022. Despite this, higher prices have lessened the impact on export value. Russia also continues to find new customers, notably China and India, to supply oil and gas at discount rates. By considering the impact of sanctions on Russian economy, the state is motivated to prioritise domestically produced goods over Western imports, aiming to enhance economic resilience against sanctions.

    Military power

    Russia is recognised as a great power, primarily due to its military capability, with 2.2 million personnel, 15,857 armoured vehicles, and 3,309 aircrafts. The Russian government’s 2024 budget includes a commitment to allocate 6% of gross domestic product (GDP) to military expenditures.

    However, it is undeniable that Russian army has faced some operational and tactical setbacks in the Ukraine invasion, such as a lack of coordination between ground and air operations. Russia sought assistance from Iran, which provided drones to address the challenge.

    Despite facing military setbacks and escalation of sanctions, Russia can persist in its war against Ukraine due to this interplay of military, ideological, and economic powers. The support of three-quarters of Russians for the invasion, and the vision of a more diversified and self-sufficient economy, contribute to countering sanctions and sustaining the military campaign. Such internal factors also show that the complexity surrounding evaluating the effectiveness of sanctions goes beyond merely determining whether they work.

    This piece originally appeared on RTÉ Brainstorm

    Main image credit: Kremlin.ru, CC BY 4.0 via Wikimedia Commons