

**MAYNOOTH
PHILOSOPHICAL
PAPERS
ISSUE 4
(2007)**

**An Anthology of Current Research from the
Department of Philosophy, NUI Maynooth**

Issue Editor: Cyril McDonnell

General Editor: Thomas A. F. Kelly



DEDICATION

The Staff and Students of the Department of Philosophy
wish to express heartfelt sadness at the death
on 21st February 2008 of

Professor Thomas Augustine Francis Kelly,
Head of the Department of Philosophy at NUI Maynooth.

All of us wish to extend our sincerest sympathies to his wife Marian,
his mother Mary, and his extended family and friends.

This issue of *Maynooth Philosophical Papers* is dedicated to
the memory of Thomas, the founder of this Anthology, a colleague,
a friend, and a genuine advocate of all things
philosophical and worthwhile.

He will be sadly missed.

May he rest in peace. *Grásta ó Dhía ar a anam.*

ISBN 9780901519375

© 2007

The Department of Philosophy, National University of Ireland —
Maynooth, and the Individual Authors

CONTENTS

	Page
Foreword by Professor Thomas A. F. Kelly	i
Editor's Introduction	ii

FACULTY

Michael Dunne:	A Being-towards-Death — the <i>Vado mori</i>	1
Ian Leask:	First Impressions Reconsidered: Some Notes on the Lévinasian Critique of Husserl	17
Harry McCauley:	Red, Riotous and Wrong: Is the Secondary Quality Analogy an Unpalatable Doctrine?	23
Cyril McDonnell:	Understanding and Assessing Heidegger's Topic in Phenomenology in Light of His Appropriation of Dilthey's Hermeneutic Manner of Thinking	31

TRANSLATION

Edith Stein:	Martin Heidegger's Existential Philosophy Translation by Mette Lebeck	55
--------------	--	----

DOCTORAL CANDIDATES

John Haydn Gurmin:	Edith Stein and Tania Singer: A Comparison of Phenomenological and Neurological Approaches to the Problem of Empathy	99
Denise Ryan:	Jean de La Rochelle's Formulation of the Distinction between Being and Essence	123

FOREWORD

I am delighted, as Professor of Philosophy, to be able to write a foreword to the current edition of *Maynooth Philosophical Papers*, which has been edited by Dr Cyril McDonnell. I would like to express my heartfelt thanks and warmest congratulations to all the contributors, both faculty and doctoral candidates. To do this is a very congenial duty for me, since *Maynooth Philosophical Papers* is one of the ways in which our Department renews and extends its already vital research culture, and stimulates the work of our younger, emerging scholars, as well as that of our well-established staff members.

The present assembly of essays shows that Philosophy is alive and well in NUI Maynooth. The fine contributions of our doctoral candidates also show that Philosophy is being passed on to a new and very worthy generation of philosophers. The diversity of the essays which form the present collection is witness to the plurivocality of the discipline as it is practised here. Each of them shows a depth of penetration and mastery of their discipline of which their authors can be very proud. I am delighted to see that Dr Mette Lebech's translation of Edith Stein's work, never before translated into English, entitled 'Martin Heidegger's Existential Philosophy', appears for the first time in this issue. In my view this represents a significant contribution both to Stein and Heidegger studies, and to the history of existential and phenomenological philosophy.

I would finally also like to offer my congratulations and thanks to Dr Cyril McDonnell, for his fine contribution, for his excellent editorship and for his hard work.

**Professor Thomas A.F. Kelly,
General Editor, *Maynooth Philosophical Papers*,
Head, Department of Philosophy,
NUI Maynooth.**

29th November, 2007.

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION


This is Issue No.4 (2007) of *Maynooth Philosophical Papers*, comprising on-going work from both Faculty and post-graduate students in the Department of Philosophy at National University Ireland, Maynooth. *Maynooth Philosophical Papers* was an idea initiated and promoted by Dr Thomas Kelly, who, I am happy to write, has been recently appointed Professor of Philosophy and Head of the Department of Philosophy at N.U.I. Maynooth. Students and staff extend warmest congratulations to Professor Kelly, and we wish him all the very best in his new position and endeavours.

Earlier in the year, Tom asked me if I would be interested in editing this issue of *Maynooth Philosophical Papers* 2007, around the theme of 'Contemporary Philosophy', which I was delighted to do and gratefully accepted. Thank you very much, Tom, for that invitation. I am also genuinely appreciative of the responses to the call for papers that I received from staff and postgraduate students for this edition.

Submissions to *Maynooth Philosophical Papers* are reviewed anonymously and internationally. A very important and special thank you, therefore, is extended to each of the referees who gave generously of their time, evaluations, suggestions and comments, which the contributors appreciated and benefited in kind.

Topics addressed in this issue straddle some of the main currents in contemporary philosophy, such as, for instance: existentialism, hermeneutics, phenomenology, and analytic philosophy, in addition to topics in medieval philosophy which are of perennial relevance to contemporary philosophical debate. Also presented here for the first time is an English translation of Edith Stein's essay 'Martin Heidegger's Existential Philosophy' by Dr Mette Lebeck of the Department of Philosophy at Maynooth. Stein's original essay 'Martin Heideggers Existentialphilosophie' was first published in German as an appendix in Edith Stein, *Endliches und Ewiges Sein. Versuch eines Aufstiegs zum Sinn des Seins* (1950), but it was not part of the first edition of her collected works by Herder in 1986, and so, not translated by Kurt F. Reinhardt for *Finite and Eternal Being* (Washington: ICS Publications, 1986). It does appear, however, in the new edition of Stein's *Gesamtausgabe*, bd. 11/12 (Freiburg: Herder, 2006), pp. 445–500; and Mette's translation will feature in the re-issue of *Finite and Eternal Being* (ICSP, forthcoming). We are, therefore, deeply delighted and indebted to Mette (and to Fr Sullivan's permission of ICSP) for inclusion of her translation in this edition of *Maynooth Philosophical Papers* 2007. Interestingly, themes touched upon by Stein in her essay are also touched upon by several of the authors of the articles that are presented and collected here. Thus Stein's essay is a very fitting inclusion in this issue.

Finally, it remains for me to offer my sincere thanks to each of the authors for their contributions. Though the whole is greater than the sum of the parts, the parts are needed. Thanks, therefore, to one and all.



Dr Cyril McDonnell
Series Editor

Introduction

The artistic output of Damien Hirst, especially his most recent work, the jewel encrusted ‘Skull’ makes sure that Nietzsche’s ‘unbidden’ guest remains somewhat within Western consciousness, despite the best efforts of modernity to exorcise the prospect of mortality. The theme of death is of course well inserted within the philosophical tradition. Plato writes in the *Phaedo*: ‘The one aim of those who practice philosophy in the proper manner is to practice for dying and death’,² and for Schopenhauer ‘death is the inspiration for philosophy’.³ Much of the efforts of the philosophers in the face of death has been to ‘overcome’ the emotions associated with it, especially fear, terror, disgust. One thinks of the efforts of Epicurus to free his fellow man from the fears of death and of the punishments of the afterlife through a calm acceptance of ultimate dissolution at death. The Stoic insistence that we should remember that we are mortal, the *memento mori* as an ethical rejoinder to the hedonism of *carpe diem*, re-emerges in renaissance and early modern times. From the history of philosophy of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries two philosophical movements were particularly influential in associating the acceptance of finitude with authentic human existence, namely existentialism and phenomenology. The Heideggerean *Sein zum Tode* alluded to in the title of this article in some ways represents a secularisation of the Kierkegaardian conception of death as the decisive moment in life, the *dies natalis* of the Christian. For both the reality of death as an immanent personal possibility forces one to become authentic, no longer to be merely content to ‘enjoy the ride’ but to accept that it has a terminus. Where thought diverges is over the possibility of turning being-towards-death into being-towards-transcendence. Death for some becomes the clearest indication of the absurdity of human existence, of the anguish of our ‘dual consciousness’ (Camus) of our desire for duration and our certainty of termination. It can be transmuted through *jouissance* and the excesses of postmodernism. Or, of course, for most of the western tradition, it becomes the turning point (κρίσις, separation and judgment) which opens up to the beyond (ἐπέκεινα).

The fusion between the Greek and Roman philosophical tradition and that of Judaeo-Christianity gave rise to a series of sustained reflections on the nature of the human condition. Christian soteriology, however, means that the Ancient tragic sense of life is overcome in a hope-filled vision of ultimate redemption, indeed to the extent as seen in the Eriugenian doctrine of the return of everything to God and so nothing will be lost. Many Christian authors saw themselves as continuing the philosophical tradition and completing it in the sense of providing a series of definitive answers to the questions which troubled the ancients.

I

The Twelfth-Century Background

It might seem an extraordinary thing to state but it seems that ‘Death’ was invented in the twelfth century, i.e., that particular Western idea, linked to

judgment and the afterlife, and which persists into modern times as a dominant theme in Western culture.⁴ It seems that Death as an abstract entity, or anthropomorphic representation, is absent from the High Middle Ages. He (?) begins to take form from the twelfth century onwards and becomes the centre of a rich artistic and literary production. Why the twelfth century? The suggestion by some is that the emergence of a wealthy and comfortable middle class, rich in material possessions, means an increased or heightened awareness of how much there is to be lost through death. There is also a reaction to this increased hedonism and materialism on the part of the monks whose chosen way of life runs counter to this new ‘consumer society’. There is the development of the *contemptus mundi* literature with its pitiless depiction of the misery and sordidness of human life; of the final judgment and the sufferings of the damned. Life is depicted as an existential drama where the individual is presented with a fundamental choice between salvation or damnation. There is an acute phenomenological description of the stark choices which faces every free individual on the road of life and where the ultimate turning point is the moment of death, a moment which is so important and yet unknown. The impetus for these monastic writers is a situation where if there is too much love of life that people need to be reminded of death, that ‘Et in Arcadia ego’. The solution is conversion, penitence and that distance from the world so beloved of Neoplatonism. On a more negative side, the obsession with the macabre already mentioned by Plato in the *Republic*⁵ where Leontius has a compulsion to look at corpses, emerges in vernacular literature, sermons and artistic depictions. One could also mention the fact that the dead themselves are often on show to remind the living of what they will become, a spectacle which still fascinates today in the crypts of some Capuchin monasteries in Italy.

In Twelfth-Century literature, one could mention the importance of texts such as the *De contemptu mundi* and that ‘best seller’ the *De miseria humane conditionis* of Innocent III. There is the beginning of that long tradition of texts around the theme of the *artes moriendi*, of preparing for a good death (and familiar to many Irish people up to recently, especially as related to the practice of the ‘Nine First Fridays’).⁶ An important poem in French is the *Vers de la Mort* of Hélinant of Froidmont and composed between 1194 and 1197 and which is seen as being one of the sources of that later medieval tradition of the Dance of Death.⁷ Hélinant develops his work around three themes: death is near at hand; the need to distance oneself from worldly goods; man’s destiny in the next life. As the opening lines put it:

Morz, toi suelent cremir li sage:
 Or queurt chascuns a son damage:
 Qui n’i puet avenir s’i rue.
 Por ce ai changié mon corage
 Et ai laissé et gieu et rage:

(O Death, those who are wise have always feared you
 Now, however, everyone rushes to their destruction
 And if they do not meet you at the pass, you gallop towards them.
 For this reason, I changed my ways
 And left behind pleasure and madness ...)

Unlike later authors, Hélinant does not indulge in the macabre; he appeals to the mind and the emotions of his reader/ hearer and not to fear or disgust.⁸ This,

rather, is something which comes to the fore with the experience of the Black Death in the fourteenth century. Hélinant is also important since he is one of the candidates suggested for the authorship of the poem which is our concern here, the *Vado mori*.

II The *Vado mori*

While doing some research on the manuscripts of the *Lectura on the Sentences* of Richard FitzRalph in the Vatican Library, I came across some verses at the end of the manuscript Ottoboni 679 which is of English origin and was written towards the end of the fourteenth century. The verses came at the end of the manuscript and together with some other lines of poetry or sayings which seemed to be jottings by the scribe in order to fill up the parchment which was left blank when he had finished copying his text. Each line (at least in the first part of the poem) begins and ends with the statement 'Vado mori' ('I am going to die') and hence the generic name for this type of poem which, while having its origins in the twelfth century, continued as a literary type up to the sixteenth century. The interest for the medievalist lies in the fact that the poem presents a list of various characters who come forward, state who they are, what their function in life was, and that they are going to die. Thus we have a depiction of the various types in medieval society and how they were viewed by a contemporary writer. Each personage is assigned a verse in which they lament their own death as something which is inevitable and before which they are impotent, no matter how important they were in life. The repetition of the phrase 'vado mori' is suggestive of a sombre litany, with funereal rhythms, characterised by melancholy and resignation.

The *Vado mori* genre was very popular, existing in many versions and surviving in over 50 manuscripts scattered throughout Europe.⁹ The surviving versions all differ in terms of the number of verses and the personalities which are listed, reflecting contemporary changes in taste, politics, and social status and indeed how much space a scribe wished to fill! All would seem to derive from a common source with verses being added to the poem and changed or deleted over the course of time. It is rather ironic that we have here a real death of the author in the post-modern sense. With each stage of re-committing the text to parchment, the scribe feels empowered to adapt the poem to his own needs and without respecting any authorship or ownership of the text. Each writing of the text is a re-reading and re-interpretation without any felt need to subscribe to a master narrative.

As I examined some more manuscripts while carrying out research in the Bodleian Library at Oxford, I discovered some other texts from roughly the same time (fourteenth century) and background (Anglo-French). This allowed me to establish the basis for a text which might have circulated at the time but which does not survive in any one manuscript. The possibility of such a text was strengthened when I came across the editions of similar texts by Eleanor Prescott Hammond and published in 1911.¹⁰ The text which is given below, it is hoped, is close to the original text which seems to date from the thirteenth century. What is clear from the text is that it is relatively optimistic and, unlike the Dance of Death, does not see Death as triumphing; rather, ultimately it is Death who must die since it is Life who wins in the end. Peter Dronke¹¹ was of the opinion that the style of

the opening verses with their unusual internal rhyming would suggest a date before 1200. Helmut Rosenfeld tended to go for a later date of the thirteenth century¹² and pointed out that the origin of the expression ‘*Vado mori*’ was undoubtedly French, ‘*je vais mourir*’. Indeed, as will be seen below, one of the lines appears in French.¹³

In the versions of the text which appear in the works of Rosenfeld¹⁴ and Donà,¹⁵ only the *vado mori* verses appear without the introductory lines. Both are relatively late versions. In the version printed below the *Vado mori* verses are counterbalanced by *Vive Deo* verses (in some manuscripts they are laid out in parallel columns). The opening lines or exordium begin with a statement of the anguish which arises at the thought of death for no matter what time it is, that moment could be one’s last (vv. 2-3). The impartiality of death is acknowledged, its function as ‘leveller’ bringing down both rich and poor since all must die (vv. 4-9). The various persons then appear on stage, to state who they are and then to exit. Here we have *Papa* (Pope); *Rex* (King); *Presul* (Prelate); *Miles* (Warrior); *Monachus* (Monk); *Legista* (Lawyer); *Placitor* (Advocate); *Praedicator* (Preacher); *Logician* (Logicus); *Medicus* (Doctor); *Cantor* (Singer); *Sapiens* (Intellectual); *Dives* (Rich man); *Cultor* (Country man); *Burgensis* (City man); *Nauta* (Sailor); *Pincerna* (Butler); *Pauper* (Poor man); *Elemosinarius* (Benefactor). Much has been made of the hierarchical nature of medieval society and more written of its caste-like structure riven with inequalities based upon birth. Only the Church, it seems, offered the possibility for a poor man to rise to the very top. It is rarely pointed out, however, that the structure of medieval society while being generally static and conservative (like most societies) did not have much by way of a religious justification. In fact, the message of Christianity was strongly egalitarian and favoured community of goods rather than private property. In this regard, religious communities were meant to oppose the secular arrangement of society, the latter being temporal whereas the life of the monk was seen as an anticipation of an eternal situation.

Each reader will find verses which amuse, strike a chord, or are memorable for one reason or another. The student of philosophy might pause at the fate of the logician: ‘A logician, I learned how to defeat others; Death quickly defeated me.’ The intellectual (*Sapiens*) finds that his knowledge is of no use when Death turns him into a fool (*me reddit fatuum mors seva*). The image of the cantor is a nice one where Death plays him a tune in a descending scale soh, fa, mi.



And the butler with a fondness for wine finds that death has served him up poison! In general, however, the tone, is not bitter or over-critical. The advice given to each character in the second section (*Vive Deo*) is hortative rather than condemnatory and is ultimately hopeful.

III Conclusion

In the medical school of Salerno, verses were also used in order to help future doctors remember their schooling. However, the author of the verses had to conclude that no matter how much medical learning one had, there was no cure for death: *Contra vim mortis, non est medicamen in hortis*. In our text the *Medicus* can find no cure and instead vomits up the medicine which his doctors prescribe. In the second section we find that the *Medicus* is advised one cannot ultimately rely upon medical science (*fallax est ars medicine*). The hopes of many then and now have always been that medical science might ultimately prolong our lives so as to ultimately exclude death. Clearly we have not reached that point and even if we had there is nothing to guarantee that we might not become such a problem to ourselves that death might still be chosen by some over living. The challenge remains to integrate the realisation of our radical finitude into our lives, to no longer take life for granted. If philosophy is to be a reflection on life, then it must also be a reflection on death and perhaps even some sort of guide as we all make our way to that *iter tenebrosum*.

NOTES

¹ I wish to thank Prof. Pietro B. Rossi for his help in sourcing some materials in Italian and to Prof. James McEvoy who read the Latin text and made some helpful suggestions. Thanks are due also to Prof. Peter Dronke who provided some very useful information as well as suggesting the arrangement of the opening lines of the poem.

² *Phaedo* 64A..

³ *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, I, §54; II, c. 4.

⁴ See Carlo Donà, *Hélinant de Froidmont, I Versi della Morte* (Parma: Pratiche Editrici, 1988), p. 7. See, also, the classic work by Phillipe Ariès, *L'homme devant la mort* (Paris: du Seuil, 1977).

⁵ *Republic*, IV: 440a: ‘I once heard something that I trust. Leontius, the son of Aglaion, was going up for the Piraeus under the outside of the North Wall when he noticed corpses lying by the public executioner. He desired to look, but at the same time he was disgusted and made himself turn away; and for a while he struggled and covered his face. But finally, overpowered by the desire, he opened his eyes wide, ran towards the corpses, and said: “Look, you damned wretches, take your fill of the fair sight.”’

⁶ See Mary Catherine O’Connor, *The Art of Dying Well: the Development of the Ars Moriendi* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1942).

⁷ See Helmut Rosenfeld, *Die mittelalterliche Totentanz, Entstehung, Entwicklung, Bedeutung* (Cologne–Graz, 1968). An excellent website and source for materials on this and related matters is to be found at <<http://www.totentanz-online.de/totentanz.php>> [accessed 9 September 2007].

⁸ This is also apparent from his ‘dispassionate’ treatment of the ineffectuality of death from what he writes in his *De cognitione sui*: *Clamat nobis certissima mors, et hora mortis incertissima, mortem semper ad omnium pendere oculos, et ideo semper habendam ab omnibus prae oculis, semperque meditandam, sicut scriptum est in Ecclesiastico [7:36]: Memorare novissima tua et in aeternum non peccabis ...* (PL 212, col 730) with the *novissima* being death, judgment, hell or heaven.

⁹ See Hans Walther, *Initia carminum ac versuum medii aevi posterioris Latinorum*, 2nd edn (Göttingen: Vandenhoech & Ruprecht, 1969).

¹⁰ E. P. Hammond, 'Latin Texts of the Dance of Death', *Modern Philology*, 8 (1911), 399–410.

¹¹ In a letter to me, dated 21.12.03.

¹² Helmut Rosenfeld, 'Vadomori', *Zeitschrift für Deutsches Altertum*, 124 (1995), 257–264 (p. 257): 'Zu den verbreitetsten Vergänglichkeitsdichtungen des Mittelalters gehören die lateinischen 'Vadomori'-Gedichte. Sie sind seit dem 13. Jahrhundert in ganz Europa anzutreffen und in zahllosen Sammelhandschriften überliefert, vielfach dabei variiert im Bestand und in der Anordnung der Verse, und sie wurden in den Volkssprachen angeeignet.'

¹³ We should remember that the French-speaking world at the time includes the Norman nobility of England, Wales, Ireland, Southern Italy and Sicily. The 'placitor hundredis et comitatu' mentioned in connection with the phrase in French is an advocate within the Anglo-Norman legal system of the Shires.

¹⁴ Helmut Rosenfeld, 'Das Aberaltaicher Vadomori-Gedicht von 1446 und Peter von Rosenheim', *Mittellateinisches Jahrbuch*, 2 (1965), 190–204; the Latin text is to be found on pp. 195–198, and has a considerably amplified number of personages.

¹⁵ See Carlo Donà, *Hélinant de Froidmont, I Versi della Morte* (Parma: Pratiche Editrici, 1988), Appendice 1, pp. 102–113. This version is completely different from our text except for three verses, *Rex*, *Miles*, *Medicus* and *Logicus* which are identical.

‘Vado mori’¹

C = St John’s College, Cambridge, E6 (109), (XV) ff. 39v-40v

O¹ = St John’s College, Oxford, 58 (XV), f. 1 (92v)

O² = Oxford, Bodleian 423, f. 354v (mutilated)

V = Vaticana, Ottoboni 679, ff. 206rb-206vb

Editions:

B¹ = *Vado Mori*, *British Library*, Landsdown 397 (edited by Eleanor Prescott Hammond, 1911)

B² = *Lamentatio*, *British Library*, Royal 8 B VI (edited by Eleanor Prescott Hammond, 1911)

<Lamentatio morituri>

Dum mortem recolo² – crescit michi causa doloris,

Nam cunctis horis – mors venit ecce cito³.

Equa lege⁴ rapit⁵ – mors magnos atque pusillos,

Nunc hos nunc illos⁶ – precipitando capit⁷.

Pauperis et regis – communis lex moriendi,

Dat causam⁸ flendi – si bene scripta legis.

Gustato pomo – nullus transit sine morte,

Heu misera sorte⁹ – labitur omnis homo!

Vado mori Papa qui iussu regna subegi,

Mors michi regna tulit heccine: vado mori.

Vado mori rex sum. Quid honor? Quid gloria regni?

Est via mors hominis regia: vado mori.

Vado mori presul cleri populique lucerna,

Qui fueram validus, languo¹⁰: vado mori.

Vado mori miles certamine victor belli¹¹,

Mortem non didici vincere: vado mori.

Vado mori monachus mundi moriturus¹² amor,
Vt¹³ moriatur amor dic¹⁴ michi: vade¹⁵ mori.
Vado mori legista fui defensor egenis¹⁶,
Causidicus causas desero¹⁷: vado mori.

Vado mori placitor hundredis et comitatu,
(*Tor^at*) *e force or faut*, langueo: vado mori.¹⁸
Vado mori populo verbum vite predicare
Qui solitus fueram, langueo: vado mori.¹⁹
Vado mori logicus²⁰ aliis concludere noui,
Conclisit breviter mors michi: vado mori.
Vado mori medicus medicamine non redimendus²¹,
Quicquid agant medici²² respuo²³: vado mori.²⁴
Vado mori cantor frangens²⁵ que²⁶ notas modulando,
Ffrangit²⁷ mors modulos sol fa mi: vado mori²⁸.
Vado mori sapiens michi nil sapientia prodest²⁹,
Me reddit fatuum mors seva: vado mori³⁰.
Vado mori diues ad quid michi copia rerum³¹?
Cum mortem nequeat³² pellere: vado mori.
Vado mori cultor collegi farris acervos³³
Quos ego pro vili computo³⁴: vado mori.
Vado mori burgensis eram censum cumulaui,
Omnia³⁵ mors adimit impia: vado mori.
Vado mori nauta fluctus sulcans³⁶ remigando,

Mors proram pertransit nauifrago³⁷: vado mori.
Vado mori pincerna³⁸ fuit vinum michi dulce,
Propinat michi mors fellea³⁹: vado mori⁴⁰.
Vado mori pauper pro Christo cuncta relinquens⁴¹,
Hunc sequar⁴² evitans omnia: vado mori⁴³.
Vado mori pietate potens benefactor egenis,
Hoc mors non resecat hac dote: vado mori.
Nulli mors partis concludens singula fine⁴⁴,
Omnia transibunt preter amare Deum.⁴⁵

Responsio vite⁴⁶

Mors genus omne terit – sequitur sed vita futura,
Celica futura – nunc sibi finis erit⁴⁷.

Contendunt mutuo⁴⁸ – sibi⁴⁹ mors et vita duello⁵⁰,
Ista suo bello – se parat illa suo⁵¹.
Mors vitam resecat⁵² – sternit pro tempore fortem,
Set tandem mortem – vita probata secat.
Ad certamen eo – litis lis certat amori,
Dicis vado mori – consulo⁵³ vive Deo

Vive Deo papa nunc mammona sit dea pape,
Desine papa dee vivere: vive Deo.
Vive Deo per quem rex es re nulla adorna,
Rex rege, Rex Deus est, rex homo: vive Deo.
Vive Deo presul cuius vice stas in honore,
Fforma⁵⁴ gregi⁵⁵ datus es sta bene: vive Deo.
Vive Deo miles pacem patriamque tuere,
Fforcior⁵⁶ in fidei robore: vive Deo.
Vive Deo monachus quid voveris ipse memento⁵⁷,
Christo commoriens in cruce: vive Deo.
Vive Deo legista Dei lex vera probatur,
Ne te lex perdat perdita: vive Deo.
Vive Deo placitor iustas sustenta querelas⁵⁸,
Munera que cecant respue: vive Deo.
Vive Deo predicans qui vivere tu docuisti,
Cunctaque peccata spernere: vive Deo.
Vive Deo logice premissas fac tibi vite,
Ne conclusa tibi sit via: vive Deo.
Vive Deo medice fallax est ars medicine,
Est medicina Deus optima: vive Deo.
Vive Deo cantor sit vox bene consona laudi,
Mens bene concordet sic⁵⁹ bene: vive Deo.

Vive Deo sapiens que sursum sunt sapiendo,
 Desipit⁶⁰ hic mundus tu sape: vive Deo.
 Vive Deo dives opibus simul et pietate,
 Pauper eget fer opem, da sibi⁶¹: vive Deo.
 Vive Deo cultor manus utiliter colat agrum,
 Religione Dei mens pia: vive Deo.
 Vive Deo seu burgensis seu civius in urbe,
 Vt sis⁶² viva Dei mansio: vive Deo.
 Vive Deo nauta quia⁶³ multos obruit unda,
 Fforsan⁶⁴ erit subita mors tua: vive Deo.
 Vive Deo pincerna Dei sunt pocula⁶⁵ vina,
 Ffons⁶⁶ vius Deus est hunc bibe: vive Deo
 Vive Deo pauper tam re quam mente beata,
 Nil ut habens⁶⁷ et habens⁶⁸ omnia: vive Deo.
 Vive Deo carus rapiaris in eius amorem,
 Tota fer in Domini⁶⁹ viscera: vive Deo.
 Vive Deo bene vivis ei si vivis amori,
 Non potes ante Deum vivere preter eum.

THE LAMENT OF ONE WHO IS TO DIE⁷⁰

When I think about death, a reason for sorrow grows within me
 For at all times of the day look how quickly death comes!
 With impartiality death siezes the great and small
 Hurrying to grab now these, now those.
 A common law of dying applies to the king and pauper
 Such a well-written law gives cause for tears.
 Once the apple was eaten, no one passes on without death
 Alas what a miserable end touches everyman!

Pope

I am going to die, the Pope who subdued kings with a command
 Are not these then the kingdoms that death takes from me? *Vado mori*.

King

I am going to die, I am the King, what an honour and glory to the kingdom
Death is the royal road for humankind. *Vado mori*.

Bishop

I am going to die, a Bishop, the lamp for the clergy and people
I who was strong now am weak. *Vado mori*.

Knight

I am going to die, I am a Knight, in conflict the winner of the war
I was not able to deny victory to Death. *Vado mori*.

Monk

I am going to die, I am a monk, one dead to love of this world
So that this love may die, say to me, "you will die".

Lawyer

I am going to die, a lawyer, I was a defender of the poor
An advocate, I have lost my case. *Vado mori*.

Magistrate

I am going to die, a magistrate at the county court
Authority and force now fail me and I am weak. *Vado mori*.

Preacher

I am going to die, I who preached the word of life to the people
I who was solid now am weak. *Vado mori*.

Logician

I am going to die, a Logician I knew how to silence others
Death has quickly silenced me. *Vado mori*.

Doctor

I am going to die, a Doctor who is not saved by medicine
Whatever the doctors prepare I throw it up. *Vado mori*.

Cantor

I am going to die, a Cantor who shortened notes and made tunes
Death shortens my tune, soh, fa, mi. *Vado mori*.

Intellectual

I am going to die, an Intellectual, my knowledge is no good to me
Uncouth Death makes a fool of me. *Vado mori*.

Rich Man

I am going to die, a Rich Man, what good are riches to me now?

Death is impossible to defeat. *Vado mori*.

Farmer

I am going to die, a Farmer I gathered together heaps of wheat

Now I regard this with contempt. *Vado mori*.

Burgess

I am going to die, a Burgess I collected taxes

Merciless Death carries off everything. *Vado mori*.

Sailor

I am going to die, a Sailor sailing over the waves by rowing

Death holes the hull, sinking the ship. *Vado mori*.

Butler

I am going to die, a Butler, wine was sweet to me

Now Death serves me poison. *Vado mori*.

Pauper

I am going to die, a Pauper, I left everything behind for Christ

Follow him, avoiding all. *Vado mori*.

Benefactor

I am going to die, from mercy a rich Benefactor of the needy

This endowment Death does not divide up. *Vado mori*.

Without a part of its own, Death finishes each part in the end

Everything will pass away besides loving God.

THE RESPONSE OF LIFE

Death terrifies all but in a future life

A heavenly life, there will be an end to Death.

Death and Life faced each other in a war between them

One in battle the equal of the other.

Death halted Life and threw it to the ground

But Life, having been tested, wounded Death.
The outcome of the struggle was found in favour of love.
You say 'Vado mori', I say to you 'Vive Deo'.

Pope

Live in God, Pope to whom wealth is god
If you want to live, leave wealth behind, *Vive Deo*.

King

Live in God, he through whom you are King, without riches
Is King to a king, God the King is man the king, *Vive Deo*.

Bishop

Live in God, Bishop in whose place you stand in honour
You are given as an example to your flock, stand well, *Vive Deo*.

Knight

Live in God, Knight, protect peace and your country
Strong in the assurance of your faith, *Vive Deo*.

Monk

Live in God, Monk, what you vowed remember
With Christ hanging on the cross, *Vive Deo*.

Lawyer

Live in God, Lawyer, the law of God is proved the true law
Do not let the sinful law condemn you, *Vive Deo*.

Judge

Live in God, Judge, by finding for the just causes
Spit out the bribes which blind, *Vive Deo*.

Preacher

Live in God, you who by preaching have taught to live
By despising all sins, *Vive Deo*.

Logician

Live in God, Logician, make for yourself the premises of life
Lest the way be concluded for you, *Vive Deo*.

Doctor

Live in God, Doctor, medical skill is fallible
God is the best medicine, *Vive Deo*.

Cantor

Live in God, Cantor, let your voice be harmonious with praise
And so your mind will also be well-tuned, *Vive Deo*.

Intellectual

Live in God, Intellectual, it is the things above which should be known
Know that this world deceives, *Vive Deo*.

Rich Man

Live in God, Rich Man, both goods and mercy,
The poor man needs, help him, *Vive Deo*.

Farmer

Live in God, Farmer, the hand usefully cultivates a field
A pious mind the religion of God, *Vive Deo*.

Burgess

Live in God, be you a burgess or a citizen in the town
So that you will be the living dwelling of God, *Vive Deo*.

Sailor

Live in God, Sailor, since the waves sink many ships
It may be your death will be soon, *Vive Deo*.

Butler

Live in God, Butler, the wine sacks are God's
God is the living spring, drink this, *Vive Deo*.

Pauper

Live in God, Pauper, blessed in goods and mind
While having nothing, you have everything, *Vive Deo*.

Benefactor

Live in God, Dear Friend, be caught up in his love
Confide everything to the depths of God, *Vive Deo*.

Live in God, you live in him if you live in love
You cannot live before God without love, *Vive Deo*.

* * *

- ¹ Nota istos versus pro optimis mors C; Conclusio mortis pro omni genere hominum dicens Vado mori O²
- ² recolo B²: meditor B¹
- ³ Dum mortem – ecce cito: om. CO¹V O²: cito: citor B¹
- ⁴ The term ‘aeque lege’ (with impartiality) is to be found in Horace, Odes III, 1 which also deals with the subject of death.
- ⁵ rapit: capit B²
- ⁶ ‘Nunc hos accepit nunc illos’, Virgil *Aeneid* VI, 313-316, referring to Charon.
- ⁷ capit: rapit B²
- ⁸ causam: eam B²
- ⁹ sorte CO¹V; morte O²
- ¹⁰ langueo CO¹: langue V
- ¹¹: certamine victor belli C: belli certamine victor O¹V
- ¹² moriturus *codd. recte mortuus?*
- ¹³ Vt: O¹: Et C
- ¹⁴ dic O¹V: hic CO²
- ¹⁵ vade O¹V: vado CO²
- ¹⁶ egenis CO¹V; egenus O²
- ¹⁷ desero B²O²:defero CO¹V
- ¹⁸ line is left as a lacuna in V; tmria et fortitudo nunc deficient – langueo vado mori *in marg.* B²; perhaps this is a legal term or common expression, given that French was the language used in the law courts.
- ¹⁹ Vado mori placitor – Qui solitus fueram langueo vado mori *om.* O¹O²
- ²⁰ logicus CO¹V; O² places the verses on medicus here and the logicus follows.
- ²¹ redimendus CO¹V; revolendus O²
- ²² medici: medi O¹
- ²³ respuo: reppuo B²
- ²⁴ B¹ breaks at this
- ²⁵ frangens B²O¹: fuagensCV:
- ²⁶ que om. B²
- ²⁷ frangit O: FfuagitCV
- ²⁸ Ffrangit mors – modulando sol fa mi: In lacrimas muto; cantica: B²; Vado mori cantor ... vado mori *om.* B¹O¹O²;
- ²⁹ michi nil sapientia prodest CO¹V; doctor nunc cesso docere O²
- ³⁰ Me reddit fatuum mors seu a vado mori CO¹V; Qui facundus eram non oro vado mori O²
- ³¹ At this point a large tear begins in O², leaving only some of the text to the right of the line.
- ³² nequeat B¹O¹V: nequiat O²; nequeant B²
- ³³ acervos CO¹V: a cervos O²
- ³⁴ computo: deputo B²
- ³⁵ omnia V: diuina C; dimua O¹
- ³⁶ sulcans: fulcans B²
- ³⁷ Mors proram pertransit – nauifrago: Mors proram perimit nauifraga B²; a variant in the margin of B2 reads:
Vado mori nauta fluctus qui fulco marinos
Naufragor auferetur anchora vado mori
See E. P. Hammond, ‘Latin Texts of the Dance of Death’, *Modern Philology*, 8 (1911), 399–410 (p. 8).
- ³⁸ Pincerna (butler)
- ³⁹ fuit michi ... fellea: fui potum michi fellis, Hora proponandi vltima B²; fellea: follea V
- ⁴⁰ Vado mori burgensis ... Propinat michi mors fellea vado mori *om.* B¹CO²
- ⁴¹ pro Christo cuncta reliquens O¹V: quem pauper Christus amauit C; Christus pauper amauit O². In O² the manuscript has been mutilated and what remains of the lines is as follows:
... -nd tu nisi fimus
... mutare nequimus
... mundo totus adheres
... -a solus heres
... imo sepelitur
... -ta datur
... homo sic adnichilatur

-
- ... dum stare putatur
... et michi causa doloris
... venit ecce cito.
⁴² sequar: sequor C
⁴³ B¹ ends here
⁴⁴ Vado mori pietate ... singula fine; C has:
Te male ...
Qui subito rapuit ... isse mori
⁴⁵ Text ends here in C and there then follows a letter which ends on 40v: Explicit vna epistola
vnius Italici ad alterum ...
⁴⁶ Responsio vite V; om. O¹
⁴⁷ Mors – erit B²; om. B¹CO¹ O²V. The editor of B2 arranged the text so that the ‘vado mori’
couplet is followed immediately by the ‘vive deo’ couplet.
⁴⁸ mutuo: vario B²
⁴⁹ sibi O¹: igitur V
⁵⁰ A reference to the Easter sequence *Victimae Paschali Laudes*: Mors et vita duello confluxere
mirando; Dux Vitae mortuus, Regnat vivus.
⁵¹ Ista suo bello – se parat illa suo: illa suo bello separat ista pio suo B²
⁵² resecat: rececat V
⁵³ consulo O¹: consule V
⁵⁴ fforma: forma O¹
⁵⁵ 1 Pet 5:3 Forma facti gregi ex animo
⁵⁶ Fforcior: Forcior O¹
⁵⁷ Vive Deo monachus – quid voveris ipse memento: Vive deo monache: quodque anueris ipse
memento B².
⁵⁸ Vive Deo placitor – iustas sustenta querelas: Vive deo rethor? iustas sustolle querelas B²
⁵⁹ sic: sit B²
⁶⁰ decipit V
⁶¹ sibi: tua B²
⁶² sis O¹: sit V
⁶³ quia: que B²
⁶⁴ Fforsan : forsan O¹
⁶⁵ pocula O¹: pocla V
⁶⁶ ffons V: fons O¹
⁶⁷ habens: heus B²
⁶⁸ habens: heus B²
⁶⁹ donum B²
⁷⁰ This rendering into English is neither ‘fair nor faithful’ but is merely intended to give an idea of
the content of the Latin original.

First Impressions Reconsidered: Some Notes on the Lévinasian Critique of Husserl

Ian Leask

ABSTRACT

This article investigates an intriguing ambivalence in Lévinas's reading(s) of Husserl's phenomenology of internal-time consciousness. The article focuses on the specific treatment of the Husserlian 'proto-impression', suggesting that one (under-appreciated) aspect of Lévinas's approach may serve to undermine, or even 'un-say', its better known counterpart.

Introduction

Given that Lévinas would eventually declare the deformalization of temporal representation to be 'the essential theme' of his research,¹ it is hardly surprising that the Husserlian analysis of time-consciousness should have received consistent critical scrutiny throughout Lévinas's oeuvre. To be sure, there is a more prominent focus upon (and explicit opposition to) Heideggerian finitude; but such focus itself seems to presuppose a regular critique of Husserl, particularly his stress on presence and re-presentation, in order to indicate a more general faultline in so much of the established phenomenological approach to temporality and temporalization.

In the notes that follow, I shall outline something of the nature of Lévinas's critique — in part, by showing something of the phenomenological alternative that he tries to offer. However, by focussing upon Lévinas's own, differing treatment(s) of the Husserlian analysis of 'proto-impression', I shall also investigate the possibility of a radically different assessment of Husserlian temporal analysis — an assessment which may well beg fundamental questions about the aforementioned Lévinasian alternative. My main concern, I should stress, is more with Lévinas's critical understanding than with the fine detail of the 'object' of that understanding: what follows, therefore, is intended as an engagement with Lévinas's engagement with Husserl, rather than an engagement with Husserl *per se*.

I

Lévinas on Husserl on Temporality

Understandably, Lévinas's principal contentions regarding temporality and temporalization have been mainly understood in terms of his trenchant opposition to Heidegger: as the title of Lévinas's first *magnum opus* already indicates, finitude should never be taken as the ultimate horizon which Heidegger himself took it to be; and, as has become so well known, Lévinas will contend that the 'immediate' overflow of the Other's face suggests a kind of structural measurelessness that is, at the very least, comparable with the Cartesian idea of infinity (whereby any idea that the knowing mind might form is always exceeded by the *ideatum* of such an idea). Furthermore, beyond the specific question of

infinity, Lévinas would devote so much of his later work, in particular, to a certain deconstruction of the Heideggerian ek-stases, depicting them as a (literally) self-centred ‘making present’ or homogenisation of temporal excess: for Lévinas, Heidegger consistently fails to respect the sheer alterity of time (principally by failing to address the question of *generation*, or generations, which it entails). Overall, for Lévinas, the Heideggerian treatment of temporality is left stunted by its fixation upon *Dasein*’s finitude.²

But what, specifically, of Husserl? Lévinas’s general comments (on the tendency, within phenomenology, towards a ‘will to presence’) may be directed mainly towards Heidegger; nonetheless, it seems that the critique of Heidegger presupposes, as a kind of armature, the critique of Husserl. More specifically, it seems that the ‘ontological imperialism’ which Lévinas condemns in Heidegger can already be found, allegedly, in Husserlian phenomenology. Thus, for Lévinas, Heidegger’s (anti-ethical) concern with Being seems, at least in part, to be the full manifestation of certain Husserlian propensities: authentic, care-full *Dasein*, concerned with the Self-Constancy of anticipatory resoluteness, is (so it seems) merely the dramatic, existential, intensification (and certainly not the contrary) of the monadic ego-pole that Husserl understands as intentional consciousness. Which is why Lévinas regularly conjoins the concern with Being and the concern with cognition: whether ontological or epistemological, so much of the previous phenomenological tradition has failed to do justice to alterity.

Husserlian intentionality, we are told, is almost archetypal in its privileging of the knowing gaze. Thus:

[Husserlian] Intelligibility, characterized by clarity (*claret*), is a total adequation of the thinker with what is thought, in the precise sense of a mastery exercised by the thinker upon what is thought in which the object’s resistance as an exterior being vanishes. This mastery is total and [...] is accomplished as a giving of meaning (*sens*): the object of representation is reducible to noemata. The intelligible is precisely what is entirely reducible to noemata [...]. Clarity is the disappearance of what could shock (*heurter*).³

Noesis always seeks to *overcome* alterity (including sensation); ‘consciousness of...’ always seeks to become the foundation of what shows itself; and so phenomenological ‘horizon’ comes to play ‘a role equivalent to the *concept* in classical idealism’.⁴ With Husserl, it seems that reflection and thematization always want to win out.

Above all, though, it is the Husserlian concern with representation (or, more specifically: re-present-ation) that betrays a kind of inner truth of phenomenology — and which returns us to the specific issue(s) of temporality (and temporalization). For just as Heideggerian ek-stases are found wanting, so their Husserlian ‘foundation’ is exposed, supposedly, as a volitional drive always to render temporal disparity present within a simultaneousness, or conjunction brought about by ‘*my grasp*’. By discovering (or re-discovering) presence as the work of consciousness, Lévinas suggests, the Husserlian ego reduces — fatefully — the time of consciousness to the consciousness of time.⁵ The ‘primordial intrigue of time’⁶ is dismissed, or at least subordinated, by the imposition of a representational frame: past and future become merely ‘retained or anticipated presents’;⁷ intentional consciousness maintains control — in terms of the present; Husserlian representation asserts its own status by positing ‘a pure present without even tangential ties with time’.⁸

For Lévinas, then, Husserlian representation seeks never to be preceded. It anticipates all surprises. It is ‘not *marked* by the past but *utilizes* it as a represented and objective element’.⁹ It denies its own enduring, its temporal succession, by converting exteriority into its noemata, thereby reducing alterity to the work of meaning-bestowing thought. (‘Such is the work’, Lévinas declares, ‘of the Husserlian *epochē*’.¹⁰) All told, the Husserlian analysis assumes that time has ‘exhausted itself (*s’épuisait*) in its way of making itself known or of conforming to the demands (*exigences*) of its manifestation’.¹¹ Hence:

The constitution of time in Husserl is also a constitution of time in terms of an already effective consciousness of presence in its disappearance and in its ‘retention’, its immanence, and its anticipation — disappearance and immanence that already imply what is to be established, without any indication being given about the privileged empirical situation to which those modes of disappearance in the past and imminence in the future would be attached.¹²

The Husserlian thinking of time is, it seems, essentially as one with its Heideggerian successor. In both, the alterity of time is forced into a Procrustean containment; future and past are never acknowledged ‘on their own terms’. Against both, Lévinas wants to highlight an alterity irreducible to any noetico-noematic correlation — ‘a lapse of time that does not return, a diachrony refractory to all synchronization’.¹³ By thinking other-wise, Lévinas claims, he might undo re-presentation and unveil a temporalization which is not *mine* and which exceeds my ‘now’: a future which can never be anticipated, and a past which was never present.

II

Lévinas on Husserl on Proto-Impression

We find some of Lévinas’s most concentrated attention to Husserlian temporality — attention which seems, initially, to unveil the founding structure of the Heideggerian ek-stases — in the analysis he provides, in *Otherwise than Being*, of the ‘absolute’ primal streaming, the realm of the proto-impression (or primal impression), which Husserl takes to be the basis of conscious life itself.¹⁴ Needless to say, this apparent self-temporalizing of the acts of consciousness is regarded with deep suspicion: although such a primal realm might seem beyond objectification, beyond intentionality, and beyond (or beneath) self-coincidence, its ‘true status’, Lévinas maintains, is more to do with guaranteeing the prestige of autarchic consciousness.

For Lévinas, it is not just that ‘the primal impression is [...] not *impressed* without consciousness’¹⁵ — a point which might suggest a distinction between the intrinsic nature of primal impression and the ‘secondary’ role of consciousness. It is also, and more significantly, that the intrinsic nature of primal impression is itself confirmation of the ‘hegemony of presence’ — as Lévinas would have it here, it is the absolute source and beginning of all temporal modification, the spontaneous centre which is *indifferent* to protention and retention.

As such, primal ‘streaming’ becomes, fatefully, ‘the prototype of theoretical objectification’;¹⁶ it is as if the primacy of presence is *already confirmed* by this notion of origin and creation. (Proto-impression precedes all else — even its own possibility. Its presence is *pure*.) The primal impression

might seem, ‘initially’, to be beyond intentionality — but it is always ‘fitted back in the normal order’¹⁷ and is never on ‘the hither side of the same or of the origin’.¹⁸ Accordingly, ‘the non-intentionality of the primal retention is not a loss of consciousness’¹⁹ — for ‘nothing can be produced in a clandestine way (*à l’être clandestinement*)’, ‘(n)othing enters incognito into the Same’,²⁰ ‘nothing can break the thread of consciousness’.²¹ The (negative) significance of Husserl’s analysis of internal time consciousness could hardly be greater, therefore: for Lévinas, the Husserlian interpretation of proto-impression is (nothing less than) ‘the most remarkable point’ of a philosophy ‘in which intentionality “constitutes” the universe’.²²

But just how valid is Lévinas’s contention, in *Otherwise than Being*, about this ‘remarkable point’ in Husserlian thought? Is it the case that originary impression confirms and sanctifies the domain of ‘the Same’ — and hence that it excludes the dia-chronic? Is the Husserlian analysis nothing more than the suppression of temporal alterity? Is the primal impression to be understood solely in terms of ‘autonomy’? In attempting to answer these questions, one of the most instructive texts we can consult is another penetrating, although very different, reading of *The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness* — one which Lévinas himself gives us. For, in his 1965 essay ‘Intentionality and Sensation’,²³ Lévinas reads Husserlian ‘absolute streaming’ in a way that may not quite contradict his more standard approach, but which certainly throws into question some of the central contentions just examined.²⁴

The 1965 work is designed as a general (although intensive) survey of the significance of intentionality’s corporeal ‘basis’ — and, not surprisingly, given this context, the issue of the proto-impression is at the centre of Lévinas’s treatment. However, here, unlike in *Otherwise than Being*, he wants to stress that the *Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness*, overall, is in no sense ‘the deduction or construction of time starting out from an atemporal gaze (*d’un regard intemporal*) embracing the proto-impression and its pale modifications’.²⁵ On the contrary, Husserl finds the proto-impression — pure of all ideality, ‘nonideality *par excellence*’²⁶ — to be more like a kind of immanent disjunction ‘within’ consciousness. (As he also puts this: ‘An accentuated, living, absolutely new instant — the proto-impression — already deviates from that needlepoint (*pointe d’aiguille*) where it matures (*mûrit*) absolutely *present*’.²⁷)

The proto-impression is, fundamentally, *non-coincidence*, ‘presenting’ itself only in terms of its own departure or deviation from the present. Its very ‘structure’ is divergence — so that the proto-impression ‘in itself’ is always already beyond itself, always already the event of ‘dephasing’. The proto-impression is not ‘in sequence’; it is more a transgression of continuity, a fundamental *lapse*. Meanwhile (if this is not too inappropriate a term), the protention and retention which ‘attach’ to any proto-impressional instant are never adequate to, and are overflowed by, sensational flux: adequation, presence and recuperation are ‘defeated’, so to speak.²⁸ There is a kind of constitutive gap, Lévinas finds, between sensation-event and proto-impression: the former both precedes *and* succeeds the latter; this, in turn, seems to found the ‘diachrony stronger (*plus forte*) than structural synchronism’²⁹ that Lévinas finds at the core of Husserlian embodiment.

Furthermore, and perhaps most significantly of all, Lévinas’s reading of genesis and ‘origin’ here seems (again, *contra* the reading in *Otherwise than Being*) to undermine rather than bolster the autonomy of the subject: absolute

primal streaming can certainly be seen as source, beginning, or creation, as *genesis spontanea*; yet, far from this confirming the primacy of presence and theoretical objectification, what arises ‘in’ this origin only serves to confirm *alterity*, the un-present-able. There is, Lévinas insists, ‘unforeseeable novelty’ arising within this origin; any fulfilment is ‘beyond all conjecture, all expectation, all germination, and all continuity, and consequently is wholly passivity (*toute passivité*), receptivity of an “other” penetrating the same.’³⁰ (This, in turn, shows ‘the essence of all thought as the reserve of a fullness that escapes (*d’une plénitude qui échappe*)’.³¹) Alterity ‘is’ at the core of the self’s temporalization: deep within immanence, within apparently ‘indistinct sedimentation and thick alluvium’,³² we find nothing less than *transcendence* (understood here literally, as ‘a passing over, an overstepping’, as a ‘going-beyond-itself-within-itself’, as ‘the zero point of representation [...] [that] is beyond this zero’³³). The answer to Lévinas’s central question in the essay ‘Intentionality and Sensation’ — ‘Is there diachrony within intentionality?’³⁴ — is, therefore, an unambiguous ‘Yes’: as he will conclude, it is this ‘divergence from’ that is nothing less than ‘(t)he mystery of intentionality’.³⁵

III Conclusion

The issues raised by this disparity in Lévinas’s approaches to the Husserlian proto-impression have huge significance. For one thing — and, admittedly, this may seem a banal truism — we are reminded of the immense and fecund richness of Husserl’s analysis. But, beyond this fairly obvious point, we are also confronted with the possibility — unveiled *by Lévinas himself* — that Husserl may well counter the Lévinasian critique of his phenomenology, by ‘thinking other-wise’ in a way that not only differs from but also profoundly challenges Lévinas. As Lévinas shows us, Husserl uncovers a ‘structural’ alterity *within* the self, a ‘knotted intrigue’ that is not the product or outcome or effect of the Other. Husserl, that is to say, raises the possibility that — ‘prior’ to encounter with the Other, as such — we already encounter alterity within ‘our own’ temporalization. Thus, before any delineation of the Lévinasian Other, Husserl may have already uncovered an irreducible otherness that resists synchronization within noetico-noematic correlation — but, in this case, the irreducible *self*-otherness of our ‘absolute subjectivity’. It seems that Husserl (read through Lévinas’s more generous 1965 appraisal) may show us that the consciousness of time neither overwhelms nor suppresses the time of consciousness; rather, he shows that the consciousness of time is ‘always already’ the time of consciousness — and so, is ‘always already’ lapse, dispersion, iteration, alterity.³⁶

NOTES

¹ Emmanuel Lévinas, ‘The Other, Utopia, and Justice’, in *Is it Righteous To Be? Interviews with Emmanuel Lévinas*, ed. by Jill Robbins (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), pp. 200–210 (p. 209); ‘L’autre, utopie et justice’, in *Autrement*, (102, Nov. 1988), pp. 50–60 (p. 59). Hereafter OUI, with the translation’s pagination preceding the original’s.

² I have treated some of these issues elsewhere. See Ian Leask, 'Finitude: The Final Frontier? Heidegger and Lévinas on Death', in *At the Heart of Education. School Chaplaincy & Pastoral Care*, ed. by James Norman (Dublin: Veritas, 2004), pp. 239–250, and 'Contra Fundamental Ontology: the Centrality of the Heidegger-Critique in Lévinas's Phenomenology', *Maynooth Philosophical Papers*, 2, (Maynooth, 2004), pp. 51–58.

³ Emmanuel Lévinas, *Totality and Infinity*, trans. by Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), pp. 123–24; *Totalité et infini. Essai sur l'extériorité* (Phaenomenologica 8) (La Haye: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961), pp. 96–97. Henceforth, abbreviated as TI, with the English translation's pagination preceding the original's.

⁴ TI, p. 44–5:15.

⁵ See Emmanuel Lévinas, 'Diachrony and Representation', in *Entre Nous. On Thinking-of-the-Other*, trans. by Michael B. Smith and Barbara Harshay (London: Athlone, 1998), pp. 159–177 (p. 163); 'Diachronie et Representation', in *Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa*, 55, 4, (1985), 85–98 (p. 88).

⁶ *Ibid.*, p.164:88-89.

⁷ Emmanuel Lévinas, 'From the One to the Other: Transcendence and Time', in *Entre Nous*, pp. 133–154 (p.138); 'De l'un à l'autre. Transcendance et temps', *Archivo de Filosofia*, 51 1-3 (1983), 21–38 (p. 25). Hereafter abbreviated as FOTO, with the translation's pagination preceding the original's.

⁸ TI, p. 125:98

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ FOTO, p. 138:25

¹² OUJ, p. 209:59

¹³ Emmanuel Lévinas, *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*, trans. by Alphonso Lingis (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1981), p. 9; *Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1974), p.17. Hereafter abbreviated as OB, with the translation's pagination preceding the original's.

¹⁴ See Husserl, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness*, ed. Martin Heidegger, trans. J.S.Churchill (Indiana UP, 1964), *passim*.

¹⁵ OB, p. 33:41

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ OB, p. 33:42

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ OB, p. 34:43

²⁰ OB, p. 33:42

²¹ OB, p. 34:43

²² OB, p. 33:42

²³ Emmanuel Lévinas, 'Intentionality and Sensation', in E. Lévinas, *Discovering Existence with Husserl*, trans. by R. Cohen & M. Smith (Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1998), pp.135–150; 'Intentionalité et sensation', in *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, 71–72, fasc. 1-2, (1965), pp. 34–54. Hereafter abbreviated as IS, with the translation's pagination preceding the original's.

²⁴ IS has received surprisingly little scholarly attention. For an exception to the general rule, see Rudolf Bernet, 'Lévinas's Critique of Husserl', in *The Cambridge Companion to Lévinas*, ed. by Simon Critchley & Robert Bernasconi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 82–99, esp. pp. 91–93.

²⁵ IS, p. 142:44

²⁶ IS, p. 144:46

²⁷ IS, p. 142:43

²⁸ See IS, p. 144:46–47.

²⁹ IS, p. 148:52

³⁰ IS, p. 144:46–47

³¹ IS, p. 145:47

³² IS, p. 149:53

³³ IS, p. 148:51

³⁴ IS, p. 143:45

³⁵ IS, p. 145:47

³⁶ I should like to express my thanks to Dr James Mc Guirk for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

Red, Riotous and Wrong: Is the Secondary Quality Analogy an Unpalatable Doctrine?

Harry McCauley

I

In recent analytical moral theory a debate has been raging for some time now about the merits and demerits of realism about morality. Two main schools of moral realists have emerged on opposite sides of the Atlantic. In the US various naturalist realists — prominent amongst them, the so-called Cornell realists — have canvassed various versions of the view that moral properties are real and are either reducible to, or are constituted out of natural properties.¹ In the UK moral realism has taken a somewhat different direction. More under the thrall of Moore and the ‘open question argument’ than the Americans, the British realists have tended to reject the naturalist path and have tried to find some way in which to defend a conception of moral properties in which such properties are seen as objective and mind-independent, without thereby being reduced, to or constituted out of natural properties.²

Hanging over and haunting this British project is, of course, the spectre of Moorean ‘non-natural properties’, and British realists find themselves constantly confronted with one or other version of a constraint succinctly expressed by Panayot Butchvarov as follows: ‘The alleged reality of ethical properties must be understood in a straightforward, familiar and unsurprising fashion. What it is for something to be real or exist is perhaps the deepest philosophical problem, but one does realism in ethics no service by resting it on highly dubious and unclear solutions to that problem.’³

One way in which a number of British realists have attempted to meet Butchvarov’s constraint has been to canvass for an analogy between moral properties and secondary qualities like colours. The overall argument runs somewhat as follows: surely secondary qualities, like colours, are straightforward, familiar and unsurprising properties of things and surely it would also be agreed that such qualities are real, mind-independent features of the world, i.e. features whose existence does not depend on their being actually perceived. At the same time it would be agreed that there is, nevertheless, an extent to which such qualities also depend *in some way* on the presence of perceivers with appropriate perceptual systems. As a key supporter of the analogy, John McDowell, put it: ‘(colours) [...] are not brutally there — not there independently of our sensibility — though [...] this does not prevent us from supposing that they are there independently of any particular [...] experience of them.’⁴ Secondary qualities, it is maintained, exhibit an intriguing combination of objective and subjective dimensions which enable us at one and the same time, to concede that they are undoubtedly part of the furniture of the world, while also conceding that the presence of observers like us, with perceptual faculties like ours, is necessary for some aspects of that furniture to be ‘lit up’.⁵

Reflecting on this intriguing combination of subjectivity and objectivity, philosophers like McDowell, Wiggins and McNaughton have argued that we

might locate moral properties epistemologically and ontologically by analogy with secondary qualities. When we say that persons or their actions are just or unjust, fair or unfair, courageous or cowardly or, more generally, right or wrong, good or evil we are, on the one hand, claiming that what we are saying is true — i.e. that things really are as we say they are — while, on the other, we would readily concede that terms like good and bad, right and wrong, just and unjust etc. only have application in an order of things in which persons with moral sensibilities like ours are present. McNaughton puts this combination of claims neatly as follows: ‘[just as ...] our mode of perception does not create colours, but makes us able to see them’ so also ‘moral properties are not to be thought of as created by [us] [...] but as real properties which can only be experienced by beings who share a whole network of responses with us.’⁶

One final aspect of the secondary quality analogy (hereafter the SQA) merits a brief mention. By locating a key pole of morality in a wide-ranging conception of human responsiveness, the supporters of the SQA also hope to capture one of the most widely shared positions in contemporary analytical moral theory: internalism i.e. the view that moral considerations are intrinsically action-guiding. Realists who construe moral considerations as beliefs have well-known and widely discussed problems squaring their belief-based realisms with internalism, and, given the widespread support for internalism, such problems are often seen as bad news for those realists. However, supporters of the SQA, by basing morality partly in a conception of human responsiveness which straddles the cognitive and emotive sides of our being, seem well placed to meet the constraints of internalism. If our moral responses engage with how we feel, as well as what we believe, then room for internalism seems clearly available.

The SQA, or ‘sensibility’ account of moral properties thus holds many attractions for realists and it has been widely discussed over the past three decades. However, it has not gone unchallenged. It has been challenged by realists like Jonathan Dancy, who maintain that it does not deliver a sufficiently robust realism, and by anti-realists like Simon Blackburn, who has claimed that there are so many disanalogies between moral properties and secondary qualities that the view lacks plausibility.⁷ Under the weight of the opposition, overt support for the SQA has waned in recent years, though there remain those who still see promise in the interesting combination of features which it offers to realists.⁸

II

In a recent paper on the analogy, Elijah Millgram has offered a novel criticism of the SQA, claiming that support for it carries with it potentially unpalatable and embarrassing implications. Millgram’s claim is that the SQA carries with it the implication that moral familiarity would breed, if not moral contempt, then, at the very least, a growing moral indifference to evil. Millgram argues that this conclusion follows from a combination of the SQA — with its key thought that our detection of, and response to moral properties are rooted in our moral sensibilities — and an alleged simple and indisputable fact about human beings and their sensibilities i.e. that the more we are exposed to this or that phenomenon, the less and less acute our responses and reactions to the phenomenon in question become — leading to a point at which we may well become indifferent to, or bored by the phenomenon in question.

Following Wiggins,⁹ Millgram takes ‘funny’ as a plausible candidate for a secondary quality and argues that while we may respond on the first, second and perhaps even on a few subsequent occasions, to the same joke by finding it riotously funny, surely by the hundredth telling the humour of the joke will have faded and we will no longer find it funny at all, will no longer react to it as we did at the outset. We may even bring ourselves to say ‘the joke isn’t funny anymore’.¹⁰ Moreover, we see nothing wrong with our responses on such occasions and we readily accept that the joke in question has — as we may put it — passed its sell-by date as far as its ‘funniness’ is concerned.

Applied to moral cases this reading of the SQA and its implications seems rather disturbing. To use Millgram’s own example: our responses to the first and second holocausts may carry with them an appropriate sense of horror and moral outrage, but what of the hundredth holocaust? Just as in the case of the joke, doesn’t the SQA suggest that we would greet that hundredth holocaust with a world-weary indifference, and perhaps without any sense of horror or moral outrage at all? Moreover, and still more disturbing, doesn’t the SQA suggest that in the holocaust case, as in the joke case, our new, jaded response is a wholly appropriate one — it seems right to say that this latest holocaust is not really wrong or evil at all, that is not the response it provokes. Thus, just as the initial funniness of the joke has faded and all but disappeared with time and familiarity, so also the wrongness or evil of the holocausts have faded and all but disappeared with time and familiarity. Just as the once riotous is no longer even funny, so also the once morally horrific is no longer even morally eyebrow raising.

It seems central to Millgram’s criticism of the SQA that he takes it that the *whole story* about moral values which supporters of the SQA can tell is a story entirely in terms of the *actual* reactions which moral phenomena *actually* elicit from us on a given occasion. It is true that he briefly adverts to McDowell’s talk of such responses being also *merited*¹¹, but he goes on to construe this claim of McDowell’s in terms of the agent’s responses to his/her moral sensibility and claims that an iteration of the initial attack on the SQA would deal with any such ‘higher-order’ move to defend it.¹² Millgram’s key point is that the SQA implies not just that we will *in fact* respond to similar moral evils etc with diminishing outrage, but that such a response is to be deemed *wholly appropriate* — a conclusion which he thinks is surely unpalatable. He concludes as follows:

It is widely thought to be a feature of our moral concepts that repeated application of such a concept in like circumstances is correct in *all* instances, if correct in *any* [...]. It is a feature of our moral sensibilities that *their* repeated exercise in like circumstances gives rise to reactions that are not constant but systematically changing. It follows either that a secondary quality account of value is not a suitable account of moral or ethical value, or that it is a radically revisionist one.¹³

Now I do not wish to engage here in a wide-ranging defence of the SQA — it is liable to a wide range of difficulties and problems¹⁴ — but merely to argue that, as generally presented, it has available to it resources which can protect it from the kind of attack mounted by Millgram. I will confine myself here to making four points — one very general point about how to understand the SQA and three more specific points about those dimensions of the theoretical setting of the SQA which provide the needed protection against Millgram’s attack.

III

(i) *How to Understand the SQA*

Twice in the course of his brief paper Millgram suggests that supporters of the SQA take it that moral values either ‘are’, or ‘are to be understood as’ secondary qualities.¹⁵ This suggestion of an equation of values with secondary qualities blurs a key point being made by the supporters of the SQA. What they argue for is an *analogy* between values and secondary qualities — an analogy intended to throw some light on the epistemological and ontological status of moral properties. To say that A and B are analogous is not to say that they can be equated with each other, but that there are interesting similarities to be noted in how we are to understand them and place them in our scheme of things. In all such claims there is a recognition that there are also differences to be noted — often differences of some significance. John McDowell e.g. is quick to point to such significant differences in his account of the SQA and to highlight the point that the analogy is intended as just that: an analogy.¹⁶ Thus, in discussing the SQA it is of vital importance to recognise that its supporters see secondary qualities only as offering us a useful epistemic and ontological model — a model which — suitably adapted — can then be applied to values and can throw some light on the epistemic and ontological dimensions of our thoughts about values. The SQA is not to be understood as offering us an exact parallel which will hold up all along the line. As Richard Norman recently put it, ‘the value of the secondary quality analogy is that it enables us to hold on to the idea of *objectivity* alongside an acceptance of a certain kind of anthropomorphism.’¹⁷ Millgram, in his account of the SQA, does not pay sufficient attention to this general point about how to take the analogy and this colours his presentation of it and his discussion of its implications.

(ii) *The SQA and the Language of ‘Reactions’*

In addition to this misleading general setting of his discussion, Millgram also seems inclined to understand the SQA account of our detection of, and response to moral situations in an overly mechanical manner. The word he most often uses in his discussion of it is ‘reactions’, and in doing so he conveys the impression that supporters of the SQA are inclined to see our moral responses as simply involving the moral agent in reacting to certain features of the world in the way in which it might be reasonable to suggest that colour perception involves such relatively simple reactions. Now it is, of course, true that supporters of the SQA do occasionally talk in such a manner, but by and large their claims are made in terms of our possessing a complex form of moral sensibility which enables and facilitates us to respond appropriately to the demands which we find being made on us in this or that moral situation. These moral responses are not simply reactions in the way we might think of colour perceptions as involving such reactions, rather do they have their place in a more wide-ranging and sophisticated account of what it is for a moral agent to respond to a moral demand.

Thus e.g. David Wiggins explicitly draws a distinction between mere reactions to features of the world and the complex and sophisticated manner in which supporters of the SQA understand the sensibility side of the analogy story. Over time, Wiggins notes, our capacities to respond are developed and fine-tuned in a way which takes the SQA account some way beyond any simple

feature/reaction story. Thus he notes: ‘Finer perceptions can both intensify and refine responses. Intenser responses can further heighten and refine perceptions. And more and more refined responses can lead to further and finer and more variegated or more intense responses *and* perceptions.’¹⁸

So any suggestion that the SQA is committed to some rather simple feature/reaction account of moral knowledge or moral responsiveness oversimplifies the case regularly made and emphasised by the leading supporters of versions of the analogy. In her recent over-view of the moral realism debate, Margaret Little highlights this side of the SQA: ‘just as one needs a certain sensory apparatus to see red things, one needs a certain emotional and motivational palette to see cruel or kind things [...], [but the moral] sensibility in question is not understood as some mechanistic disposition to react. It is instead a practice of responding that is partly constituted by judgments of appropriateness.’¹⁹

(iii) Appropriate Responses and Appropriate Agents

Mention of ‘appropriateness’ brings me to a further dimension of the SQA. Supporters of the SQA do not confine the refinements of their theory to a offering a more complex account of the way in which we should understand what a moral sensibility is like — they also regularly emphasise the point that it is only persons of a certain sort who should be taken as paradigms of what a *moral agent* should be like, and thus as exhibiting the appropriate sort of moral sensibility. For John McDowell, with his Aristotelian leanings, this comes down to the point that it is only virtuous persons who are, in the end, to be taken as possessors of appropriate moral sensibilities and thus as reliable detectors of moral value. In both ‘Virtue and Reason’ and ‘Are moral requirements hypothetical imperatives?’ McDowell emphasises these points. In the latter, stressing the importance to moral perception of an appropriate process of character formation, he notes that ‘in moral upbringing what one learns is [...] to see situations in a special light’ and in the former he says, focusing specifically on the moral actions of a virtuous agent, that a ‘*kind person* has a reliable sensitivity to a certain sort of requirement that situations impose on behaviour [...]. The sensitivity is, we might say, a sort of perceptual capacity.’²⁰ Similar thoughts are present in Wiggins’s comments in the later sections of his paper ‘A Sensible Subjectivism?’.

These thoughts may be applied to Millgram’s remarks about jokes and holocausts. As far as jokes are concerned, while we might agree with Millgram that being ‘an occasion for laughter’ is certainly connected with ‘what it is to be funny’, surely we would balk at his simple equation of the two.²¹ Surely Wiggins is nearer the mark when, in offering a more developed notion of our comic sensibility, he says that ‘when we dispute whether x is really funny, there is a whole wealth of considerations and explanations we can adduce [...]. We can do a little better than say that the funny is that which makes people laugh’.²² A person with a developed and sophisticated sense of humour — i.e. an appropriate comic agent — may well agree with Millgram that repetitions of trivial ‘knock-knock’ jokes may bore, fade and finally entirely lose their humour, while resisting the suggestion that such fading is also a feature of the comic moments of a play by Oscar Wilde. As Wiggins notes: ‘A feeble jest or infantile practical joke does not deserve to be grouped with the class of things that a *true judge* would find genuinely funny’.²³

Similarly, to those with sophisticated and well-developed moral sensibilities — i.e. virtuous persons — there is little likelihood that the hundredth holocaust will be greeted with a ‘ho-hum’ as Millgram suggests.²⁴ Moral agents with adequately developed sensibilities can be generally relied upon to respond *appropriately* to the demands of the situations in which they find themselves. These responses are, on the SQA, viewed as informed and developed responses to features of those situations - features which are rooted in the moral situations involved and which merit or demand a certain sort of response from appropriately moralised agents. As McDowell puts it: ‘One cannot share a virtuous person’s view of a situation in which it seems to him that virtue requires some action, but see no reason to act in that way.’²⁵ To a virtuous person it is not just the detection of the evil characteristics of holocausts which trigger off the demand for a condemnatory response, it is also a matter of the type of person a virtuous person is. The response has its roots in the virtuous person’s moral sensibility and for as long as that person’s moral sensibility remains intact the response will be the same and will not tend to fade with repetition.

(iv) Repetitions of Jokes and Holocausts

The suggestion that moral situations, like jokes, may be subject to such repetition brings me to my final comment on Millgram’s criticism of the SQA. Jokes — particularly trivial ‘knock-knock’ jokes — may easily lend themselves to the sort of repetition which Millgram suggests will lead to the evaporation of their funniness. However, is the same true with regard to moral situations like holocausts? More specifically, would those who canvass for the SQA be likely to think it true?

The leading supporters of the SQA would be inclined to offer a negative reply to this question. As supporters of the SQA are generally particularists they would surely be inclined to the view that moral situations do not repeat themselves in the way which Millgram’s criticism requires. They resist the suggestion that morality can be codified and are inclined — on that account — to reject the claim Millgram makes that the application of a moral concept ‘is correct in all situations if correct in any’.²⁶ Wiggins, e.g., explicitly queries the applicability here of supervenience — one of the concepts upon which Millgram hangs his case at this point.²⁷

McDowell is perhaps the most ardent supporter of the particularist side of the SQA story. Time and again he rejects the idea that morality is a matter of applying concepts in a rule governed manner, always in the same way to situations which repeat themselves with sufficient clarity to licence such codifiability. True to his Aristotelian roots he sees virtuous agents not as agents who have learned how to apply a set of rules over a range of cases, but as agents who, through appropriate character formation, have developed a sensitivity to the salient features of moral situations which enables them to respond to such situations on a case-by-case basis. In ‘Virtue and reason’ he puts the point directly: ‘Occasion by occasion, one knows what to do, if one does, not by applying universal principles but by being a certain kind of person: one who sees situations in a certain distinctive way.’²⁸ If asked how such a person would proceed in dealing with moral questions, McDowell is equally forthcoming: ‘It is by virtue of his seeing this particular fact rather than that one as the salient fact

about the situation that he is moved to act by this concern rather than that one. The perception of saliences is the shape taken here by the appreciation of particular cases.²⁹

From such a perspective it is the vista of fading responses to a succession of holocausts which begins to fade. For the particularist the very idea that even simple moral situations could repeat themselves in the manner of ‘knock-knock’ jokes is a non-starter — not to mention the suggestion that complex moral situations like holocausts could do so. In the absence of such moral repetitions Millgram’s final point about the general applicability of moral concepts and the alleged fickleness of human responses also loses its force.

IV Conclusion

All in all, then, Millgram’s case against the SQA requires for its success not only a somewhat misleading presentation of the overall role of the analogy, but also the ignoring of a range of features which are part and parcel of the theoretical setting internal to which the analogy is generally set out and defended. The supporters of the SQA make much of the complexity of the notion of a moral sensibility and specifically reject the idea that it implies a simple feature/reaction capacity. They also make much of the idea that it is the complex and developed sensibilities of moral agents who have been appropriately educated — virtuous agents — which are in question and, finally, they tend to be particularists and thus to reject the idea that moral situations repeat themselves and can be codified in the way Millgram’s account would require. With a proper appreciation that the SQA is intended only as an analogy, and with these additional features of its theoretical setting in place, the SQA — whatever its other difficulties — does not carry the unpalatable implications Millgram attributes to it.

NOTES

¹ The most prominent US moral realists are Nicholas Sturgeon, Richard Boyd, Peter Railton and David Brink. For a discussion of their work see, e.g., Alexander Miller, *An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics* (Oxford: Polity Press, 2003), chapters 8 and 9.

² See part 2 of Margaret Little’s ‘Recent Work on Moral Realism’, in *Philosophical Books*, 35 (1994), 225–233.

³ Panayot Butchvarov, *Skepticism in Ethics* (Indiana University Press, 1989), p. 4.

⁴ John McDowell, ‘Values and Secondary Qualities’, in J. McDowell, *Mind, Value and Reality* (Harvard University Press, 1998), pp. 131–150 (p. 146).

⁵ When it comes to *moral* realism, these moves enable supporters of the analogy to recognise that in any talk of a ‘moral reality’ the notion of ‘reality’ must be understood as crucially involving moral agents. As David McNaughton puts it, the very idea of a moral realism which left moral agents out of the picture would be completely implausible. See D. McNaughton, *Moral Vision* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988), p.94.

⁶ McNaughton, p. 95.

⁷ See Jonathan Dancy, ‘Two conceptions of moral realism’, in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Supplementary Volume 60 (1986), pp. 167–86; and Simon Blackburn, ‘Errors and the

phenomenology of value' in his *Essays in Quasi-realism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 149–165.

⁸ See, e.g., James Rachels, 'Introduction', in *Ethical Theory: The Question of Objectivity*, Vol. 1, ed. by J. Rachels (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 1–18 (p.15); Richard Norman, 'Making sense of moral realism', in *Philosophical Investigations*, 20 (1997), 117–135; and Peter Sandøe, 'The Perceptual Paradigm of Moral Epistemology', in *The Danish Yearbook of Philosophy*, 27 (1992), pp. 45-71.

⁹ David Wiggins, 'A Sensible Subjectivism?', in D. Wiggins, *Need, Values, Truth* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), pp. 185–214 (p. 195).

¹⁰ Elijah Millgram, 'Moral Values and Secondary Qualities', *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 36 (1999), 253–55 (p. 254).

¹¹ See McDowell, p. 143.

¹² Millgram, p. 254.

¹³ Millgram, p. 255.

¹⁴ For an influential and wide-ranging assault on the SQA, see David Sosa, 'Pathetic Ethics', in *Arguing about Metaethics*, ed. by Andrew Fisher and Simon Kirchin (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 241–284.

¹⁵ Millgram, pp. 253 and 254 respectively.

¹⁶ McDowell, pp.138 and 143.

¹⁷ Richard Norman, p. 131.

¹⁸ Wiggins, p. 196. McNaughton has some interesting things to say on this point in his discussion of a person's gradual appropriation of a musical sensibility which enables a proper appreciation of jazz. See *Moral Vision*, p. 58.

¹⁹ Little, pp. 227–228.

²⁰ Both papers appear in McDowell's collection *Mind, Value and Reality*, and the quotations are from that book, pp. 85 and 51 respectively.

²¹ Millgram, p. 253.

²² Wiggins, p. 195.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 193.

²⁴ Millgram, p. 254.

²⁵ McDowell, *Mind, Value and Reality*, p. 90.

²⁶ Millgram, p. 255.

²⁷ See Wiggins, p. 197.

²⁸ J. McDowell, 'Virtue and Reason' in McDowell, *Mind, Value and Reality*, pp. 50–73 (p. 73).

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

Understanding and Assessing Heidegger's Topic in Phenomenology in Light of His Appropriation of Dilthey's Hermeneutic Manner of Thinking

Cyril McDonnell

ABSTRACT

This paper analyses Heidegger's controversial advancement of Husserl's idea of philosophy and phenomenological research towards 'the Being-Question' and its relation to 'Dasein'. It concentrates on Heidegger's elision of Dilthey and Husserl's different concepts of 'Descriptive Psychology' in his 1925 Summer Semester lecture-course, with Husserl's concept losing out in the competition, as background to the formulation of 'the Being-Question' in *Being and Time* (1927). It argues that Heidegger establishes his own position within phenomenology on the basis of a partial appropriation of Dilthey's hermeneutical manner of thinking, an appropriation that was later radically called into question by Lévinas on Diltheyan-hermeneutical-philosophical grounds.

Introduction

Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) is generally regarded as one of the most important thinkers of the twentieth century. Heidegger is also regarded, in particular, as one of the most influential figures of the new phenomenological movement in philosophy that was inaugurated in Germany by Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) at the turn of the twentieth century and which spread rapidly throughout Europe and further field in the first half of that century. Yet, despite this prominence, agreement has not been reached about what Heidegger's topic in philosophy exactly is,¹ or about the precise nature and actual extent of the influence that Husserl's phenomenological manner of thinking had upon Heidegger's 'path of thinking' (*Denkweg*) about 'the question of the meaning of Being' (*die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein*), more often abbreviated by Heidegger as simply 'the Being-question' (*die Seinsfrage*), Heidegger's famously self-declared topic of research in philosophy and phenomenological research in his unfinished essay *Being and Time* (1927).² Two years prior to the publication of *Being and Time*, however, Heidegger, in his 1925 Summer Semester lecture-course delivered at Marburg University, remarks to his students that one should look towards Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911), and not to Husserl, to find the origins of the topic in philosophy and phenomenological research with which he is concerned, for, in Heidegger's estimation,

As superior his analyses in the particular certainly are, Husserl does not advance beyond Dilthey. However, at least as I [Heidegger] see it, my guess is that even though Dilthey did not raise the question of [the meaning of] being and did not even have the means to do so, the tendency to do so was alive in him.³

In this article I want to take seriously Heidegger's indication to his students that whilst Husserl's phenomenological analyses are of little use to him in his own effort 'to raise anew (*wiederholen*) the question of the meaning of Being',⁴ Dilthey's manner of thinking certainly is, even if Dilthey himself did not deploy his energies in that direction. The relation of Heidegger's 'way of thinking' about

‘the Being-Question’ both to Dilthey’s hermeneutic manner of thinking and to Husserl’s phenomenological manner of thinking, nevertheless, is much more intricate than that as intimated by Heidegger to his students in his 1925 lectures, for, in this article I will argue that Heidegger uses, at least *implicitly*, central features of Dilthey’s hermeneutic method of enquiry, in particular Dilthey’s interest in the experience of language, in order to *correct* Husserl’s unphenomenological manner of reflection whilst advancing Dilthey’s hermeneutic towards ‘the question of the meaning of Being’, notwithstanding Heidegger’s highly controversial and repeated claim throughout his career in philosophy that this issue had been left ‘unthought’ (*ungedacht*) by *Husserl* in phenomenology and phenomenological research.⁵ In other words, Heidegger’s development of phenomenology towards ‘the question of the meaning of Being’ and its relation to *Dasein* is better understood less in terms of a philosophical dialogue (*Auseinandersetzung*) between him and Husserl, as both professed by Heidegger in various places and re-iterated by several critics in recent commentary on the Husserl-Heidegger philosophical relationship, and more in terms of an appropriation of Dilthey’s hermeneutic manner of thinking, just as Heidegger himself intimates in his 1925 lectures but without elaborating upon — an appropriation of Dilthey’s manner of thinking, however, that was later to be radically called into question by Lévinas on Diltheyan hermeneutic-philosophical grounds, or so shall I argue in the concluding section of this article. Hence the title which is also the argument of this article: ‘Understanding and Assessing Heidegger’s Topic in Phenomenology in Light of His Appropriation of Dilthey’s Hermeneutic Manner of Thinking’.

I

Heidegger’s Elision of Dilthey and Husserl’s Concepts of Descriptive Psychology

In his 1925 lectures Heidegger suggests to his students that there is an ‘inner kinship’ between Dilthey’s manner of thinking in his 1894 Berlin Academy Essay ‘Ideas towards a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology’ and Husserl’s descriptive-psychological analyses in the two Volumes of his *Logical Investigations* (1900-1901).⁶ There is, however, no ‘inner kinship’ between Dilthey’s analysis of human experiences and Husserl’s analyses. In ‘Ideas towards a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology’, Dilthey attempts to describe and analyze human experiences from the point of view of their structural totality and inherent historical (and linguistic) depth-dimension.⁷ Thus plays, poems and novels, as well as State laws, social systems, art, music, economies, philosophies and religions, all document and articulate, in Dilthey’s eyes, something meaningful about the historically evolving nature of man’s self-understanding that is never always complete but always partially unfolding in and through history and life itself, and yet, always belonging to a greater whole of understanding of the kind of being that we ourselves are.⁸ Thus Dilthey saw his work (after Kant) in terms of a ‘Critique of Historical Reason’.⁹ In the *Logical Investigations* Husserl analyses the experiences of a normative logical consciousness *as such* — the ‘life’ of an abstract (ahistorical) logical consciousness *as such* — and seeks intuitively verifiable descriptions of essential and invariant *a priori* features of logical acts of reasoning.¹⁰ Husserl learned his descriptive method not from Dilthey, but from

Franz Brentano (1838–1917) when attending the latter’s lectures on ‘Descriptive Psychology’ at Vienna University from 1884 to 1886.¹¹ It is true, then, that both Dilthey and Husserl (and Brentano of the Vienna period) call their work ‘descriptive psychology’, as Heidegger instructs his students in his 1925 lectures, but identity in terms is not equivalent to identity in concepts.¹² Behind the terminological agreement that exists between Dilthey and Husserl (and Brentano) on ‘Descriptive Psychology’ there are real and major substantial disagreements in concepts of ‘Descriptive Psychology’. Which method of ‘descriptive psychology’ that is being appealed to and defended by Heidegger in the development of his own thought towards ‘the question of the meaning of Being’, therefore, is not just of nominal significance but of philosophical-conceptual significance as well. In effect, I will argue that what occurs in the 1925 lectures is an elision by Heidegger of Dilthey and Husserl’s concepts of descriptive psychology, with Husserl’s concept losing out in the competition. Before addressing this matter in Heidegger’s thinking, then, it will be useful to note firstly and briefly some of the salient features of Brentano’s descriptive method that were so influential in the development of Husserl’s thought, before examining Dilthey’s descriptive method and Heidegger’s subsequent fusion of both methods of ‘descriptive psychology’ in the elaboration of his own topic of research in philosophy and hermeneutical-phenomenological research: ‘the question of the meaning of Being’.

By the time Husserl attended Brentano’s lectures from 1884 to 1886 in Vienna, Brentano had begun to apply his new descriptive-psychological method of analysis, which he had devised some ten years earlier in his unfinished study *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (1874),¹³ to the task of clarifying the meaning of concepts employed in the normative disciplines of Logic, Ethics and Aesthetics.¹⁴ This task, of course, was not the original function of descriptive psychology. Rather, in *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, the main task that Brentano set for descriptive psychology was to clarify the meaning of concepts for the science of psychology, or, more precisely, the meaning of two central terms used in current scientific debate, namely, ‘physical phenomenon’ and ‘psychical phenomenon’.¹⁵ This clarification was necessary for Brentano because, in his view, there existed much ‘confusion’ among scientists over the meaning of these terms and ‘neither agreement nor complete clarity has been achieved regarding the delimitation of the two classes’.¹⁶ Thus Brentano informs us that he found ‘no unanimity among psychologists’ about the meaning of these basic terms for their science.¹⁷ ‘And even important psychologists’, Brentano further remarks, ‘may be hard pressed to defend themselves against the charge of self-contradiction’ in the way in which they used and understood the meaning of these terms.¹⁸ This ‘lack of agreement’, coupled with ‘misuse’, ‘confusion’, and ‘self-contradiction’ by some eminent scientists concerning the meaning of the physical and the psychical, was, in Brentano’s estimation, impeding the evolution of the natural sciences in general, especially physics, and the budding new science of psychology in particular, which Brentano now considers as ‘the crowning pinnacle’ of the natural sciences, that is to say, as ‘the science of the future’.¹⁹ Since Brentano, however, could not settle the dispute about the meaning of these terms among psychologists and physicists by appealing to any well-founded theory elaborated in natural science, nor resolve this difficulty by drawing upon any debatable meaning which these terms may have enjoyed in any particular philosophical or historical understanding of the physical and the psychical, his only alternative was to check the meaning of these terms against the facts of

experience itself.²⁰ And that meant for Brentano, now following Locke's approach, against the experience of 'physical phenomena' given to outer perceptual-sense experience and the experience of the ability of consciousness to reflect upon itself and to have itself, 'psychical phenomena' (i.e., its own psychical-act experiences), as a content for reflection in inner perception.²¹ After the domain of each of these two basic classes of phenomena, presented *via* outer and inner perception respectively, had been appropriately demarcated and the meaning of the terms 'physical phenomenon' and 'psychical phenomenon' clearly agreed, the ensuing task of the natural science of psychology, so Brentano believed, would be to explain, using the method of the natural sciences, how such 'psychical phenomena' or 'psychical-act experiences' (and their immediate objects) came into existence and went out of existence for that 'mentally active subject'. Thus Brentano drew a sharp distinction within the science of empirical psychology between what he called 'Descriptive Psychology' and 'Genetic Psychology'.²² 'Genetic Psychology' is the natural-scientific part of the science of empirical psychology. Its main task is to explain, through observation, hypotheses and experimentation, how the phenomena of immediate consciousness really and truly exist when we are not immediately aware of them, e.g., colours (physical phenomena) as light-waves (or light-particles), sounds as sine waves, etc., that is to say, as the theoretically constructed objects of natural science. We could say that the natural scientist begins with 'physical phenomena' (e.g. colours) only to demonstrate that this is not the way they really and truly exist (for colours exist as light waves, light particles, and are 'effects of stimuli' on the retina and in the brain etc.).²³ 'Descriptive Psychology', on the other hand, does not rely on natural-scientific theories, nor on 'outer (sense) perception', nor on hypothetical reasoning, but on 'inner perception' and direct 'intuition' of the phenomena themselves (i.e. psychical-act experiences and their objectivities).²⁴ The task of the descriptive part of psychology is to yield clear and unambiguous descriptions of the phenomena in question themselves, 'removing all misunderstanding and confusion concerning them',²⁵ that is to say, the sole aim of descriptive psychology is to clarify for use in natural science in general and for the natural science of empirical psychology in particular the meaning of the terms 'physical phenomenon' and 'psychical phenomenon'. In Brentano's scheme of things, then, though both descriptive psychology and genetic psychology constitute the natural science of empirical psychology as he understands it, in *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* descriptive psychology serves a preparatory function for empirical psychology; its task is to clarify intuitively what genetic psychology later has to explain causally.

Brentano, therefore, *never* advocated the method of the natural sciences for the descriptive part of the science of empirical psychology. Rather, Brentano held firmly to the Lockean conviction that knowledge of consciousness and its contents in descriptive psychology is to be gleaned directly (non-hypothetically) from reflection within consciousness itself.²⁶ Furthermore, Brentano was equally adamant that the descriptive part of the science of psychology sought 'truths of reason', and not truths concerning 'matters of fact'.²⁷ Only descriptions of phenomena based on 'truths of reason' and grasped 'at one stroke and without induction' can remove any possible self-contradiction or ambiguity about the meaning of the phenomena themselves in question, and that are to be later studied by natural science.²⁸ Comparatively speaking, then, descriptive psychology, like mathematics, 'is an exact science, and that in contrast, genetic psychology, in all

its determinations, is an inexact one.²⁹ From an epistemological point of view, therefore, knowledge of incorrigible, intuitively demonstrable, *a priori* features and structures that are embedded in the actual experiences of consciousness and its objectivities is sought in the ‘descriptive’ part of the science of empirical psychology. This methodological requirement Husserl also rigorously adheres to and advances in the development of his own descriptive-*eidetic*-psychological investigations, though Brentano himself, as Husserl himself later remarked, much to his own disappointment, ‘could not recognise his [Husserl’s] ideas [e.g., ‘the intuition of essences’] as the fruition of his [Brentano’s] own ideas’.³⁰ Nevertheless, this descriptive method of reflection on consciousness and *its* objectivities, i.e., on ‘intentional consciousness’³¹ is staunchly promoted by Husserl both in the *Logical Investigations*³² and in his version of Kantian transcendental idealism defended in *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book, General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology* (1913).³³

According to Brentano, then, the natural sciences, including genetic psychology (empirical psychology), concern themselves only with knowledge-claims pertaining to ‘matters of fact’, and to ‘matters of fact’ construed from a particular natural-scientific-theoretical standpoint. In this regard, the scientific method of observation by hypothesis by experimentation is simply not suited to the task of solving disagreements between psychologists and scientists over the meaning of basic concepts that are deployed in the natural science of empirical psychology. Nor is the method of the natural sciences, as Brentano later argued, capable of clarifying the meaning of concepts deployed in the normative disciplines of Logic, Ethics and Aesthetics, but descriptive *a priori* analysis of the essential features of particular psychical-act experiences, including the psychical-act experiences of normative consciousness as such, can — as Brentano proposes in his lectures on ‘descriptive psychology’ at Vienna University in the 1880s, therein developing ‘descriptive psychology’ in a direction hitherto unimagined by him in the 1870s.³⁴ In maintaining this radical distinction between ‘laws of fact’ and ‘laws of norms’ in his lectures at Vienna, however, Brentano, in effect, joins in the ‘Back to Kant’ counter-movement against naturalism, positivism and historicism that had emerged in Germany in the late nineteenth century.³⁵ And here, Husserl, with his refutation of any attempt to base the validity of logical (and ethical) laws on inductive generalisations of empirical psychology in Volume One of the *Logical Investigations* (1900) (and in other writings on logic), joins his mentor in the ‘Back to Kant’ movement too, for, as Heidegger correctly notes to his students in his 1925 lectures about Husserl’s *Logical Investigations*,

Husserl, like Brentano, showed that the laws of thought are not the laws of the psychic course of thinking but laws of what is thought; that one must distinguish between the psychic process of judgement, the act in the broadest sense, and what is judged in these acts. Distinction is made between the real intake of the acts, the judging as such, and the ideal, the content of the judgement. This *distinction between the real performance and ideal content* provides the basis for the *fundamental rejection of [naturalism in the form of logical] psychologism*.³⁶

Thus, it was at a time (from about the mid- to late 1880s) when Brentano was developing his novel idea of descriptive psychology in his Vienna lectures as an autonomous science that clarifies the foundations of concepts deployed in the normative disciplines of Logic, Ethics and Aesthetics that Husserl attended his

lectures and encountered a style of thinking and a method of questioning that had such a formative impact on Husserl's initiation into and understanding of the tasks of philosophy, as we now know and as Heidegger correctly points out to his students.

It is undoubtedly true, then, that Dilthey, Husserl and Brentano of the Vienna period, all called their work 'descriptive psychology', but this does not imply that there is an 'inner kinship' between Dilthey and Husserl's (or between Dilthey and Brentano's) concepts of descriptive psychology, as Heidegger also asserts in his 1925 lectures. The 'kinship' that does exist between Dilthey's descriptive-hermeneutic-historical method and Husserl's descriptive-scientific-eidetic method is primarily *negative* in character; both of their methods reject the applicability of the method of the natural sciences in the study of the meaning of experiences that are characteristically lived by humans: the experiences of a valid, normative logical consciousness as such being Husserl's selected topic of investigation 'for a decade' (1890–1900), culminating in his *Logical Investigations*;³⁷ the experience of 'Being as thing (*Sein als Ding*)' given to outer perceptual-sense experience and of the experience of 'Being as (conscious) experience (*Sein als Erlebnis*)' given to inner perception being the particular acts of perception that are selected for comparative descriptive-eidetic analyses by Husserl around 1907–08,³⁸ and later documented by Husserl in his (in)famous reduction of the natural standpoint to the transcendental-phenomenological-standpoint in *Ideas I* (1913); the experiences of the whole of 'life' being Dilthey's topic of investigations from about the mid-1860s to the latter's unexpected death in 1911.

Heidegger, however, believes that there is a common source to Husserl and Dilthey's concepts of descriptive psychology and it is from Brentano's 'descriptive psychology', and stresses two points to his students in his 1925 lectures. Firstly, he maintains that 'the decisive move' towards the 'idea of a descriptive psychology' that begins in Brentano's *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (1874) 'had a profound impact on Dilthey [in the 1894 Academy essay]', and secondly, he remarks that 'the truly decisive aspect of Brentano's way of questioning is to be seen in the fact that Brentano became the teacher of Husserl, the subsequent founder of phenomenological research'.³⁹ That Brentano (the descriptive psychologist) had a profound impact and influence on Husserl's initiation and formation in philosophy can not be doubted, but a glance by anyone, including Heidegger, at Brentano's idea and method of descriptive psychology and Dilthey's idea and method of descriptive psychology would reveal very different approaches to and concepts of descriptive psychology.⁴⁰ It is thus difficult to see how Heidegger could justify the claim that he does make to his students in his 1925 lectures that the idea and method of descriptive psychology first muted in *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* and developed by Brentano in his Vienna lectures in the 1880s and early 1890s — 'Brentano's way of questioning' — had any direct influence on Dilthey's idea and method of descriptive psychology sketched in his 1894 Academy essay. Dilthey's descriptive method goes in the opposite direction to Brentano's and Husserl's descriptive method.⁴¹ Unlike Brentano's (and Husserl's) descriptive method, Dilthey's method does not attempt to understand the whole of life experiences in terms of its discrete parts, i.e., as abstractable and analyzable mental events occurring, somehow, in consciousness — in his 1894 essay Dilthey famously called this latter approach 'brooding (*Grübeleien*) over oneself'.⁴² Rather, Dilthey sought to

understand and to analyse the meaning of the parts (individual experiences) in terms of the whole (of life), i.e., Dilthey sought a descriptive-hermeneutic-analytic understanding of the meaning of life itself that is historically embedded and expressed in particular life experiences themselves and in the products of such life experiences (e.g. plays, poems, cultural objects etc.) from within the overall context of their lived experience. Thus Dilthey's descriptive method seeks to understand individual life experiences from the whole of life experiences, i.e., from the entire context in which and through which such experiences are expressed, and vice versa, i.e., the whole of life that is partially expressed in such products themselves.

The influential figure lying behind Dilthey's descriptive-hermeneutic method sketched in his 1894 Academy essay, of course, is not Brentano as intimated by Heidegger in his 1925 lecture-course, but Schleiermacher as Heidegger himself indicates in a short series of public lectures which Heidegger also gave around this time in 1925, at Kassel, on 'Wilhelm Dilthey's Research and the Current Struggle for a Historical Worldview'.⁴³ In these lectures Heidegger remarks that it was 'under Schleiermacher's influence, [that] Dilthey saw knowledge within the context of the whole of life', and so, 'the 1860s were decisive [for Dilthey], not because of neo-Kantianism but because of Dilthey's tendency to understand the human condition on the basis of a total comprehension of the human being'.⁴⁴ After completing his doctoral dissertation 'De principiis ethices Schleiermacheri' in 1864, the 1860s culminated for Dilthey, as Heidegger notes, in the publication of the first part of his biography on *The Life of Schleiermacher* in 1870 (which Heidegger recommended to one of his doctoral students to read in 1918).⁴⁵ Dilthey's researches were extensive, but, as Heidegger also remarks, '(O)nly two major works appeared during his life time, and they both remained at volume one: *The Life of Schleiermacher* [1870] and *Introduction to the Human Sciences* [1883]'.⁴⁶ And other essays that were published during his life time were always, as Heidegger comments, 'preliminary, incomplete, and on the way', and 'entitled "Contributions to [...]", "Ideas Concerning [...]", "Attempts at [...]"'.⁴⁷ Indeed, it was only after Dilthey's death that these 'incomplete' essays (which had been scattered in various journals), with other unpublished essays, were collated and published in Dilthey's *Collected Works* in 1914.⁴⁸ Throughout his academic career, then, Dilthey devoted himself to developing the hermeneutic manner of thinking, both in his published and unpublished writings, and, 'especially from 1883 onwards,' as one historian of philosophy notes, 'Dilthey drew a sharp distinction between the abstractness of Kant's thought and his own concrete approach [to the whole of life]'.⁴⁹

By comparison to Dilthey, in the 1860s the influential figure lying behind Brentano's early philosophical career is not Schleiermacher, but Aristotle. In 1862 Brentano completed and published his doctoral dissertation *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle* (which Heidegger first read in 1907⁵⁰).⁵¹ This was followed by his 1866 habilitation thesis on *The Psychology of Aristotle, in Particular His Doctrine of the Active Intellect*, which was published in 1867.⁵² Thus in the 1860s Brentano had earned for himself the reputation of a young but significant Scholastic commentator on Aristotle (and Aquinas).⁵³ In the 1870s, however, Brentano turned his attention away from the Aristotelian world view, and adopted a 'modern conception' of psychology that defines its 'experiential basis' and modus operandi by way of 'the inner perception of our own psychical phenomena'.⁵⁴ In this decade, and throughout the 1880s and into the 1890s, the

dominant figure behind Brentano's philosophizing is Descartes, followed by Locke and Hume, where access to consciousness and its contents is regarded 'as peculiarly direct and certain as compared with our knowledge of anything else'.⁵⁵ Indeed, in *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (1874) Brentano now argues that we can define 'psychology', contra Aristotle and the Aristotelians, as a science 'without a soul',⁵⁶

(F)or whether or not there are souls, the fact is that there are psychical phenomena [whose existence is given and guaranteed *via* 'inner perception' as is evident from the context]. Nothing, therefore, stands in our way if we adopt the modern definition [of psychology as the science of psychical phenomena] instead of defining psychology as the science of the soul. Perhaps both are correct. The differences, which still exist between them, are that the old definition contains metaphysical presuppositions from which the modern one is free [...]. Consequently, the adoption of the modern conception simplifies our work. Furthermore, it offers an additional advantage: any exclusion of an unrelated question not only simplifies, but also reinforces the work. It shows that the results of our investigations are dependent on fewer presuppositions, and thus lends greater certainty to our convictions.⁵⁷

It is this very 'modern definition' and 'modern conception' of philosophical psychology that advances the method of inner reflection on the nature of consciousness and its objectivities that Dilthey decidedly did not adopt from the very outset of his studies in the 1860s, and throughout his career in philosophy — it being thoroughly abstract (ahistorical).⁵⁸ For Dilthey, therefore, both the dominant natural-scientific approach to the study of 'man' in empirical psychology and the modern self-reflective model of 'consciousness understanding itself' championed by Descartes, Locke, Hume, Kant, Brentano (the descriptive psychologist) and Husserl (the descriptive-eidetic psychologist) are equally inappropriate methods to be deployed in the study of the meaning of experiences that are characteristically lived by human beings and that are addressed in the 'human sciences' (*Geisteswissenschaften*).⁵⁹ Thus it is of importance to draw attention to the point, as Bambach does, that,

The term *Geisteswissenschaft(en)* is a crucial term for Dilthey [...]. The term signifies for Dilthey that group of studies dealing with the cultural spirit of humanity: history, psychology, economics, sociology, philosophy, anthropology, politics, religion, literature, and others. It is to be carefully differentiated from the term *Naturwissenschaft*, which includes all the fields in the natural sciences. The differences between these two branches of study are not merely terminological but, more fundamental, also *methodological*. Nature is 'explained,' as Dilthey puts it, but spirit is 'understood.' This difference between explanation (*Erklären*) and understanding (*Verstehen*) points to the centrality of hermeneutics for a theory of the human sciences.⁶⁰

We can thus understand why Dilthey would have been particularly impressed by *the first volume* of Husserl's *Logical Investigations*, the *Prolegomena*, when it appeared in 1900, wherein 'naturalism in the particular form of *psychologism*, specifically psychologism in the particular field of logic', as Heidegger points out to his students, is refuted,⁶¹ but less than impressed by the ensuing second volume, published in the following year in 1901, and in two parts, comprising the Six Logical Investigations — which Heidegger notes elsewhere, are 'three times as long' as volume one⁶² — wherein Husserl clarifies, through descriptive-eidetic-psychological analyses, the experiences of a (abstract, ahistorical) *normative logical consciousness as such*. Dilthey's idea of a

descriptive psychology begins with what Husserl (and Brentano) *leaves out*, namely, with the *lived* nature of human experiences themselves, and seeks a comprehensive understanding of the meaning of those experiences in the facticity of their lived, historical, social, personal, mundane and, ultimately, temporal existence. Meaning is to be found within those experiences themselves, in the context of their lived nature, and not by way of either factual-inner perception or eidetic-intuitive inspection of intentional consciousness and its contents in inner reflection as advocated by the Brentanean-Husserlian school of descriptive *a priori* psychology from about the mid-1870s onwards.

It was, therefore, in opposition to *both* the natural-scientific *and* the self-reflective model of consciousness reflecting upon itself approaches to studying the meaning of human experience that Dilthey proposed *an alternative method* of studying human experience (*Erlebnis*) for the human sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*), one that would describe and analyze, without dissecting into atomic units, the way in which human life experience expresses its own understanding of its life experience, from poetry to prose.⁶³ Thus Dilthey argued,

Because our mental life finds its fullest and most complete expression only through language, [...] explication finds completion and fullness only in the interpretation of the written testimonies of human life.⁶⁴

It was by taking this cue from Dilthey, however, that Heidegger managed to overcome ‘a main [methodological] difficulty (*eine Hauptschwierigkeit*)’ regarding how to actually conduct ‘the manner of thinking that calls itself phenomenology’, with which he tells us he struggled for many years in his early career in philosophy as he read and re-read Husserl’s texts in phenomenology from 1909 onwards and after he became Husserl’s assistant-lecturer in philosophy at Freiburg University from 1919 to 1923, ‘teaching and learning in Husserl’s proximity.’⁶⁵ Heidegger’s solution to his difficulty was as simple as it was revolutionary in comparison to *Husserl’s established way of doing phenomenology*: the way to practice ‘phenomenological seeing’, so Heidegger argues, is to hear what is expressed in the words themselves.⁶⁶ Thus in Heidegger’s Diltheyan-inspired, hermeneutic way of doing phenomenology, ‘hearing’ what is expressed in the written word must re-place, and so, dis-place ‘seeing’ that which is retrievable in and through consciousness’s reflection upon itself, i.e., Husserl’s stipulated *way of doing phenomenology*.⁶⁷ Or, perhaps more accurately speaking, for Heidegger, it is only through hearing what is expressed in the written word that seeing what is talked about is made present.⁶⁸ Hence Heidegger’s singular but characteristic hermeneutic style or ‘way of thinking’ (*Denkweg*) about his topic in philosophy and phenomenology as he goes about ‘researching’ and ‘engaging’ with what is ‘said’ and ‘written’ about ‘the meaning of Being’, but with particular reference to that which is left ‘unthought’ (*ungedacht*) by the author but nevertheless implicitly expressed in the testimony of that author’s text and inviting ‘retrieval’.⁶⁹ This is in-deed, both in theory and in practice, a generous application of Dilthey’s hermeneutic manner of thinking to issues in philosophy and phenomenological research, and to the topic of the question of the meaning of Being in particular, just as Heidegger intimates to his students in his 1925 lecture course.⁷⁰

II Hearing Replaces Seeing (Dilthey Replaces Husserl)

The following gloss by Heidegger in his 1925 lectures at Marburg University, purportedly on the theory of linguistic expression and perception elaborated by Husserl in the Sixth Logical Investigation, indicates the extent to which Heidegger, in his ‘way of thinking’, has internalised his methodological switch and adherence to Dilthey’s hermeneutic approach, for, according to Heidegger,

It is [...] a matter of fact that our simplest perceptions and constitutive states are already *expressed*, even more, are *interpreted* in a certain way. What is primary and originary here? [Heidegger rhetorically asks, and he answers.] It is not so much that we see the object and things [...] rather the reverse; we see what *one says* about the matter.⁷¹

Because Heidegger situates his commentary above directly on Husserl’s text of the *Logical Investigations*, some commentators have been led to believe — wrongly, in my opinion — that here Heidegger is unearthing and developing something embryonic in Husserl’s position of the Sixth Logical Investigation.⁷² Such is clearly not the case. What Heidegger is defending here is a version of Dilthey’s views on the way linguistic acts of meaning contain the highest step in the expression of meaning in human experience, and not Husserl’s actual position in the Sixth Logical Investigation, for whom ‘(S)ignitive acts constitute the lowest step: they possess *no fullness whatever* [my emphasis].’⁷³ In direct contrast to Husserl’s views on this matter, Dilthey argued, in his well-known triad, that all human experience (*Erlebnis*) contains implicitly some form of understanding (*Verstehen*) which in turn is completed and raised to a higher level of meaning in expression (*Ausdruck*).⁷⁴ From a Diltheyan-hermeneutic point of view, therefore, it is *not* a fact of linguistic experience, as Husserl would lead us to believe in the Sixth Logical Investigation, that linguistic acts of meaning are ‘empty-intending acts’ requiring perceptually founded objects to ‘complete’ their meaning (whatever ontological status such ‘intentional objects’ may have). It is a fact of linguistic experience, however, that the meaning and understanding of an individual (lived) experience is not ‘crossed out’ but ‘raised’ and ‘intensified’ in its meaning in its expression, be it in a word, a sentence, a poem, a play, a story, a philosophical treatise, or an object of culture etc.⁷⁵ And this, of course, can be said of and includes ‘the question of the meaning of Being’ itself because *it too*, the meaning of Being (*Sinn des Seins*), as Heidegger insists in *Being and Time*, pushing Dilthey’s manner of thinking in a direction that Dilthey himself did not go, ‘can be something unconceptualised (*unbegriffen*), but it never completely fails to be understood (*es ist nie völlig unverstanden*).’⁷⁶ That is to say, we all, as a matter of fact, have some implicit understanding what it means to be a being in Being (*Seinsverständnis*), and this ‘fact of life’, or ‘issue’ is both open to and invites hermeneutic expression and inquiry. If this is the case, then Heidegger is quite right to stress in *Being and Time* that for him, ‘(Only as [Diltheyan-hermeneutic] *phenomenology*, is *ontology* [the study of the meaning of Being] *possible*.’⁷⁷ And so, Heidegger’s argument pointedly unfolds in *Being and Time*, despite the latter’s incompleteness, that the question of the meaning of Being must be traced back to the lived experience (or ‘facticity’) of the ‘There’ (*Da*) of ‘Being’ (*Sein*), and in which one finds oneself implicated as that-which-is (*als Seiendes*) in Being with some ‘understanding of Being (*Seinsverständnis*)’.⁷⁸ In

this ‘reduction’, Heidegger clearly composes a Kierkegaardian-existentialistic rendering of Dilthey’s triad of *Erlebnis-Verstehen-Ausdruck* in terms of the expressed concern about what goes about (*es geht um*) and is at issue for *that* being’s understanding of its own being in being in *Dasein*, at the basis of his attempted retrieval of ‘the question of the meaning of Being’ in his unfinished essay of *Being and Time*.⁷⁹ And yet, this existentialistic rendering of Dilthey’s thesis is configured upon a possibility that Heidegger found inherent in Dilthey’s hermeneutic manner of thinking, and *not one* that is *discernible*, as Heidegger correctly indicates to his students in his 1925 lectures, in *Husserl’s early descriptive-eidetic-psychological analyses* of the *Logical Investigations* or in *Husserl’s later transcendental-idealist analyses* of *Ideas I* (1913) and *Ideas II* (1924).⁸⁰

III

Some Conclusions and Some Critical Assessments

According to Heidegger, the ‘understanding of Being’ that is definitive of *Dasein’s* mode of being-in-the-world differs from any understanding of Being that is gained in and through cognitive-reflection on that-which-is, or on beings as beings. In point of fact, identifying and pointing to ‘that-which-is’ (*das Seiende*) that either comes into existence or goes out of existence cannot add to or subtract from *Dasein’s* ‘understanding of Being’ (*Seinsverständnis*) because such indication presupposes *the facticity of some understanding of Being already there for Dasein*, but whose meaning has been deferred in the process. It is, therefore, both a central contention and a fundamental limit in Heidegger’s formulation and elaboration of ‘the question of the meaning of Being’ in *Being and Time* that there is ‘an understanding of Being’ that is always and already present *implicitly* in *Dasein*, the back behind of which we cannot go, i.e., that we cannot think, when addressing ‘the question of the meaning of Being’ in phenomenology and phenomenological research. Heidegger thinks that (t)his position on the facticity of *Dasein* in phenomenology and phenomenological research is unchallengeable and unquestionable, for, pointing to that-which-is or beings in *their* being, will, as noted above, *obstruct* the issue at hand, or at least it will lead to a fundamental *mis-targetting* of the issue at hand (*die Sache selbst*) that Heidegger wishes to address in his ‘Being-question’. ‘Doesn’t insistence on what is,’ Heidegger rhetorically asks in his late lecture ‘The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking’, ‘block access to what-is?’ (*Versperrt die Insistenz auf dem Beweisbaren nicht den Weg zu dem, was ist?*).⁸¹ And, of course, insistence *by us* on what is does indeed prevent access to *the way* what is, is because insistence on the being of the being of beings invariably deflects attention from the ‘(implicit) understanding of Being’ that is already presupposed as a precondition for and in any such (actual or possible) ostentation. And yet, the latter is *the way* the meaning of what-is is, that is to say, the way the meaning of what-is is lived, understood and expressed, however unconceptualised, so Heidegger insists in Diltheyan-phenomenological fashion.

For Heidegger, then, questions pertaining to the ‘understanding of Being’ and to the being of the being of beings must be kept not only distinct but also unrelated in his starting-point in philosophy and phenomenological research. The former belongs to phenomenology, just as Husserl insists, the latter remains

outside of phenomenological remit, just as Husserl also insists. The ‘understanding of Being’ and the being of the being of beings, therefore, are entirely different concepts of being in Heidegger’s philosophy. Heidegger himself clearly *recognizes* this distinction in *Being and Time*. Heidegger, in point of fact, *insists* on this distinction in *Being and Time* precisely because his ‘way of thinking’ about ‘the Being-Question’ and its relation to *Dasein* clearly requires it. Heidegger, however, does not explore this distinction any further in *Being and Time* (or in later works). Heidegger’s starting point and finishing point in philosophy and phenomenological research, therefore, remains asserted, not argued for, nor vouchsafed, and the same throughout his path of thinking about ‘the Being-Question’, namely:

Entities *are* [Heidegger’s emphasis], quite independently of the experiences by which they are disclosed, the acquaintance in which they are discovered, and the grasping in which their nature is ascertained. But [the meaning of] Being ‘is’ only in the understanding of those entities to whose Being something like an understanding of Being belongs.⁸²

In order for Heidegger to maintain this position, nevertheless, Heidegger must acknowledge, as de Boer acutely points out, *that there is* a being [small ‘b’] of the being of entities that *precedes* the Being of the understanding of Being [big ‘B’].⁸³ Heidegger does not turn to the significance of this first being of the being of entities that is not reducible to the understanding of Being of those entities deposited in *Dasein*, in his ‘path of thinking’ about ‘the Being-question’. The being of the being of entities is set aside, and not returned to in the development of Heidegger’s thought, just as it had been set aside and not returned to in the development of Husserl’s thought either. *Here* Heidegger joins Husserl (and joins Dilthey to Husserl). Recall Husserl’s famous transcendental reduction. Outside of all that we can know and actually do know about things given to outer perceptual-sense experience, there is ‘nothing’ of any intelligible or sensible nature to know ‘in itself’; there is only ‘nonsensical thought’.⁸⁴ *That* such things or entities *are* is not a matter for *phenomenology* and phenomenological *research*. Likewise, outside of the apodictic *knowledge* of the existence of a currently lived psychical-act experience (and its intentional object, if it exists) in an act of immanent perception — whose non-existence is inconceivable — lies *its* existence; but *that* such an experience exists (in its temporal facticity as Dilthey understands it) in immanent perception is not a matter for *phenomenology* and *phenomenological research* in *Husserl’s definition of phenomenology*. The facticity of individual (lived) experience is to be ignored because its meaning is not susceptible to scientific analysis and scientific generalization or to conceptual analysis in any form, in Husserl’s eidetic eyes. There can be no eidetic science of the ‘thisness’ of a particular experience here and now. And precisely because the essential features of such lived-experiences is all that counts *methodologically* in Husserl’s definition of phenomenology, the very lived nature of the particular experiences themselves in their uniqueness must be passed over and not entertained as a matter for philosophy and phenomenological research. This is what Heidegger means, influenced by his reading of Dilthey, when he emphasizes in his 1925 lectures to his students in his ‘immanent critique’ of Husserl’s philosophical starting-point that ‘the being of the intentional [acts of consciousness] [...] *gets lost precisely through them* [i.e. through *both* the eidetic and the transcendental reductions]’.⁸⁵ And yet *Heidegger himself* does not return to *this facticity* of the

life experiences in *Dasein*. That I exist, that you exist, that you die, that I die are not the concern of Heidegger's phenomenology either, but my understanding of myself in anticipation as a being-for-death (*Vorlaufen zum Tode*) is.⁸⁶ Outside of one's own actual understanding of oneself as a being-for-death, that you are murdered, or that blood-lust and domination 'exists' (not in Heidegger's sense of that term) is not the concern of *Dasein* in *Being and Time*.⁸⁷ It is at this point that Lévinas, taking up Dilthey's comprehensive perspective on a philosophy of life, raises the following critical question from within both Husserl and Heidegger's phenomenologies and their respective phenomenological researches: is not the very anonymous existence of things that are and of experiences that are a presupposition itself requiring and inviting a hermeneutic investigation? Pursuing this matter for investigation, however, would lie both beyond and outside of the dual limits which Husserl set in the transcendental reduction on the 'understanding of Being' as thing *given to outer perceptual-sense experience* and as (conscious) experience *immanently perceived*, and beyond and outside of the existential-phenomenological reduction and limit set by Heidegger on 'the understanding of Being' as *that which is hermeneutically deposited and retrievable in anxious anticipation, in the present, of one's own death in the future* in *Dasein* as the root of the 'understanding of Being' and the sole 'matter at stake' that needs to be thought *methodologically* in philosophy and phenomenological research.⁸⁸ Rather, pursuing this facticity of the 'understanding of Being' in life experiences for hermeneutic inquiry would require, *inter alia*, acknowledging the primacy of the existence of one's own fellow human being outside of any 'understanding of Being' that is *capable* of being retrieved either by way of Husserlian transcendental-phenomenological reduction to one's own actual, perceptual intentional consciousness and *its* objectivities or by way of Heideggerean analysis of *Dasein* for whom *that being's* own being *alone* is what counts in the 'understanding of Being'. And, in point of fact, Heidegger himself suggests as much to his students in his 1925 lectures, for, as Heidegger queries (rhetorically) *against* Husserl's analyses of *Ideas II* (which he had received in unpublished manuscript-form from Husserl earlier in the year)⁸⁹ and answers (rhetorically) *in favor of* a hint given by Dilthey:

How is the life of the other originally given? As an epistemological question, it is presented as the problem of how we come to know an alien consciousness. But this way of posing the question [by Husserl] is mistaken because it overlooks the fact that life is primarily *always already* life with others, a knowledge of them as fellow human beings. Yet Dilthey never pursued these questions any further. What is essential for him is that the structured context of life is acquired, and thus determined by its history.⁹⁰

Whether Heidegger is correct in his estimation that Dilthey never pursued any further the question pertaining to the significance of the existence of one's own fellow human being in 'the fact that life is *primarily always already* life with others', or not, Heidegger certainly does not and cannot press this issue any further because his existentialistic rendering of Dilthey's triad of *Erlebnis-Verstehen-Ausdruck* in terms of the expressed concern that *Dasein* has *for its own being* as that which lies at stake in *Dasein* precludes him. Nevertheless, if Heidegger, following Dilthey, is right, and if our 'understanding of Being' extends equally to the world, myself and my fellow human being, then the critical question that Lévinas raises *against* Heidegger's appropriation of Dilthey's

manner of thinking is this: how can I reach ‘an understanding of Being’ that is not mine but shareable and *therefore* for the common good of each and any understanding of Being that I can and do reach? Focusing on *Dasein* — i.e. on the awareness of the ‘There (*Da*)’ of Being (*Sein*)’, and in which one finds oneself implicated as a being in being and as a being-for-one’s-own-death — methodologically excludes *a prioristically* such an *ethical* (or ‘metaphysical’ in Lévinas’s sense) possibility within (hermeneutic) phenomenology and phenomenological research. Heidegger’s insistence in *Being and Time* on the ontic-ontological priority of ‘the understanding of Being’ in *Dasein* as that the-back-behind-of-which we cannot think, then, is itself a presupposition, an assertion that needs to be tested for its hermeneutic-phenomenological credentials. This is why Lévinas, in his work in philosophy and phenomenological research, therefore, believes it philosophically necessary to bring Dilthey’s manner of thinking back-into-step with itself, as it were, and in the direction of the ‘otherness’ of the ‘other’, in order to out-step Heidegger’s appropriation and stultification of Dilthey’s hermeneutic in the existential analytic of *Dasein* promoted in *Being and Time*.⁹¹

According to Dilthey, ‘(T)he religious thinker, the artist, and the philosopher create on the basis of lived experience.’ Seen in this light, ‘Biblical verses [that contain the expression and understanding of life experiences of the prophets] do not function here as proof’, as Lévinas points out *against* Heidegger’s ‘account’ or ‘story’ and ‘formulation’ of man’s self-understanding in the historical unfolding of ‘the Being-Question’, ‘but as testimony of a tradition and an experience.’⁹² ‘Don’t they’, therefore, Lévinas rhetorically asks, ‘have as much right as Hölderin and Trakl to be cited?’⁹³ and to be invited, in any engagement of man’s reflection on his and her self-understanding? And of course they do, if you follow Dilthey’s philosophy of life; however, if you follow Dilthey’s starting-point in philosophy — and Heidegger professes he does — here there can be no ‘science’ of man’s self-understanding, only hermeneutic ‘retrieval’ and ‘interpretation of’ the-significances-of-the-way-of-life that unfolds in and through human experiences (*Erlebnisse*) themselves.⁹⁴ And this entails, both hermeneutically and philosophically, no prioritizing by Heidegger of *Dasein*’s concern for its own being-for-death in ‘the understanding of Being’ (*Seinsverständnis*), and no aprioristic exclusion of the significance of ‘the call’ (*der Ruft*) that one’s own fellow human being makes, in conscience, on *my* ‘understanding of Being’ — ‘an understanding of Being’ that Heidegger acknowledges extends to *and includes, equally*, not only oneself and the world but also one’s own fellow human being, but of whom scant treatment can be found or heard in *Being and Time*, or in Heidegger’s earlier or later works.

NOTES

¹ This controversy concerning what exactly Heidegger’s topic in philosophy is, is well summed up by Otto Pöggeler, a student of Heidegger’s, when he remarks in his 1983 ‘Afterword to the Second Edition’ of *Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers* (1963) that: ‘in the case of Heidegger, one can validly assert that by means of *Sein und Zeit* he decisively altered the significant phenomenological philosophy of Husserl and Scheler, that due to Oskar Becker he brought along the way with him a philosophy of mathematics and through Bultmann a new theology, and that with new impetus he later, above all, decisively determined continental European philosophy. To be sure, in all of these effects *the dispute about what was ultimately at issue in Heidegger’s thinking remained.*’ *Martin Heidegger’s Path of Thinking*, trans. by Daniel Magurshak and

Sigmund Barber (New Jersey, Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1987, 1991), p. 261, my emphasis. This dispute is still not resolved today.

² Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962, 2000); *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1927, 1957), also published, in a separate printing, in *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, ed. by Edmund Husserl, Vol. 8 (1927), 1–438. Though published as a work in phenomenology, ascertaining the philosophical influence of Husserl’s phenomenology in Heidegger’s *Being and Time* (and in other works) is quite difficult. After making the point that ‘Husserl’s phenomenology was of paramount importance for the conception and composition of *Being and Time*,’ one recent commentator, alas, is forced to continue and to admit, ‘yet it is difficult to say exactly what the nature and scope of his [Husserl’s] influence on Heidegger amounted to in the end.’ Taylor Carman, *Heidegger’s Analytic. Interpretation, Discourse, and Authenticity in ‘Being and Time’* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 53. Unless the nature and scope of Husserl’s influence on Heidegger’s philosophy is determined, however, it will be difficult to substantiate the claim that Husserl’s phenomenology was of paramount importance for the conception and composition of the philosophy of ‘the Being-question’ attempted by Heidegger in *Being and Time*.

³ Martin Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena*, trans. by Theodore Kisiel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985) p. 125; *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs*, Gesamtausgabe (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann), Vol. 20, ed. by Petra Jaeger (1979); Summer-Semester Lecture Course, delivered at Marburg University in 1925. Cf., also, Heidegger’s remarks on Dilthey’s philosophy of ‘life’ in *Being and Time*, § 10 pp. 72–73.

⁴ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 19:1.

⁵ Cf. Martin Heidegger, ‘The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking’, in M. Heidegger, *On Time and Being*, trans. by Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 1972; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), pp. 55–73 (p. 72); ‘Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens’ (1964), in Heidegger, *Zur Sache des Denkens* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1969). Taking his cue from Husserl’s (and Hegel’s) call (*Ruf*) to go back ‘to the thing itself’, Heidegger remarks: ‘We have chosen a discussion of the call “to the thing itself” (“zur Sache selbst”) as our guideline (*als Wegweiser*). It was to bring us to the path (*auf den Weg*) which leads us to a determination of the task of thinking at the end of philosophy. [...] From the perspective of Hegel and Husserl — and not only from their perspective — the matter of philosophy (*(Die Sache der Philosophie)* is subjectivity. It is not the matter as such that is controversial for the call, but rather its presentation (*ihre Darstellung*) by which the matter itself becomes present. [...] The two methods [of Hegel and Husserl] are as different as they could possibly be. But the matter as such, which they are to present, is the same, although it is experienced in different ways. But of what help are these discoveries to us in our attempt to bring the task of thinking to view? They don’t help us at all as long as we do not go beyond a mere discussion of the call and *ask what remains unthought (ungedacht) in the call “to the thing itself.”*” Questioning in this way, we can become aware (*Auf diese Weise fragend, können wir darauf aufmerksam werden*) how something which it is no longer the matter of philosophy to think conceals itself (*sich etwas verbirgt*) precisely where philosophy has brought its matter (*inwiefern gerade dort, wo die Philosophie ihre Sache [...] gebracht hat*) to absolute knowledge and to ultimate evidence (*ins absolute Wissen und zur letztgültigen Evidenz*).’ (p. 63–64:70–71, my emphases.)

⁶ *History of the Concept of Time*, p. 24. Heidegger even remarks that ‘(I)n a letter to Husserl, he [Dilthey] compared their work to boring into a mountain from opposite sides until they break through and meet each other. Dilthey here found an initial fulfilment [in Husserl’s *Logical Investigations*] of what he had sought for decades and formulated as a critical program in the Academy essay of 1894: a fundamental science of life itself’ (ibid.). What Heidegger does not point out to his students, however, is that whilst Dilthey certainly did compare his work to Husserl’s as boring into the same mountain [= *Erlebnisse*], they did so *from opposite sides*, and when they meet, it is Husserl who has to give way to Dilthey, not Dilthey to Husserl, in any ‘[interpretive] science of life’.

⁷ Wilhelm Dilthey, ‘Ideas Concerning a Descriptive Psychology and Analytic Psychology (1894)’, in W. Dilthey, *Descriptive Psychology and Historical Understanding*, trans. by Richard M. Zaner & Kenneth L. Heiges (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1977), pp. 139–240; ‘Ideen über eine beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie’, *Gesammelte Schriften*, Band V.: *Die Geistige Welt*, Erste Hälfte (“Abhandlungen zur Grundlegung der Geisteswissenschaften”) (Leipzig und Bern: Teubner, 1924).

⁸ Cf. H. P. Rickmann, *Wilhelm Dilthey: Pioneer of the Human Sciences* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), esp. Chapter 10 ‘The Methodology of the Human Sciences’, (pp. 143–162).

⁹ Cf. Werner Brock, *An Introduction to Contemporary German Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1935), pp. 20–23.

¹⁰ Edmund Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, trans. by John N. Findlay (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970); *Logische Untersuchungen. I. Teil: Prolegomena zur reinen Logik* (Halle, 1900), *II. Teil: Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis*, In zwei Bänden (Halle, 1901); *Gesammelte Werke*, Husserliana (Dordrecht: Kluwer), Volume XVIII, ed. by Elmar Holenstein (1975) and Volume XIX, ed. by Ursula Panzer (1984).

¹¹ Franz Brentano, *Descriptive Psychology*, trans. and ed. by Benito Müller (London: Routledge, 1995); *Deskriptive Psychologie*, ed. by Roderick M. Chisholm & Wilhelm Baumgartner (Hamburg: Meiner, 1982). The first time that Brentano delivered a lecture-course entitled ‘Descriptive Psychology’ was in 1887/88, and he repeated these, without major revision, in 1888/89 and 1890/91. (The 1888–89 lecture-course was entitled: ‘Deskriptive Psychologie oder beschreibende Phänomenologie’, ‘Descriptive Psychology or Describing Phenomenology’. See Herbert Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement: a Historical Introduction*, 3rd revised and enlarged edn (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994), p. 27.) Thus Husserl, who had attended Brentano’s lectures in Vienna University from 1884 to 1886, would not have attended a lecture-course that was actually called ‘Descriptive Psychology’ or ‘Describing Phenomenology’. Müller informs us, however, that ‘[E]ven though Husserl left Vienna by the time the present lectures were read by Brentano, he was in possession of a transcript (by Dr Hans Schmidkunz) of the 1887/8 lectures which is kept in the Husserl Archive in Leuven, (call number Q10).’ (Introduction, Part I, *Descriptive Psychology*, p. xiii, n. 14.) Dermot Moran also notes that after Husserl left Vienna in 1886 he still ‘diligently collected Brentano’s lecture transcripts, e.g. his *Descriptive Psychology* lectures of 1887–91, his investigations of the senses, as well as his studies of fantasy, memory and judgement’. *Edmund Husserl: Founder of Phenomenology* (Cambridge: Polity, 2005), pp. 18–19. Brentano, of course, was working on these issues when Husserl attended his lectures because Husserl remarks that one lecture course he took with Brentano called ‘Selected Psychological and Aesthetic Questions [...]’ was devoted mainly to fundamental descriptive analyses of the nature of the imagination.’ Edmund Husserl, ‘Reminiscences of Franz Brentano’, trans. by Linda L. McAlister, in *The Philosophy of Brentano*, ed. by Linda L. McAlister (London: Duckworth, 1976), pp. 47–55 (p. 47); ‘Erinnerungen an Franz Brentano’, in Oskar Kraus, *Franz Brentano. Zur Kenntnis seines Lebens und seiner Lehre*, Appendix II, pp. 153–167, (Munich, 1919). Again, another course Husserl took with Brentano, ‘Elementary Logic and its Needed Reform’, ‘dealt with systematically connected basic elements of a descriptive psychology of the intellect, without neglecting, however, the parallel elements in the sphere of the emotions, to which a separate chapter was devoted’ (ibid.). It was these ‘questions of descriptive psychology’ that Brentano was addressing in his lectures, in particular the founding of the normative disciplines of Ethics, Logic and Aesthetics that gave Husserl the courage and conviction ‘to choose philosophy as my [Husserl’s] life’s work’ (pp. 47–49). For a lucid account of the impact of Brentano’s development of his descriptive method in these lectures on Husserl’s initiation and formation in philosophy, see Theodore De Boer’s excellent, short article ‘The Descriptive Method of Franz Brentano: Its Two Functions and Their Significance for Phenomenology’, in *The Philosophy of Brentano*, ed. McAlister, pp. 101–7. For a meticulous and extensive analysis of the problems that Brentano bequeathed to Husserl, and Husserl’s response, see de Boer’s major study *The Development of Husserl’s Thought*, trans. by Theodore Plantinga (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978); *Die ontwicklungsgang in het denken van Husserl* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1966).

¹² Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, pp. 20–23.

¹³ Franz Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, trans. by Antos. C. Rancurello, D.B. Terrell & Linda L. McAlister (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973; Routledge, 1995); *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* (Leipzig: Duncker and Humblot, 1874). Originally, Brentano had proposed six books for this study but he only completed and published the first two, Book One Psychology as a Science and Book II Psychological Phenomena in General.

¹⁴ Brentano’s next published work after *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* was in Ethics, *Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis* (Leipzig, 1889); *On the Origin of our Knowledge of Right and Wrong*, trans. by Roderick M. Chisholm & E. Schnerwind (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969). In the Foreword to this study, Brentano announces this as part of his new work in descriptive psychology.

¹⁵ *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, p. 77.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 77.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 86.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 77.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 3, 11, 26, 77–78, 86–88, 92–93, 98–99.

²⁰ Cf. *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, Book II, § V ‘A Survey of the Principal Attempts to Classify Psychological Phenomena’, pp. 177–193.

²¹ John Locke famously held that all our knowledge came from the twin fountains of sensation and reflection. Cf. J. Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. R. Woolhouse (London: Penguin, 1997), Book II, ch 1. The way consciousness knows itself, according to Locke, is by reflecting on its own contents. Brentano never relinquishes this Cartesian-Lockean assumption concerning the manner in which consciousness can, in light of its own evidence, gain knowledge about itself from within itself, in the elaboration of his idea of descriptive psychology. In a ‘Supplement’ to a re-issue of his *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, Brentano re-iterates and stresses this point: ‘The fact that the mentally active subject has himself as object of a secondary reference, regardless of what else he refers to as his primary object, is of great importance’ (p. 276–77). This assumption, however, is premised on acceptance of a radical metaphysical separation of a lucid mind and opaque body within the being of human subjectivity, a metaphysical assumption that was later to be called into question by others, residing outside of Brentano’s school of descriptive psychology, on existential-phenomenological grounds. Cf. Philip Bartok, ‘Brentano’s Intentionality Thesis: Beyond the Analytic and Phenomenological Readings’, *Journal of History of Philosophy*, vol. 43, no. 4 (2005) 437–60, esp. p. 443 and pp. 445–446.

²² Brentano also coined the term ‘*Psychognosie*’ for the descriptive part of the science of empirical psychology and the term ‘psychognost’ for the descriptive psychologist. He borrowed the idea of dividing the science of empirical psychology into two component parts of a descriptive and a genetic part from a model that occurred in other natural sciences. ‘In the same way as orognosy and geognosy precede geology in the field of mineralogy, and anatomy generally precedes physiology in the more closely related field of the human organism, psychognosy [descriptive psychology] [...] must be positioned prior to genetic psychology’ *Descriptive Psychology*, § 1 ‘Psychognosy and Genetic Psychology’, pp. 3–11 (p. 8). Cf. also Brentano’s letter to his friend and former student Oscar Kraus in 1895, published in Appendix to *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*: ‘My school distinguishes between a *psychognosy* and a *genetic psychology* (in distant analogy to geognosy and geology)’ (pp. 369–370, trans. mod.). Cf., also, Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement*, p. 34.

²³ ‘It is true that in dreams we have presentations of colours and sounds and various other forms, that we are afraid, get angry, feel pleased and experience other emotions. But that which these mental activities refer to as their content and which really does not appear to be external is, in actuality, no more outside of us than in us. It is mere appearance, just as the physical phenomena which appear to us in waking life really correspond to no reality although people often assume the opposite’. *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, pp. 175–6. Thus if we compare (unphenomenologically) ‘physical phenomena’ in the sense of sensorially perceived objects to what a natural scientist discovers and establishes as a matter of natural-scientific fact as the object of its research, Brentano thinks (naturalistically) that we are justified in concluding that the sensorially perceived objects or so-called *qualia* or secondary-qualities of outer perceptual-sense experiences have a *merely* phenomenal mode of existence by comparison to the actual (*wirklich*), real (extra-mental) mode of existence discovered in natural science, for: ‘I believe that I will not be mistaken if I assume that the definition of natural science as the science of physical phenomena is frequently connected with the concept of forces belonging to a world which is similar to the one extended in space and flowing in time; forces which, through their influence on the sense organs, arouse sensation and mutually influence each other in their action, and of which natural science investigates the laws of co-existence and succession. If those objects [‘physical phenomena’] are considered as the objects of natural sciences, there is also the advantage [over ‘physical phenomena’ considered as sensorial objects of actual acts of outer perceptual-sense from a descriptive-psychological point of view, as is evident from the context] that this science appears to have as its object something that really and truly exists’ (pp. 99–100). Earlier in *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, Brentano had already asserted the point: ‘The phenomena of light [colours], sound, heat, spatial location and locomotion which he [the natural scientist] studies are not things which really and truly exist. [Instead] They are signs of something real, which, through its causal activity, produces presentations of them [e.g. colours, sounds etc.] [for the experiencing

subject].’ (p. 19). Brentano does not explain how or why such real objects of scientific discovery (e.g. light rays, sine waves) actually produce, causally, the so-called *qualia* or secondary-qualities (e.g. sounds, colours) of outer perceptual-sense experience, or the relevance of such natural-scientific facts for descriptive psychology.

²⁴ ‘Psychology, like all natural sciences, has its basis in perception (*Wahrnehmung*) and experience (*Erfahrung*). Above all, however, its source is to be found in the *inner perception* (*die innere Wahrnehmung*) of our own psychological phenomena (*der eigenen psychischen Phänomene*). We would never know what a thought is, or a judgement, pleasure or pain, desires or aversions, hopes or fears, courage or despair, decisions and voluntary intentions if we did not learn what they are through inner perception of our own phenomena. Note, however, that we said that *inner perception* (*innere Wahrnehmung*) and not introspection, i.e. inner *observation* (*innere Beobachtung*), constitutes this primary (*erste*) and indispensable source (*unentbehrliche Quelle*) of psychology.’ *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, Book I, Psychology as a Science, Chapter 2 ‘Psychological Method with Special Reference to its Experiential Basis’ (‘Über die Methode der Psychologie, insbesondere die Erfahrung, welche für sie die Grundlage bildet’), § 2., p. 40–4, trans. modified.

²⁵ ‘(S)ince neither agreement nor complete clarity has been achieved regarding the delimitation of the two classes [of physical and psychological phenomena] [...] Our aim is to clarify the meaning of the two terms “*physical phenomenon*” and “*psychical phenomenon*,” removing all misunderstanding and confusion concerning them.’ *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, p. 77–78.

²⁶ This position, nevertheless, contains metaphysical dualistic assumptions of a lucid mind and an opaque body in human subjectivity. Cf. *supra*, n. 21.

²⁷ Cf. Oskar Kraus, ‘Introduction to the 1924 Edition’ of *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, ‘Appendix’ to *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, pp. 396–408 (p. 370).

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ Brentano, *Descriptive Psychology*, pp. 4–5.

³⁰ Cf. Edmund Husserl, *Phenomenological Psychology. Lectures, Summer Semester 1925*, trans. by John Scanlon (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), p. 28. *Phänomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925*; Hua Vol. IX, ed. by Walter Biemel (1968). In these lectures Husserl refers to Brentano ‘as path finder’ (*als Wegbereiter*) in this entire area of descriptive-psychological research, cf. ‘Section (d) Brentano as pioneer for research in internal experience—discovery of intentionality as the fundamental character of the psychic’, pp. 23–7. Reflecting on the philosophical relationship between Brentano’s descriptive psychology and his own *Logical Investigations*, however, Husserl also remarks about their essential *methodological difference*. ‘The *Logical Investigations*’, Husserl recalls, ‘are fully influenced by Brentano’s suggestions, and should be readily understandable in view of the fact that I was a direct pupil of Brentano. And yet the idea of a descriptive psychology has undergone, in the *Investigations*, a new change and also an essential transformation through an essentially new method, so much so that Brentano himself did not recognise it as the fruition of his own ideas.’ (p. 28). Brentano, of course, *could not* recognise Husserl’s descriptive-*eidetic*-psychology as a fruition of his own ideas, given Brentano’s views on (Husserl’s) ‘essences’ as ‘fictional entities’, which any descriptive-*empirical* psychology would find incomprehensible. Cf. Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, Appendix (1911), Supplementary Remarks, IX ‘On Genuine and Fictitious Objects’, pp. 291–301. Cf., also, De Boer, *The Development of Husserl’s Thought*, pp. 297–298.

³¹ For an examination of what Brentano means by ‘intentional consciousness’, see Cyril McDonnell, ‘Brentano’s Revaluation of the Scholastic Concept of Intentionality into a Root-Concept of Descriptive Psychology’, *Yearbook of the Irish Philosophical Society*, ed. by Catherine Kavanagh (2006), 124–171.

³² Cf. Husserl, ‘Appendix: External and Internal Perception: Physical and Psychological Phenomena’, in Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, pp. 852–69.

³³ Cf. Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book, General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology*, trans. by Fred Kersten (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982); *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Erstes Buch, Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie*, (Halle: Niemeyer, 1913); Hua Vol. III/ 1 & III/ 2 ed. by Karl Schumann (1977, 1995), esp. § 77 ‘The Phenomenological Study of Reflections on Mental Processes’ (*Erlebnisreflexionen*).

³⁴ Hence the critical title of de Boer's article, 'The Descriptive Method of Franz Brentano: Its *Two Functions* and Their Significance for Phenomenology' (my emphasis).

³⁵ De Boer, 'The Descriptive Method of Franz Brentano', p. 102.

³⁶ Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, p. 116.

³⁷ In his 1925 Summer Semester Lecture course at Freiburg University, Husserl explicitly draws attention to his students of the fact that the task and significance of his *Logical Investigations* (1900–1901), which were 'the results of my ten years effort', lay in providing 'eine Klärung der reinen Idee der Logik im Rückgang auf die im logischen Bewußtsein, im Erlebniszusammenhang logischen Denkens sich vollziehende Sinngebung oder Erkenntnisleistung'. Hua IX, § 3. 'Aufgabe und Bedeutung der *Logischen Untersuchungen*', p. 20; *Phenomenological Psychology. Lectures, Summer Semester 1925*, p. 22.

³⁸ Cf. Edmund Husserl, *Thing and Space: Lectures of 1907*, trans. by Richard Rojcewicz (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997); *Ding und Raum. Vorlesungen 1907*; Hua Vol. XVI, ed. by U. Claesges (1973).

³⁹ Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, pp. 20–23.

⁴⁰ Heidegger would have encountered this difference in concepts of 'descriptive psychology' *ab initio* in his early career in philosophy, for, around the time he introduced himself to Husserl's *Logical Investigations* in his first semester at Freiburg University in 1909, he was being introduced to Dilthey's hermeneutic line of thinking in his theology classes. In a letter to Karl Löwith on September 13, 1920, Heidegger informs him that 'I don't have Dilthey's works, only detailed excerpts, in part *hand-copied* by me as a theologian in 1909–10.' Quoted by Theodore Kisiel in *The Genesis of Heidegger's 'Being and Time'* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 524, note 43. Cf., also, Heidegger's remarks about his introduction to hermeneutics in his early student's days in his 1922 'Vita, with an Accompanying Letter to Georg Misch', in *Becoming Heidegger: On the Trail of His Early Occasional Writings, 1910–1927*, ed. by Theodore Kisiel and Thomas Sheehan (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2007), pp. 104–109 (p. 107). During the time that he read and re-read Husserl's *Logical Investigations* in the years following 1909, and Husserl's *Ideas I*, when it was published in 1913, Heidegger continued to be interested in Dilthey's work, and in many other thinkers outside of Husserl's phenomenology, for, as he recalls in 1957: 'What the exciting years between 1910 and 1914 meant for me cannot be adequately expressed; I can only indicate it by a selective enumeration: the second, significantly enlarged edition of Nietzsche's *The Will to Power*, the works of Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky in translation, the awakening interest in Hegel and Schelling, Rilke's works and Trakl's poems, Dilthey's *Collected Writings*.' M. Heidegger, 'A Recollection (1957)' in *Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker*, ed. by Thomas Sheehan (Chicago: Precedent Publishing, Inc, 1981), p. 22. According to Heidegger himself, it was as early as 1915 that 'my [Heidegger's] aversion to history, which had been nurtured in me by my predilection for mathematics, was thoroughly destroyed'. 'Curriculum Vitae 1915' in *Becoming Heidegger*, pp. 7–8 (p. 8). (Husserl, of course, was a trained mathematician before seriously studying philosophy with Brentano, and attempted to apply Brentano's descriptive-psychological analysis to arithmetic in his first work in philosophy, published in 1891, *The Philosophy of Arithmetic*. Mathematics was the model of exact scientific knowledge for Brentano, too, in the elaboration of his idea of descriptive psychology. See *supra*, n. 29.) Heidegger credits his conversion to the significance of historical-hermeneutics in philosophy to his study of Fichte, Hegel, Rickert, Dilthey, and 'lectures and seminar exercises [in history]' of Prof. Finke. (*ibid.*). By the time Heidegger wrote his letter to Georg Misch (Dilthey's son-in-law) in 1922, then, Heidegger is clearly convinced, as his remarks and emphasis indicate, that his own researches in philosophy and phenomenology is bringing out 'the positive tendencies of "life philosophy"', and moving towards 'a principled meditation-on-meaning [*Besinnung*] within phenomenological research and its direction' (p. 104). Thus Heidegger concludes, *contra* Husserl's idea of phenomenology, and in *Diltheyan* fashion, that '(L)ife is approached [by Heidegger] as the basic comprehensive object of philosophical research. The self-illuminating comporting of factic life to itself is, on the cognitive level, interpretive exposition [*Auslegung*]; the principled scientific development of this exposition is phenomenological interpretation [*Interpretation*]; the genuine logic of philosophy is accordingly a principled phenomenological *hermeneutics*.' (*ibid.*). Kisiel's study corroborates Gadamer's claim that Heidegger's main 'breakthrough to the topic' of his philosophy and hermeneutic phenomenology dates as early as 1919, in his "war-emergency semester" lecture-course, entitled 'The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldviews'. Cf. Kisiel, *Genesis*, p. 16. Though Heidegger read and read Husserl's texts in phenomenology from 1909 onwards, by the time of the publication of *Being and Time* in

1927 Heidegger had thoroughly internalized (and advanced) Dilthey's position and critique of Husserl's idea of phenomenology in his own definition and *methodological practice* of phenomenology as hermeneutic phenomenology.

⁴¹ Cf. De Boer, 'The Descriptive Method of Franz Brentano', p. 101.

⁴² 'Ideas Concerning a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology (1894)', p. 63. In comparison to historical research, then, the 'descriptive method' proposed by Brentano and Husserl, in Dilthey's eyes, is profoundly abstract and solipsistic, and tantamount to 'brooding (*Grübele*) over oneself'. In *Being and Time*, however, Heidegger explicitly maintains that his analysis of 'being-towards-death', *from a methodological point of view*, is a form of 'brooding' over one's own death, but 'of course', Heidegger adds, 'such brooding over death does not take away from it its character as a possibility [of *actual Dasein*]' (p. 305). In fact, Heidegger goes as far as to hold that this is an *existential* task (requirement) of one's life, and so: 'this possibility [disclosed in anticipation, *Vorlaufen zum Tode*] must not be weakened; it must be understood *as a possibility*, it must be cultivated *as a possibility*, and we must *put up with it as a possibility*, in the way we comport ourselves towards it [in such brooding]' (p. 306). Dilthey, of course, eschewed any such brooding about oneself as a proper methodological requirement of understanding the concreteness and historicity of anything in human life, including the meaning of death.

⁴³ Martin Heidegger, 'Wilhelm Dilthey's Research and the Current Struggle for a Historical Worldview', trans. by Theodore Kisiel, in *Becoming Heidegger: On the Trail of His Early Occasional Writings, 1910–1927*, pp. 241–274 (p. 247). Kisiel notes that Heidegger delivered his lectures in Kassel a week or so before his 1925 Summer Semester lecture-course at Marburg University began (cf. *ibid.*, p. 240).

⁴⁴ Heidegger, 'Wilhelm Dilthey's Research', p. 247.

⁴⁵ Cf. Kisiel, *Genesis*, p. 72.

⁴⁶ Heidegger, 'Wilhelm Dilthey's Research', p. 248.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 248–249.

⁴⁸ In 1957 Heidegger recalls his youthful excitement over the arrival of Dilthey's *Completed Writings* in 1914. See *supra*, n. 40. Kisiel notes that Heidegger's 1920 Summer Semester Lecture course 'Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression: Theory of Philosophical Concept Formation' begins 'with an extensive bibliography of Dilthey's then widely scattered works' (*Genesis*, p. 524, note 43). Kisiel also notes that in Heidegger's Winter Semester Course 1919–1920 on 'Basic Problems of Phenomenology', Heidegger concludes this course with an account of the origins of the history of ideas and the birth of 'historical consciousness', and of the significance of 'factic experience of life' in the particular experiences of the early Christian community in the emergence of the human sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*), but, '(O)ne thing that Heidegger does not tell his class is that this brief reading of the history of ideas comes in large part, sometimes almost word for word, from two short chapters of Dilthey's *Introduction to the Human Sciences*' (*Genesis*, p. 77). About Heidegger's own later, citation in *Being and Time* (1927) of the influence of Dilthey's thought on his thinking in the mid-1920s, Gadamer remarks that '(T)his dating of his influence is much too late'. Hans-Georg Gadamer, 'Martin Heidegger's One Path', in *Reading Heidegger from the Start. Essays in his Earliest Thought*, ed. by Kisiel and van Buren (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), pp. 19–34 (p. 22). The influence, Gadamer observes, 'has to have been sometime before 1920' because about his earlier days lecturing at Freiburg University (1915–1923) Heidegger himself had recounted the story to Gadamer in Marburg in 1923 'how burdensome it had been to lug home the heavy volumes of the Berlin Academy publications that contained Dilthey's late work' (*ibid.*).

⁴⁹ Frederick Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, Vol. 7, *18th and 19th Century German Philosophy* (London & New York: Continuum, 1963; 2003), p. 369.

⁵⁰ Cf. Martin Heidegger, 'My Way to Phenomenology', in Heidegger, *On Time and Being*, pp. 74–82 (p. 74). Cf., also, Heidegger's remarks to Fr Richardson in 'Vorwort' / 'Preface', in William Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), pp. viii–xxiii; (Letter to Richardson, April 1962).

⁵¹ Franz Brentano, *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle*, trans. by Ralph George (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975); *Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles*, (Freiburg, 1862).

⁵² Franz Brentano, *The Psychology of Aristotle, in Particular His Doctrine of the Active Intellect*, trans. by Ralph George (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1977); *Die Psychologie des Aristoteles, insbesondere seine Lehre vom nous poiētikos*. (Mainz: Kirchheim, 1867).

⁵³ This reputation as a Scholastic still surrounded Brentano in Vienna, for, Husserl recalls that he went to Brentano's lectures (in 1884) 'at first merely out of curiosity, to hear the man who was the subject of so much talk in Vienna at that time, but whom others (and not so very few) derided as a Jesuit in disguise, as a rhetorician [viz], a fraud, a Sophist, and a Scholastic.' Husserl, 'Reminiscences of Franz Brentano', p. 47. Cf. also Rolf George, 'Brentano's Relation to Aristotle', in *Die Philosophie Franz Brentanos*, ed. by Roderick M. Chisholm & Rudolf Haller (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1978), pp. 249–266.

⁵⁴ Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, Book I, Psychology as a Science, Chapter 2, § 2 'Psychological Method with Special Reference to its Experiential Basis', pp. 28–43.

⁵⁵ John Passmore, *A History of Philosophy* (London: Duckworth, 1957; Penguin Books, 1968), p. 178. Cf., also, Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, p. 91.

⁵⁶ *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, p. 11

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 18–19.

⁵⁸ Cf. Heidegger's critical remarks (à la Dilthey) on 'a lack of history' that characterises Husserl's phenomenology and on the need 'to activate a genuine sense of the past' in 'phenomenological research', in his 'Wilhelm Dilthey's Research', pp. 241–274, esp. p. 273.

⁵⁹ 'Man does not apprehend what he is by musing over himself, nor by doing psychological experiments, but rather by history' (Dilthey, 'Ideas Concerning a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology', p. 63). Behind this is also Dilthey's sharp distinction between the natural sciences (*Naturwissenschaften*) and a group of sciences that are referred to in German as the *Geisteswissenschaften* that are concerned about understanding the human being and the latter's achievements. Translating *Geisteswissenschaften* as the 'mental sciences' in English is somewhat misleading, however, because the *Geisteswissenschaften*, as Dilthey lists them, comprise such sciences as: 'history, national economy, the sciences of law and of the State, the science of religion, the study of literature and poetry, of art and music, of philosophical world-views, and systems, finally psychology'. Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, Vol. 7, p. 369.

⁶⁰ Charles Bambach, *Heidegger, Dilthey, and the Crisis of Historicism* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1995) p. 128–129, note 2, my emphasis. Sometimes, Dilthey even leaves 'psychology' out from the list of sciences that comprise the *Geisteswissenschaften*, for, when psychology refers to the natural science of psychology, the latter approach has to abstract from the lived nature of 'man' in order to see and analyse 'man' like any other object of natural science (i.e. from the point of view of a theoretical, abstract construction e.g. in terms of atoms, or infra-atomic particles etc). Cf., Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, Vol. 7, p. 369. Unlike the *Geisteswissenschaften* that attempt, in Dilthey's view, to get behind 'the external expression to an inward spiritual structure (the "spirit" of Roman law, of Baroque art and architecture, and so on)' in order to re-live (*Erleben* and *Nacherleben*) the meaning, values, attitudes, ideals and understanding of life deposited and expressed in such external products of culture, 'the physicist can scarcely be said to attempt to relive the experience of an atom or to penetrate behind the relations of infra-atomic particles to a spiritual structure expressed in them. To introduce such notions into mathematical physics would mean its ruin. Conversely, to fail to introduce them into the theory of the culture sciences is to forget that "he who explores history is the same who makes history" [Dilthey].' Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, Vol. 7, p. 373.

⁶¹ *History of the Concept of Time*, p. 116. Cf., also, Heidegger, 'Wilhelm Dilthey's Research', p. 249.

⁶² Heidegger, 'My Way to Phenomenology', in Heidegger, *On Time and Being*, pp. 74–82 (p. 76).

⁶³ Cf. Brock, *An Introduction to Contemporary German Philosophy*, pp. 20–23.

⁶⁴ 'The Understanding of Other Persons and their Expressions of Life (ca. 1910)', in Dilthey, *Descriptive Psychology and Historical Understanding*, tr. by Kenneth L. Heiges, trans. modified, pp. 123–144 (p. 135). (Also available as, 'The Understanding of Other Persons and Their Life Expressions', in *The Hermeneutics Reader: Texts of the German Tradition from the Enlightenment to the Present*, ed. by Kurt Mueller-Vollmer (New York: Continuum, 1985; Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), pp. 148–164 (p. 161).)

⁶⁵ Heidegger grounds all of the difficulties he experienced in trying to understand Husserl's method of philosophising into 'one main difficulty' (*eine Hauptschwierigkeit*), namely, 'the simple question [of] how thinking's manner of procedure (*die Verfahrensweise des Denkens*) which called itself "phenomenology" was to be carried out.' 'My Way to Phenomenology', p. 76:83. Heidegger does not tell us in this autobiographical sketch, however, what part, if any, Dilthey played in overcoming this struggle. It is a well-known fact that Heidegger read other thinkers, outside of Husserl's text in phenomenology — Heidegger singles out his

'phenomenological readings' of Aristotle's philosophy, for example, in 'My Way to Phenomenology' (p. 79) — and these influences coloured his reading of Husserl's 'phenomenology'. In addition to Aristotle, Heidegger reminds us elsewhere about his avid readings of the works of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Dostoevsky, Hegel, Schelling, Rilke, Trakl, and Dilthey, at the same time as he read and re-read Husserl's texts in phenomenology. See *supra*, n. 40 and 48. For a brief, clear and sympathetic treatment of Heidegger's interest in Aristotle's work, and the significance of the latter for Heidegger in his 'confrontation' with Husserl's phenomenology, see Thomas Sheehan, 'Hermeneia and Apophasis: the Early Heidegger on Aristotle', in Franci Volpi et al., *Heidegger et la idée de la phénoménologie* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988), pp. 67–80.

⁶⁶ Cf. Heidegger, 'My Way to Phenomenology', p. 79.

⁶⁷ Heidegger, of course, will give Husserl's reflection on this 'living now' of consciousness in *Ideas I* §77 a distinctively Kierkegaardian temporal interpretation on top of his appropriated Diltheyan-historical interpretation, with the net result of overriding 'historicality' by 'temporality' in Division Two of *Being and Time*. Cf. Klaus Held, 'Heidegger and the Principle of Phenomenology', trans. by Christopher Macann, in *Martin Heidegger: Critical Assessments*, Vol. II: History of Philosophy, ed. by Christopher Macann (1992) pp. 303–325.

⁶⁸ There are, clearly, resonances of Schleiermacherean biblical-hermeneutics at play here in Heidegger's 'way of thinking'; however, these are outside the scope of this present article to entertain.

⁶⁹ We can thus understand why 'Husserl', as Heidegger recalls, 'watched me in a generous fashion, but at the bottom in disagreement' ('My Way into Phenomenology', p. 79), while Heidegger, as Husserl's assistant at Freiburg University from 1919 to 1923, worked on Husserl's earlier *Logical Investigations* and on 'phenomenological readings' of Aristotle and of other thinkers drawn from the history of philosophy. Husserl, in fact, had secured this position for Heidegger at Freiburg on a twofold basis: (1) that he needed Heidegger to introduce students to the beginnings of phenomenological research and (2) that it would provide financial security for Heidegger. Cf. Hugo Ott, *Martin Heidegger: A Political Life*, trans. by Allan Blunden (London: Fontana Press, 1993), pp. 115–116.

⁷⁰ This style of philosophising in his lectures, in which Heidegger engaged his students, became part of the allure of Heidegger's way of thinking. Cf. Rüdiger Safranski, *Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil*, trans. by Ewald Osers (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1998), Ch. 6 'Revolution in Germany and The Question of Being' (pp. 89–106), especially Safranski's account and analysis of Heidegger's use of the example of perceiving a lectern, where the 'experiencing' of the lectern in terms of 'it worlds' (*es weltet*) 'in Lecture Hall 2 of the University of Freiburg on a grey February day in 1919' (pp. 94–96) becomes a kind of *enactment* of a perception whereupon '(L)ooking at the lectern, we can participate in the mystery that we are and that there exists a whole world that gives itself to us' (p. 105). Many of Heidegger's students in the 1920s (e.g. Gadamer) found it very difficult to discern whether Heidegger was engaged in the delivery of an original interpretation of a selected author's texts in his lecture courses, e.g., of *Aristotle's views*, or engaged in the lectures in the presentation of *his own* (Heidegger's) novel ideas about 'the question of the meaning of Being'. Cf. Ted Sadler, *Heidegger and Aristotle* (London: Athlone Press, 1996), pp. 12–13.

⁷¹ *History of the Concept of Time*, p. 56.

⁷² Cf. Theodore Kisiel, Ch. 2 'On the Way to *Being and Time*: Introduction to the Translation of Heidegger's *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitsbegriffs*,' in Kisiel, *Heidegger's Way of Thought. Critical and Interpretative Signposts* (London & New York: Continuum, 2002), ed. by Alfred Dunker & Marion Heinz, pp. 36–63 (p. 38); Dermot Moran, 'Heidegger's Critique of Husserl's and Brentano's Accounts of Intentionality', *Inquiry*, 43 (2000), 39–66 (p. 58); Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's 'Being and Time'* (1993), p. 49; Jacques Taminiaux, 'Heidegger and Husserl's *Logical Investigations*. In Remembrance of Heidegger's Last Seminar (Zähringen, 1973)', trans. by J. Stephens, *Research in Phenomenology*, 75 (1977), 58–83.

⁷³ Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, § 37, p. 761.

⁷⁴ As early as 1919 at the University of Freiburg, and throughout the 1920s, Heidegger is already using this triad *as a critique* of Husserl's theory on 'intuition' and 'expression' documented in the Sixth Logical Investigation, 'although', as Kisiel remarks, 'the fairly loyal gloss of Husserlian terminology in the early stages of the course [Marburg Summer Semester 1925 lecture course] disguises this.' *Genesis*, p. 373.

⁷⁵ Cf. Th. De Boer, *The Rationality of Transcendence: Studies in the Philosophy of Emmanuel Lévinas* (Amsterdam: Giegen, 1997), p. 174, and as de Boer remarks, this is true of the interpretation of anything, as it ‘too, is tuned to the individual, whether this be a psychical experience, an act, a literary work or an object of culture’ (ibid).

⁷⁶ *Being and Time*, p. 228.

⁷⁷ *Being and Time*, p. 60.

⁷⁸ ‘The very asking of this question is an entity’s mode of *Being*; and as such it gets its essential character from what is inquired about — namely Being. This entity which each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being, we shall denote by the term “*Dasein*”. If we are to formulate our question explicitly and transparently, we must first give a proper explication of an entity (*Dasein*), with regard to its Being.’ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 27.

⁷⁹ ‘Being with Others belong to the Being of *Dasein*, which is an issue for *Dasein* in its very Being’. *Being and Time*, p. 160: ‘zum Sein des *Daseins*, um das es ihm in seinem Sein selbst geht’ *Sein und Zeit*, p. 123. Cf., also, *Being and Time*, p. 225:181.

⁸⁰ According to Kisiel, Heidegger received the unpublished manuscript of *Ideen II* (dealing with ‘naturalistic’ and ‘personalistic consciousness’, ‘nature and spirit’) from Husserl in February 1925, and this ‘seems to have driven Heidegger’, in his preparation for his Summer Semester 1925 Lecture course ‘to a renewed detailed examination of Husserl’s work, especially the Sixth Logical Investigation, the Logos-essay and *Ideas I.*’ Kisiel, *Heidegger’s Way of Thought. Critical and Interpretative Signposts*, p. 38. We cannot conclude from this, however, that Heidegger is positively developing Husserl’s position(s) elaborated in any of these works, however Husserl’s analyses are to be understood, in *Heidegger’s* own particular development of ‘phenomenology’ in *Being and Time* (or in earlier or later works and lecture-courses). Nevertheless, for remarks towards this, see Sebastian Luft, ‘Husserl’s Concept of the “Transcendental Person”: Another Look at the Husserl–Heidegger Relationship’, *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 13 (2005), 141–77. See also the ‘review essay’ by Burt Hopkins, ‘The Husserl–Heidegger Confrontation and the Essential Possibility of Phenomenology: Edmund Husserl, *Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger*’, in *Husserl Studies* 17 (2001), 125–148.

⁸¹ ‘The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking’, p.72.

⁸² *Being and Time*, p. 228.

⁸³ De Boer, *The Rationality of Transcendence*, p. 119.

⁸⁴ Husserl, *Ideas I*, §49. Cf. De Boer, *The Rationality of Transcendence*, p. 119. Cf., also, Theodore De Boer, *The Development of Husserl’s Thought*, p. 338 ff., 369, 381.

⁸⁵ *History of the Concept of Time*, p. 110.

⁸⁶ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 353:305.

⁸⁷ Cf. Theodore de Boer, ‘Enmity, Friendship, Corporeality’, in his *The Rationality of Transcendence*, pp. 133–146, (pp. 141–142). See also, Th. de Boer, ‘Beyond Being. Ontology and Eschatology in the Philosophy of Emmanuel Lévinas’ *Philosophica Reformata*, vol. 38 (1973), 17–29, esp. pp. 23–24.

⁸⁸ Such methodological brooding over one’s own death would not be regarded by Dilthey as a proper requirement of concrete historical-hermeneutic research into the meaning of any human life experience, including the experience of the anticipation, in the present, of one’s own death, and would be improperly invoked as such if it were. See *supra*, n. 42.

⁸⁹ Cf. Kisiel, *Heidegger’s Way of Thought*, p. 38. See, also, *supra*, n. 80.

⁹⁰ Heidegger, ‘Wilhelm Dilthey’s Researches’, p. 254. Cf., also, Dilthey, ‘The Understanding of Other Persons and their Expressions of Life (ca. 1910)’, in Dilthey, *Descriptive Psychology and Historical Understanding*, pp. 205–227.

⁹¹ Though *Seinsverständnis* extends equally to the world, myself and the being of my fellow human being, what Heidegger has to say about one’s fellow being is notoriously absent in his thought. Cf. De Boer, ‘Lévinas on Theology and the Philosophy of Religion’, in his *The Rationality of Transcendence*, pp. 169–183 (p. 175, note 15). Heidegger, nevertheless, believes that his appeal to *Seinsverständnis* as a basic fact of experience is sufficient for dismissing, or at least for evading most, if not all of the philosophical controversies that emerge from and in relation to the modern Cartesian solipsistic starting-point in philosophy. Heidegger’s interest in and analysis of *Dasein*, whose *own* being in Being is what is at stake for *that being*, however, is, as Lévinas points out, conducted without reference to any genuine exteriority, and thus from the height of subjectivity.

⁹² Emmanuel Lévinas, 'Without Identity', in Lévinas, *Humanism of the Other*, tr. Nidra Poller (Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 2003), pp. 58–69 (p. 66).

⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 66.

⁹⁴ Cf. Heidegger, 'Letter on Humanism' in *Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings*, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper Collins, 1977), pp. 193–241. Here, Heidegger is quite right to correct himself (in 1946/ 47) over *not dispensing with* 'the inappropriate concern with "science" and "research"' that he now realises was *not contained* in 'the essential help of phenomenological seeing' in his attempt to adhere to a *hermeneutic-methodology in phenomenology* in his earliest days in philosophy, up to and including the publication of *Being and Time* and other works, i.e., before his 'turning' (*die Kehre*) (p. 235). Some commentators take this as a (veiled) criticism of Husserl's idea of phenomenology and of the latter's stress on 'science' and 'research' (into the intricate web of intentional consciousness); but this cannot be the case because the context is clearly in relation to *Heidegger's own self-professed* earlier 'way of thinking' in phenomenology that called itself 'scientific'. Relinquishing the concern for 'science' and 'research' would, of course, contradict *Husserl's very definition* of phenomenology, but it would not contradict 'the essential help of phenomenological seeing' that a genuine *hermeneutic* phenomenology or 'a principled phenomenological *hermeneutics*', to quote Heidegger from his letter to Misch in 1922, would bring in *its definition*. See *supra*, n. 38. From Husserl's perspective, the scientific credentials of Heidegger's early phenomenology did leave much to be desired, for, as Husserl tells us, after devoting two months to studying Heidegger's *Being and Time* (and other works), he 'arrived at the distressing conclusion that philosophically I [Husserl] have nothing to do with this Heideggerean profundity, with this brilliant unscientific genius [...]; that he may be involved in the formation of a philosophical system of the kind which I have always considered my life's work to make forever impossible. Everyone except me has realised this for a long time.' Edmund Husserl, 'Letter to Alexander Pfänder, January 6, 1931,' trans. by Burt Hopkins, in Edmund Husserl, *Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger (1927–1931): The 'Encyclopaedia Britannica' Article, The Amsterdam Lectures, "Phenomenology and Anthropology" and Husserl's Marginal Notes in 'Being and Time' and 'Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics'*, trans. and ed. by Thomas Sheehan & Richard E. Palmer (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Press, 1997), Appendix 2, p. 482.

Translated by Mette Lebeck,
Department of Philosophy, National University of Ireland, Maynooth.

From:

'Martin Heideggers Existentialphilosophie', in Edith Stein, *Endliches und Ewiges Sein. Versuch eines Aufstiegs zum Sinn des Seins*, Gesamtausgabe, bd. 11/12 (Freiburg: Herder, 2006), 'Anhang', pp. 445–500

Translator's Introduction

The text which is hereby made available in translation originates as a lengthy appendix to Stein's main work *Finite and Eternal Being*. It was, however, left out of the first edition of this work (1950) and in the reprint of *Edith Steins Werke*¹ and thus the editors of the *Collected Works of Edith Stein* likewise left it for a future occasion. The omission has been emended in the new critical edition *Edith Steins Gesamtausgabe*,² and a completed English translation will follow in due course.

The essay is divided into four sections, each concerned with one of Heidegger's (until then) published works: *Being and Time*; *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*; *The Essence of Reasons*; and *What is Metaphysics?* About two thirds is taken up with an analysis of *Being and Time*, again simply divided into an 'Outline of the Argument' and an 'Evaluation'. The latter part addresses three questions: 'What is Dasein?'; 'Is the Analysis of Dasein Accurate?' and 'Is it sufficient for adequately addressing the Question of the Meaning of Being?'.

The essay is written in Stein's clear and economic style, where rhetoric gives place to reasoning, and where criticism is given straightforwardly without flattery, polemics or irony. It contains Stein's Heidegger critique, which may be read as a key to *Finite and Eternal Being* as a whole. The *Auseinandersetzung* with Heidegger opens up for regarding Stein's work as an alternative to Heidegger's development of phenomenology, an alternative which draws on the philosophical tradition instead of rejecting it.

A few critical studies of the relationship between Stein and Heidegger and of the text before us have appeared, such as, for instance: Hugo Ott, 'Edith Stein und Freiburg', in *Studien zur Philosophie von Edith Stein*, ed. by E.W. Orth (München – Freiburg: Alber, 1993), pp. 107–45³; Antonio Calcagno, 'Die Fülle oder das Nichts? Edith Stein und Martin Heidegger on the Question of Being', in *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly*, 74 (2000), 269–85 (rewritten for the author's book, *The Philosophy of Edith Stein* (Duquesne: University of Duquesne Press, 2007)); John Nota, 'Edith Stein and Martin Heidegger', in *Edith Stein Symposium, Carmelite Studies 4*, ed. by John Sullivan (Washington D.C.: ICS Publications, 1987) pp. 50–73 (a German version is found in *Denken in Dialog: zur Philosophie Edith Steins*, ed. by Waltraud Herbstrith (Tübingen: Attempto, 1991), pp. 93–117; Lidia Ripamonti, 'Sein, Wesen bei Edith Stein und Martin Heidegger', in *Die unbekannte Edith Stein: Phänomenologie und Sozialphilosophie*, ed. by Beate Beckmann-Zöller and Hanna-Barbara Gerl-

Falkovitz (Frankfurt A.M.: Peter Lang, 2006), pp. 155–68; Mette Lebeck, ‘Edith Stein and Martin Heidegger on the Meaning of Being’, in *Edith Stein Phenomenologist and Theologian*, ed. by Kathleen Haney (forthcoming). For the purpose of critical examination, the reader is referred to these; the aim of the present publication is merely to make available an English translation of the German text.

The glossary compiled by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson in their translation of Heidegger’s *Being and Time* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967) has served as guide to translate terms coined by Heidegger in the four works covered by Stein’s critique. In addition existing translations of these works have been consulted: *Being and Time*, trans. by J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967); *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, trans. by James S. Churchill (Bloomington – London: Indiana University Press, 1962); *The Essence of Reasons*, trans. by Terrence Malick (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969); *What is Metaphysics?*, trans. by R.F.C. Hull and Alan Crick in Martin Heidegger, *Existence and Being* (London: Vision, 1949). These translations have been altered whenever it was thought necessary to bring out points emphasised by Stein from the German original, or when there was some difficulty in the existing translation. *Sein*, for example, has consistently been rendered as ‘being’, not ‘Being’, and other capitalisations have also been avoided (e.g. Existence, Interpretation, Experience, Nothingness). *Seiendes* has been rendered by ‘the being’, ‘the beings’ or ‘beings’ and not by either ‘entity’, ‘what-is’ or ‘essent’. *Augenblick* has been translated by ‘moment’ and not by ‘moment of vision’; *Angst* by ‘anguish’ and not by ‘dread’, nor has it been left untranslated, *pace* Stambauch, to avoid unpalatable hybrid forms like ‘angsted’ and ‘angsting’. *Mitsein* has not been left untranslated either, but has been translated by ‘being-with’. *Mensch* has been translated by ‘human being’ and not by ‘man’; *existential* by (an) ‘existential’; *Nichts* by ‘nothingness’; *nichtig* by ‘null’; *Entfernung* by ‘distance’; *Gegenstand* by ‘object’ (not ob-ject) and *Verfall* not only by ‘deterioration’, *pace* Macquarrie and Robinson, but also by ‘decay’ and ‘degeneration’ to facilitate a smoother English expression.

Punctuation has been retained as far as possible, but sometimes the sentences have been broken up or a parenthesis introduced. Stein’s italicisation has been kept as restored by the editor of the *Gesamtausgabe* edition of *Endliches und ewiges Sein*, Andreas Uwe Müller. He draws attention to the fact that Stein uses italics to underline the importance of what is said, and quotation marks to mark either her own translation of a Greek or Latin term, a term that is under discussion, or when a metalinguistic level is indicated (p. xvii). We have departed from Müller restoration only to italicise also the titles of works by Stein left in quotation marks.

German lends itself to the precise use of pronouns (*ihrer, ihre, sein, seinen, seiner*, etc.), whereas English of course does not. Hence such pronouns have sometimes been replaced by the noun to which they refer. At other times, however, ‘it’, ‘this’ or ‘these’ stands in, even if it opens up some ambiguity, which may be less present in the German text. ‘He’ and ‘she’, and their derivatives, are used as equivalent, when not referring to a specific person.

Many thanks are due to Sarah Borden for her careful reading of the translation, and for her many helpful suggestions to improve it in different ways. Thanks are also due to Pat Gorevan and Cyril McDonnell for their contributions to the readability and completion of the text.

BEING AND TIME

It is not possible in a few pages to give a picture of the riches and the power of the often truly enlightening investigations contained in Heidegger's great torso *Being and Time*. Perhaps no other book has influenced contemporary philosophical thought in the last ten years so strongly as this one,⁴ even if one repeatedly gets the impression that only the newly-coined *words* are picked up, without realisation of their radical meaning and incompatibility with other conceptual tools often thoughtlessly used as well.⁵

Here we shall merely attempt to outline the fundamental structure of the work so as to be able to make a judgement about it, insofar as that is possible.

A. Outline of the Argument

The work has as its aim to 'raise anew the question of the meaning of being'.⁶ The reasons advanced for aiming in this manner are the *objective-scientific primacy* of the being-question: 'Basically all ontology [...] remains blind and perverted from its ownmost aim, if it has not first adequately clarified the meaning of Being, and conceived this clarification as its fundamental task';⁷ and the claim that until now no satisfactory solution has been found, nor has an appropriate manner of questioning been achieved. The significant attempts in Plato and Aristotle have not been able to advance towards the goal, because the ontology of antiquity generally regarded a *specific way of being* — *the being-present-at-hand* — *to be being as such*. As a consequence being was presupposed as the most general and self-evident, neither yielding nor needing a definition. The ontology of Antiquity was retained throughout the Middle Ages and also by the most influential attempts of modern times: Descartes and Kant.

In order to obtain an answer to the question concerning the meaning of being, one must question *beings*, and not any being, but *that being to whose being the asking for the meaning of being and a certain anticipatory ('pre-ontological') understanding of being belongs*. This being, 'which each of us is himself' is called 'Dasein',⁸ 'because we cannot define Dasein's essence by citing a "what" of the kind that pertains to a subject-matter, and because its essence lies rather in the fact that in each case it has its being to be, and has it as its own'.⁹ As its understanding of being concerns not only its own being (which is called *existence*), but also the being which is not Dasein, 'Fundamental Ontology, from which alone all other [ontologies] may arise, must be sought in the *existential analytic of Dasein*'.¹⁰ Thus the first part of the work is dedicated to the interpretation of Dasein: its first section contains a preparatory analysis of Dasein, the second will show 'temporality as the meaning of the being we call Dasein'.¹¹ Whereas the understanding of being belongs to the being of this being, 'time needs to be explained primordially as *the horizon for the understanding of being, and in terms of temporality as the being of Dasein, which understands being*'.¹² A third section was to have treated of 'Time and Being', in the sense that not only Dasein were to be conceived as temporal, but *being as such* should have been 'conceived in terms of time'.¹³ It seems that this section was written together with the two previous ones (more than once reference is made to its sub-sections); but it was never

published. Equally, the entire second part — necessitated by reference to the historicity of Dasein and its understanding of being as a ‘destruction of the history of ontology’ (Kant–Descartes–Aristotle) — remains merely announced.

1. The Preliminary Analysis of Dasein

The *preliminary investigation* designates as a characteristic of *Dasein’s being* that it is *in each case mine* (i.e. is as such individual and not a universal); that it *relates to itself* and that its being or its *existence is its essence*. What belongs to the structure of this being is designated as an ‘*existential*’. The existentials correspond to the categories of the *present-at-hand*. Dasein, however, is not a present-at-hand, not a ‘*what*’, but a ‘*who*’. It ‘has’ no possibilities as ‘attributes’, but ‘is’ its possibilities. Its *proper being* is its *having-to-become-itself*. The expressions ‘I’, ‘subject’, ‘soul’, ‘person’, even ‘human being’ and ‘life’ are avoided, because they either signify a reification of Dasein (the ontology of Antiquity and Christian dogmatics mistakenly place Dasein under the categories of the present-at-hand according to Heidegger), or intend a kind of non-thingly being which remains unclarified.

Dasein is then contemplated in its *everydayness*. To it belongs essentially the ‘*being-in-the-world*’, of which different things are emphasised: the ‘in-the-world’, the ‘who’, who are in the world, and the ‘being-in’. With ‘world’ is not understood the totality of all objects present-at-hand, nor a certain area of beings (like for example ‘nature’); but *that wherein a Dasein lives*, which is not to be understood in terms of anything else than Dasein. The ‘*being-in*’ has *nothing* to do with *spatiality*. It is an existential, something that belongs to Dasein’s mode of being as such, independent of the spatial extendedness of the body. ‘Being-in-the-world’ is characterised by ‘*concern*’ (in the many senses of ‘enduring’, ‘achieving’, ‘obtaining’, and ‘being apprehensive’). Knowing is also a kind of concern. One falsifies its original character if one sees it as a relationship between present-at-hands (*subject* and *object*). It is a kind of in-being, and admittedly not the fundamental one, but a *modification of the original in-being*. The original in-being is a *dealing* with things, whereby these are regarded not merely as something ‘present-at-hand’ but also as ‘equipment’ which is there to be used for something (material, tool, item of practical use): as ‘*ready-to-hand*’. All of these are understood to be something ‘*for...*’; revealed by the sight that is *circumspection*. The theoretical attitude is in contrast a non-circumspect mere-seeing. In frictionless dealings with things which are ‘ready-to-hand’, these stay unobtrusive, inconspicuous, docile. Only when something shows itself as useless does it stand out and impose itself, in contrast with what is used, but just not ‘available’. What imposes itself as useless discloses its *being-present-at-hand*. Failure or uselessness becomes a *referral* from the individual to the *totality of equipment* and to the *world*. Concern arises always already on the basis of a familiarity with the world. Dasein understands itself as a being in the world and understands the *significance* of the world. It has with everything in it a *certain involvement*, and at the same time ‘one lets it be involved’, i.e. one ‘sets the things free’, when they do not directly provoke attack and reformation.

Every item of equipment has its *place* and its *region* in the totality of equipment where it belongs: it is ‘in its place’ or it is ‘lying about’. This is *spatiality*, which belongs to the items of equipment as such; it is not to be

explained by a space of indifferent places already present-at-hand into which things are put. But because of the unity of the totality of involvements all places combine to form a unity. *Dasein* is also *spatial*. But its spatiality signifies neither that it has a position in objective space, nor a place like the ready-to-hand. It is determined by ‘*distance*’ and ‘*directionality*’. ‘Distance’ (suppression of the far-away) means the bringing of ready-to-hand into its proper nearness.^[14] ‘Directionality’ means its having directions in the environment (right, left, up, down, etc.) and its encountering all things spatial. By this, space is not yet made to stand out, however. Space is neither ‘in’ the subject, nor is the world ‘in’ it as in an already present-at-hand. Space belongs to the world as something that co-structures it. In an attitude where *Dasein* has given up its original concern while still ‘contemplating’, it can be brought out for it and seen as ‘pure homogenous space’.

The *who* of *Dasein* is no present-at-hand substance, but a *form of existence*. ‘[T]he human being’s substance is not the spirit as a synthesis of soul and body; it is rather *existence*’.¹⁵ It belongs to *Dasein* to *be-with* other beings who also have the form of *Dasein*. This [being-with] is not a finding of other subjects that are present-at-hand, but is instead a being-with-one-another which is already presupposed for learning and understanding (empathy). To *Dasein*’s understanding of being belongs the understanding of others. ‘This understanding, like any understanding, is not an acquaintance derived from knowledge about them, but a primordial, existential kind of being, which makes such knowledge and acquaintance possible in the first place’.¹⁶ So *Dasein* is from the start *with-being-there-in-the-world*. Its subject — and the subject of the everyday *Dasein* generally — is not its own proper self, but a *they-self*: it is not a sum of subjects, nor a genus or kind, but — just like the authentic *self* which is covered over in the they-self — an *essential existential*.

Having clarified the ‘*world*’ and the ‘*who*’, the *being-in* can now be better grasped. *Dasein* means being *there*, and that implies being here as distinct from over there: openness to a spatial world; it means further ‘being there for itself’. This openness is claimed to be the meaning of the ‘talk of the *lumen naturale* in man’, it ‘means nothing other than the existential-ontological structure of this being, that it is in such a way as to be its “there”. That it is “illuminated” means that *as being-in-the-world* it is cleared in itself, not through another being, but in such a way that it *is* itself the clearing.’¹⁷ Being open does not rely on reflective perception, but is an existential, something that belongs to *Dasein* as such. We find in *Dasein* the *state-of-mind* and *understanding* as equi-primordial. The ‘state-of-mind’ refers to an internal mood. *Dasein* is always in some ‘mood’ or other; it comes neither ‘from the outside’ nor ‘from the inside’, but is a way of being-in-the-world. And it reveals to *Dasein* its ‘thrownness’: it finds itself as being in the world and thus in this or that mood. ‘The pure “that it is” shows itself, but the whence and the whither remain in darkness.’¹⁸ ‘Finding itself’ — that means nothing else, than that it is open to itself. This openness is one of the meanings of *understanding*. It harbours moreover an ‘understanding of [...]’, i.e. a possibility or ability, which as belonging to its being is transparent. ‘*Dasein* is not a present-at-hand which in addition possesses a competence; it is rather primarily its being-possible.’¹⁹ Existential understanding is that from which both thought and intuition derives. In addition to understanding its own possibilities, the inner-worldly possibilities of significance for *Dasein* are also understood: *Dasein*

constantly *projects* its being unto possibilities. It *is in* this projection always already that which it is not as yet, because of its understanding of being.

Understanding may develop into *interpretation*, i.e. into an understanding of *something as something*. Such interpretation may not necessarily express itself linguistically. Simple understanding is always presupposed as an understanding from within a totality of meaning; in such a totality of meaning is implied a *fore-having*, a *fore-sight* and a *fore-conception* pointing in a certain direction.

Being, which is opened up to Dasein, has a meaning. What is understood are the beings themselves; meaning is not *in-itself*, but it is rather an existential determination. Only Dasein can be *meaningful* or *meaningless*. What is not of Dasein is *nonsensical*, and only it can be *absurd*. Meaning is structured by interpretation and already in understanding disclosed as susceptible of being structured. When a ready-to-hand stands out from its context and is having something attributed to it, the interpretation is changed into *expression*. This implies three things:

1. *Pointing out* a being or something relating to being;
2. *Determination* of beings (predication);
3. *Communication* as letting-see-with.

Founded in understanding, *speech* and *hearing* belongs to the being of Dasein — to its openness and its being-with. The understood totality of meaning is expressed by its structure through speech. What is spoken is the *language* (of which speech is the existential foundation). That *about which* we speak, are beings.

In the everyday Dasein of the ‘they’, speech has deteriorated into *idle talk*. In idle talk there is no original understanding of things, but a mere *understanding of words*, whether in hearing or in talking. What is understood, is not the beings but rather the talking as such.

Original appropriation of beings is *sight*: in the form of original prudently concerned understanding, knowing or contemplative gazing. As sight relates to curiosity, so speech relates to idle talk.^[20] *Curiosity* is the craving to see for the sake of seeing, not in order to understand; it is restless, relentless, leading to distraction. Idle talk and curiosity are closely linked, idle talk determines what one must have read and seen. Add to this the third characteristic of deterioration, *ambiguity*: that one no longer knows the difference between original and mere inauthentic understanding. *Deterioration* is a mode of being wherein Dasein is neither itself, with things or with the other, but only pretends to be all this. ‘This kind of *not-being* has to be conceived as the kind which is closest to Dasein, in which Dasein maintains itself for the most part. This is why Dasein’s deterioration should not be taken to be a *fall* from a purer and higher *primal status*.’²¹

Until now the investigation has clearly shown *existentiality* and *facticity* to be the constitution of Dasein’s being. Existentiality designates the specific characteristic of Dasein, that to its being belongs a relation to itself, that it is ‘brought before itself and becomes disclosed to itself in its thrownness’; facticity designates the thrownness which ‘as a kind of being, belongs to a being which in each case *is* its possibilities, and is them in such a way that it understands itself in these possibilities, projecting itself upon them’. ‘The self, however, is proximally and for the most part inauthentically the they-self [...]. *Accordingly Dasein’s average everydayness can be defined as the falling-open thrown-projecting being-in-the-world, for whom its ownmost potentiality-for-Being is an issue, both in its being alongside the world and in its being-with others*’.²² Now an attempt is made

to grasp the thus presented understanding of being in its *totality*, and to show the intimate relationship of its individual features designated by *existentiality* and *facticity*. To this end Dasein's *fundamental state-of-mind*, in which this relationship could become clear, is sought. There must be 'in Dasein an understanding state-of-mind in which Dasein is specifically disclosed to itself'.²³ It will be shown that *anguish* meets this condition. While fear always is directed towards something threatening in the world, anguish is not anguish for something in the world, but for being-in-the-world itself. Yes, it is anguish that brings the 'world' as such in sight. It is anguish 'for' being-alone-in-the-world (as 'solus ipse'), i.e. for an authentic being from which Dasein in its deterioration flees into the world and the 'they'. Even from the point of view of this turning away can anguish be detected with hindsight. That *about which* Dasein is anguished is its possibility for being in the world. The deterioration is a deflection of its own free possibilities to be towards being-by-the-world and to the 'they-self'. In the possibilities it is always already 'ahead of itself' — and this belongs to being thrown; its being-ahead is named '*care*' and is the foundation for all concern and solicitude, all wishing and willing, all addiction and urge.

According to Heidegger it is a reversal of the order of being to want to understand the being of Dasein in terms of *reality* and *substantiality*. According to him the tradition understands reality to be nothing but 'the being of beings that are present-at-hand within-the-world (*res*) [...]';²⁴ one could also take it in a wider sense including the different ways of being of innerworldly beings. As the understanding of being is something that belongs to Dasein, there is understanding of being only when Dasein is. From this it follows that being itself, if not beings, is dependent on Dasein. The *substance of human beings* — understood as caring — is claimed to be their *existence*.

If *truth* and being belong so closely together as tradition has always held since Parmenides, then the original meaning of truth must also be obtainable from the analysis of Dasein. The common definition of truth as *adequatio rei et intellectus* does not manage to point to an equality or similarity between subject and object or between ideal judgement content and fact, through which speaking of an agreement can be justified. *The assertion states something of the thing*: it is *the same* thing of which something is taken to be true and of which something is stated. Truth is equivalent with *being true*, and that means *being revealing* (*ἀλήθεια*²⁵ — revealedness). It pertains thus originally to Dasein. Only in a derived manner is *revealedness* of beings in-the-world to be designated as truth. This is because of *Dasein's openness*: *it is in the truth*. Likewise, however, — in its deterioration — it is in *falsity* when covered over by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity.

The *assertion* is a *pointing* to beings growing out of understanding and interpretation. As asserted, however, it becomes ready-and-present-to-hand, and as such it is brought into relation with the ready-and-present-at-hand of which it is an assertion: in this way is achieved the accord between knowledge (= judgement) and beings (= *res*). The modification must be understood to stem from the fact that all truth must first be wrought from beings; that revealedness in contrast with hiddenness — as something unusual — demands proof. The *truth of judgement* is thus *not the most original* [form of truth], but is indeed derived. In its original meaning truth is an existential. As such *truth is only when Dasein is*. There can only be *eternal truths* if there were an *eternal Dasein*, and only if the latter were proven to exist, *would* the former be shown to be. On the other hand truth must

be, as it belongs inextricably to Dasein. We must ‘presuppose’ it, as we ‘presuppose’ ourselves, i.e. as always already found thrown into Dasein.

II. Dasein and Temporality

The preparatory investigation of Dasein is at an end. It should serve the purpose of disclosing *the meaning of being*. To suffice for this it should have conceived *Dasein in its totality and authenticity*. Recapitulating, the question is raised whether this has been achieved with the determination of Dasein’s existence as care. It is decided, however, that something essential is still missing. If Dasein is concerned with its own possibility, this obviously entails that there is something which it is not yet. In order to be grasped in its totality, also its end — *death* — must be grasped, something which only is possible in being towards death. In order to show moreover the authenticity of Dasein, it must be indicated how it testifies to itself, and this happens in *conscience*. Only when the authentic possibility of Dasein’s being can be accounted for in its entirety is the analytic of Dasein’s original being secured, and this is only possible when Dasein’s *temporality* and *historicality* have been accounted for. The death, conscience, temporality and historicity of Dasein are thus the objects of the following investigations.

The specificity of Dasein’s being as *care*, in which it is ahead of itself and according to which something of its being always remains *outstanding* seems to exclude an understanding of Dasein in its totality. It must therefore be shown that *death can be grasped*, and that as a consequence the entirety of Dasein can be grasped along with it.

The experience of the death of others is not an authentic experience of death. We experience their not-being-any-more-in-the-world, a transition from Dasein to something which comes close to sheer being-present-at-hand but which nevertheless does not coincide with it, as what is left behind is no mere body-thing, nor is it something merely dead; but for us being-with and care are still possible in relation to the one who has ‘died’. And the ceasing to be is only a ceasing for us; it is not understood from the point of view of the one who is dying, *we do not experience the dying of the other*. While standing in for the other is — to a large extent — possible in the being-in-the-world which is concern, *no one can take upon herself the death of another. As the ending of Dasein* it is itself an *existential*, and it can, in so far as it can be *experienced at all, only be so as mine*, not from the point of view of others’.

The ‘outstanding’, which belongs to Dasein’s being and which matures in death, is not the outstanding of a not yet ready-to-hand, which becomes disposable of its kind (like an outstanding debt). It is not the immaturity of the fruit which is consumed in the ripening, and it is not like the unfinishedness of the road ending only at the goal. The ending that lies in death is also not a disappearing (like the rain that stops). It cannot be understood in terms of anything else but the being of Dasein itself, i.e. in terms of care. *Dying* is neither identical to the ‘perishing’ of a living being, nor to the *demise* as a passage from life to being-dead, but it is the *mode of being* in which Dasein *is* towards death.²⁶

‘The existential interpretation of death takes precedence over any biology and ontology of life. But it also founds any investigation of death which is historico-biographical, or ethnologico-psychological. [...] On the other hand there

is in the ontological analysis of being-towards-the-end no anticipation of our taking any existential stance towards death. If death is defined as the “end” of Dasein, i.e. of being-in-the-world, this does not imply any ontical decision as to whether “after death” still another being is possible, whether higher or lower, or whether Dasein “lives on” or even “outlasts” itself as “immortal”. Nor is anything decided ontically about the “other-worldly” and its possibility, any more than about the this-worldly; [...]. But the analysis of death remains purely “this-worldly” in so far as it interprets the phenomenon merely in the way in which it “enters into” any particular Dasein as a possibility of its being. Only when death is conceived in its full ontological essence can we have any methodological assurance in even *asking* meaningfully and with justification *what may be after death*.²⁷ *Being towards death* is prefigured in care as the being-ahead-of-one-self. It belongs as originally to Dasein as being-thrown and expresses itself most clearly in *anguish*; but it is mostly hidden, as Dasein flees it in the mode of deterioration towards the present-at-hand. What *impends* is the *possibility-not-to-be*, the ownmost possibility of being free from all relations; but it impends not as something exterior imposing itself but as an ownmost possibility to be. The everyday idle talk of ‘the they’ makes this an event which ‘the they’ comes across, from which, thus, one’s individual self can feel secure.^[28] Idle talk makes anguish out to be fear of a threatening event and thus as something which one ought not to indulge in; it does not let the courage to anguish before death come up, but hides Dasein’s ownmost, non-relational possibility to be. In that the ‘they’ accords to death only an empirical certainty (as a fact of general experience), it hides Dasein’s own *authentic certainty* belonging to its openness: the specific certainty *that death is possible at every moment*, even if temporally undetermined. *Dasein is*, with this certainty, *already given* in some kind of totality.

The *authentic being towards death* is no concerned wanting-to-make-available, no waiting for a realisation; it envisages the ability-to-not-be as pure possibility, in that it *anticipates* it as its *ownmost* possibility, which it must take up itself *independently* of all relations, and which therefore reveals to it its authentic being together with the inauthenticity of average being and the other’s authentic possibility to be. From inside the *anguished* state-of-mind this possibility poses a threat. But for its totality it has significance, ‘as anticipation of the unrepeatable possibility opens up all its presented possibilities with it’, ‘it harbours the possibility of an existential anticipation of the whole of Dasein’.²⁹

Dasein’s authentic possibility for being whole, announcing itself in the anticipation of death, needs, however, *an attestation of the possible authenticity of its being* from Dasein itself. Such is found in *conscience*. From being lost in the ‘they’ Dasein must be called to itself. The voice of conscience has the character of a *call*. *Called* is *Dasein* itself *silently*, despite the they. *The calling* is again *Dasein*, but the appeal is not accomplished ‘by’ me, rather it ‘comes upon me’: Dasein in its anguish concerned with its own possibility to be as care, is the caller. The self is, for the Dasein lost in the they, a foreigner; from this stems the *foreignness* of the call. ‘The appeal to the self [...] does not force it inwards upon itself, so that it can close itself off from the ‘external world’.³⁰ ‘The call points *forward* to Dasein’s possibility to be [...]’ It ‘calls us back by calling us forth’.³¹ It speaks not of occurrences and gives nothing to talk about. When it speaks of *guilt*, this *guiltiness* designates an *existential: a reason for a not-being’s being*. (This is fundamental to all having of guilt.) Dasein, as thrown into existence (i.e. a being as project), is reason for its being: it is delivered over to being as reason for

the possibility to be. As it always stays behind its possibilities, as it in being *one* is *not* being another, it is *essentially* always reason for not-being and therefore always *guilty* (in a sense which is not oriented towards evil, but is presupposed for good and evil). The correct understanding of the call of conscience is thus *wanting to have a conscience*, to willingly act from the *freely-chosen ability to be*, and thus to be responsible. 'In fact all action is necessarily *conscienceless*, not only because it may fail to avoid some factual moral indebtedness, but because it for the null reason of its null projection already has, in being-with-others, become guilty towards them. Thus the wanting-to-have-conscience becomes the taking-over of that essential conscience-lessness within which alone the existential possibility of *being* 'good' subsists'.³² 'Thus conscience manifests itself [...] as an *attestation* belonging to Dasein's being, in which it calls Dasein face to face with its ownmost possibility to be.'³³ When the habitual interpretation of conscience as 'good' or 'bad' reckons things passed or warns against things in the future, this (mis)represents the call of conscience from the point of view of everyday concernedness, directed at the present-at- or ready-to-hand and fleeing from authentic being. The *correct understanding* of the appeal of conscience is as a *mode* of Dasein, indeed as *its openness*. The corresponding state of mind is *uncanniness*, the appropriate 'talk' to *remain silent*, in both of which Dasein takes upon itself its possibility-to-be. The whole is to be designated '*resoluteness*', and this means a 'distinctive mode of openness',³⁴ which is identical to *original truth*. Dasein is not by this released from its being-in-the-world, but is only now authentically *situated* and hence capable of *authentic being-with* and authentic solicitude.

In the wholeness which is hidden by anticipation, the *temporality of Dasein* marking all its fundamental determinations shows forth. '*As being towards the end which understands*, i.e. as anticipation of death, resoluteness becomes authentically what it can be.'³⁵ Being resolved means to be hidden and hide in the possibility to be, i.e. to be in the truth and to appropriate in being conscious the taking-of-something-to-be-true. The current 'situation' is not to foresee and it is not given beforehand as a present-at-hand; it 'merely gets disclosed in a free resolving which has not been determined but is open to determination.'³⁶ Hearing the appeal of conscience means Dasein's reverting back to authentic being, as well as the acceptance of its ownmost possibility to be in death, coming with anguish and uncertainty. To make this authentic being shine forth is not easy: it must first be weaned from the dissimulating everyday attitude.

With the term 'care' is designated the *entire structure of Dasein* (*facticity* as thrownness, *existence* as self-anticipation including being towards the end, *deterioration*). The *unity* of this whole expresses itself in the *self* or *I*: it is not to be understood as 'res', nor as 'res cogitans'; nor does it speak from the I, but it expresses itself silently in care, and it is 'independent' in authentic being. It belongs to the meaning of care, i.e. to the being of 'a being for which this being is an issue', that this being understands itself in its being. 'The meaning of Dasein's being is not something free-floating which is other than and outside of itself, but it is the self-understanding Dasein itself.'³⁷ The understanding of self is understanding of the ownmost possibility to be and this is possible because Dasein *comes to itself* in its being. Likewise it is *what it has been*, and it is this *by something present*: future, having been (past), and present are its *outside itself* or the *ecstases* of its *temporality*. The *future* has *primacy*. With it Dasein, future and

temporality are given as *finite*. What in relation to this original time the infinite means still remains to be shown.

If the being of Dasein is essentially temporal, this temporality must be noticeable in all that belongs to its constitution of being. *Understanding* as projection is authentically oriented towards the *future*, insofar as it anticipates. In contrast *everyday understanding* as care has only authentic future in that it expects the cared-for. The *moment* is the *authentic present*, in which the self recollects itself and opens up a situation by its *resolution*. Authentic understanding takes *having-been-being* upon itself, while concern lives in *forgetfulness* of the having-been. The temporality of inauthentic understanding in which the self is closed up is thus a forgetting-making present-expecting.

The *state of mind*, which being-thrown unveils and which accompanies every understanding, is founded *primarily* on *having-been-being*, even if it is directed towards future things; for example, anguish is authentically, and fear inauthentically, flight from having-been-being and from the lost present into the threatening future that must be faced. It is essential to the having-been which belongs to the state-of-mind of anguish that it brings before Dasein its 'repeatability': Anguish 'brings back to the pure "that" of the most authentic individualised thrownness. This bringing back has neither the character of an evasive forgetting nor that of a remembering. But equally does anguish not imply a repeat taking over of existence in resolution. On the contrary, anguish brings back to thrownness as something that can *possibly be repeated*. And in this way it is revealed *with* the possibility of an authentic possibility to be, which, in repetition must come back to its thrown "there".'³⁸

Deterioration has its *temporality primarily* in the *present* where curiosity always tends to be occupied with something; its *emptiness* stands in the greatest possible contrast to the *moment* of authentic being.

To *temporality* belongs at all times all three *ecstases*, and these are not to be understood as *one next to the other*.

'The being which bears the title Dasein is "cleared"',³⁹ not through a 'present-at-hand implanted power', but in that 'ecstatic temporality clears the there *primordially*'.⁴⁰ Through it the unity of all existential structures becomes possible. From it being-in-the-world is to be understood, [as well as] the meaning of the world's being and its transcending.

Prudent concern and theoretical understanding are modes of being-in-the-world. It is characteristic of the *temporality of prudent concern* that the wherefore of the *present* and *retained* totalities of involvement are *expected*. The current concern takes off from inside a totality of involvement. Its original understanding is called *overseeing* and has its 'light' from Dasein's possibility to be. Practical *deliberation* concerning the involvement relations of the ready-to-hand is a making present of possibilities. In the transition to *theoretical knowledge* lies not only an example of praxis — theory requires no less its own praxis — but a revision of *what is now present-at-hand*: outside its relations and its place, in an indifferent space. This is thematisation, in which the uncovered present-at-hand can be set free and meet us as an object; a special making-present founded in resoluteness — 'in the disclosedness of the "there" the world is disclosed along with it'⁴¹ — and in Dasein's transcending of thematised being.

To Dasein belong the three ecstases and being-in-the-world, which is itself temporal. *Dasein's being* as thrown, concerned, making present, and even as thematising and objectifying, always *presupposes a world* in which something

present-at-hand or ready-to-hand can be met. On the other hand, *without Dasein* there is *no world* either. 'It is existing its world'.⁴² The 'subject' 'as an existing Dasein whose being is grounded in temporality',⁴³ obliges us to say: the *world* is *more objective* than every possible object.

Dasein's *temporality* is not one in which space is coordinated to time. But the *spatiality* of Dasein is temporal. Dasein is not at a point in space, but rather takes up space (and not only that which the body fills. 'Because Dasein is "spiritual", and *only because of this*, can it be spatial in a way which remains essentially possible for the extended corporeal thing').⁴⁴ It is directed out in space and uncovers regions wherefrom and whereto it expects something and where things become present. Its temporality makes it possible for it to take up space. In the approaching making present which gives preference to deterioration, the yonder is forgotten and it appears hereafter only as a *thing in space*.

Everyday Dasein has its own special temporality. It is as Dasein 'is for the most part'; running its course 'like yesterday, so today and tomorrow'; and in addition including an habitual calculation with time. Everydayness thus means temporality; as 'this makes possible the *being* of Dasein, an adequate conceptual delimitation of everydayness can succeed only in a framework in which the meaning of being in general and its possible variations are discussed in principle'.⁴⁵

Because understanding of being is necessary to disclose the meaning of being, and as understanding of being is something that belongs to Dasein's constitution, the analysis of Dasein is used as a preparation for the investigation of the meaning of being. The analysis has so far determined the *being of Dasein as care* and therewith as *being towards death*. For the sake of completion, moreover, *birth* and the *relationship between birth and death* is to be included. This relation is not to be conceived as a succession of real moments in time. Dasein's temporality with its three equally real ecstases shows that Dasein does not primarily order itself according to time, its being is a self-stretching to which birth and death always belong, and to which these are what happens. This happening, which follows from Dasein's temporality, is a pre-condition for history (= the science of what has happened). *Historicality and being-in-time both follow from original temporality*; therefore history is also secondary in time.

According to common linguistic usage *historical* has a fourfold sense; it signifies: 1. What has *passed* (and that as either what is no longer influential or what remains so); 2. That *wherefrom* something comes about or descends; 3. The whole of that which is *in time*; in particular: 4. The *being that is human* ('spirit', 'culture'). The four senses are taken together in the affirmation that: 'History is that specific occasioning of existent Dasein which comes to pass in time, so that that which is "past" in the being-with-one-another, and which at the same time has been "handed down to us" and is continually effective, is regarded as "history" in the sense that it gets emphasised'.^[46] But *primarily historical* is *Dasein*, which is not 'past' (no longer present-at-hand), as it never was 'present-at-hand'; and *secondarily* all that is *internal to the world* of a having-been Dasein (it is called the 'world-historical'): for example, equipment that still is present-at-hand when the world in which it was ready-to-hand no longer is.

Dasein exists in possibilities that are handed on and into which it is *thrown*, but which it nevertheless takes upon itself in *free resolution* as its *destiny*. By *destiny* we designate 'the primordial happening of Dasein, which lies in authentic resoluteness and in which it hands itself over, free for death itself, in a

possibility which it has inherited and yet has chosen'.⁴⁷ 'Fate as the powerless superior power of the concealed preparing itself for adversity, ready for anguish in a projection of itself on its own being-guilty requires care as its ontological condition for its possibility, that is to say, [it requires] *temporality*.'⁴⁸

'Only a being which, in its being, is essentially *futural* so that it is free for its death and can let itself be thrown back upon its factual "there" by shattering itself against death, that is, only a being which, as futural, is equiprimordially *having-been*, can, by handing down the inherited possibility, take over the own thrownness and instantaneously be for "its time". Only authentic temporality which at the same time is finite makes something like fate, that is to say, authentic historicity, possible.'⁴⁹

'*Repeating is explicit handing down*, that is to say, the going back to the possibilities of the Dasein that has-been-there.'⁵⁰ It allows not only a returning to what was previously real. 'It does not abandon itself to that which is past, nor does it aim at progress. Both are indifferent to authentic existence in the moment.'^[51]

In *being-with* others Dasein has part in the *destiny of the community*. Fate and destiny are being-towards-death. Thus *all history has its gravity in the future*, which only inauthentic historicity covers up.

The *innerworldly present-at-hand* is historical not only insofar as it is in the world, but insofar as *something happens to it* (which is fundamentally different compared to natural events). In the *inauthentic sense* of everyday concern the distracted Dasein collects its life from these particular happenings. In the *authentic being* of resoluteness it lives in its fate and in faithfulness to its own self.

History is existentially founded in Dasein's essential historicity. Its theme is neither what merely happens once, nor something universal which floats above it, 'but the possibility which has been factually existent':⁵² The possibilities which drive history, which are from the itself historically determined Dasein, are repeated. Nietzsche's tripartition [of history] in *monumental*, *antiquarian*, and *critical* is necessary, and corresponds to the three ecstasies of temporality.⁵³

The final chapter will show what significance *temporality and internal time* have for *the origin of the vulgar concept of time*. Before all measuring of time, Dasein *counts on time* (which it *has, has not, loses*, etc.). It finds time first in the inner-worldly ready-to-hand and present-at-hand, and it understands itself as a present-at-hand. The *origin of the vulgar concept of time* derives from Dasein's temporality.

Everyday 'concern' always expresses itself temporally as expecting-when, retentive-then and present now. Thus it dates all 'then, when...', 'at the time that...', 'now, as...'. The irresolute Dasein always *loses* time and *has* therefore none. The resolute never loses time and thus always has some. 'For the temporality of resoluteness has [...] the character of a moment [...]. This kind of temporal existence has always time *for* what the situation demands of it'.⁵⁴ Because Dasein exists *with others*, who understand its now, then, etc., as also dated by others, *time* is not understood as one's own, but as *public*.

Counting on time is founded necessarily in Dasein's basic constitution as *care*. 'Dasein's being thrown is the reason why public time exists;⁵⁵ time 'in which' there is — within-time — present-at-hand and ready-to-hand. As *brightness* belongs to the sight of the world into which Dasein is thrown, Dasein *dates* according to day and night ('it is time to ...'), *counts* time in days, and

measures these by the position of the sun. The time which is based in concern is always ‘time to ...’; it belongs to the world’s worldliness and is therefore called ‘world-time’. It is *datable*, *tense*, and *public*. To read the time is always a now-saying expressing a making-present. In the *measuring of time* its being made public is accomplished, according to which it always and at any time is given for everyone as ‘now, now and now’. It is dated according to spatial measurement relations, without thereby becoming spatial itself. Only through the measurement of time do we arrive at *the* time, and to every thing in *its own* time. It is *neither subjective nor objective*, as it makes world and the being of the self possible. Only Dasein is *temporal*; the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand exist merely *within time*.

The above serves as a foundation to show the *origin of the vulgar concept of time*: with the openness of the world time is made public and busy. Insofar as Dasein counts on *itself*, it counts on time. One regulates oneself according to time by the use of the clock, by reading the pointers. In this lies a present retention of then and a making present of later. The time that shows itself in this ‘is the *counted* expecting, counting following of the travelling pointer showing itself.’⁵⁶ It expresses the *Aristotelian* definition of *time* as the *number of movement*: it stays with the natural understanding of being without making it into a problem. The more concern loses itself in the equipment provided, the more naturally it counts on time, without paying attention to it itself, and it takes it ‘as a sequence of constant *present-at-hand*, simultaneously passing away and coming along now’, ‘as a succession, as a stream of now [...]’.⁵⁷ This world-time = now-time, lacks the datability (= meaningfulness) of *temporality*: This is *original time*. Because time is seen as a present-at-hand now-succession, one calls it the *image of eternity* (Plato). The tension of world-time, which follows from the extendedness of temporality, remains covered up. Because every *now* is understood both as a *just now* and an *immediately*, time is understood to be *infinite*. This is founded on *care*, which flees from death and ignores the end. One speaks of the passing away, but not of the beginning of time, as one cannot conceal the evanescence of time to oneself: Dasein knows it from ‘its “fleeting” knowledge about its death’.⁵⁸

Also in the *irreversibility* of time is revealed its origin from temporality, which is primarily futural.

The *moment* cannot be explained from the vulgarly understood *now*, nor can the datable then and at that time. In contrast, the *traditional concept of eternity* can be seen to originate from it *as a standing now*. From the point of view of *original temporality*, *God’s eternity can only be understood as infinite time*. In the juxtaposition of *time and soul* or spirit in Aristotle, Augustine, Hegel an approach to the *understanding of Dasein as temporality* is opened up.

The analysis of Dasein was the way to prepare the question of the meaning of being. The difference between Dasein-like and non-Dasein-like being has hitherto not been elucidated; nor has the fact that ontological interpretation, which since time immemorial has been directed on thingly being, has again and again deteriorated. Everything was ordered to show temporality as the basic constitution of Dasein. Thus the investigation ends with the question: ‘Is there a way which

leads from primordial *time* to the meaning of *being*? Does time itself manifest itself as the horizon of being?'⁵⁹

B. Evaluation

The goal of the entire work was nothing else but to ask the question of the meaning of being in an appropriate manner. *Is* thus the question with which the work rings out identical with this question that was put aside, or is a doubt expressed as to whether the way chosen was the right one? Whatever the case is, it invites us to look back at the road taken and to question it.

It will not be possible to give attention to all the difficulties which the quite short abstract lets shine through.⁶⁰ To this end a large volume would be necessary. Here we shall merely concentrate on the main features of the thought and attempt to answer the following questions:

1. What is 'Dasein'?
2. Is the analysis of Dasein accurate?
3. Is it a sufficient foundation for posing the question of the meaning of being in an adequate manner?

1. What is Dasein?

It can hardly be doubted that Heidegger wants to understand *Dasein* as *the human kind of being*. We could also say: 'human beings', as Dasein often is called 'a being', without opposing the being, as 'that which is', with being itself. It is also directly said that the *essence* of human beings is *existence*. That means nothing else than that something is claimed for human beings which according to the *philosophia perennis* is reserved for God: the identity of essence and being. The human being is nevertheless not simply put in the place of God; 'Dasein' does not simply mean being, but a particular way of being, in contrast with which there are others: the present-at-hand and the ready-to-hand, and also something which here and there is hinted at, but which is not further discussed. The human being, however, is conceived as a little god insofar as it is claimed to be the being distinguished among all beings as *that* being from which alone information about the meaning of being is to be hoped for. God is spoken of only now and then in footnotes, and then only in a dismissive fashion: that divine being is something which could have significance for the meaning of being remains completely excluded.

The choice of the name 'Dasein' for human beings is *positively* founded on the fact that it belongs to their being to be 'there'; i.e. being open to itself in a world in which it is always 'directed' towards a 'yonder'. The *negative* reason is that the traditional and dogmatically determined definition of human beings as 'consisting of two substances, soul and body',⁶¹ which is implied by the name human being, should be excluded in advance. That the human being has a body is not disputed, but nothing further is said about it. In contrast, the way in which the 'soul' is spoken about indicates that this is a word behind which there is no clear meaning. This must not be understood to suggest that what we have here is a materialist outlook. In contrast: it is clearly stated that the 'spirit' (this is admittedly also a word we ought not to use) has priority.⁶² Apparently the analysis

of Dasein should give us the clarity that until now no ‘doctrine of soul’ has been able to.

What is left of the human being, when it is abstracted from body and soul? That another quite large volume could be written about this is perhaps the best proof of the distinction of essence and existence in human beings.^[63] That Heidegger does not get away from this distinction, even when he denies it, is shown by the fact that he constantly speaks of the ‘being of Dasein’: something which would have no meaning if by ‘Dasein’ was meant nothing else than the human kind of being. Moreover, he also speaks about something that belongs ‘essentially’ to Dasein. And when ‘being-in-the-world’ is set forth as belonging to Dasein, and ‘who’ is distinguished not only from the ‘world’ but also from ‘being-in’, then it is expressed that the word *Dasein* is used for different things intimately belonging together to the point where they cannot be without the others, and yet without being identical. Thus we must say: ‘Dasein’, for Heidegger, designates sometimes human beings (referred to as ‘whom’ or ‘self’), sometimes the being of human beings (in this case the expression the ‘being of Dasein’ is often used). This being, in its difference from other modes of being, is called *existence*. If we think of the formal structure of beings, as shown in our investigations — ‘something that is’ — then ‘something’ expresses the ‘who’ or ‘self’, the ‘that’ is articulated by body and soul, whereas the ‘being’ becomes valid in *existence*. Sometimes the analysis is concerned with the self, but mostly, however, it is dedicated to being.⁶⁴

2. Is the Analysis of Dasein Accurate?

It is nowhere expressly said — even though it probably is presupposed as self-evident — that the analysis as a whole does not claim to be complete. The fundamental determinations of the human being — e.g., state-of-mind, thrownness, and understanding — must be very undetermined abstractions, as they do not take account of the specificity of the psychosomatic being into consideration. (The ‘state-of-mind’ seems particularly important to me in order to ascertain what is bodily and what is of the soul, and how these relate, but its full meaning cannot be completely clarified, if it is not seen in its unfolding as relating to the being of body and soul). This incompleteness does not exclude, however, that what is said is genuinely informative about the human way of being. The description of the already mentioned fundamental constitution and its changing between the two different modes of everyday and authentic being must be described as masterly. It is probably largely thanks to this that the book has occasioned a strong and lasting effect. Is, however, this fundamental constitution to be evaluated as an analysis of the human being which proceeds as far as it can? Does the investigation not in many places and in surprising ways halt in front of references which present themselves in a direct and imperious manner?

The human being is designated as *thrown*. With this it is expressly made clear that the human being discovers itself in Dasein, without knowing how it came to be there, that it is not from and through itself and that it also cannot expect information concerning its origin from its own being. With this, however, the question concerning the origin does not completely disappear. One might try by whatever power to silence it till it dies or to prohibit it as meaningless — it always inevitably arises again from the displayed distinctiveness of the human

being and requires a something which is founding without being founded, something which founds itself: One that throws the 'thrown'. Thus thrownness reveals itself as creatureliness.⁶⁵

Especially plausible is the exposition of *everyday Dasein*: being-in-the-world, the concerned commerce with things, the being-with others. It must also unhesitatingly be conceded that human life 'firstly and for the most part' is life with others in traditional forms, before one's own and authentic being breaks through — a thought which Max Scheler already emphatically stressed. Are the reasons for this fact sufficiently illuminated, however, through the distinction between the 'they-self' and the 'authentic self', and the designation of either as 'an existential' or 'form of existence'? What we are to understand by an 'existential' is repeatedly stated: that which belongs to existence as such. And by existence we are to think of the being of beings, in which their being is in question, i.e. the human being as distinct from other modes of being. In contrast, the expression *form* is left completely unclarified. And we know from the investigations of this book how much in need of clarification it is.^[66] Thus we cannot gain from the expression *form of existence* any information about the meaning and the mutual relationship of the two 'selves'. That a who or a self belongs to existence seems obvious. But what characterises this 'existential' against another (as, for example, 'being-in-the-world' and 'understanding')? And again: what is the relationship between the they-self and the authentic self *at the level of being*? Is it not clear that in the constitution of being in human beings the 'self' plays a very special role, which it shares with no other existential? And has not Heidegger made the necessary clarification of this special role impossible in advance by declining to talk about 'I' or 'Person', while instead enumerating the possible meanings of these terms? With due regard to earlier clarifications we may well dare to affirm: what Heidegger intimates with the 'self' is the *personal being* of human beings. And it is the distinction of personal being before all else that belongs to being human, that the person as such is the bearer of all other 'existentials'.

Can both the 'authentic self' and the 'they-self' be claimed to be person in the full sense? It seems to me that one takes 'idle talk' too seriously if one wanted to show the 'they' this honour. In order to get to the heart of the matter, we must further investigate what in fact is meant by the 'they'.^[67]

In common parlance one often uses *one*, in the same sense in which I just used it here: '*one* takes idle talk too seriously...' Instead it could have been said that '*whoever* would, *he'd take* [idle talk too seriously]'. It is an expression of undetermined commonality of a hypothetical character: to 'taking seriously' as a personal attitude belongs a personal bearer; but it is not affirmed as a fact and not attributed to a specific person. The statement: '*one* uses the word usually in this sense' affirmatively establishes a fact. It concerns moreover a personal attitude: to a series of individual cases which are both experientially established and yet still to be expected, and to an undetermined circumference that common experience allows one also to affirm with a special certainty. Often the speaker designates him- or herself, as well as the one or those addressed, equally by 'one': for example: 'one could go for a walk on Sunday?' This can be due to a certain shyness to express the 'we', which in fact is meant, and it can thereby give expression to a not yet fully confessed or secretly guarded community; perhaps this is also a shyness which would like to hide from one-self as well as from the addressee the claim which lies in the question, the feelings of the questioner that

he perhaps goes further than what he ought to, or which could gain acceptance. With this we touch something that seems to lie in the Heideggerian 'one'. The speaker knows him- or herself to be ruled by a common law, or at least by a rule of assessment. He or she has an impression of what 'one ought' and 'ought not' to do. And in this the 'one' has a common meaning: it designates an undetermined circle of human beings, to whom the speaker knows himself or herself to belong.

To sum up we can say: 'one' means:

1. A certain group or an undetermined circle of individuals, ultimately all human beings, for whom something is valid as a common fact, or who are concerned by a common rule of attitude;

2. The individual insofar as he stands under the common law or knows himself to do so.

Should we conclude from this that the individual flees from his own self into the one [the they-self] and shifts its responsibility onto it? Let us stick to the examples Heidegger himself gives: 'One' prescribes, what 'one' ought to have read. It stands here in both senses: referring to the one that dictates, and the one concerned by the dictate. Those who 'must' have read this or that book are those belonging to a certain social stratum within a certain culture: 'barbarians' need not; our builders, insofar as they still live according to their state and do not claim to build cities, need not either; but the 'cultivated European' must. Many levels are here to be observed: some things are expected from the professor, the students, the lady of society, others are limited to a scientific speciality. Who determines what must be read? It is also those who belong to the same level, though not all those who make the claim theirs, but a small selection of predominant individuals. It is here much as it is in a state: here there is 'authority' and 'subjects'; it is simply not laid down by law and in fact not at all determined who belongs to one group and who to the other. At any rate, in one case as in the other, the 'one' is not existing outside of and next to the individual human beings, nor is it an authentic self; it designates a 'community' (in a wide sense of the word, including every kind of structure grown out from individuals as something that includes them),⁶⁸ as well as the members belonging to them as such. The 'predominant' individuals belong to a wider community but form among themselves a more restricted one.

What can then the flight into the 'one' [the they-self] mean? Who flies? Why and whereto? The individual flees — so we heard — before his or her ownmost and authentic being, which is a lonely and responsible one, into the community, and unloads his or her responsibility onto it, whether unto the more restricted one or the wider one. This can, strictly speaking, only be called a 'flight', when the individual is awake to authentic being and is conscious of responsibility. The first 'Dasein', in which the human being finds him or herself — 'thrown' — is not, however, the lonely one, but the communal one: the 'being-with'. According to its being the human being is co-originally individual and community-oriented, but its conscious life as an individual begins later than the communal life in time. The human being acts with and like what he sees others do, and is led and drawn by this. And this is perfectly in order as long as nothing else is demanded of him. A call is needed to awake the ownmost and most authentic being. If this call has been felt and understood, and if it has not been paid attention to, then the flight from authentic being and from responsibility first begins. And only then does being-with become 'inauthentic' being: or better said perhaps 'counterfeit' being. Being-with is not as such counterfeit.⁶⁹ The person is

just as much called to being a member as to be an individual; but in order to be able to be both in its *own* particular way, ‘from within’, it must first step out of the imitating mode in which it lives and is bound to live at first. Its ownmost being is in need of the preparation provided by the being-with others in order to be, in its turn, guiding and fruitful for others. This must be ignored if one does not want to acknowledge *development* as an essential feature of the human way of being; and one *must* ignore development if one denies human beings an essence different from their Dasein, the temporal unfolding of which is its existence.

If it is recognised that the individual needs the community’s support — right from becoming awake to his or her own identity ‘as such’ and ‘in a specific sense’ (i.e. as a member) — and that to a community belong *leading* spirits, who form and determine its lifeforms, then it is no longer possible to see ‘the they’ as a form of deterioration of the self and nothing else. It does not designate a person in the strict sense of the word, but a plurality of persons linked in community who fit themselves into its forms by their Dasein.

Responsibility begins with the awakening of the individual to its own life. One can speak of the responsibility of the community, which is different from that of the individuals. But this is borne for the community by its members, and to different degrees: it is borne by all those who are capable of it, i.e. those who are awake to their own life, but it is borne first and foremost by the ‘leader’.⁷⁰

Now to the question of ‘what one must have read’. In a community there are certainly human beings who are more qualified than others to judge what may contribute to genuine spiritual education. They carry then in this regard an intensified responsibility, and it is thus appropriate when those who are less able to judge let themselves be led by them. In the reference to ‘the they’ lies the remains of an understanding of the fact that every community must preserve a treasure of acquired wisdom for which the individual, with his or her narrow field of experience and modest depth of insight, does not suffice, but [which he or she] on the other hand cannot renounce without substantial loss. Deterioration, however, consists in this: the ‘predominant’ often are not at all those with professional expertise, and they let their unprofessional judgement be broadcast in an irresponsible manner. On the other hand, however, the mass also subjects itself irresponsibly to the judgement of non-professionals and lets itself be bossed around when instead an independent, responsible attitude is called for. *Irresponsible* does thus not mean here that human beings have no responsibility, rather it means that they close their eyes to it, and moreover seek to pretend it is not there. In this really lies a flight from one’s own authentic Dasein. That it is possible is founded in the human being itself — we can happily say: in the essence of the human being — in that its life encloses a richness of possible kinds of attitudes and that freedom allows for choosing between drawing back and engaging oneself, between taking a stand in this way or that. It is, however, also founded in the natural bonding of human beings with each other, in the drive to ‘participate’ and to make oneself ‘count’: the drive of the ‘strong’ to force others to follow, the drive of the ‘weak’ to fit in and assure themselves a place by ‘justifying the other’. In this is expressed the care for one’s own possibility, in which, according to Heidegger, ‘existence’ really consists. What is meant by this remains to be seen, but the question of ‘deterioration’ must first be further clarified.

Deterioration does not consist in communal life as such, nor in the letting oneself be guided, but in undiscerning collaboration ignoring the ‘call of

conscience', at the cost of the authentic life to which one is called. When Dasein deteriorates, neither its individual, nor its community life is genuine. Yet it sounds very strange when Heidegger declares that the deteriorated Dasein ought not to be understood to have fallen from a purer and higher original state.⁷¹ What meaning can 'deterioration' have, if there is to be no reference to a 'fall'? (This is a parallel to 'thrownness' without a 'throwing'). The reason advanced also is poor: *because* deteriorated being (it is even called 'non-being') is the closest kind of being to Dasein's, in which the latter exists for the most part, deterioration ought not to be interpreted as a fall. When the average everyday human being is characterised as deteriorated, this is only possible in contrast with authentic being, of which we must also have knowledge. And in relation to deteriorated being, authentic being is, *qua being*, more original. A further question is how the temporal relationship is to be conceived. This issue is obscured by Heidegger, as he does not observe the difference between the breakthrough from a previous level of development to authentic being and the turning back from a degenerate condition. It is possible in the natural order of things to rise from an earlier incomplete developmental stage to a more perfect being. From a degenerate condition, however, no more perfect stage can be reached, according to the natural order. All decay also temporally presupposes a fall: not unconditionally in the being of the individual, but as a historical event from which it results. The special kind of fall which we know from Revelation cannot be derived from this. But we must say, however, that the teaching of the Church concerning the Fall is the solution to the puzzle which has arisen from Heidegger's exposition of degenerated Dasein.

Wherefrom comes then the required knowledge of authentic being? It is announced in the voice of everyone's conscience. This voice calls Dasein from being lost in degenerate being-with, back to its authentic being. The caller must, in Heidegger's view, again be Dasein. If the call sounds as if it comes *upon* me, and not *from* me, this is explained by the authentic self being foreign compared to the self lost in the 'they'. What, however, testifies, against appearance, to the fact that the one called should also be the caller? As far as I see, nothing does apart from the fundamental attitude that issues from and dominates the whole work: that the 'solus ipse' is distinguished above all other being, that it is that from which all answers concerning being is to be expected, the ultimate origin beyond which there is nothing further. The uninhibited investigation of this 'solus ipse', however, again and again comes up against references testifying to the fact that it is itself not the ultimate: not ultimately fundamental and not the ultimate light.

We will not further concern ourselves with the call of conscience, but dwell instead on the affirmation that there are two forms of being: degenerate and authentic, and then ask of what authentic being consists. The mode of Dasein which corresponds to the call of conscience is 'resoluteness'; a special kind of 'openness' or 'being in the truth', by which the human being takes upon itself its authentic being, which is an 'understanding being to the end', an 'anticipation of death'.⁷²

We have now reached the essential feature of 'Dasein' which Heidegger obviously has privileged. That it is always 'ahead' of itself, that it is concerned with its possibility to be (expressed by the word 'care'), that the future has priority among the three 'ecstases' of its temporality, all this is merely preparatory references to the fundamental attitude: that the human being has its ultimate possibility in *death* and that its openness, i.e. its understanding of its own being, from the very first includes this ultimate possibility. This is why anguish is

perceived to be its fundamental state of mind. An answer to the question that concerns us, of whether the analysis of Dasein is accurate, can therefore not be possible without probing what is said about death.

We must first and foremost ask: *What is death?* Heidegger answers: *the end of Dasein*. He immediately adds that with this no decision should be favoured as to the possibility of a life after death. The analysis of death remains purely 'of this world': it looks at death only insofar as it belongs to this world as a possibility of the particular Dasein. What comes after death is a question that can only be asked meaningfully and with justification when the ontological essence of death has been grasped.⁷³ Much is strange in this discussion. If it is the ultimate meaning of Dasein to be 'being towards death', then the meaning of Dasein should be clarified by the meaning of death. How is this possible, however, if nothing else can be said of death than that it is the end of Dasein? Is this not a completely fruitless circularity?

Moreover: does the possibility of a life after death really remain open, if one sees death as the end of Dasein? Dasein has here been taken in the sense of *being-in-the-world*. One should thus be able to say: it is possible that the *being-in-the-world* of human beings ends, without them thereupon ceasing to be in another sense. But this would run against the sense of the previous analysis, which, although underlining other *existentials* besides *being-in-the-world* (e.g. understanding), did not regard these as separable. Furthermore: if something of what has been shown to belong to *the being of Dasein* remains while other things cease (and how could one then speak about *living on?*), one could no longer speak about the end of Dasein.

Finally: could we speak about having grasped the ontological essence of death as long as one leaves it open whether it is the end of *Dasein* or the transition from one mode of being to another? (We must here understand the word *Dasein* as Heidegger has used it in the entire previous investigation, to mean not only the end of earthly existence but the end of human beings as such). Is this not rather the decisive question concerning the meaning of death and therefore decisive for the meaning of Dasein? Should it transpire that no answer to the question is to be gained from the analysis of Dasein, then it would be shown that the analysis of Dasein is incapable of clarifying the meaning of death and thus of giving sufficient information concerning the meaning of Dasein.

As it happens Heidegger quickly passes over the question of what death is, and concentrates on the question of how it can be experienced.⁷⁴ He claims that it cannot be experienced as the death or dying of others, but only as an 'existential', as belonging to Dasein. (As dying also is designated as the 'ending of Dasein', there is apparently no sharp distinction to make between death and 'dying'.) We will now treat these questions: 1. Is there an experience of one's own death? (Heidegger says yes!) 2. Is there an experience of the death of the other (Heidegger says no!) 3. How do the two relate?

According to Heidegger's interpretation dying is 'that way of being in which Dasein *is* towards its death',⁷⁵ and by this is not meant its 'demise' as transition from life to death, but something belonging to Dasein as such, which co-constructs it as long as it lasts. Do we not meet another ambiguity here: on the one hand, death and dying are an end towards which Dasein is proceeding and, on the other hand, it is this proceeding itself? In the first sense, death is always yet to come; in the second, Dasein is itself a continuous dying. Both meanings are

acceptable, but we must be clear which one is in question when we speak about death or dying.

We now take death in the sense of what is yet to come for Dasein. Do we have an experience of it? Certainly, and even as an experience in the body; dying means to experience death in the body. In a completely literal, non-metaphorical sense, we can only have this experience when we die. In the meantime much of it is already anticipated in life. What Heidegger calls 'dying' — 'being towards death' or 'anticipation of death' — testifies to this. (That he does not take into account this anticipation as compared with authentic dying is linked to his general overvaluation of the future and devaluation of the present. With this is also connected the fact that he completely omits consideration of the phenomenon of *fulfilment* fundamental to all experience). We must here distinguish between anguish as the state which reveals to human beings their 'being towards death' and the 'resoluteness' that takes it on. In resoluteness, anguish has reached understanding. Anguish as such does not understand itself. Yet Heidegger interprets it as both anguish *for* one's own being and as anguish *about* one's own being. Does 'being' here mean the same in these two cases? Or more correctly: is it the same being *wherefore* and *where-about* one is anguished? That wherefore one is anguished is the possibility not to be, to which anguish testifies: it is the experience of *the nothingness of our being*. That about which one is anguished, and likewise that about which human beings are concerned in their own being, is being as a *fullness, which one would like to preserve and not leave behind* — of which there is no mention in Heidegger's entire analysis of Dasein and through which it would nevertheless first be founded. If Dasein were simply not-being, then no anguish would be possible *for* the ability-not-to-be and *about* the possibility to be. Both are possible because human beings share in a fullness from which something continually slips and something is continually won: both life and death. In contrast, authentic dying means the loss of fullness right to complete emptying, and death means emptiness or nonbeing itself. We now have to ask whether the understanding of the possibility of one's own nonbeing and even the insight into the inevitability of death would grow out of anguish, if this were the only way in which our own death was anticipated. Rationally we can only conclude from the not-ness of our being to the possibility of nonbeing, not to the necessity of an expected end. In the pre-theoretical understanding of being which belongs to human beings as such, there is a purely natural and healthy 'life-feeling', a certainty of being that is so strong that, when unbroken by anguish, one would not believe in death were it not for other testimonies. There are, however, such other testimonies, and they are so convincing that the natural certainty of being is annihilated when confronted with them. These are first and foremost one's own near-death states: severe illness, especially when it brings sudden or progressive deterioration of powers or the threat of immediate, violent death. Here is where the real experience of dying sets in, even if the end does not come in the cases where the danger passes.

In severe illness, which brings us face to face with death, all 'concern' stops: all the things of this world, with which one has been concerned, lose importance and fade completely from view. This also means a separation from all those who are still caught up in concern; one stops living in their world⁷⁶. Another care may replace it, as long as the inevitability is not yet understood or recognised: the exclusive care for one's own body. But that will also end (even if it is possible that someone might stay prisoner to it and even be 'surprised by

death' in the midst of it), and then there is finally only one important question: being or not-being? The being now in question is most certainly not 'being-in-the-world'. That has already ended when one actually sees death eye to eye. It is the end of bodily living and of all connected to bodily life. Beyond that, however, is a large, dark gate: one must pass through it — but what then? This 'what then?' is the real question of death that is experienced in dying. Is there an answer to this question even before one passes through the gate?

People who have faced death and then turned back are an exception. Most are faced with the fact of death through the death of others. Heidegger claims that we cannot experience the death of others, and we do of course not experience it in the same manner as our own death. Yet the dying and death of others are fundamental to our knowledge of these and thus also for the understanding of our own being and of the human being as such. We would not believe in the end of our lives and we would not understand anguish, yes, in many anguish would not even erupt (without it being disguised as fear for this and that), if we did not constantly experience the fact that others die. As children we usually first experience death as being-no-longer-in-the-world. People, who have belonged to our close or distant environment disappear, and we are told that they are dead. As long as we do not experience any more than that, anguish is not awoken, nor is the horror of death. On this basis, what Heidegger calls 'one dies', can grow: a knowledge that all human beings one day will be cut out of the world in which we live, and that also such a day will come for us. It is a fact that we do not doubt. But we do not either have a lively experiential faith in it: it is not a happening that is embraced with a live expectation. Therefore it leaves us cold, we are not concerned about it. For these first years of childhood this carefreeness is natural and healthy. If it is maintained, however, into maturity and perhaps through one's whole life, then one must say that such a life is not *authentically* lived. A full human life implies an understanding of being which does not ignore 'the last things'. Even a thoughtful child is soon disturbed by the disappearance of people in its neighbourhood and wants to know what it means to be dead; and the explanation one gives him will induce reflection upon death. Perhaps already this suffices to shatter the carefreeness of 'one dies'. It is certainly shattered by seeing someone dead. Even attending funerals can have this effect on a sensitive child. The clearing of the coffin that first was covered in flowers, the carrying away and the lowering of the coffin into the grave, make one shudder in the face of the finality of the farewell, perhaps it also awakes a horror at the wrenching away of the soul.

If religious education has not given death a new meaning through reference to eternal life, seeing the dead adds wrenching away of the soul to the interpretation of death as being-no-longer-in-the-world. This is so particularly when one understands vital liveliness to predominate in living human beings, as compared with the spiritual expression. Heidegger must ignore this contemplation of death as it would force him to consider body and soul in their mutual relationship, something which he excluded from the start. Human beings have, since time immemorial, spontaneously met the experience of death with the question of the *destiny of the soul*.

The question is definitely awoken when one sees not only the dead, but lives through the *dying process* with the person dying. The one who has once witnessed a difficult death is for always lost to the indifference of 'one dies'. It is the powerful sundering of a natural unity. And when the struggle is over, then the

human being, who has fought or in whom the fight has taken place, is no longer there. What is left of her is no longer 'her self'. Where is she? Where is what made her into this living human being? If we cannot give an answer to this question, the full meaning of death is not clear to us. Faith knows an answer. But does there exist, within the realm of our experience, something that affirms it? In fact there does. Heidegger rightly says that no human being can take away someone else's death. It pertains to *Dasein*, and every single one has *her* death as she has *her* *Dasein*. And so what one sees at various deathbeds is in no way is the same thing. I do not refer to this case being a difficult fight and that one being a mild falling asleep. I refer to the fact that many a dead person lies there, after the fight, like a victor: in majestic calmness and deep peace. So strong is the impression on the survivors that the pain over the loss fades in comparison to the importance of what has happened. Could the simple cessation of life, the transition from being to not being, bring forth such an impression? And could it be thought that the spirit, which has impressed this seal on the body, does not exist anymore?

There is a dying in which something else happens: in which all signs of struggle and suffering disappear, even before bodily death sets in. Here the dying person is illumined by another life in a manner visible to all those who surround him. He is illuminated as his eyes see into a light out of reach for us: Its glory still lingers in the body whose soul has been wrenched away. Anyone who had not heard of a higher life, or who had lost belief in such a life, would in this sight meet the likelihood of its existence. The meaning of death as a transition from life in this world and in this body to another life, from one mode of being to another, is revealed to him. Then, however, *Dasein* — as being towards death — is not being towards the end, but towards a new [kind of] being: even though it is reached through the bitterness of death, the violent sundering of natural existence.

The consideration of death should help us to understand *authentic* being, to which the human being is called back from its everyday living. Authentic being reveals itself as a being to which the human being tunes himself by reference to a different being, and loosens himself from everyday being, in which he first finds himself. In this manner we have three ways or degrees of being within *Dasein* itself, which we — from the point of view of faith — can understand as natural life, life of grace, and life of glory. It is obvious that if one replaces the life of glory with non-being, then for the life of grace the being to an end is replaced with a stepping into nonbeing. We must now ask whether within *Dasein* itself — and not only from within its dying and death — reference can be found to an 'authentic' (i.e. 'fuller', not '*more* empty') being. Such suggestions can be found in Heidegger, in expressions from which one can clearly see that authentic being means more than the anticipation of death. 'Resoluteness' involves understanding one's own possibility, which renders the human being capable of 'throwing' herself forth, as well as an understanding of the factual 'situation' and its demands. Living 'authentically' means to realise one's ownmost possibilities and to meet the challenges of the 'moment', which always expresses the given life-conditions.

How should we understand this, if not in the sense of the realisation of an *essence* or a *specificity*, which is *given with* being human (i.e. *with* which one is thrown into *Dasein*), that, however, for its development needs free co-operation and hence is entrusted to one? What else can the concepts of the 'moment' and the 'situation' mean apart from an understanding of an *order* or a *plan*, which the

human being has not herself projected, but in which she nevertheless is included and plays a role? All this means *a bond between Dasein and a being which is not its own*, but which is the foundation and goal for its own being. It also means a *breaking open of temporality*: the ‘concerned’ bustling that dwells on no particular thing, but always hastens towards the future does not do justice to the ‘moment’. Herein is expressed that all moments present a fullness that should be brought out. Much is hereby said. First, that the ‘moment’ is not simply to be taken as a mere ‘moment in time’, a section between ‘stretches’ of past and future. It rather designates the way in which the temporal touches something which is not itself temporal, but which reaches into its temporality. Heidegger himself speaks of the interpretation of time as the ‘image of eternity’, but only in order to exclude it. From the standpoint of an understanding of time that knows of no eternity and declares being as such to be temporal, it is impossible, however, to clarify the meaning he gives to the moment. ‘In the moment’ — and this does here mean a moment in time — something meets us that perhaps no other moment will offer us. To ‘bring it out’, i.e. to take it up completely into one’s own being, we must ‘open’ ourselves to it and ‘hand ourselves over’ to it. It is moreover necessary that we do not relentlessly hasten on to something else, but stay with it until we have brought it out or until a more pressing claim obliges us to renounce it. ‘To dwell with...’ means that we, because our being is temporal, ‘need time’ to acquire the timeless. That we, however, despite our being’s fleeting nature, can take the timeless up into ourselves, *maintain* something (what Heidegger calls *having-been-being* is a maintaining), proves that *our being is not simply temporal*, that it does not exhaust itself in temporality.

The relationship between the temporality of our being and the timeless it can take into itself and realise — according to the possibilities decided in it — is no simple equation. Our earthly existence does not yearn for the realisation of all our possibilities, nor to take up all that is offered to us. The decision for a possibility and the letting go of others is designated by Heidegger as a being guilty, which is unavoidable and to which we must consciously acquiesce, as we ‘resolutely’ take our existence upon ourselves. He fails to distinguish this guilt, founded in our finitude, from the avoidable and therefore sinful denial of an obligation. It is probably also a much too idealised picture of the ‘resolute one’, when he affirms that he never ‘loses time’ and always ‘has time’ for what is demanded of him in this moment. Even the holy one, who comes closest to this ideal, will often say that the necessary time is lacking for him to fulfil all that is required of him, and he is not capable always of clearly discerning the best choice among the different possibilities open to him.⁷⁷ He will find rest in the confidence that God preserves the one who is of good will from a tragic mistake, and makes his involuntary errors serve a good end. But he also is convinced of his own fallibility and that God alone is the unrestrictedly *open* one.

The inability of our temporal being to fully unfold our essence, to express what we are bid to assume into ourselves and possess ‘as a whole’, points to the fact that the ‘authentic’ being which we in temporality are capable of — ‘resoluteness’ freed from the ‘deterioration’ of everyday mediocrity and obedient to the call of conscience — is still not our final authentic being. In this connection we should remember a saying of Nietzsche: ‘Woe to the one who says: end! For all desire wills eternity, wills deep, deep eternity.’ Desire must here not be taken in a narrow and lowly sense. It must be thought of as the deep liberation in which the fulfilment of yearning is experienced. Heidegger does not want ‘care’ to be

understood as a state of mind, and not ‘in the sense of a worldview-ethical judgement of human life’,⁷⁸ ‘but purely as the specificity of the human being: that humans by their being are concerned with their being’. But it is probably no coincidence that the word ‘care’ has been chosen, and that his investigation, on the other hand, leaves no room for what gives human life fullness: joy, happiness, love. Dasein is for him emptied to the point of being a sequence from nothing to nothing. And yet, it is rather the fullness that first really makes it understandable why the human being is ‘about its being’. This being *is* not only a temporal extension and therefore constantly ‘ahead of itself’; the human being always *requires* being given new gifts of being in order to be able to express what the moment simultaneously gives her and takes away. She does not want to abandon what fulfils her and she would like to *be* without end and without limits in order to possess it entirely and definitively. Joy without end, happiness without shadows, love without boundaries, the most intense life without sleep, the most powerful action which at the same time is complete stillness and freed from all tension — that is *eternal bliss*. This is the *being about which human existence is*. The human being reaches out in faith, as she here is promised, that she will be in the full sense when she is in full possession of her essence; this promise speaks from her deepest essence, because it reveals the meaning of her being. To this belongs ‘openness’ in a double sense: as transition from all possibilities into reality (the perfection of being) and — in the Heideggerian sense — as unlimited understanding of one’s own being and absolutely all being, limited [only] through the limits of one’s own finite being. In both [of these senses] the ‘recollection’ of the temporal extension into a unity, referred to by Kierkegaard and Heidegger as the ‘moment’, is necessary. The mode of being in which the difference between the moment and duration is surpassed and the finite reaches its highest possible participation in the eternal is a midway between time and eternity that Christian Philosophy ‘has designated as Aion (aevum)’.⁷⁹ Hence there is no more thorough distortion of the idea of the eternal than in Heidegger’s remark: ‘If *God’s* eternity can be *constructed* philosophically then it may be understood only as a more primordial and ‘infinite’ temporality’.⁸⁰ A being that has reached full possession of its own being is no longer concerned for it. And also: to the extent that it is freed from the disfiguring tension of care for its own existence in order to embrace abandonment and the relaxation of the self-forgetting gift of self to eternal being, to this extent even its temporal being is already filled with the eternal. Care and temporality are therefore in no way the final meaning of the human being, but rather — according to their own testimony — what must be surpassed as far as possible, in order to reach the fulfilment of the meaning of being.

It is clear, then, that the entire understanding of time given in *Being and Time* needs to be revised. Temporality, with its three *ecstases* and its extension, must have its meaning clarified as the way in which the finite gains participation in the eternal. The significance of the *future*, so strongly emphasised by Heidegger, must be explained in two ways. First as Heidegger does — as the *care* for its preservation stemming from understanding the flux and nothingness of one’s own being; secondly as a direction towards a *fulfilment yet to come*, a transition from the dispersion of temporal being to the gathering of authentic, simple, eternity filled being. Moreover, the *present* must be accorded its rightful position as the *way of being open to fulfilment*, which — like a flash of eternal

light — opens up the understanding to being's fulfilment, and the *past* as the way of being that gives an impression of *durability* in the flux of our being.

There is of course much more to say about Heidegger's analysis of being. But we have come far enough to answer the question of whether it is accurate: it is accurate in a certain sense, in [the sense namely] that it reveals something of the basic constitution of the human being, and sketches a certain way of being human with great clarity. I know of no better expression for this way of being, which he calls *Dasein* and understands to pertain to all human beings, than *unredeemed being*. Unredeemed is both its deteriorated everyday being, and that which he holds to be its authentic being. The first is the flight from authentic being, the avoiding of the question: 'being or not being'. The second is the decision for non-being against being, the turning down of *true*, authentic being. With this is said that *the human way of being as such is caricatured*, despite it being elucidated in its ultimate depths. The exposition is not only defective and incomplete — because it wants to understand being without reference to essence and sticks to a particular way of being — it is also deceptive in regard to its subject-matter, because it isolates this from the totality of ontological relations to which it belongs, and thus cannot reveal its true meaning. The description of 'everyday' being is ambiguous, as it comes close to the mistaken affirmation that community life as such is 'deteriorated', and that 'authentic' being means lonely being, whereas in fact both solitary and community life have their authentic and deteriorated forms. And the description of 'authentic being' replaces it with its denial.

3. Is the Analysis of Dasein a Sufficient Foundation for Addressing the Question of the Meaning of Being Appropriately?

Hedwig Conrad-Martius says about Heidegger's approach that it is 'as if a door, so long left unopened that it can hardly be opened anymore, is blown wide open with enormous strength, wise intention and unrelenting stamina, and then immediately closed again, bolted and so thoroughly blocked that any further opening seems impossible'.⁸¹ He has 'with his conception of the human I worked out with inimitable philosophical clarity and energy the key to an ontology which, dispelling all subjectivist, relativist and idealist ghosts could lead him back into a truly cosmological and God-borne world.' He establishes 'being first and foremost in its full and complete rights' even if only in one place: the I. He determines the *being of the I* by the fact that it '*understands being*'. Thus the way is cleared to bring out the understanding of being that belongs to the human being — undisturbed by the 'critical' question of how the knowing I can reach out beyond itself — but also to bring out the being of the world and all created being, which in turn grounds the understanding of divine being. Instead of this, the I is thrown back on itself. Heidegger justifies his taking the analysis of Dasein as point of departure with the fact that one can only ask a being for the meaning of being, if it belongs to its meaning to have an understanding of being. And as 'Dasein' not only has understanding for its own being, but also for other beings, one must start with an analysis of Dasein. But does not the opposite follow from this reasoning? Because the human being understands not only its own being but

also other beings, it is not referred to its own being as to the only possible way to the meaning of being. Surely the self-understanding of being must be questioned, and it is advisable to take one's own being as point of departure, so that the understanding of being can be laid bare in its root and critical reservations be encountered from the start.^[82] But the possibility always persists of beginning with the being of things or with primary being. One will not get from this a sufficient explanation of the human being, but only references to it that must be checked. On the other hand, the human being also gives only references to other ways of being, and we must 'question' these if we want to understand it. They^[83] will of course not answer in the same manner as a human being answers. A thing has no understanding of being and cannot talk about its being. But it is and has a *meaning* that is expressed in and through outer appearance. And this self-revelation belongs to the meaning of thingly being.

Heidegger cannot accept this however, as he recognises no meaning distinct from understanding, but dissolves meaning in understanding — although meaning is seen as related to understanding. (We will have to speak of this later.) That one cannot reach understanding of other ways of being from the starting point of the human being, if one does not approach this latter without prejudice, is shown by the darkness in which the being-present-at-hand and the being-ready-to-hand are left by Heidegger. In fact the human being is caricatured already in what it shares with the being of things: in the deletion of its essentiality and substantiality.

It is obvious that Heidegger's investigation is borne along by a particular and presupposed understanding of being, not only by a 'pre-ontological understanding of being' which belongs to the human being as such and without which no questioning of being is possible. [It is] also not [borne] by any genuine ontology, as Heidegger himself would have understood it: research which with persistent focus on being brings this to 'speak'. From the start everything is meant to demonstrate the temporality of being. Hence a barrier is raised everywhere where a view could open onto the eternal; therefore there cannot exist an *essence* distinct from existence that could develop in existence, no *meaning* distinct from understanding that is grasped in understanding, no 'eternal truth' independent of human understanding. In all these the temporality of being would be broken open, and this is not allowed to happen, even though existence, understanding, and 'discovering' cannot be understood apart from something that is independent of them and timeless, which enters time through these and in these. Language takes on a particularly bitter and spiteful tone when such urgent references must be toned down: for example, when 'eternal truths' are designated as belonging 'to those residues of Christian theology within philosophy which have not yet been radically extirpated'.⁸⁴ In such passages, an anti-Christian feeling comes through which is generally mastered, however, perhaps in a struggle with [Heidegger's] own, far from dead, Christian being. It also shows in the manner in which the philosophy of the Middle Ages is treated: in minor side remarks which it seems superfluous to discuss in earnest, as dead ends where the right question about the meaning of being got lost. Would it not have been worthwhile to investigate whether the real question of the meaning of being lives in the discussion of *analogia entis*? In a more serious investigation it would also have been clear that tradition did not understand 'being' in terms of mere 'being-present-at-hand' (i.e. thingly persistence). It is moreover very conspicuous how the discussion of the concept of truth in the sense of the tradition is simply said to pertain to judgement,

when Saint Thomas, in the first *Quaestio de veritate* answering the question: ‘What is truth?’, distinguishes four senses of truth, and in no way considers the truth pertaining to judgement to be the primary, even if [he considers it to be] primary in relation to us. When he, with Hilary, denotes *the true* as ‘*being that reveals and explains itself*’, it reminds one specifically of Heidegger’s ‘truth as revealedness’. And where is the justification of talk about truth as an ‘existential’, if not in relation to the first truth? God alone is without restriction ‘in the truth’, while the human spirit, as Heidegger himself emphasises, is equally ‘in the truth and in falsehood’. The critics of *Being and Time* have seen it mostly as their task to demonstrate the rootedness of this philosophy in the leading spirits of the previous century (Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Karl Marx, Bergson, Dilthey, Simmel, Husserl, Scheler, etc.). It seems lost on them to what extent the struggle with *Kant* has been decisive. (The *Kant*-book has made that clear.) And of no less importance is the constant reference to the original questions of the Greeks and their transformation in later philosophy. It would be worthwhile in a separate investigation to assess Heidegger’s relation to Aristotle and Scholasticism, from the way in which he quotes and interprets them. That cannot, however, be our task here.

When we look at the work in its entirety, we are left with the impression that it attempted to show the human being as the ultimate foundation to which all other ways of being lead back, but that the original attempt became questionable in the end. It will be good to compare this with Heidegger’s later publications on the question of being, in order to see whether this impression remains.

KANT AND THE PROBLEM OF METAPHYSICS⁸⁵

This book sets out, on Heidegger’s own account, to show not only what Kant in fact has said, but what he ‘intended to say’.⁸⁶ It is also meant to show that *Being and Time* is a ‘repetition of the Critique of Pure Reason’, i.e. a new attempt to found metaphysics through which the ‘own primordial possibility’ of the Kantian attempt is disclosed.⁸⁷

We will not here investigate whether this interpretation, which must ‘necessarily resort to violence’,⁸⁸ interprets Kant truly. Our task is only to find further clarification of the question raised in *Being and Time*: the question of the meaning of being. The question, with which the first part of *Being and Time* rings out — ‘is there a way which leads from original *time* to the meaning of *being*? Does time manifest itself as the horizon of being?’⁸⁹ — must probably be designated as the real theme of the *Kant*-book. The entire investigation is intended to let a positive answer to this question come through.

Traditional metaphysics, on which Kant bases himself, has combined the question of *beings as such* with the question of the *totality of beings* and ‘the excellent realm of beings as such [...] through which the totality of all beings is determined’.⁹⁰ The question of being as such is an earlier one. But in order to ‘be able to understand the essential determination of beings through being, being itself must first be grasped.’⁹¹ Should ‘the question, “what does being mean?” find an answer’ it must be clarified ‘*from where* originally an answer can be expected at all’.⁹² Hence the question: ‘*From where at all are we to grasp something like*

being [...]?’⁹³ is still more primordial than the question concerning beings as such and being as such. We are thus ‘driven back to the question concerning the essence of the understanding of being as such’.⁹⁴ In order to show the possibility of a knowledge of beings, the *founding of metaphysics* must be an ‘elucidation of the essence of a relation to beings, in which these show themselves as such.’⁹⁵ *Ontic knowledge* (= knowledge of beings) becomes *possible through ontological knowledge*, i.e. through an *understanding of beings’ constitution of being*, which lies before experience. As it belongs to the essence of human reason to transcend itself towards beings, and as this fundamental constitution of the human spirit is called ‘*transcendence*’, the *fundamental ontology* which must achieve the founding of metaphysics is called *Transcendental Philosophy*. Thus *transcendence* is brought to the *centre of the investigation*: Because metaphysics — the questioning of being — lies in ‘human nature’,⁹⁶ the foundation of metaphysics must disclose that in the constitution of [the] being of human beings, which is the reason for their understanding of being. Fundamental ontology is therefore ‘analysis of Dasein’ and especially of its transcendence. In transcendence, however, *the finitude of human beings* announces itself. It is what makes all finite knowledge possible: a turning towards ... which *builds a horizon* through which (i.e. in which) the objectivity of an object becomes possible. ‘Transcendence makes the beings themselves accessible to a finite being.’⁹⁷ ‘In transcendence, *Dasein* manifests itself as need of the understanding of being [...]. This need is the innermost finitude that carries Dasein.’⁹⁸ The human being is ‘in the midst of other beings in such a way that the being that she is not and the being that is herself always already are manifest to her.’⁹⁹ ‘*Dependent* on the being that she is not, the human being is, at bottom, *not even* master of herself.’ With her existence ‘there occurs an *irruption* into the totality of beings such that, by this even, the beings become manifest in themselves, i.e. manifest *as* beings — this manifestation being of varying amplitude and having different degrees of clarity and certitude. However, this prerogative [...] to be in the midst of beings, *delivered up to them as such, and of being answerable to oneself as a being*, involves in itself the *necessity* of a need for an understanding of being’. The human being must, insofar as it is, be able *to let be*, and for this she must ‘have already projected that which she encounters as a being.’¹⁰⁰ Existence (i.e. the human way of being) ‘is in itself *finitude* and, as such, is *only possible on the basis of the understanding of being*. *There is and must be such as being only where finitude has become existent*’.¹⁰¹

The most original action of the finite spirit is the building of the horizon in which beings can meet. This action is ‘*completing presentation*’. It ‘produces the immediate aspect of the now as such,’¹⁰² which belongs to any seeing of the present, and likewise of the not-any-more of the past or then, which is united to the now and presupposed for all retaining. The seeing of the present, and the remembering of what has been, are inseparable: to these belong thirdly the understanding of the present and the past as *the same*: it relies on a ‘search’, a ‘prospecting proceeding’. This ‘prospects the horizon of proposedness in general’, it is ‘the original *formation* of that which makes all intending possible, i.e. the future’.¹⁰³

And so, that which is formed as the *horizon of beings* is *time*. The *forming of the horizon* is, however, taken to engage *original time*: ‘Time is pure intuition in that it spontaneously pre-forms the aspect of succession and, as a creative taking, proposes this aspect *as such to itself*. This pure intuition *concerns itself*

with that which it intuits (forms) [...]. Time is, according to its nature, pure affection of itself.’¹⁰⁴ ‘Time is not an active affection engaging a present-at-hand self; but as pure self affection, it forms the essence of all self concernedness. So far, however, as the power of being self-concerned belongs to the essence of the finite subject, time as pure self-affection forms the essential structure of subjectivity [...]. As pure self-affection, it originally forms finite selfhood in such a way that self-consciousness becomes possible.’¹⁰⁵ ‘Pure self-affection provides *the transcendental origin-structure of the finite self* as such.’¹⁰⁶ The I is, like time itself, not ‘in time’. From this it does not follow, however, that it is not temporal, but ‘that it renders *time itself as such* possible according to its own essence.’¹⁰⁷ The ‘abiding and remaining’ of the I do *not* mark it as *substance*, but belong essentially to the letting-be of things which the I accomplishes. ‘This abiding and remaining are *not ontic* assertions concerning the immutability of the I but [...] *transcendental* determinations [...]. The “abiding” I is so called because it as the *I think*, i.e. the *I represent*, proposes subsistence and persistence to itself. As I, it forms the correlative of subsistence in general.’¹⁰⁸ Because the pure obtaining of pure present sight is the *essence of time*, the *abiding and persisting* I is ‘the I in the original forming of time, i.e. as *primordial time*’. The ‘*full essence of time*’ comprises therefore two things: ‘*pure self-affection*’ and *that which springs from it*, and which can be caught sight of within the usual ‘counting on time’^[109].

Original time is the ultimate foundation to which the human understanding of being is led back. The reference to the understanding of being is, however, founded on the *finitude* of humans. This is why the question of finitude as the *basic constitution of the human being* becomes the fundamental question of the foundation of metaphysics. (Only in *this* sense is it possible to make ‘anthropology’ the ‘centre of philosophy’.)¹¹⁰

Thus Heidegger regards it as the essential task of fundamental ontology ‘to show how far the problem of the finitude in human beings and the enquiries which it calls for necessarily contribute to our mastery of the question of being, [...] it must bring to light the essential connection between being as such (not beings) and the finitude in human beings.’¹¹¹ This essential connection is seen in that ‘the constitution of being of all beings [...] is accessible only through understanding in so far as this [latter] has the character of *projection*.’¹¹² With *transcendence* (or ‘being-in-the-world’) ‘the *projection* [...] of beings in general happens.’¹¹³ In that ‘Dasein’ needs understanding of being, it ‘is “cared for” that the possibility that something like Dasein can be.’ The ‘transcendental need’ is ‘as innermost finitude carrying Dasein’.¹¹⁴ And *care* is the name for the structural unity of Dasein’s essentially finite transcendence.

For the *critique of care* (and thus of the entire Dasein-analysis as fundamental ontology and foundation of metaphysics), Heidegger has himself handed us the perspectives; they should ‘show that the *transcendence* of Dasein and consequently the understanding of being does not constitute the innermost finitude of human beings, so that the foundation of metaphysics does *not have* an essential relation to the finitude of Dasein, and finally, that the basic question of the laying of the foundation of metaphysics is *not* opened up by the problem of the inner possibility of the understanding of Being.’^[115]

As these three perspectives strike the core of Heidegger’s existential philosophy, we will now dare to test their validity. The first question goes like this: ‘*Is Dasein’s transcendence and hence the understanding of being the*

innermost finitude of humans? In order to answer the question, we must be clear about what is meant by ‘transcendence’, ‘understanding of being’, and ‘finitude’.

What ‘transcendence’ means has been thoroughly dealt with. It is synonymous with ‘being-in-the-world’ — or more accurately: what founds it; the human finds itself as a being in the midst of beings, and the being he is himself is disclosed to him along with other beings, as he forms a horizon in an original turning-towards, in which beings can meet. This ‘formation of the horizon’ is thought of as *understanding of being*, and indeed as understanding projection of a being’s constitution of being. Transcendence and understanding of being thus coincide.

They should also, however, coincide with ‘*finitude*’. What is meant by this is not so easily exposed. Various things are excluded which should *not* be meant by it: 1. The finitude of humans should *not* be determined as *temporality*; it also does *not* mean *imperfection*: imperfections do not let the essence of finitude be seen, they are perhaps only some of its *distant factual consequences*. 2. Finitude must *not* either be interpreted as *creatureliness*: ‘And even if we succeeded in doing the impossible, i.e. in proving rationally that the human being is created, then the characterisation of the human being as an ens creatum would only point up the *fact* of this finitude without clarifying its *essence* and without showing how this essence *constitutes* the fundamental constitution of being of the human being.’¹¹⁶ We are convinced, with the tradition, that the ‘impossible is possible’, i.e. that createdness can be proved rationally — perhaps not the special kind of creation which is presented by the biblical narrative of creation (with regard to this actual historical happening we talk about the ‘*mystery* of creation’), but the necessity, not to be *per se* or *a se*, but *ab alio*, which follows from the fact that the human being is ‘*something*’, but ‘*not everything*’. Is this not precisely the *authentic meaning* of *finitude*? Heidegger touches on this when he finally brings up the question: ‘Is it possible to develop the *finitude* in Dasein, even as a *problem*, without presupposing *infinity*?’¹¹⁷ He must immediately add a further question: ‘What is the nature of this “presupposition” in Dasein? What does the infinitude thus “posed” mean?’ With these questions he addresses what, as ‘pre-ontological understanding of being’, has given purpose and direction to our above efforts regarding the meaning of beings: *Finitude can only be understood in relation to Infinity, i.e. to the eternal fullness of being. The understanding of being of a finite spirit is as such always already a breakthrough from the finite to the Eternal.*

With this we have in advance answered more than the question under discussion concerning the relation between transcendence and finitude. We must now take our thinking to its conclusion. ‘*Ens creatum*’ has not only the meaning of the actually created, but also that of something which is essentially conditioned by the infinite. Herein lies the *meaning of finitude*: to be ‘*something and not everything*’. This meaning of finitude, however, is not only fulfilled in humans but in every being which is not God. *Thus finitude as such and transcendence do not simply belong together.* Transcendence means the breakthrough from finitude, which a *spiritual*, and, *as such*, knowing *personal* being, is given in and through its understanding of being. Heidegger sometimes speaks of the *specific* finitude of human beings, but without ever saying what he understands by it. In order to explain it, [he] would have to abolish that which distinguishes the being of human beings from that of non-personal spiritual beings and finite pure spirits.

We come now to the second question: *is the foundation of metaphysics ultimately concerned with the finitude of Dasein?* Heidegger has not given up the old sense of ‘*metaphysica generalis*’ as the doctrine concerning ‘beings as such’, but only emphasised that it is necessary to clarify the meaning of being in regard to it. In this we agree. He has, however, taken a step further and claimed that one, in order to understand the meaning of being, must investigate the human understanding of being, and as he found the ground for the possibility of the understanding of being in the finitude of human beings, he saw the task of founding metaphysics to lie in a discussion of human finitude. Against this, reservations must be made from two sides. *Metaphysics concerns the meaning of being as such, not only of the human being.* We must of course question the human — that is our own — *understanding of being as regards the meaning of being.* But this means that we must ask what it intends when it speaks about being. And this question may not be replaced by the other question of how such understanding of being ‘happens’. The one who neglects the question of the meaning of being implicit in the ‘understanding of being’ itself, and ‘projects’ it carelessly as the human *understanding of being*, is in danger of cutting himself off from the meaning of being: and as far as I can see, this is what Heidegger succumbs to. We will have more to say about this. Then consider this other point: We saw that the understanding of being did not belong to finitude as such, as there are finite beings which have no understanding of being. The understanding of being belongs to that which distinguishes spiritual and personal beings from other kinds of being. Internal to this, the *human being’s* understanding of being must be distinguished from that of other finite spirits, and all *finite* understanding of being must be distinguished from *infinite* (divine) understanding of being. What *understanding of being* is *as such*, however, cannot be explained without clarifying what the *meaning of being* is. Therefore it remains that for us *the fundamental question for the foundation of metaphysics is the question of the meaning of being.* What significance the human understanding of being has for the meaning of being is important for the evaluation of the role which the finitude of human beings must play in the foundation of metaphysics. This coincides with the third question which it remains for us to discuss: *whether the fundamental question of the foundation of metaphysics is contained in the problem of the internal possibility of the understanding of being.* The problem is not yet dealt with by the fact that we have designated the question of the meaning of being as the fundamental question. These two are intimately connected: to ask for the meaning of being presupposes that we, the questioners, have an understanding of being, that such [understanding] is ‘possible’. To investigate this understanding of being in its ‘inner possibility’, i.e. according to its essence, is to presuppose that the meaning of being is accessible to us. For understanding means nothing else than having access to some being. Meanwhile it is possible to ask the question of the meaning of being without also asking how the understanding of being is achieved, since we in understanding something are turned towards the meaning and not towards the understanding. It is, in contrast, not possible to investigate the understanding of being without including the meaning of being. If disconnected from accessible meaning, understanding is no longer understanding. In any case we have a shift in the meaning of ‘*foundation*’, if one considers the question of the understanding of being — and not the question of the meaning of being — as the fundamental one. It would still be possible, however, that the meaning of being

also would be clarified in a faithful and sufficient investigation of the understanding of being. Is this the case in Heidegger?

Heidegger says that the human being must be able to *let* beings *be* and must also 'have projected that which he encounters as beings.'¹¹⁸ Moreover: 'such as being is and must be only where finitude has become existent'. Finally: 'the being of beings is only understandable [...] if Dasein on the basis of its essence *holds itself into nothingness*.'¹¹⁹ In order to be able to understand this last sentence, we must seek information as to what is meant by *nothingness*. At a previous occasion¹²⁰ that which pure knowledge '*knows*' — the pure horizon — was designated as a *nothingness*. And it was said of it: 'Nothingness means: not a being, but yet "*something*" [...]' What is seen in pure intuition (space and time) is called 'ens imaginarium', and this expression is explained as follows: 'the ens imaginarium belongs to the possible forms of "*nothingness*", i.e. to what is not a being in the sense of being present-at-hand.'¹²¹

According to all these explanations what is understood by nothingness is not '*absolutely nothing*'. As there is talk of various forms of nothingness and these are not further explained, it remains unclear what kind of '*something*' was meant earlier. If we take all the passages quoted together, and moreover remember what was said about 'original time', no other interpretation remains possible than that by '*nothingness*' is here meant a being's '*constitution of being*', which is *projected with understanding* by human beings, i.e. *being itself*. If this really is what is meant — and everything points towards it, in the Kant-book even more clearly than in *Being and Time* —, *then beings and being are torn apart in a manner suspending the meaning of being*: if we designate a thing as a being (even Heidegger admits thingly being which he calls the *present-to-hand* to be a form of being), we mean that *it itself is*, that it has being independently of our understanding of being. Heidegger has correctly emphasised that in *being-a-what* (essence, *essentia*), *that-being* (reality, *existentia*) and *being-true* always means something different, and that it is necessary to clarify the reason for this division of being and the meaning of being. (This in fact is the big question of the 'analogia entis'.) In any case we always mean by *being* something which is something, is essential, is real or true, is itself and not something in which it is captured at the same time by our understanding of being. Yes, even our own being is something which we *come upon*. Heidegger seeks to justify calling the human understanding of being an *accepting intuition*, a 'thrown project'. But his whole effort is centred on characterising the 'project' as such. 'Thrownness' (= finitude = referredness to other beings) is pictured as the fundamental constitution of the human being, but it does not obtain the clarification it could, and which would be able to disclose the meaning of being and of the understanding of being. Heidegger expressed the conviction that Kant would have recoiled from the results of his critique of pure reason. To this he adds the remarkable question: 'do our own efforts [...] not evidence a secret evasion of something which we — and certainly not by accident — no longer see?'¹²² He regards it thus as possible that his own foundation of metaphysics 'holds back from what is decisive.'^[123] With this the point towards which we steered has been reached. Heidegger's existential philosophy withdraws and stops in front of what gives being meaning and towards which all understanding of being is directed: in front of the 'infinite', without which nothing 'finite' and the finite as such can be comprehended. That it is a withdrawal and a making halt, and [that it is] not a simple oversight, is seen from the fact that following Kant *finite knowledge, appearance or object and being as*

such are opposed: ‘The term ‘appearance’ refers to the being itself as the object of finite knowledge. More precisely: *only for finite knowledge is there such a thing as an object. Only such knowledge is exposed to the beings which already are.*’ Infinite knowledge, in contrast, ‘reveals beings to itself by letting them arise and has at the same time the arisen ‘*only*’ in the letting-arise i.e. as revealed *arisen* [...]. They are beings as beings *in themselves*, i.e. not as objects’. ‘The being of *the appearance* is the same being as the being as such’, but as ‘object’ it discloses itself ‘in conformity with the manner and scope of the possibility to accept which is at the disposal of finite knowledge;’¹²⁴ and it belongs to finite knowledge that it ‘as *finite* also necessarily *conceals*...’¹²⁵ In what follows, however, this opposition [between finite and infinite knowledge] has been dropped. Only finite knowledge is talked about, and the being which it accepts as an *object*. Thereby are, however, ‘beings in themselves’ replaced by ‘objects’, and the formal structure ‘projected’ by finite knowledge for the ‘object’ claimed to be being itself. Is this shift to be justified by the fact that human reason as finite is circumscribed by the limits of finitude and must renounce the *claim* to understand and say something about ‘beings as such’ and ‘infinite’ reason? Is it not rather so, that the knowledge of one’s own limits is necessary for breaking through these? Knowing oneself as ‘finite’ means knowing oneself as ‘something, and not everything’, but by this ‘everything’ is envisaged, even if not ‘comprehended’, i.e. enclosed and mastered by human knowledge. Human understanding of being is only possible as a breakthrough from finite to eternal being. Finite being as such must be known from the point of view of eternal being. But since the finite spirit only glimpses eternal being without being able to comprehend it, finite being, and also its own being, remains uncomprehended, a *magis ignotum quam notum*: the eternal embarrassment, the ἀεὶ ἀπορούμενον which we met as starting point for Aristotle’s metaphysics, and which comes to an end in Heidegger’s foundation of metaphysics.

If the Kant-book was written in order to answer the question with which *Being and Time* rang out: whether a way led from original time to the meaning of being, whether time is the horizon of being, then it obviously did not reach its goal. The ambiguity of time, being both seeing and seen, ‘projection’ and ‘projected’, and likewise the shimmer of what is called the *horizon*, already bars the way to the meaning of being. If the road taken at the end of *Being and Time* became questionable, looking back on it from the perspective of the Kant-book makes it even more questionable. And what has since appeared in print changes nothing in this regard.^[126]

THE ESSENCE OF REASONS

Like the Kant-book, so too the two small writings *The Essence of Reasons*¹²⁷ and *What is Metaphysics?*¹²⁸ should serve the purpose of clarifying the previous great work, refuting misinterpretations [of it] and clarifying some points that had been left in the dark, while drawing up earlier lines that were merely indicated and continuing them on. Thus being-in-the-world is more clearly conceived under the name of *transcendence* in the treatise concerning the essence of reasons. Transcending means hereafter that Dasein constantly *goes beyond* all beings, also itself, in the direction of the ‘*world*’; i.e. not towards the totality of all beings, nor towards the entirety of all human beings, but towards *being* in its totality. World is

‘essentially Dasein-related’¹²⁹ and Dasein ‘is in the essence of its being “forming the world”’.¹³⁰ As the language of Scripture (the letters of St. Paul and the Gospel of St. John), as well as that of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, is used to clarify the concept of world, it can give the impression that the obvious anti-Christian feeling of *Being and Time* has been surmounted.¹³¹ In the foot-notes we are also assured that ‘the ontological interpretation of Dasein as being-in-the-world tells neither for nor against the possible existence of God’¹³² and that Dasein should not be construed to be *the* ‘authentic’ being as such: ‘ontological interpretation of being in terms of the transcendence of Dasein is by no means ontical derivation of non-Daseinal [beings] from beings qua Dasein.’¹³³ In regard to the second [criticism], the critics have in fact not left ‘being-present-at-hand’ and ‘being-ready-to-hand’ in the darkness in which Heidegger left it, but rather developed it in a way not foreseen by him. And by a quite faithful and sufficiently far-reaching interpretation of the essential ‘self-transcending’, a view of ‘Dasein’ could have been gained which, at least, left open the possibility of a ‘being-towards-God’. But actually no such interpretation is carried through in *Being and Time* or in this later treatise. In fact the interpretation which *being* received in the Kant-book — even more evidently than in *Being and Time* — leaves no possibility open for any being [Sein] independent of Dasein. When, furthermore, transcendence is interpreted as *freedom*, by the power of which Dasein projects world and its own possibilities, and in connection with the establishment of the *finitude of Dasein* (witnessed by the limitation of its *really* realisable possibilities) the question is raised: ‘And does the essence of freedom announce itself as *finite* in this?’¹³⁴ This (quite likely rhetorical) question excludes [the possibility] that the being of Dasein pertains to *all* personal being and it denies it to God: at least to the God of the Christian Faith and also to that of the other monotheistic religions. That ‘Dasein is *thrown* among beings as *free* possibility to be’; that it ‘does not stand within the power of freedom itself to be according to its possibility a self which it actually is according to its freedom,’¹³⁵ this insight serves here as little as earlier as the point of departure for proceeding towards an unthrown thrower who would be infinitely free.

WHAT IS METAPHYSICS?

The Freiburg inaugural lecture *What is Metaphysics?* centres on the discussion of *nothingness*. For the reader of the Kant-book, this is not as surprising as it might be for an unprepared member of the audience, as a questioning of ‘*nothingness*’ was already called for in the investigation of the understanding of being of the *horizon*, which makes being accessible to ‘*Dasein*’. As meanwhile the meaning of nothingness still remains obscure, it is worthwhile to go through the new developments dedicated to it.

All *science aims at beings*. The break-through to the totality of beings which belongs to human existence breaks beings up into what they *are* and how they *are*, and thus helps ‘beings to come to themselves’.¹³⁶ ‘That to which the world-relationship refers are *beings themselves* — and nothing else.’ And now this apparently barely escaped ‘nothingness’ is grasped in a surprising fashion: ‘*But what about this nothing?*’¹³⁷ Reason cannot decide about it. *Nothingness* can *not* be understood as *negation of the totality of all beings*, as ‘nothing is more original than the not and the negation’.¹³⁸

The *'fundamental happening of our Dasein'*, which discovers being in its entirety, is the *being in a state of mind* or the *mood*; authentic boredom, for example (not when one is bored with this or that thing, but [when one is bored] 'simply'). The mood in which the human being is brought face to face with *nothingness*, is — as we already know — *anguish*: as beings fade and *we fade away ourselves*, anguish reveals nothingness. It reveals itself in anguish, not *as a being* and *not among beings*: it 'meets [us] *as part of the totality of beings*'.¹³⁹ This [totality] is *neither destroyed* nor *denied*, but it becomes *obsolete*. Nothingness 'does not aim at itself: it is essentially rejecting. This rejecting from itself is, however, as such the letting-fade referring to the vanishing of beings in their totality. This rejecting referring to the vanishing totality of beings, as which nothing crowds around us in anguish, is the essence of Nothing: the *nihilation*. It is neither destruction nor does it spring from negation. *Nothing nihilates of itself*.'¹⁴⁰ It reveals beings 'in their till now hidden *strangeness* as simply *other* in contrast with nothing.'¹⁴¹ In the clear night of anguish's nothingness, beings are revealed *as such* in all their *original* evidence: that they are *beings* — and not nothing [...]. *The essence of nothing as original nihilation lies in this: that it alone brings Dasein face to face with beings as such*.'¹⁴² 'Nothing is that which makes the revelation of beings as such possible for human existence. Nothing does not merely provide the conceptual opposite of beings, but belongs originally to the essence of *being itself*. It is in the *being* of beings that the nihilation of nothing occurs.'¹⁴³

A witness to 'the steady and extended, and yet dissimulated evidence of nothing in our existence' is the *negation*. It expresses itself in 'a *no-saying* about a not', but does not manage to bring a nothing out of itself, as it 'can only negate when there is *something there to be negated*.'¹⁴⁴ This, however, is only possible, if 'all thinking as such is already *on the look-out for the not* [...]. The not does not arise from the negation, but the negation is *based* on the not which derives from the nihilation of nothing.'¹⁴⁵ Negation is also not the only negating attitude; counteracting, disdaining, renouncing, prohibiting, and lacking are also grounded on the not. 'The permeation of Dasein by nihilating attitudes points to the steady, ever-dissimulated manifestness of nothing.'¹⁴⁶ The most repressed anguish which it makes manifest is brought forth in the *audacious Dasein*. 'But this occurs only for the sake of that for which *it spends itself*, so as to safeguard the *supreme greatness* of Dasein.'¹⁴⁷ The anguish of the audacious is not opposed to the joy or to the pleasant enjoyment of the satisfied Dasein. 'It stands [...] in secret *union* with the serenity and gentleness of creative longing.'¹⁴⁸

'The extendedness of Dasein into nothingness [...] makes the human being the *stand-in* for nothing. So *finite* are we that we cannot, by our own choice and will, bring ourselves originally face to face with nothingness [...]. The extendedness of Dasein into nothing on the basis of hidden anguish is the overcoming of the totality of beings: transcendence [...]. Metaphysics is the *enquiry over and above* beings, with a view to get it back for conceptualisation *as such* and *in totality*.'¹⁴⁹ *The question of nothing concerns metaphysics in its entirety* as 'being and nothing hang together [...], because *being* itself is essentially *finite* and only reveals itself in the transcendence of Dasein extended into *nothing*.'¹⁵⁰

The *metaphysics of Antiquity* understood 'nothingness' as unformed matter, as in the expression 'ex nihilo nihil fit', and let only the object count as being. *Christian dogmatics* denies the phrase and affirms instead: ex 'nihilum fit ens

creatum' and understands by 'nihil' the absence pertaining to non-divine beings. 'The questions concerning being and nothing as such remain in both cases unasked. Thus there is no need to be worried by the difficulty that if God creates "out of nothing" he, above all, must be able to relate himself to nothing. But if God is God, *he* cannot know nothing, assuming that the "absolute" excludes from itself all nullity.'¹⁵¹

In Heidegger's interpretation the sentence takes on 'a different meaning, and one appropriate to the *problem of being itself*, so as to run: *ex nihilo omne ens qua ens fit*. Only in the nothingness of Dasein can the totality of beings come to itself, according to its most authentic possibilities, i.e. as finite.'¹⁵² All questioning of beings relies on nothingness: 'Only because nothingness is revealed in the very basis of Dasein is it possible for the utter *strangeness* of beings to dawn on us.'¹⁵³ *Metaphysics* 'is the *fundamental phenomenon in and as Dasein itself*'. It happens 'through a special *thrust* of its own existence, into the fundamental possibilities of Dasein as a whole. For this thrust the following things are determinating: *firstly*, the leaving room for the totality of beings; *furthermore*, the letting go of oneself into nothingness [...] and *finally*, the letting swing out of the floating where it will, so that it may continually swing back again to the *basic question* of metaphysics, which is wrested from *nothingness* itself: *Why is there any thing at all — why not far rather nothing?*'¹⁵⁴

It is obvious: This speech, which is designed to inspire rather than to teach people who are not trained in the subject, falls short of the rigor of a scientific treatise. It casts floodlight here and there, but gives no serene clarity. Thus it is difficult to take anything concrete from it. The manner of speaking has in several places even mythological tones to it: nothingness is spoken about as if it were a person that should be helped to claim rights that had always been suppressed. One is brought to remember 'Nothingness, the nothingness that at first was everything'. But it would be fruitless to stick to such obscure phrases.

Perhaps we will only reach clarity on this matter if we take our lead from the various interpretations of the sentence 'ex nihilo nihil fit'. Did metaphysics in Antiquity really mean unformed matter when it spoke of the nothingness out of which nothing comes? In that case the above sentence could not make sense, as it states that everything 'formed' was 'formed' out of unformed matter. It distinguishes between not being simply (οὐχ ὄν) and non-being, which in some sense is — namely according to its possibility (μη ὄν).¹⁵⁵ And this is the material out of which all that, which in the *authentic* sense is, is formed. That from which nothing can come, has also no possible being; it is *absolutely* nothing.

In which sense then is the phrase: 'ex nihilo fit ens creatum' to be understood? Here too '*nihil*' does not mean the matter to be formed. The doctrine of Creation in fact denies the availability of a material before Creation. According to Heidegger Dogmatics intends by 'nothingness' the absence of all extra-divine beings. We will leave the question open of whether the meaning of 'nothingness' is fully brought out in this way. In any case nothing can be made from nothingness understood in this manner as though 'from' some pre-existing material. Nothing is 'taken from' it. 'Creation' means, rather, that all that the creature is, including its being, stems from the Creator. The phrase can thus only

be understood to mean that the Creator in creating is unconditioned by any other being, that there in fact are no beings like the Creator and the creation. What about the difficulty that God must relate to nothingness in order to create from nothing? It must be conceded that God must know of nothingness in order to create something. But this knowledge does not mean nothingness in any absolute sense, as all knowledge, including that of nothingness, is positive as such. God knows nothingness as the opposite of himself, i.e. as the *opposite of being itself*. And this 'idea of nothingness' is presupposed for Creation, as everything *finite* is 'something and not everything', a meaning whose being includes non-being. Is it true therefore, when Heidegger claims that Christian Dogmatics questions neither being nor nothingness? It is true insofar as Dogmatics as such does not at all *ask*, but instead *teaches*.¹⁵⁶ That does not mean, however, that it does not concern itself with being and nothingness. It speaks of being when it speaks of God. And it speaks of nothingness in several connections, for example when speaking of Creation, and when by 'creature' referring to a being whose being includes a non-being. Thus we can say that 'being and nothingness' belong together; but not because *being* essentially is *finite*, but because nothingness is the opposite of being in the most original and authentic sense, and because all finite being falls between this most authentic being and nothingness. As we are 'so *finite* [...] that we [...] cannot bring ourselves face to face with nothingness through our own decision and will', the manifestation of nothingness in our own being indicates the breakthrough from this our finite, non-existing being to infinite, pure, eternal being.¹⁵⁷

And thus the question in which the being of the human being expresses itself changes from '*why is there being at all, and not rather nothing?*', to the *question of the eternal foundation of finite being*.

NOTES

¹ Ed. by Lucy Gelber and Romaeus Leuven (Freiburg: Herder, 1986); as it had already been published separately in Vol. VI (1962).

² Vol. 11/12, ed. by Andreas Uwe Müller (Freiburg: Herder, 2006).

³ I am grateful to Prof. Klaus Hedwig for averting my attention to this article.

⁴ Maximilian Beck (*Philosophische Hefte* 1, Berlin, 1928, p. 2) says that in it all living problems of contemporary philosophy are thought through in the most consistent manner to their final conclusion.

⁵ Georg Feuerer, *Ordnung zum Ewigen*, Regensburg, 1935, is completely conditioned by Heidegger's thought, but without ever mentioning his name, and interpreting his expressions in such a manner as to give the impression that the whole without further ado can be brought into harmony with the basic Christian truths.

⁶ *Sein und Zeit*, p. 1. [Hereafter, abbreviated as *SZ*. Page-numbers refer to the German edition only, as they are reproduced in Macquarrie & Robinson's English translation.]

⁷ *SZ*, p. 11.

⁸ *SZ*, p. 7.

⁹ *SZ*, p. 12.

¹⁰ *SZ*, p. 13.

¹¹ *SZ*, p. 17.

¹² *SZ*, p. 17.

¹³ *SZ*, p. 18.

[¹⁴ Macquarrie and Robinson explain their translation of the terms ‘Entfernung’, ‘ent-fernung’, ‘Entferntheit’ in *Being and Time*, n. 2, pp. 138–139 (relating to *SZ*, p. 105). I follow their translation and refer the reader to their reflections, of which I here reproduce some: ‘The nouns “Entfernung” and “Entferntheit” can usually be translated by “removing”, “removal”, “remoteness”, or even “distance”. In this passage, however, Heidegger is calling attention to the fact that these words are derived from the stem “fern-” (“far” or “distant”) and the privative prefix “ent-”. Usually this prefix would be construed as merely intensifying the notion of separation or distance expressed in the “fern-”; but Heidegger chooses to construe it as more strictly privative, so that the verb “entfernen” will be taken to mean abolishing a distance or farness rather than enhancing it. It is as if by the very act of recognising the “remoteness” of something, we have in a sense brought it closer and made it less “remote”.] [Endnotes in square brackets, as in this one, are translator’s notes.]

¹⁵ *SZ*, p. 117.

¹⁶ *SZ*, p. 123.

¹⁷ *SZ*, p. 133.

¹⁸ *SZ*, p. 134.

¹⁹ *SZ*, p. 143.

[²⁰ Stein has the idly talked about (*das Geredete*) in stead of idle talk (*das Gerede*). We take this to be a mistake, however.]

²¹ *SZ*, p. 176.

²² *SZ*, p. 181.

²³ *SZ*, p. 182.

²⁴ *SZ*, p. 209.

[²⁵ Because this translation is being made available on-line, standard Microsoft Basic Greek symbols are being used, and not Stein’s original Greek lettering. CMcD–Editor.]

²⁶ *SZ*, p. 247.

²⁷ *SZ*, p. 247-8.

[²⁸ ‘Das Man’ or ‘Man’ can be translated by ‘they’ (as do Macquarrie and Robinson) or by ‘one’, which is the more grammatically correct.]

²⁹ *SZ*, p. 264.

³⁰ *SZ*, p. 273.

³¹ *SZ*, p. 280.

³² *SZ*, p. 288.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ *SZ*, p. 297.

³⁵ *SZ*, p. 305.

³⁶ *SZ*, p. 307.

³⁷ *SZ*, p. 325.

³⁸ *SZ*, p. 343.

³⁹ *SZ*, p. 350.

⁴⁰ *SZ*, p. 351.

⁴¹ *SZ*, p. 365.

⁴² *SZ*, p. 364.

⁴³ *SZ*, p. 366.

⁴⁴ *SZ*, p. 368. [Stein’s text mistakenly reads *möglich* in stead of *unmöglich*, yet that mistaken reading also makes sense, albeit in a slightly different manner.]

⁴⁵ *SZ*, p. 372.

[⁴⁶ *SZ*, p. 379, according to Uwe Müller p. 381]

⁴⁷ *SZ*, p. 384.

⁴⁸ *SZ*, p. 385.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ *SZ*, p. 386.

[⁵¹ Ibid.]

⁵² *SZ*, p. 395.

⁵³ Following the discussion of historicity, reference is made to the connection with the work of Dilthey and the ideas of Count Yorck [Stein has York].

⁵⁴ *SZ*, p. 410.

⁵⁵ *SZ*, p. 411.

⁵⁶ *SZ*, p. 421.

⁵⁷ *SZ*, p. 422.

⁵⁸ *SZ*, p. 426 [p. 425].

⁵⁹ *SZ*, p. 438 [p. 437].

⁶⁰ The abstract keeps close to Heidegger's own exposition and terms: retaining all the ambiguity that attaches to these. For a critical appraisal, this approach must be abandoned, as it would otherwise be impossible to gain clarity. In contrast to this approach stands the reflection: 'the meaning of all that Heidegger teaches becomes other when one discusses it in a language foreign to its own' (Maximilian Beck, *Philosophische Hefte* I, p. 6). If one were to stop because of this difficulty, one would have to renounce entirely making sense of the book and evaluating it. Alfred Delp, *Tragische Existenz* (Freiburg: Herder, 1935) is an example of how difficult it is to understand the work, so much so that its exposition is unsatisfactory on essential points. On p. 53 is claimed that Dasein=*res* even if Heidegger stresses that Dasein should not be conceived as *res*. On p. 54 it is claimed that the being of external things is limited to the being of equipment. That Heidegger distinguishes 'being-present-at-hand' from the 'ready-to-hand' of equipment, as having its own mode of being (even if he does not clarify this distinction) – seems to have been completely overlooked.

⁶¹ *Denzinger* 295 and 1783. [Heinrich Denzinger, Clemente Bannwart, Johannes Baptista Umberg, *Enchiridion symbolorum, definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum*, a common reference work often used by Stein.]

⁶² Compare with what has been said above concerning Dasein's spatiality, *SZ*, p. 368.

[⁶³ Stein has 'Dasein' for what is here translated by 'existence'. We translate with existence because Dasein means existence, and because Stein is referring to the classical distinction between essence and existence.]

⁶⁴ Heidegger himself would not agree with the distinction outlined here. In his Kant-book he attempts to show that the I is not different from original time. (Compare with the following.) It is also identified with the 'I think'. In this is expressed that one should no longer distinguish between the pure I and its being (or life). But with this is betrayed my understanding of the original meaning of I, and Heidegger's own expressions contradict his point of view.

⁶⁵ Heidegger underlines in the Kant-book (p. 226) that thrownness concerns not only coming-to-Dasein, but completely dominates Da-sein. Still it designates *also* the coming-to-Dasein. Concerning thrownness and creatureliness, compare the following.

[⁶⁶ Stein clarified the notion of form in *Finite and Eternal Being*, to which this essay is an appendix, Chapter IV, §§ 3–4.]

[⁶⁷ *Das Man* is translated by R and M. as 'the they', but grammatically 'the they' cannot function as can *das Man*. A more literal translation would be 'the one', which can be used grammatically as *das Man* is used, but which sounds strange when rendered as a substantive. In the following, when Stein makes use of the grammatical possibilities of *Man*, we shall translate it by 'one', although we shall sometimes add 'the they' for clarity.]

⁶⁸ We do not need to go into the question here of whether there also exists subhuman and superhuman communities.

⁶⁹ There are places in Heidegger which show that he also recognises a *genuine* being-with and even attaches great importance to it, but within the boundaries of the 'they-self' and the inauthentic self, it does not come fully into its own.

⁷⁰ Compare Edith Stein, 'Individuum und Gemeinschaft', in *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, ed. by Edmund Husserl, Vol. V (1922), p. 252 ff. and Edith Stein, 'Eine Untersuchung über den Staat', in *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, Vol. VII (1925), p. 20 ff. ['Individual and Community', in Edith Stein, *Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities*, tr. by Mary Catharine Baseheart and Marianne Sawicki (Washington D.C.: ICS Publications, 2000), p. 279 ff., and Edith Stein, *An Investigation Concerning the State*, tr. by Marianne Sawicki (Washington D.C.: ICS Publications, 2006), p. 34 ff.]

⁷¹ Compare *SZ*, p. 176.

⁷² *SZ*, p. 305.

⁷³ *SZ*, p. 247.

⁷⁴ This corresponds to the replacement of the question of being by the question concerning the understanding of being.

⁷⁵ *SZ*, p. 247.

⁷⁶ Heidegger has himself mentioned Tolstoy's novel *The Death of Ivan Ilych* in a note (p. 254). In it is not only the breakdown of the one dies (whereto Heidegger refers) masterly exposed, but also

the deep rift between the dying and the living. In *War and Peace* this does not happen with the same crass realism, but perhaps with even clearer focus on the essential.

⁷⁷ It is well known how major crises of conscience may be caused by vows always to do the more perfect deed.

⁷⁸ See his Kant-book, p. 226. [Martin Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, Gesamtausgabe I Abt., Bd. 3 (Frankfurt a. M.: Vittorio Klosterman, 1991) (henceforth referred to as: KPM, § 43. Stein is using the first edition. Whereas the texts of the first, second and third editions are unchanged, the page numbers have changed each time. We will therefore give the page numbers of the translation only: Martin Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, trans. James S. Churchill (Bloomington – London: Indiana University Press, 1962), henceforth referred to as ‘Churchill’, p. 245.]

⁷⁹ See [Thomas Aquinas] *Summa Theologica* I, q. 10, a. 5 corp..

⁸⁰ SZ, p. 427, n. 1. Compare with difference between true and apparent eternity in Hedwig Conrad-Martius, *Die Zeit, Philosophischer Anzeiger* II, Bonn, 1927, p. 147.

⁸¹ Hedwig Conrad-Martius, *Heideggers Sein und Zeit* (Kunstwart, 1933).

⁸² This is why Stein takes the being of the I as the point of departure for the ontology she works out in *Finite and Eternal Being*.]

⁸³ Stein speaks of only one other way of being here, but for grammatical clarity it has been rendered in the plural, which is consistent with her meaning.]

⁸⁴ SZ, p. 229. The question of Christian Philosophy need not here be taken up again, as it was sufficiently treated in *Finite and Eternal Being*, Introduction, § 4.

⁸⁵ Stein is making use of the first edition, Bonn, 1929. As this is not widely available, the paragraph number has been included with the reference to the translation.]

⁸⁶ KPM, p. 193. [§ 35, Churchill, p. 206.]

⁸⁷ KPM, p. 195. [§ 35, Churchill, p. 208.]

⁸⁸ KPM, p. 193. [§ 35, Churchill, p. 207.]

⁸⁹ SZ, p. 438 (In the previous p. 66).

⁹⁰ KPM, p. 6 (see p. 211). [§ 1, The quotation from Heidegger runs in its entirety: ‘Sie [die erste Philosophie] is sowohl Erkenntnis des Seienden als Seienden ($\delta\nu \tilde{\eta} \delta\nu$), als auch Erkenntnis des vorzüglichsten Bezirks des Seienden ($\tau\mu\acute{\iota}\omega\tau\alpha\tau\omicron\nu \gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\varsigma$), aus dem her sich das Seiende im Ganzen ($\chi\alpha\theta\acute{\omicron}\lambda\omicron\nu$) bestimmt’. Churchill, p. 12. Stein’s adaptation seems uncharacteristically clumsy, although the meaning is relatively clear.]

⁹¹ KPM, p. 213. [§ 40, Churchill, p. 230.]

⁹² KPM, p. 215. [§ 40, Churchill, p. 232.]

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ KPM, p. 216. [§ 40, Churchill, p. 233.]

⁹⁵ KPM, p. 9. [§ 2, Churchill, p. 15.]

⁹⁶ KPM, p. 162. [§ 31, Churchill, p. 176.]

⁹⁷ KPM, p. 113. [§ 24, Churchill, p. 124.]

⁹⁸ KPM, p. 226. [§ 43, Churchill, p. 244.]

⁹⁹ KPM, p. 218. [§ 41, Churchill, p. 235.]

¹⁰⁰ KPM, p. 219. [§ 41, Churchill, p. 236.]

¹⁰¹ Ibid. The latter phrase is underlined by me. [Churchill, p. 236.]

¹⁰² KPM, p. 171. [Churchill p. 184.]

¹⁰³ KPM, p. 178. [§ 33 c), Churchill, p. 191: ‘erkundet den Horizont von Vorhaltbarkeit überhaupt’.] What is said here is the Kantian pure synthesis, in its three modes of Apprehension, Reproduction and Recognition. (I have on purpose avoided the Kantian expressions in the text.) Heidegger’s analysis of time far exceeds that of Kant, and must be compared with Husserl’s *Lectures on the Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness* (Husserl’s *Yearbook*, IX, 1928; it also appeared in a separate printing), published by Heidegger not long before the appearance of his Kant-book.

¹⁰⁴ KPM, p. 180 f. [§ 34, Churchill, p. 194.]

¹⁰⁵ KPM, p. 181. [§ 34, Churchill, p. 194.]

¹⁰⁶ KPM, p. 183. [§ 34, Churchill, p. 196.]

¹⁰⁷ KPM, p. 184. [§ 34, Churchill, p. 198.]

¹⁰⁸ KPM, p. 185. [§ 34, Churchill, p. 198 – 9.]

¹⁰⁹ ‘Zeitrechnung’ literally means ‘counting with time’, or the ‘counting of time’ apart from designating the order we indicate by A.D. or B.C. We could have translated ‘keeping of time’, thus

expressing some of the reality evoked, yet, ‘counting on time’ was chosen as it designates the most central meaning available in ordinary English.]

¹¹⁰ *KPM*, p. 199 ff. and p. 210. [probably Churchill, p. 211 ff (section four) and p. 222 (§ 38).]

¹¹¹ *KPM*, p. 212. [§ 39, Churchill, p. 228.]

¹¹² *KPM*, p. 223. [§ 42, Churchill, p. 240.]

¹¹³ *KPM*, p. 225. [§ 43, Churchill, p. 243.]

¹¹⁴ *KPM*, p. 226. [§ 43, Churchill, p. 244. Churchill’s translation has been altered. The German reads: ‘dass überhaupt so etwas wie Da-sein sein kann’.]

[¹¹⁵ § 43, Churchill p. 246.]

¹¹⁶ *KPM*, p. 210. [§ 39, Churchill, p. 227.]

[¹¹⁷ § 45; Churchill p. 254.]

¹¹⁸ *KPM*, p. 218. [§ 41, Churchill, p. 236.]

¹¹⁹ *KPM*, p. 228. [§ 43, Churchill, p. 246.]

¹²⁰ *KPM*, p. 114 ff. [The two f’s suggests that Stein is quoting from memory. In fact I have not been able to retrieve the quotation, nor anything said about the horizon in those approximate pages. What comes closest to the following quotation is: ‘Ist das Sein nicht so etwas wie das Nichts?’ § 41. It could be rendered as Stein does: Heidegger asks whether being is not something like nothing is, which clearly presupposes that nothing is something, just like being is, which is the sense Stein retains. The quotation marks here should therefore be taken with a grain of salt.]

¹²¹ *KPM*, p. 136. [§ 28; Churchill, p. 150.]

¹²² *KPM*, p. 235. [§ 45; Churchill, p. 253.]

[¹²³ These brackets are not quotation marks. Stein is merely reiterating and emphasising the consequences of what Heidegger affirmed in the previous sentence.]

¹²⁴ *KPM*, p. 28. Herewith it is neglected that infinite knowledge also spans finite knowledge and the object as it appears to finite knowledge. [§ 5; Churchill, p. 35-6.]

¹²⁵ *KPM*, p. 30. [§ 5, Churchill, p. 38.]

[¹²⁶ Stein died during the War. What she would have made of Heidegger’s later thought therefore remains an object for speculation and further study.]

¹²⁷ In the *Husserl-Festschrift*, Halle, 1929. [The edition used here is Martin Heidegger, *The Essence of Reasons. A Bilingual Edition, Incorporating the German Text of ‘Vom Wesen des Grundes’*, trans. by Terrence Malick (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969). *Vom Wesen des Grundes* is henceforth abbreviated ‘WG’ and its translation ‘Malick’.]

¹²⁸ This is the public inauguration lecture, which Heidegger gave on the 24 July 1929 in the Aula of the University of Freiburg im Bresgau, published by Cohen in Bonn, 1930. [We will make use of *Was ist Metaphysik?* (Frankfurt a.M.: Klosterman, 1969), the pagination of which is different. This edition is abbreviated henceforth as ‘Klosterman’. Translation is taken from ‘What is Metaphysics?’, in Martin Heidegger, *Existence and Being*, trans. by R.F.C. Hull and Alan Crick (London: Vision, 1949), p. 357 – 8. The work is henceforth abbreviated ‘WM’ and the translation ‘Hull and Crick’.]

¹²⁹ *WG*, p. 96 [Malick, p. 86 – 7.]

¹³⁰ *WG*, p. 97 [Malick, p. 88 – 9.]

¹³¹ Perhaps this turn can be explained from the fact that the treatise of *The Essence of Reason* is conceived in Heidegger’s Marburg-time, under the strong influence of the protestant theologians, from which it probably also received some notice.

¹³² *WG*, p. 98, note 1. [Malick, p. 90 – 1.]

¹³³ *WG*, p. 100, note 1. [Malick, p. 98 – 9.]

¹³⁴ *WG*, p. 104. [Malick, p. 110 – 1.]

¹³⁵ *WG*, p. 110. [Malick, p. 128 – 9.]

¹³⁶ *WM*, p. 9. [‘in seiner Weise dem Seinenden allererst zu ihm selbst’. Klosterman p. 26; Hull and Crick p. 357 – 8]

¹³⁷ *WM*, p. 10. [Klosterman, p. 26; Hull and Crick, p. 358.]

¹³⁸ *WM*, p. 12. [Klosterman, p. 28; Hull and Crick, p. 361.]

¹³⁹ *WM*, p. 18. [Klosterman, p. 34; Hull and Crick, p. 368.]

[¹⁴⁰ *WM*, p. 18. Klosterman, p. 34; Hull and Crick, p. 369]

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.* One gets the impression that nothingness here is meant in a more radical sense than in the Kant-book. The relationship between nothingness and being is adjusted correspondingly.

¹⁴² *WM*, p. 19. [Klosterman, p. 34; Hull and Crick, p. 369.]

¹⁴³ *WM*, p. 20. [Klosterman, p. 35; Hull and Crick, p. 370.]

¹⁴⁴ *WM*, p. 21. [Klosterman, p. 36; Hull and Crick, p. 372.]

¹⁴⁵ *WM*, p. 22. [Klosterman, p. 36; Hull and Crick, p. 372.]

¹⁴⁶ *WM*, p. 23. [Klosterman, p. 37; Hull and Crick, p. 373.]

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

[¹⁴⁸ *WM*, p. 23. [Klosterman, p. 37; Hull and Crick, p. 374.]

¹⁴⁹ *WM*, p. 24. [Klosterman, p. 38; Hull and Crick, p. 374.]

¹⁵⁰ *WM*, p. 26. [Klosterman, p. 39; Hull and Crick, p. 377.]

¹⁵¹ *WM*, p. 25. [Klosterman, p. 39; Hull and Crick, p. 376.]

¹⁵² *WM*, p. 26. [Klosterman, p. 40; Hull and Crick, p. 377.]

¹⁵³ *WM*, p. 28. [Klosterman, p. 41; Hull and Crick, p. 378.]

¹⁵⁴ *WM*, p. 28. [Klosterman, p. 42; Hull and Crick, p. 380.]

¹⁵⁵ See Aristotle's *Metaphysics* A 1003 b and N 1089 a-b.

¹⁵⁶ Said more precisely: Dogmatics can ask whether something belongs to the faith or not, but what is accepted as dogma is no longer in question for Dogmatics.

¹⁵⁷ The reader of Heidegger's writings is necessarily left with the impression that his existential philosophy aims at exposing 'the essential and necessary finitude of being and all beings'. In contrast to this stands a remarkable oral utterance, wherein he rejects such understanding. His justification has reached us in the following manner: 'The concept of being is finite; but this teaching says nothing about the finite or infinite character of beings or of being itself. Any being, which, in order to understand beings, needs a concept of being, is finite, and if an infinite essence exists it will not need a concept of being to know being. We humans need conceptual philosophy in order to bring being to light, because we are finite; and our particular nature as finite beings, yes, even the essence of this particularity of finitude, is based on the necessity of using the concept of being. God, in contrast, as infinite, is not such that he is subject to the necessary limits of knowledge. God does not philosophise. But the human being is defined by having to conceptualise being in order to relate to being and thus he makes use of the concept of being' (See the account of R.P. Daniel Feuling O.S.B. in *La Phénoménologie*, Journées d'études de la Société Thomiste, I, Les Editions du Cerf, Juvisy, 1932, p. 39). Here the sharp distinction between being and understanding of being is made, the distinction we lacked in the writings, and thus the possibility for eternal being is left open. As this exposition only relies on oral utterances, which have no grounding in Heidegger's writings, it is only referred to here in a note. On the other hand, since it stems from a talk that was aimed at preparing a public report concerning Heidegger's phenomenology, it seems too important to omit.

Edith Stein and Tania Singer: A Comparison of Phenomenological and Neurological Approaches to the ‘Problem of Empathy’

J. Haydn Gurmin

ABSTRACT

This paper compares Edith Stein’s phenomenological approach to empathy in *On the Problem of Empathy* (1917) with that of more recent neurological explanations of empathy, broadly exemplified by Tania Singer’s (2006) work. Given that we are dealing with two different methodologies that reflect the general debate that exists between phenomenology and natural science (neurology), a consideration of ‘method’ will be discussed prior to our comparative analysis of Stein and Singer’s account of empathy. In conclusion, we argue that Stein’s phenomenological understanding of empathy provides the most comprehensive description of the act of empathy to date for neurologists to ‘reflect’ on.

Introduction

Edith Stein’s *On the Problem of Empathy*¹ was published in 1917 and represents one of the earliest phenomenological treatises on inter-subjectivity. Her supervisor Edmund Husserl had become interested in the question of inter-subjective experience around 1911 when he began his work on the natural attitude.² According to Moran, Husserl noticed that ‘connected with the focus on the ego necessarily comes the problem of the experience of other egos, of alter egos, the experience of the ‘foreign’, the ‘strange’, the ‘other’ (*Fremderfahrung*) in general’.³ Husserl recognised that accounting for how we experience the foreign was problematic, especially after his discovery, around 1908, of the absolute mode of existence of one’s own actual consciousness in immanent perception and the contingency of the mode of being of things given to outer perception upon the harmony of one’s actual (conscious) experiences, a position which he later publishes in terms of his famous ‘reduction’ of the ‘natural attitude’ to the ‘transcendental-phenomenological attitude’ in *Ideas I* (1913). And yet, the experience of the ‘other’ is, nevertheless, an experience, and as such, open, at least in principle, to phenomenological analysis. Thus Husserl adopted the term ‘*Einfühlung* (in-feeling)’ from Theodor Lipps to describe this experience; however, Husserl understood *Einfühlung* (empathy) in a manner different from Lipps. It appears, therefore, that although Husserl had not formulated a precise account of *Einfühlung* (before 1917), he followed Stein’s characterisation of empathy as published in *On the Problem of Empathy*.⁴ In fact, Stein’s publication of *On Empathy* predates Husserl’s own published reflections in this regard in *Ideas II*.⁵

Stein believed empathy was a ‘founding act (*eine Art erfahrender Akte*)’,⁶ in the Husserlian sense: that is to say; empathy is a kind of foundation for other acts that is indispensable for their execution. More significantly for Stein, however, empathy is a founding act *sui generis*;⁷ and so, it cannot be defined in any other terms except with reference to the kind of experience it is, i.e., it cannot be reduced to other, similar acts of consciousness, such as, memory, expectation,

sympathy or fantasy (see Section III). According to Stein, then, empathy is a kind of act which allows us to experience the ‘foreign’ individual. For Stein, we ‘sense-in’ or ‘in-feel’ (*Ein-fühlung*) the ‘foreign’. In this way, we have a primordial experience which is led by non-primordial content. This acknowledges the experiential fact that ‘we can *live in* the other’s experience in an intuitive manner but [we] don’t undergo that experience [ourselves] in an original fashion.’⁸

It has been ninety years since Stein’s publication of *On Empathy*. In the intermittent years there have been major scientific developments many of which were due to the work of Albert Einstein and to the advancement of quantum physics.⁹ In terms of neurology the study of the living brain became increasingly possible with the advent of PET and fMRI¹⁰ technologies. With these technologies scientists and psychologists can now analyse the human brain *in vivo* (i.e., in real time) as it actually encounters the ‘foreign’ individual. Tania Singer’s article ‘The neuronal basis and ontogeny of empathy and mind reading: Review of literature and implications for future research’ (2006) characterises, in many respects, the neurological research to date in relation to empathy.¹¹

Singer’s approach to the topic of empathy (and mind reading), however, is quite different to Stein’s phenomenological approach. Singer’s approach reflects and advances natural-scientific method and findings, whereas Stein’s approach develops the phenomenological method of inquiry proposed by Husserl. This difference in methods was one that Husserl himself encountered in the development of his own phenomenological method of inquiry. In order to compare Stein’s phenomenological insights and Singer’s neurological accounts of empathy, it will be of importance to outline the main features of the various methods deployed, with a view to finding out what either approach can offer to the other’s findings. Thus the following section will focus on general methodological issues concerning natural science and phenomenology. Then Stein and Singer’s analyses will be compared in subsequent sections. In conclusion, we shall argue that Stein’s phenomenological approach can offer neurologists a comprehensive account of empathy that will aid them insofar as they ‘reflect’ on scientific explanations.

I

Methodological Considerations: Natural Science v. Phenomenology

As noted above, phenomenological and neurological approaches to empathy are difficult to relate because of the different methodologies they employ. The father of the phenomenological method, Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), broke away from the purely positivist orientation dominant in natural science for philosophy, in favour of giving weight to subjective experience as the source of all of our knowledge. As such, Husserl’s ‘turn away’ from positivism places his phenomenological method of analyses in conflict with the natural-scientific method of scrutiny which emphasises an objective-realist approach to knowledge. Neurology is founded on the scientific methodology of explanation. It tests a hypothesis by observing causal connections, carrying out experiments and by publishing reports of findings which can subsequently be tested and compared in any similar controlled environment (e.g. a laboratory). Scientific knowledge is

built up by continuous testing and refinement of the proposed hypothesis and this hypothesis constantly seeks out falsification as outlined by Popper.¹²

While the scientific method has tended to be streamlined, although depending on the situation variations do arise, the phenomenological method did undergo development by Husserl. In fact, Husserl's turn towards transcendental idealism did come as a shock and a surprise to some of his students. Thus it is important to note the main differences between Husserl's 'early' descriptive-psychological approach in the *Logical Investigations* (1900–01) and his 'later' transcendental-phenomenological stance in *Ideas I* (1913). Furthermore, as Husserl developed phenomenology and gained a following, his followers developed phenomenology in varying and different directions to both the early and late Husserl. Thus, a brief outline of this background of Husserl's 'early' and 'late' phenomenology, with particular concern for the development of Husserl's phenomenological method of inquiry, will be undertaken prior to considering Stein's methodological stance.¹³

(i) Husserl's Early Phenomenological Method

Husserl's movement away from the positivist philosophy of his time brought him into the subjective realm and face to face with the questions of consciousness, perception and meaning. In the *Logical Investigations* Husserl maintains that consciousness has a 'meaning-conferring role'.¹⁴ In this way, we actively interpret what we are given as *content*. As such it is due to the 'activity of consciousness that a certain design (or arabesque) or a certain sound appears to us as a meaningful word.'¹⁵ This according to de Boer is the first appearance of the concept of *constitution* i.e., consciousness is shown to play a role in the constitution of what appears. As perception is a mode of access through which things 'appear' to consciousness, Husserl came to the position that perception was a constitutive activity:

in perceiving the subject is directed to the perceived object *via* the sensations (*Empfindungen*) [...].¹⁶ Husserl places a great deal of emphasis on the difference between immanent colour-sensations (*empfundene Farbe*) and objectively perceived colour. The former is '*erlebt*' and immanent, while the latter is transcendent.¹⁷

This again raises a central issue that creates problems for comparing the methodology of phenomenology and the methodology of the 'natural sciences' (neurology). For Husserl the objectively perceived colour is not to be understood as a turn to the object in a philosophical realist way (e.g., as an accidental modification of a substance). In fact, the perceived colour, from a descriptive-psychological point of view, is 'nothing but a sensation interpreted in a transcendent or objective sense'.¹⁸ The existence of the external world is thus 'bracketed' for descriptive-psychological methodological considerations, and so, any questions or interest in the objective colour in a realist sense i.e., as existing independently of one's actual experiences, is placed outside of the early phenomenological (descriptive-psychological) manner of inquiry. In this regard, the question of the origin of the sensation, and how such a coloured object arises for the experiencing subject, is not addressed or considered. Examining the origin of such sensation and sense-perception, rather, is regarded as a 'metaphysical' matter 'which does not fall within the domain of what is phenomenologically given'.¹⁹ Phenomenologists are thus precluded from the kind of investigations

which are undertaken by the natural sciences, such as, for instance, in the science of physics, on methodological grounds. As one commentator puts it:

(It appears that Husserl, like Brentano, [considers] the real, independently existing thing to be the object of physics (in later terminology, *das physikalische Ding*). It lies ‘behind’ the perceived phenomena and is the cause of the sensations. Consequently, Husserl is realist at this point, *but not in virtue of the doctrine of intentionality [of consciousness]*. The intentional object is not identical with the real object in the sense of the independently existing object.²⁰

In this respect, therefore, Husserl wishes to remain faithful to the Cartesian starting-point by proceeding only from that which is phenomenologically given, i.e., the sphere of consciousness and *its* objectivities. Any questions pertaining to the existence of ‘extra-mental things’ are thereby consigned to metaphysics. Thus, for the early Husserl, as De Boer notes:

This means that, though the technical terms are still absent, there is in the *Logical Investigations* an [descriptive-psychological] epochē and a disconnection of the existence of the extra-mental object. *And here ‘reduction’ has the meaning which it is so often wrongly said to have in the first volume of the Ideas; putting within brackets the real existence of the object.*²¹

The question of transcendence, formulated in terms of ‘how can I gain access to the external world’, still, however, remains a problem for the early Husserl since implementation of the descriptive-psychological *epochē*, as de Boer acutely points out, ‘does not solve the problem but eliminates it. It is an emergency measure which limits itself to the given (consciousness plus *cogitata*), because the real question cannot be answered.’²² In other words, by maintaining the position that any questions or issues pertaining to the extra-mental existence of things is not to be taken into consideration, on methodological grounds, in any descriptive-psychological or phenomenological analyses of intentional consciousness and its objectivities, ‘the problem of transcendence’, in Husserl’s early investigations, ‘is evaded rather than solved.’²³ The implementation of this descriptive-psychological *epochē*, nevertheless, still assumes that there is an external world of things in existence outside of one’s actual intentional consciousness. Only later did Husserl realise that this presupposition of the existence of the external world that he himself subscribed to in his early thinking is a thoroughly unphenomenological and untested *hypo-thesis* (of the natural attitude) about the existence of world in and of itself. So, from this interpretation of Husserl, we can conclude that there is an underlying realism in the early Husserl, and it is one that is based on what Husserl later calls the ‘prejudice of an independent, absolutely existing world’.

(ii) Husserl’s Later Phenomenological Method

The later Husserl moves forward to consider the prejudice of the existing world²⁴ and to demonstrate the point that, as de Boer comments,

the presupposition of a naturalistic ontology — i.e. the (hypo) thesis of the natural attitude — has no phenomenological foundation. It is an illusion. The true presupposition (ground) of the world is consciousness. This is the Copernican revolution in ontology which Husserl desires to bring about by the transcendental reduction. The effect of this transcendental reduction or epoche is not that being is

put within brackets, as was the case in the *Logical Investigations*. What is put within brackets is a particular, absurd interpretation of being! [...] Husserl [is now] able to say that the reduction does not imply the loss of anything at all. What is lost is a mere naturalistic prejudice and its insoluble problem of transcendence. [...] The thing of physics [...] is not an independent reality behind the phenomenal world, but a particular formal interpretation of the latter; it is a conceptual cloak (*Ideenkleid*) which should not be taken ontologically as 'true nature'.²⁵

Husserl moved consciousness away from nature as such and thereby held that matter was not the foundation of consciousness. Since one's own actual consciousness is a necessary (pre-)condition for the very appearing of the world of things to consciousness, then '(T)he existence of a [absolutely independent] nature *can not* condition the existence of consciousness'.²⁶ In this way, the view of consciousness as being part of nature is now replaced by a comprehensive view of idealism based on phenomenology. Through the therapeutic act of the reduction of the natural attitude to the transcendental-phenomenological attitude, then, the 'explanatory sciences of nature and consciousness are not rejected but freed from their implicit, naturalistic philosophy.'²⁷

(iii) Stein's Position with regard to Husserlian Methodology

Edith Stein among others disagreed with Husserl's movement towards transcendental idealism. Many from the Munich school saw phenomenology as a realist philosophy of pure description of objects and emphasised the objective truth discoverable through close description of the essential features of such objects, i.e., descriptive-*eidetic*-psychological analyses. Regarding the early followers of Husserl's descriptive-*eidetic* phenomenological analyses, Dermot Moran remarks that,

An elegant expression of this outlook can be found in Reinach's 'Concerning Phenomenology?' essay of 1914 and in Roman Ingarden's later study, *On the Motives Which Led Husserl to Transcendental Idealism*. These students did not follow Husserl in his reductions and transcendental idealism, a position Husserl later characterised as 'empirical phenomenology' as opposed to his 'transcendental' phenomenology. In 1907 a group of students at Göttingen founded a similar circle of phenomenology, the Göttingen Philosophy Society, led by Theodor Conrad and including Hedwig Conrad-Martius, [...] Jean Héring, Fritz Kaufmann, [...] Winthrop Bell, [...] Roman Ingarden, [...] Alexandre Koyré, and Edith Stein.²⁸

In the case of Edith Stein the methodology of phenomenology does not preclude the reality of the external world or the perception of one's own body which is an object of outer perception also, but in keeping with Husserl's early descriptive-psychological methodology questions pertaining to the external world is bracketed. Even when Stein considers the reality of the psycho-physical individual she does so from the sphere of pure consciousness.²⁹ Given that her descriptive analysis of the 'body', both in its living and physical dimensions, brings her to reflect on the causal processes that are given to consciousness, many believe she has not remained totally faithful to the 'early' phenomenological reduction.³⁰ However, that being said, it does appear valid that Stein can legitimately analyse the realm of the causal from the 'sphere of pure consciousness' as she experiences 'that' (i.e. causal) reality as it is 'given' to the stream of (an incarnate) consciousness.³¹

III

Stein's Understanding and Analysis of Empathy (*Einfühlung*)

It is in the second chapter of *On Empathy* that Stein descriptively analyses 'the essence of the act of empathy' (*das Wesen der Einfühlungsakte*). She begins her analysis by discussing the relationship between outer perception and empathy. This in turn leads on to her consideration of the primordial experience we have of our own conscious deliberations (such as perception, sensation) and the non-primordial content that we experience in a primordial fashion (empathy). Then she moves to outline how empathy differs from memory, expectation and fantasy. The chapter continues with a discussion of the distinction between empathy and fellow-feeling (sympathy). It is at this juncture that the differences between Stein's and Lipps' position vis-à-vis empathy are stated. The concluding sections of the chapter consider genetic theories of the comprehension of foreign consciousness and finally Scheler and Münsterberg's theories of comprehension of foreign consciousness. For all intents and purposes we will follow most of the chronological structure of the chapter to facilitate our outline of Stein's understanding of empathy.

(i) Primordality

Stein understands empathy to be an 'act which is primordial³² as present experience though non-primordial in content'.³³ She highlights what she means by this by describing the process as follows:

While I am living in the other's joy, I do not feel primordial joy. It does not issue live from my 'I'. Neither does it have the character of once having lived like remembered joy. But still less is it merely fantasised without actual life. This other subject is primordial although I do not experience it as primordial. In my non-primordial experience I feel, as it were, led by a primordial one not experienced by me but still there, manifesting itself in my non-primordial experience.³⁴

Primordial acts are given to us in a direct way as they issue live from the 'I' as such. Empathy is characterised as being non-primordial, in this way, a feeling of joy, sadness, guilt, regret maybe issuing live from my 'I' in the present moment but when I encounter the 'joy' of another individual 'I' am aware that it (the joy of the 'other') is not flowing presently from my 'I' in an original fashion.³⁵ Thus, we are capable of differentiating the primordial and non-primordial experience of 'joy' and as such 'I' can come to identify *my* 'I' as the pole of experience. This distinction is prior to my constitution of myself as a self but it brings about the phenomenological manifestation of the 'I'. So by having such 'awareness' we can decipher between our own experience and the experience that is brought about in us in relation to others. From this perspective we are aware of feelings which issue primordially and those that do not arise or emanate *live* from our 'I'. The problem Stein now encounters is how do we distinguish empathy from other acts that are given to us non-primordially such as memory and fantasy? As she states:

There is a well-known analogy between acts of empathy and acts in which our own experiences are given non-primordially. The memory of a joy is primordial as a representational act now being carried out, though its content of joy is non-primordial.³⁶

(ii) *Memory*

So how do we distinguish between empathy, memory and fantasy given they are analogously non-primordial in content? In terms of remembered joy we do not experience it as alive *per se*. In fact remembered joy is experienced ‘as once having lived but not now alive’. As Stein outlines:

the past memory of ‘joy’ has the characteristic of a former ‘now’ which is remembered. The ‘I’ as such becomes the ‘subject’ of the act of remembering, and in this act of representation, the ‘I’ can look back at the past joy. The present ‘I’ and the past ‘I’ face each other as subject and object. They do not coincide, though there is a consciousness of sameness.³⁷

Furthermore, Stein outlines that ‘it is possible for me to represent a past situation to myself and be unable to remember my inner behaviour in this situation.’³⁸ So memory can have the character of doubt, conjecture, or possibility, but never the character of *being*.³⁹ The experience of joy in empathy is given to us as having *being*, i.e., we do not experience the doubt that arises with the experience of memory.

(iii) *Fantasy*

In terms of fantasy Stein tells us that the ‘I’ producing the world of fantasy is experienced primordially while the ‘I’ living in that world (of fantasy) is experienced non-primordially. Fantasised experiences allow us to meet ourselves as in memory, i.e. to meet an ‘I’ which ‘I’ recognise as myself. For fantasy as in the case of memory there is a connection between the primordial and non-primordial content in what we might call the ‘stream of the “I”’. But empathy is an experience of a foreign ‘I’ as such and in this way there is not a complete connection between our primordial and non-primordial experience in the ‘stream of the “I”’. In other words, there should be a disconnection between the primordial experience and the non-primordial experience which issues from a foreign ‘I’. Stein develops this position in relation to Lipps.

(iv) *Stein’s discussion of Lipps’ position vis-à-vis Empathy*

Stein notes that Lipps’ theory of empathy in general agrees with her position in many respects. She outlines that Lipps depicts empathy as an ‘inner participation’ in foreign experiences. However, Lipps stresses that empathy is akin to memory and expectation. From what we have outlined above it is clear to see that at these points Stein will diverge from Lipps’ position. Stein does not believe that there is a complete coincidence with the ‘remembered, or expected, or empathised “I,” that they become one’.⁴⁰ In this regard Lipps has failed to distinguish between the following two acts:

- (i) being drawn into the experience at first given objectively and fulfilling its implied tendencies with
- (ii) the transition from non-primordial to primordial experience.

A memory is entirely fulfilled and identified when one has followed out its tendencies to explication and established the experiential continuity to the present. But this does not make the remembered experience primordial as Lipps maintains.⁴¹ Stein elaborates the difference between her position and Lipps in an example that all of us can ‘empathise’ with to a greater or lesser extent – going to the circus we see an acrobat perform what we consider dizzying feats at dizzying heights. For Lipps, when we see the acrobat we become ‘one’ with him/her. But for Stein we would not be ‘one’ with the experience of the acrobat but ‘at’ the acrobat. In this way, Stein says we do not go through the acrobat’s motions but *quasi*. Stein stresses that Lipps does not go so far as to say that one would outwardly go through the acrobat’s motions [...] but the inward dimensions are still a problem for Stein. According to Stein, the inward movements do not correspond to the movements of the body, the experience that ‘I move’ is not primordial, it is non-primordial for the seated individual. But through the non-primordial movement one feels led, accompanied by the acrobat’s movements.⁴²

The major fault in Lipps’ account is brought via the delusion of self-forgetfulness. In this case one forgets the self to any object, with a dissolution of the ‘I’ to the object. This happens when the ‘I’ being entertained by the acrobat becomes merged with the acrobat. Thus, strictly speaking for Stein, empathy is not a feeling of oneness as it is for Lipps.

(v) *Empathy and Imitation*⁴³

Now that Stein has differentiated empathy from ‘fellow-feeling’ or ‘sympathy’ she moves to consider empathy and *imitation*.

A child seeing another crying cries, too. When I see a member of my family going around with a long face, I too become upset. When I want to stop worrying, I seek out happy company. We speak of the contagion or transference of feeling in such cases. It is very plain that the actual feelings aroused in us do not serve a cognitive function, that they do not announce a foreign experience to us as empathy does. So we need not consider whether such a transference of feeling presupposes the comprehension of the foreign feeling concerned, since only phenomena of expression can affect us like this. On the contrary, the same change of face interpreted as a grimace certainly can arouse imitation in us, but not a feeling. It is certain that as we are saturated by such ‘transferred’ feelings, we live in them and thus in ourselves. This prevents our turning toward or submerging ourselves in the foreign experience, which is the attitude characteristic of empathy.⁴⁴

Stein notes that it is possible to be affected by imitation and contagion as such but we are not affected in the sense that we sub-merge ourselves into the other individual. On the contrary the feeling may be ‘transferred’ to us and as such we *live in* them and therefore in *ourselves*. We have not merged with the foreign individual to become ‘one’ with them as Lipps contends. In this way imitation does not serve as a genetic-causal explanation of empathy.⁴⁵ Imitation seems to happen in an automatic way and does not necessarily arouse a feeling in us as such. Stein differentiates between imitation and ‘affective empathy’ when she realises that ‘the same change of face interpreted as a grimace certainly can arouse imitation in us, but not a feeling’. In terms of neurological research a number of findings have outlined that ‘affective empathy’ is brought about through imitation via mirror neurons (we will consider imitation and mirror neurons in more detail presently).

In sum, Stein's theory of empathy is a phenomenological account of *the way* we experience the foreign individual. It makes use of an epistemological distinction, based upon descriptive-psychological analysis, of the distinction between our primordial experience and the non-primordial content given to us from 'without'. In her inquiry Stein realises that there are problems with Lipps' account precisely in the area of primordially. Stein contends that Lipps, wrongly, holds that there is a 'oneness' in empathy that allows a merging with the foreign individual such that we 'forget' (in the sense that we un-constitute or lose our personal identity) ourselves. For Stein, the primordial nature of our empathetic experience prevents such a merge. However, she does note that it is possible to be taken over by contagion or imitation but contra Lipps she argues that we still are not 'one' with the other individual. While we can be 'saturated by [...] "transferred" feelings, we live in them and thus in *ourselves*'. Our primordially is maintained.

IV Neurological Considerations—Singer's Account

Neurological explanations of empathy garnered new insight from the discussion of 'mirror neurons'⁴⁶ published by Gallese *et al.* in 1996.⁴⁷ It has been eleven years since scientists first noticed the function of these mirror neurons in the macaque monkey brain. As Gallese remarks:

About ten years ago we discovered in the macaque monkey brain a class of premotor neurons that discharge not only when the monkey executes goal-related hand actions like grasping objects, but also when observing other individuals (monkeys or humans) executing similar actions. We call them 'mirror neurons'.⁴⁸

What Gallese noticed was that the observation of an object-related hand action (such as when you see someone lift an object) leads to the activation of the *same* neural network active during its actual execution. In this way, 'action observation causes in the observer the *automatic* activation of the same neural mechanism triggered by action execution.'⁴⁹ In 2006 Tania Singer undertook a literature review of the scientific advances over the past decade and the implications for future research.⁵⁰ It is without doubt that the study is in its infancy⁵¹ but from early research Singer believes we can account for mirroring or 'empathising' on two levels – mental and affective.

(i) Theory of Mind (Mentalising)

Singer informs us that there are distinctive areas of brain structuration for different forms of empathising.⁵² As such she distinguishes between those components involved in mentalising (with regard to the thoughts, intentions and beliefs of others) and those which are involved in 'feeling' or 'affective' states.⁵³ Singer restricts her definition of empathy to its association with feelings (brain structures developed earlier in ontogeny are considered in this regard). In contrast mentalising (which refers to higher-order activities such as intentions, beliefs etc.) develop late in brain structural growth. As she states in her abstract:

Social neuro-science has recently started to investigate the neuronal mechanisms underlying our ability to understand the mental and emotional states of others. In this review, imaging research conducted on theory of mind (ToM or mentalising) and empathy is selectively reviewed. It is proposed that even though these abilities are often used as synonyms in the literature these capacities represent different abilities that rely on different neuronal circuitry. ToM refers to our ability to understand mental states such as intentions, goals and beliefs, and relies on structures of the temporal lobe and the pre-frontal cortex. In contrast, empathy refers to our ability to share the feelings (emotions and sensations) of others and relies on sensorimotor cortices as well as limbic and para-limbic structures. It is further argued that the concept of empathy as used in lay terms refers to a multi-level construct extending from simple forms of emotion contagion to complex forms of cognitive perspective taking.⁵⁴

This distinction between mentalising and empathy is somewhat artificial in the sense that mentalising and affective mirroring are both organic structures of a holistic reality – the human brain. Singer realises this when she considers that mentalising and empathising are not only separate but intertwined.⁵⁵ Psychological and scientific research vis-à-vis mentalising predates studies on mirror neurons by about twenty years.⁵⁶ The early studies concentrated on monkey brain activity. More modern research has made use of the advances in technology to examine human adult brains⁵⁷ by means of fMRI and PET imaging. The experiments involved scientists using stories, cartoons, picture sequences and animated geometric shapes in order to examine the human brain in action.⁵⁸ The stories, cartoons etc. represented in different ways the intentions, beliefs and desires of others.⁵⁹ According to Singer:

the studies have repeatedly given evidence for the involvement of three brain areas: the temporal lobes, the posterior superior temporal sulcus (STS) and most consistently an area in the medial pre-frontal lobe (mPFC).⁶⁰

Interestingly, it was discovered that although the medial pre-frontal lobe (mPFC) was found to be involved when we mentalise about the thoughts, intentions or beliefs of others it also was discovered to be involved when we are attending to our own mental states.⁶¹ Therefore, it has been suggested that this area may subserve the formation of ‘decoupled’ representations of beliefs about the world.⁶² One question, which now confronts us is – by what means or by what process is this mirroring activated? In other words what is the causal mechanism that stimulates mirroring?⁶³ Recent research is outlining that we have the ability to represent other people’s goals and intentions by the mere *observation* of their motor actions.⁶⁴ Thus observation or perception activates brain structures. In this way, we become aware of an action and can bring its teleology to ourselves, i.e. we are capable of knowing that a builder with a hammer is going to hammer a nail while a bank robber with a hammer is most likely going to use it as a weapon.⁶⁵ In terms of evolutionary theory this provides a great advantage to humans as they can bring an action to conclusion before it concludes in real time thereby providing us with the possibility of taking immediate action to avoid danger. What Singer contends is that ‘the discovery of mirror neurons demonstrat[s] that a translation mechanism is present in the primate brain and automatically elicited when viewing others’ actions’.⁶⁶ In this way, the mirror system might underlie our ability to understand other people’s intentions by providing us with an *automatic* simulation of their actions, goals and intentions.⁶⁷

From observing (perceiving/ imitating) the motor actions⁶⁸ of the other individual we are led as it were to understand their mentalising. The intentional attitudes of other individual's are in general hidden from us — we do not have direct access to a person's 'personal realm' unless we have the ability to mind read. However, through the actions of others we automatically imitate them to ourselves. This is undoubtedly a highly adaptive process — as it happens without conscious effort as such and provides information about our environment allowing us to determine how safe or dangerous it may be. Moreover, being automatic it allows us to respond in a timely fashion to imminent danger, if and when it presents itself. Motor action is a vehicle through which we gain access to 'mentalising'.

(ii) *Affective Empathy*

Singer now turns her attention to what we might call affective empathy and highlights that:

In addition to the ability to understand the mental states (propositional attitudes) of others, humans can also empathise with others, that is, share their feelings and emotions in the absence of any direct emotional stimulation to themselves. Humans can feel empathy for other people in a wide variety of contexts: for basic emotions and sensations such as anger, fear, sadness, joy, pain and lust, as well as far more complex emotions such as guilt, embarrassment and love.⁶⁹

Empathy is undoubtedly necessary for the successful creation of an affective bond between mother and child and later between family members, partners, social groupings and communities. In terms of affective empathy Singer gives the following definition:

At this point it is important to stress that although empathising is defined as 'affect sharing' the affective state in self and others is not simply *shared* but has to be induced in the self by the perception or imagination⁷⁰ of an emotional state in another person and, even if it feels similar, is nevertheless distinguishable from the same feeling originated in ourselves.⁷¹

But we are faced with the question again of how is the human being able to understand what someone else is feeling? There is no emotional or sensory stimulation of our own body to provide information as such. Influenced by perception-action models of motor behaviour and imitation, Preston and de Waal proposed a neuro-scientific model of empathy, suggesting that observation or imagination of another person in a particular emotional state automatically activates a representation of that state in the observer with its associated autonomic and somatic responses.⁷²

So as with the other cases of mentalising and motor action the human brain seems to just be able to mirror in terms of perceiving the foreign individual. Singer highlights that 'imaging studies in the past two years have started to investigate brain activity associated with different empathic responses in the domains of touch, smell and pain.' Like mental and motor mirroring:

the results have revealed common neural responses elicited by the observation of pictures showing disgusted faces and smelling disgusting odours oneself,⁷³ likewise by being touched [...] and observing videos of someone else being touched.⁷⁴ Whereas the former study observed common activation in anterior insula (AI)

cortex, a cortex which has been found to be associated with the processing and feeling of disgust, the latter study identified common activation in secondary somato-sensory cortex (SII), a part of the cortex involved in processing and feeling the sensation of touch.⁷⁵

(iii) *Empathising Pain*

In relation to pain some studies outline that there are unique networks in empathy for pain.⁷⁶ In experiment, couples were recruited allowing the assessment of empathy *in vivo* by bringing both partners into the same scanner environment. Brain activity was then measured in the female partner while painful stimulation was applied either to her own or to her partner's right hand via electrodes attached to the back of the hand. Both subjects saw their hands and the hands of their partners, colours were fired pointing to which hand was going to receive the stimulation and whether it would be painful or non-painful. This procedure enabled the measurement of pain-related brain activation (the pain-matrix), when pain was applied to the scanned subject or to her partner (empathy for pain).⁷⁷

The results suggest that some parts, but not the entire 'pain-matrix', were activated when empathising with the pain of others. Activity in the primary and secondary somato-sensory cortex was only observed when receiving pain. These areas are known to be involved in the processing of the sensory-discriminatory components of our pain experience, that is, they indicate the location of the pain and its objective quality.⁷⁸

Interestingly the bilateral AI, the rostral anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), brainstem and cerebellum were activated when subjects either received pain or a signal that a loved one experienced pain. These are the areas of the brain that are involved in the processing of the affective component of pain.⁷⁹

Thus, both the experience of pain to oneself and the knowledge that a loved partner is experiencing pain activates the same affective pain circuits.⁸⁰

Singer sums up the findings and notes that they suggest that we use representations reflecting our own emotional responses to pain to understand how the pain of others feels. Moreover, this ability to empathise may have evolved from a system which represents our own internal feeling states and allows us to predict the affective outcomes of an event for ourselves and for other people.⁸¹

So in terms of neurological insights as outlined by Singer *et al.* we can note that there are a number of areas where mirror neurons operate. They operate in response to motor actions in an automatic way so that we can prepare to respond quickly to action. In terms of mentalising we present the internal states of others to ourselves, we can do this by perceiving what another is doing (usually through their motor actions). Then there is mirroring in terms of affective empathy where there is no direct action or contact as such – we merely mirror or take on the emotions of others. We will consider this last point further in relation to automatic and appraisal models of empathy. Before moving to our analysis of Stein's position vis-à-vis neurological insights we will outline a summary overview of the various brain structures involved in mirroring.

(iv) Summary of brain structuration involved in ‘mirroring’

Various Brain Areas Concerned with ‘Mirroring’

Motor (imitation)	Mentalising	Affective empathy
Pre-Motor neurons Macaque Monkey (STP)	Temporal poles Posterior superior temporal sulcus (STS) Medial pre-frontal lobe (mPFC) ⁸²	anterior insula (AI) cortex ⁸³ anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) Somato-sensory Cortex (SII) (feel pain <i>per se</i>) ⁸⁴

Empathising Another’s Pain

Pain felt by individual	Pain empathised
‘pain matrix’ & Somato-Sensory cortex	‘pain matrix’ only

IV

Consideration of the Possibility of Bridging ‘Methodologies’

From the perspective of the phenomenological reduction we have invariably turned away from the ‘natural attitude’ and as such the phenomenological reduction has moved epistemology from ‘without’ to ‘within’. As Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl explains:

Due to the phenomenological reduction, epistemology cannot be considered an integrated part of positive science. Any epistemological analysis requires a foregoing shift of the object domain, leaving behind scientific research fields [...] Analysing objects of diverse kinds (which is the task of empirical science) is not identical or ‘continuous’ with analysing the way objects appear to us (which is the task of philosophical science) [...] A phenomenological critique of knowledge need not take any scientifically achieved knowledge as a premise of its own investigation. Neither does it make use of deductive-axiomatic explanations nor does it identify some privileged foundation in order to justify the objective validity of the knowledge we actually possess. Instead, it is interested in the meaning structure lying beneath all our knowledge claims. The phenomenological reduction does not establish a *tabula rasa* situation for analysing pure consciousness [...] phenomenologically understood, epistemology investigates the forms of (valid) intentional relations to objects.⁸⁵

From this perspective it is difficult to see how one can bridge the chasm towards an ‘integrated’ world-view in relation to phenomenology and natural science/neurology. However, phenomenology as described by Rinofner-Kreidl does not discount the possibility of reflecting on scientific knowledge as it is given to us. Moreover, natural scientists reflecting on their experimentation may try to define the essence of some law or mathematical formula in relation to phenomenology.⁸⁶ Hermann Weyl was one such individual who tried (with much admiration from Husserl) to link the natural science of mathematics/physics with eidetic analysis. As Feist outlines,

Weyl highlighted that the objective world of physics was in fact a world that physics [...] endeavours to crystallise out of direct experience. So, in some sense, this structure is implicit within the experiences of ordinary consciousness. In a similar vein, Weyl stresses that there must be a primordial link between the world and consciousness. This link appears within consciousness as a ‘felt causality,’ which is our deepest connection to the world; it is prior to that connection we call ‘perception’.⁸⁷

Feist contends that Weyl’s work and writings especially in *Space-Time-Matter* were very similar to Husserl’s phenomenological investigations of essences.⁸⁸ Perhaps the fact that Husserl was so impressed by Weyl highlights that fact that the two methodologies of phenomenology and natural science are not as diametrically opposed as one would first suppose. Feist supports this point of view in the closing lines of his article:

By [Husserl’s] approval of Weyl’s grafting relativity onto phenomenology, we gain an insight into just how closely science and philosophy can operate, a close cooperation that Husserl himself stresses.⁸⁹ Husserl insists that his phenomenological analysis of the foundations of human experience in no way prevent such cooperation. It comes as no surprise how pleased he was with Weyl’s work.⁹⁰

In this regard, a phenomenological approach to empathy may be able to assist ‘natural science’ focus their reflection on their object of inquiry, such as ‘empathy’, by engaging in descriptive-eidetic analyses of various particular ‘acts’ of ‘empathy’, ‘memory’ and ‘perception’ for the purposes of demarcating clearly the phenomena in question and the significant differences between these specific experiences of the psychical that need to be attended to for both the natural scientist and the phenomenologist. We will turn now to analyse Stein and Singer’s particular approaches to the ‘problem of empathy’ in light of the preceding discussion.

V

Analysis of Stein and Singer’s Approaches to Empathy

As we have noted neurological investigations of empathy is in its initial stages and as such there remains a great deal of speculation regarding the insights that have been gained. Yet, while the literature has been building momentum, an exact definition of empathy has been found wanting.

(i) Differences in Definition

We have outlined throughout the paper that Stein held empathy to be a founding act, which we are cognitively aware of when it arises in us. In this regard we experience non-primordial content coming from somewhere other than our own experience which issues live from my ‘I’. There is a lack of a univocal definition of empathy in the neurological literature *per se*. Neurologists realise this lack of uniformity and it appears they are aiming to move forward towards a cohesive definition. As Frederique de Vignemont states:

There are probably nearly as many definitions of empathy as people working on the topic. There are two main trends: some argue for a broad definition of empathy as an

understanding of another person's feelings, affect sharing or as an 'affective response more appropriate to another's situation than one's own.'⁹¹

Under these definitions empathy subsumes emotional contagion, sympathy, personal distress and cognitive perspective-taking. De Vignemont alongside Singer wish to limit the definition of empathy to the following:

There is empathy if: (i) one is in an affective state; (ii) this state is isomorphic to another person's affective state; (iii) this state is elicited by the observation or imagination of another person's affective state; (iv) one knows that the other person is the source of one's own affective state.⁹²

Working through this definition, empathy is viewed as an (i) affective response and as such we are responding to the emotional position of another individual. If the other individual is sad, the feeling that arises within me will be sad too (hence it is (ii) isomorphic but how isomorphic is a particularly challenging question given that we have no epistemological way of knowing the internal experience of another individual). The reason why I perceive this emotional state is given to me via (iii) observation (imagination) and we are aware that we are not the source of this affective state as it is not primordially given to my 'I'.⁹³

In terms of Singer's 2006 article 'The neuronal basis and ontogeny of empathy and mind reading: Review of literature and implications for future research' there is a similar understanding of empathy as outlined by Stein in 1917:

it is important to stress that although empathising is defined as 'affect sharing' the affective state in self and others is not simply *shared* but has to be induced in the self by the perception or *imagination* of an emotional state in another person and, even if it feels similar, is nevertheless distinguishable from the same feeling originated in ourselves. [emphasis added]⁹⁴

For Stein the inclusion of imagination in the act of empathy would be somewhat problematic. The trouble with *imagination* is akin to the problems that arise in relation to memory and fantasy as discussed earlier. In each of the former cases we are present to ourselves in the continuity of experience. As Stein noted with regard to fantasy, the 'I' that is now imagining is 'primordial' in nature. That which is imagined is 'non-primordial'. But the two experiences are related by the continuity that exists in the 'stream of the "I"'. In this way, Singer's definition when the term imagination is included fails to take into consideration the fact that empathy is given as being non-primordial in content outside the continuity of the stream of experience. This precludes imagination as a means by which we bring empathy about. Again empathy is a founding act for Stein and has no underpinning just like perception.

(ii) Automatic v Appraisal models of empathy

Neurologists point out that empathy is given to us unconsciously as such.⁹⁵ If the brain does this automatically then we may be confronted with the reality that empathy is akin to emotional contagion or imitation.⁹⁶ Stein through the phenomenological method outlines that empathy as we experience it is not mere contagion. Moreover, contagion and imitation could not be seen to underpin the act of empathy. How can these two views be reconciled – perhaps it is possible to highlight that the actual description of how empathy is 'experienced' in no way

jeopardises or is jeopardised by causal explanation. Neurology may outline that this is what occurs but what is actually experienced may in fact be totally different. However, it is probably worth noting again that neurological research is recent in this area and that causal explanations are somewhat speculative. In fact, some neurologists consider it too simplistic to hold that empathy is automatically ‘mirrored’ as such. These neurologists outline that a contextual approach to empathy is needed. In one experiment, subjects were found to show smaller empathic responses in pain-related areas when they *knew* that the pain inflicted to the other individual was justified to cure the other. So, for instance, a person looking at a surgeon operating on a patient with a sharp blade would not invest as much of an empathetic response because they know the person is being ‘cured’. But the same person watching an individual being tortured would invest a higher level of empathy.⁹⁷ This raises an interesting question concerning whether we have a conscious appraisal of a situation prior to the act of empathy. Or, perhaps, does the act of empathy happen automatically and then a subsequent appraisal take place to modulate our initial empathic response? Current research has not distinguished between whether ‘a’ conscious appraisal occurs prior or subsequent to the act of empathy.⁹⁸ For Stein, awareness is present in terms of empathising — we are aware of the ‘foreign’ — we are undoubtedly aware of the context through outer perception and as such the contextual approach to empathy may sit well with Stein’s position as opposed to imitation.⁹⁹

(iii) Development

In terms of brain development there is a lot to consider in the findings of neurology which Stein obviously was not privy to given her death in WWII. Neurologists highlight that empathy develops in accordance with overall brain growth (ontogeny). Lower structures such as the limbic and para-limbic systems are involved with the ‘feelings’ associated with empathy.¹⁰⁰ Interestingly, the structural development of the brain points to the reality that the ‘full capacity for effective and adaptive empathic responding is [perhaps] not developed until [25 years of age]’.¹⁰¹ Singer outlines, the empathetic developmental stage does not stop through life — as explicit forms of mentalising may differentiate and get more and more complex.¹⁰² Stein begins her descriptive analysis of empathy without given particular attention to brain development as such (although she does talk about unfolding). However, in terms of experience young children are privy to the act of empathy even if their brain has not developed completely and assuredly most of us will recall empathising at relatively young ages — whether it was the experience of a pet dying or understanding why we were being scolded. So although neurology points to developmental processes involved in ‘empathy’ we must ask the question — do they actually correspond to an incremental increase in empathy through time such that a mature person will be filled with empathy and a child devoid? Perhaps at that nexus it is important to look at the life of the ‘mind’ of the ‘subject’ and consider the realm of ‘spirit’. Causal developments at that level may represent potential but not the actual reality of the subject *per se*.

While we outlined that Stein did not have the neurological insights to take into consideration brain development as such, she was nevertheless aware that the individual ‘unfolded’ through time. In the fourth chapter of her work *On Empathy* Stein considers ‘Empathy as the Understanding of Spiritual Persons’. For Stein

the human individual has a personal layer — a layer that is open to the world of values. As such:

It is conceivable for a man's life to be a complete process of his personality's unfolding; but it is also possible that psycho-physical development does not permit a complete unfolding, and, in fact, in different ways.¹⁰³

The personal realm being open to the world of values is motivated in one way or another to choose one object over an 'other' for some rational reason. Neurological findings appear to indicate that Stein's 'personal layer' would (as stated) undergo modifications through time as our orbital-frontal cortex develops.¹⁰⁴ The frontal cortex is one of the last structures to reach full maturation at around 25 years of age. But as to how the causal relates to the mental is difficult to ascertain. Surely the environment as a factor has to be taken into consideration in terms of expressing the phenotype but if we take a causal 'explanation' alone we would be left devoid of responsibility for our actions because of our youth - the law seems to take this into consideration when juveniles receive more compassionate hearings and more lenient sentences. Is it too simple to say that because their 'personality' or neurological structures have not fully developed that they were less capable of judgement? If that were the case then surely all young people would be incapable of abiding by laws or taking noble actions. Undoubtedly the 'life of the mind' open to the world of motivation and 'values' has an important role to play in any analysis of mind and at that juncture phenomenology might be of particular assistance to neurologists.

VI Conclusion

In this paper we investigated Stein's treatment of the problem of empathy in her *On Empathy* (1917) in comparison to current neurological-scientific reflections on the problem of empathy. Her description of empathy revolved around the fact that we experience our own 'experience' as primordial while the experience of the 'foreign' is given to us as non-primordial in content. Neurological findings reckon that 'mirror neurons' are the brain structures involved in empathy. Some neurological research points to the fact that empathy is 'imitated' in an automatic and 'unconscious' level; other research, however, points to a contextual approach to 'empathy' with a 'cognitive appraisal' being required. Neurological research has also given us insight into the developmental process of empathy in relation to brain growth. This was not considered by Stein *per se*. It appears that neurologists, nevertheless, are moving towards a more precise definition of empathy and in this regard some have outlined empathy in terms akin to Stein's 1917 definition. The phenomenological enterprise of descriptive analysis appears to offer a 'rigorous' account of inner states. Such analyses might prove useful to neurology as they *reflect* upon and demarcate various brain structures in relation to mental and affective states. De Vignemont and Singer note that the phenomenological treatment of empathy remains to be acknowledged [within neurology].¹⁰⁵ This is obviously an avenue that remains open for exploration in the future.

NOTES

¹ Edith Stein, *Zum Problem der Einfühlung* (Halle: Buchdruckerei des Waisenhauses, 1917), trans. by Waltraut Stein as *On the Problem of Empathy* (Washington D.C: ICS Publications, 1989). Henceforth abbreviated in notes as *On Empathy*.

² Husserl believed that our 'natural life is a life in a community, living in a world of shared objects, shared environment, shared language and shared meanings'. Dermot Moran outlines this natural attitude as follows: 'when I see a tree in the garden and know it is a publicly accessible object, a tree others can also see, not just as a physical object but indeed precisely as a *tree*. In other words, my perception of the tree already indicates to me that it is a tree *for others*.' Dermot Moran, *Introduction to Phenomenology* (London & New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 175

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ It must be noted that Husserl's reflections continued to grow as phenomenology was in its infancy and a great deal of issues were yet to be considered. Stein's work *On Empathy* was obviously held in high regard by Husserl as he promoted her thesis for the doctorate degree. Furthermore, Stein later collaborated with Husserl on these issues. According to Moran, Stein's position in 1916-1917 most likely expresses Husserl's thinking at that stage. (Marianne Sawicki is not totally convinced of this identical mode of thinking in 1917; see, Marianne Sawicki, *Body, Text, and Science: The Literacy of Investigative Practices and the Phenomenology of Edith Stein* (Dordrecht/ Boston/ London: Kluwer, 1997), p. 131.) Husserl's mature phenomenological work caused strain within the phenomenological schools that grew up around him. By 1923 the problem of empathy began to take on greater precedence for Husserl. Stein had noticed in her thesis that empathy was a central issue in the phenomenological enterprise. Husserl seems to have recognised the need to address the issue himself and in his lectures on 'First Philosophy' (1923-1924) he considers the problem of the *constitution* of the foreign individual. He developed the problem further in his Fifth Cartesian Meditation. Husserl wished to maintain the primacy of the ego in constituting the foreign individual: 'It is from out of myself as the one constituting the meaning of being within the content of my own private ego that I attain the transcendental other as someone just like me; and in this way I attain the open and endless whole of *transcendental intersubjectivity*, precisely as that which, within its communalised transcendental life, first constitutes the world as an *objective world*, as a *world that is identical for everyone*.'

'Phenomenology and Anthropology', in Edmund Husserl, *Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger (1927-1931)*, trans. and ed. by Thomas Sheehan and Richard E. Palmer (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997) p. 498. But Husserl's position vis-à-vis transcendental phenomenology alienated his earlier followers. His early followers noted that Husserl was now arguing for transcendental idealism (Husserl preferred the term 'transcendental phenomenology') over and against phenomenological realism (what Husserl termed 'empirical phenomenology'). We shall address these issues in terms of methodology in section I of this article. See Moran, p. 77. For a treatment of Stein and Husserl with regard to realist and transcendental phenomenology, see Alasdair MacIntyre, *Edith Stein: A Philosophical Prologue 1913-1922* (Oxford & New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), pp. 75-89.

⁵ While Stein's work predates Husserl in terms of publication Husserl was already working on these problems since 1912. Most likely Husserl designated Stein to look after this issue of empathy when she began her thesis in 1915 because 'Husserl had not formulated a precise definition of empathy himself.' See MacIntyre, p. 71. With regard to the publication of *Ideas II* Moran outlines that 'Husserl seems to have hurriedly scribbled in pencil *Ideas II* and *Ideas III* in the summer of 1912. He wrote *Ideas I* earlier in 1912. However, in 1915 Husserl rewrote the manuscript of *Ideas II*, planning to publish it in his *Jahrbuch*, but he held back and continued revising it until 1928 when he finally abandoned it, in part because he felt that he had not worked out the problem of constitution. [...] Edith Stein closely collaborated with Husserl on the drafting and organisation of the work, which was finally published in 1952. The draft form of the work influenced Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger'. See Moran, p. 80

⁶ *On Empathy*, p. 11. Husserl saw phenomenology as being 'engaged in the constant act of radical founding (*Letztbegründung*).' Moran, p. 2.

⁷ *On Empathy*, p. 11

⁸ Moran, p. 176. Moran relates the relationship between Stein's understanding and that of Husserl's when he states: 'Empathy is, for Stein as for Husserl, a non-primordial experience which

reveals a primordial experience' (ibid.). We could also describe empathy as a primordial experience with non-primordial content referring to a primordial experience.

⁹ Einstein's reflections on atoms and the energy that they contained allowed for the development of technology such as Positron emission tomography (PET). See, Robert Matthews, 'Einstein's legacy' in *Focus*, Issue 146 (Jan. 2005), 1–108 (p. 53).

¹⁰ *Functional* magnetic resonance imaging alongside Positron emission tomography (PET) are new technologies that enable scientists to study living brains at work. These technologies do not require physical contact with the brain. They operate by producing images similar to X-rays that show which parts of the brain are active while a person performs a particular mental task. While PET operates by showing the parts of the brain that are using the most glucose (a form of sugar), fMRI works on the basis of highlighting the parts of the brain where high oxygen supplies are being delivered (hence increased activity is observed in the case of PET through glucose and fMRI in relation to oxygen levels). See Richard Restak, 'Brain Anatomy' in *World Book*, (World Book, Inc., 2005 multimedia edition).

¹¹ See Tania Singer, 'The neuronal basis and ontogeny of empathy and mind reading: Review of literature and implications for future research', in *Science Direct, Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews* 30 (2006) 855-863

¹² In other words, the natural sciences/ neurology does not perform the *epoché* and thus remains in the 'natural attitude'. As outlined, Husserl's main methodological procedure was to bracket or suspend 'all our natural attitudes towards the objects in the world and towards our psychological acts, [by] suspending all our theories about these matters, [Husserl believed it will lead] back our attention to [the] pure essences of consciousness'. See Moran, p. 136. Neurology does not undertake such a 'bracketing' towards an object. Thus neurology operates in what Husserl termed the 'natural attitude' (*die natürliche Einstellung*).

¹³ We will outline Husserl's methodological developments with the aid of Theodore de Boer's 'The Meaning of Husserl's Idealism in the Light of his Development', trans. by H. Pietersma, *Analecta Husserliana*, 2 (1972), 322–332. For a fuller and extensive treatment of this issue, see de Boer's detailed study, *The Development of Husserl's Thought*, trans. by Theodore Plantinga (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978); *Die ontwikkelingsgang in het denken van Husserl* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1966).

¹⁴ de Boer, T., 'Husserl's Idealism', p. 324

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid. pp. 324–325

²¹ Ibid. p. 325

²² Ibid. p. 326

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ For an in-depth analysis of the problem of existence, see Aron Gurwitsch, 'The Problem of Existence in Constitutive Phenomenology', *The Journal of Philosophy*, 58 (1962), 625–632

²⁵ de Boer, T., 'Husserl's Idealism', p. 329

²⁶ *Ideen* Vol. I (1st edition), p. 96 quoted by de Boer, 'Husserl's Idealism', p. 330.

²⁷ Ibid. However, the methodology of the natural sciences which place particular importance in the objective reality of the existent object over and against that of the 'subjectively' perceived object would probably find this freedom from 'naturalistic philosophy' as a step backwards in technological and scientific progression.

²⁸ Moran, pp. 76–77.

²⁹ See *On Empathy*, p. 41.

³⁰ As Sawicki states: 'the third of the extant chapters of [Stein's] dissertation [*On the Problem of Empathy*] is unlike the other two [...] The exposition is no longer conscientiously phenomenological; the argument goes by fits and starts' (p. 131).

³¹ Later, Stein would come to realise that in comparison to the Cartesian-Lockean dualistic view of transparent consciousness and opaque body underpinning Husserl's modern phenomenological approach to human subjectivity, an Aristotelian-Thomistic account of the unity of human subjectivity would better accommodate her reflections on this matter of human incarnate consciousness.

³² Stein uses the term primordial to refer to those acts which are given to us directly. She states ‘there are things other than the outer world given to us primordially; for instance, there is ideation which is the intuitive comprehension of essential states. Insight into a geometric axiom is primordially given as well as valuing. Finally and above all, our own experience as they are given in reflection have the character of primordially [...] All our own present experiences are primordial. What could be more primordial than experience itself?’ *On Empathy*, p. 7.

³³ *Ibid.* p. 10.

³⁴ *Ibid.* p. 11.

³⁵ On any given day we are open to the possibility of encountering foreign individuals who are energised to various different extents with what we might term ‘life-power’ (*Lebenskraft*). Some days ‘I’ am tired and cranky (low life-power levels), the experience I have of being de-energised is given to me in a primordial fashion. I am the subject that experiences this reality from within. It issues live from my ‘I’. While I can be de-energised I can encounter a person who is full of joy on the street. From this causal encounter with an ‘other’ — I can experience the foreign individual. I know that the joy is not issuing *live* from my ‘I’. The joy thus must come from some other place. Stein develops the analogy of life-power further in her *Philosophy of Psychology and Humanities* (Washington D.C: ICS Publications, 2000), esp. pp. 24–25.

³⁶ *On Empathy*, p. 8.

³⁷ *Ibid.* p. 8.

³⁸ *Ibid.* p. 9.

³⁹ *Ibid.* emphasis added.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.* pp. 12–13.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² *Ibid.* pp. 17–18.

⁴³ Stein discusses imitation in chapter two, §5 ‘Discussion in Terms of Genetic Theories of the Comprehension of Foreign Consciousness’. Here, she wishes to investigate whether imitation or association or inference by analogy actually account for empathy. In some ways her earlier characterisation of empathy as a founding act already proposes that there is no such genetic theory to underpin her characterisation of empathy. Imitation fails (as a theory to explain empathy) because in the case of imitation we do not perceive the feeling of non-primordial content. In fact with ‘transferred’ feelings we *live in* them and therefore in *ourselves* in this way non-primordial content is not ‘given’. With association (which is a rival theory to imitation) there are also problems not least of which is the vagueness of what association refers to exactly. However, in the case of association Stein accounts for the differences by guiding us through an example to highlight the differences between it and empathy: ‘I see someone stamp his feet. I remember how I myself once stamped my feet at the same time as my previous fury is presented to me. Then I say to myself, “This is how furious he is now”. Here the other’s fury itself is not given but its existence is inferred. By an intuitive representation, my own fury, I seek to draw it near.’ (*On Empathy*, p. 24). But in the case of empathy the experience is posited immediately, and it reaches its object directly *without representation*. For association you have to represent the previous experience to yourself and as such the theory of association does not explain the genesis of empathy. In relation to the ‘theory of inference by analogy’, Stein castigates the proponents of this theory. We are aware of outer and inner perception but we only get at the facts that these perceptions give us by means of inferences. I know my own physical body and its modifications but only in relation to the conditions and implications of my experiences. So when I know the foreign physical body and its modifications the knowledge of it is dependent also on the conditions and implications of my experiences. What we are left here with is a probable knowledge of foreign experience. Stein holds that the theory does not aim to give a genetic explanation as such but merely specifies the form in which knowledge of the foreign consciousness is ‘possible’. This position is empty for Stein ‘the value of such an empty form, not oriented toward the nature of knowledge itself, is more than doubtful. Exactly how appropriate the inference by analogy would be for such a demonstration cannot be treated here.’ Stein believes that those who hold this position have in many regards failed to recognise the act and the experience of empathy *per se*. (*On Empathy*, p. 27).

⁴⁴ *Ibid.* pp. 23–24.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.* p. 24.

⁴⁶ Mirror neurons is a descriptive term to account for how the same neural circuits involved in action control in the first person experience of emotions and sensations are also active when witnessing the same actions, emotions and sensations of others, respectively. See, Vittorio Gallese,

'Intentional Attunement. The Mirror Neuron system and its role in interpersonal relations', in *Interdisciplines* <<http://interdisciplines.org/mirror/papers/1/printable/paper>> [accessed 27 November 2006].

⁴⁷ Vittorio Gallese, Fogassi L. Fadiga, and G. Rizzolatti, 'Action Recognition in the premotor cortex' in *Brain*, 119 (1996), 593-609.

⁴⁸ Gallese, 'Intentional Attunement', esp. §2 'The mirror neuron system for actions in monkeys and humans: empirical evidence'.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.* emphasis added.

⁵⁰ Given that Singer's article amounts to a literature review of the preceding academic contributions in relation to mirror neurons, theory of mind, empathy etc., we will refer to it considerably to outline the findings in neurology and psychology vis-à-vis empathy as it represents one of the most current overviews to date of the state of research in this regard.

⁵¹ Singer, p. 859.

⁵² Given that modern neurology can account for the process of brain development Singer proposes that we ought to tease apart the different areas in order to understand them more fully in their own right (*ibid.*).

⁵³ As she states, 'we use the term "empathising" to refer to the process which allows us to experience what it feels like for another person to experience a certain emotion or sensation (e.g., qualia). The capacity to understand other people's emotions by sharing their affective states is fundamentally different in nature from the capacity to mentalise. Thus, sharing the grief of a close friend feels fundamentally different than understanding what this person is having as thoughts and intentions, the latter lacking a bodily sensations' (p. 856).

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 855.

⁵⁵ 'Even though we have argued for separate developmental pathways for empathising and mentalising abilities with the latter developing much later than the former, we assume that (a) on both neuronal and psychological grounds the two developmental pathways also interact with each other and (b) both capacities undergo developmental changes throughout childhood and adolescence.' Singer, p. 861.

⁵⁶ D. Premack, G. Woodruff, 'Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?' in *Behavioral and Brain Science* 1, (1978) 515–526, quoted in Singer, p. 856.

⁵⁷ The human's ability to 'mentalise' (i.e. to make attributions about propositional attitudes such as desires, beliefs and intentions of others) is absent in monkeys and only exists in rudimentary form in apes. See D.J. Povinelli, J.M. Bering, 'The mentality of apes revisited.' in *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 11 (2002), 115–119, quoted in Singer, p. 856.

⁵⁸ Other studies, involved the brain imaging of subjects while they played strategic games with another partner or with a computer outside the scanner room. See K. McCabe, D. House, L. Ryan, V. Smith, T. Trouard, 'A functional imaging study of cooperation in two-person reciprocal exchange. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America* 98, (2001) 11832-11835

⁵⁹ H.L. Gallagher, C.D. Frith, 'Functional imaging of "theory of mind" 5. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, 7 (2003), 77–83.

⁶⁰ Singer, p. 856.

⁶¹ See J. P. Mitchell, M.R. Banaji, C.N. Macrae, 'The link between social cognition and self-referential thought in the medial prefrontal cortex.' *Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience*, 17 (2005), 1306–1315.

⁶² Decoupled in the sense that they are decoupled from the actual state of the world and that they may or may not correspond to reality. See Singer, p. 857.

⁶³ There is a lot to consider in relation to the ability of the human mind to 'mirror'. Are we hard-wired to form communities, to exist in social units? Does the ability to mirror the intentions of others give us an ability to escape danger? In this way 'mirroring' provides an evolutionary advantage and epistemological 'insight' in order to avoid danger by bringing the possibility of a 'foreign' intentional act to conclusion 'within' before it actually is effected by the foreign individual.

⁶⁴ This research is referring to the fact that there are neurons in the pre-motor cortex of the macaque brain that fire both when the monkey performs a hand action itself and when it merely observes another monkey or a human performing the same hand action. See, G. Rizzolatti, L. Fadiga, V. Gallese, L. Fogassi, 'Premotor cortex and the recognition of motor actions.' in *Cognitive Brain Research*, 3 (1996), 131–141.

⁶⁵ Stein has a concept of the mental sphere whereby we can understand action through taking into consideration motivation. Motivation accounts for how acts are brought about in relation to some object in terms of its value. As Stein outlines: ‘Motivation, in our general sense, is the connection that acts get into with one another: [...] an emerging of the one out of the other, a self-fulfilling or being fulfilled of the one on the basis of the other for the sake of the other.’ *Philosophy of Psychology and Humanities*, p. 41. Thus, the hammer is valued by the workman as he is motivated to build a house and valued by the robber as a weapon. Motivational acts are rational in the sense that ‘we’ can determine ‘why’ they come about by reading the valuation back through the act.

⁶⁶ Singer, p. 857. One of the more puzzling questions that M. Iacoboni deals with (and which we shall outline to highlight the complexity involved in mirror neuron research) is how do we imitate an action that we do not have in our repertoire previously. It requires a different mechanism to consider this action according to Iacoboni *et al.* Their findings highlight that there is a connection between the premotor cortex of the brain and the superior temporal sulcus (a higher order visual region). This newly identified region has, according to Iacoboni *et al.* all the requisites for being the region at which the observed actions, and the refferent motor-related copies of actions made the imitator, interact. See M. Iacoboni, L. Koski, M. Brass, H. Bekkering, R. Woods, M-C. Dubeau, J. Mazziotta, G. Rizzolatti, ‘Reafferent copies of imitated actions in the right superior temporal cortex’ in *Proceedings in the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, (2001), 13995–13999: ‘imitation is a complex phenomenon, the neural mechanisms of which are still largely unknown.’

⁶⁷ Gallese, V., Goldman, A., ‘Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of mind-reading’, *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, 2 (1998), 493–501.

⁶⁸ According to Grezes and Decety the circuitry involved in motor action mirroring involves the supplementary motor area (SMA), pre-SMA, pre-motor cortex, the supramarginal gyrus, interparietal sulcus and the superior parietal lobe. See, J., Grezes, J., Decety, ‘Functional anatomy of execution, mental simulation, observation, and verbal generation of actions: a meta-analysis.’ *Human Brain Mapping*, 12 (2001), 1–19.

⁶⁹ Singer, pp. 857–858.

⁷⁰ Stein would have particular issues with the use of imagination we will consider this further in relation to our analysis of Stein’s position in relation to neurology.

⁷¹ Singer, p. 858. We note at this point that this definition is similar to Stein’s understanding of empathy as being non-primordial content given to the ‘I’ which is aware of its own primordial reality.

⁷² S.D. Preston, F.B.M. de Waal, ‘Empathy: its ultimate and proximate bases’, *Behavioral and Brain Science*, 25 (2002), 1–72. The term ‘automatic’ in this case refers to a process that does not require conscious and effortful processing, but which can nevertheless be inhibited or controlled.

⁷³ B. Wicker, C. Keysers, J. Plailly, J.P. Royet, V., Gallese, G. Rizzolatti, ‘Both of us disgusted in my insula: the common neural basis of seeing and feeling disgust’, *Neuron*, 40, 655–664

⁷⁴ C. Keysers, B. Wicker, V. Gazzola, J. L. Anton, L. Fogassi, V. Gallese, ‘A touching sight: SII/PV activation during the observation and experience of touch 1. *Neuron*, 42, 335–346.

⁷⁵ Singer, p. 858.

⁷⁶ T. Singer, B. Seymour, J. O’Doherty, H. Kaube, R.J. Dolan, C.D. Frith, ‘Empathy for pain involves the affective but not sensory components of pain’, *Science*, 303 (2004), 1157–1162.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ Singer, p. 858.

⁷⁹ Interestingly the findings of a new study by Singer *et al.* indicate that overall empathy-related activation for unfamiliar persons in pain is lower than when empathising with a loved one in pain. See T. Singer, B. Seymour, J.P. O’Doherty, K.E. Stephan, R.J. Dolan, C.D. Frith, ‘Empathic neural responses are modulated by the perceived fairness of others. *Nature* 439, (2006), 466–469

⁸⁰ Singer, pp. 858–859.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁸² The area considered to be involved in mirroring. As stated previously, the mPFC has not only been found to be involved when mentalising about the thoughts, intentions or beliefs of others but also when people are attending to their own mental states.

⁸³ The anterior insula cortex (AI) has in various tests been found to be associated with the processing and feeling of disgust.

⁸⁴ The somato-sensory cortex (SII) is involved in processing and feeling the sensation of touch only activated in the person suffering the causal effect of pain *per se*. However, one study has found that –there was reduced motor excitability specific to the muscle that the subjects observed

being penetrated deeply by needles in another person, contrasting with another study showing only secondary somatosensory cortex activity. This causes a particular challenge in relation to the ‘degree of isomorphism in empathy.’ See, de Vignemont, F., Singer, T., ‘The empathic brain: how, when and why?’ in *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* Vol. 10 No. 10 (2006), 434–441.

⁸⁵ Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl, ‘What is Wrong with Naturalising Epistemology? A Phenomenologist’s reply’, in *Husserl and the Sciences*, ed. by Richard Feist (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2004), pp. 51–52.

⁸⁶ See Richard Feist, ‘Reductions and Relativity’ in *Husserl and Stein*, ed. by Richard Feist & William Sweet (Washington D.C: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2003), pp. 89–103 and Richard Feist, ‘Husserl and Weyl: Phenomenology, Mathematics, and Physics’ in *Husserl and the Sciences*, pp. 129–153.

⁸⁷ Feist, ‘Reductions and Relativity’, p. 96

⁸⁸ *Ibid.* p. 97

⁸⁹ Feist refers to Husserl, *Ideas I*, p. 169. See his ‘Reductions and Relativity’, p. 101, cf. n. 40.

⁹⁰ Feist, ‘Reductions and Relativity’ p. 99

⁹¹ F. de Vignemont, T. Singer, ‘The empathic brain: how, when and why?’, p. 435.

⁹² *Ibid.*

⁹³ Emotional contagion would not be considered as empathy in relation to the above definition because it does not distinguish between self and other as required by (iii) and (iv) of the definition. This would bring the definition close (although not synonymous) to Stein’s description of empathy as it rules out contagion.

⁹⁴ Singer, p. 858. See *supra*, n. 71.

⁹⁵ de Vignemont & Singer, ‘The empathic brain: how, when and why?’, pp. 435–436. In this account Lipps’ theory on empathy seems to be right. According to Singer, Lipps understands that when we ‘internally imitate a facial expression, we have direct access to the emotion that triggered that facial expression. [Thus, the discovery of] mirror matching systems in the motor domain is considered as the first neural evidence of Lipps’ theory: the perception of someone else moving suffices to elicit a mental simulation of the observed movement and, if not inhibited, the subsequent physical execution of that movement. Imitation is thus a prepotent automatic response tendency, even if usually inhibited.’ (p. 437).

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁹⁷ This is obviously of benefit in that you know to avoid the danger of being tortured yourself if you see someone else being mistreated.

⁹⁸ de Vignemont & Singer, ‘The empathic brain: how, when and why?’, pp. 437–439.

⁹⁹ Again we must maintain that, phenomenologically speaking, Stein’s methodology remains the descriptive analysis of the interior experience given to us and as such even if empathy happens ‘unconsciously’ in an automatic sense it is not the experience given to us consciously. Although ‘unconscious’ refers to not being aware of the process, Stein does not hold that there is an unconscious as put forward by authors such as Freud.

¹⁰⁰ As Singer states: ‘findings suggest that levels of empathic responding that involve implicit affect sharing and are based on limbic and para-limbic structures as well as on somato-sensory cortices should develop earlier than our ability for cognitive perspective taking because the former rely on structures which develop early in brain development, whereas the latter rely on structures of the neo-cortex which are among the latest to mature, such as the pre-frontal cortex and lateral parts of the temporal cortex. The finding that the [dorso-lateral pre-frontal cortex] has not fully matured up to an age of 25 is interesting with respect to its possible role in the modulation and control of affective responses and might suggest that the full capacity for effective and adaptive empathic responding is not developed until late adolescence.’ See, Singer, p. 860.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.* The structural development process is outlined by Singer (cf., p. 861) as follows:

- | | |
|------------------|--|
| 1 day–18 months: | New born babies already have the ability for emotional contagion (crying) — before they have developed self-awareness and the distinction between self and others. |
| 18–24 months: | Self-awareness develops, children also display the first manifestations of pro-social behaviour towards others. |
| > 24 months: | The ability to have empathic responses in the absence of any emotional cue develops probably later [than 24 months] and should parallel the |

maturation of memory systems and mental imagery. Moreover, explicit forms of empathy should coincide with the emergence of conscious representations of one's own feeling states allowing for statements such as 'I feel sad or jealous'. The capacity to understand other people's feelings when there is congruency between one's own and another person's feeling states probably develops earlier than the capacity to understand others' feeling in the absence of any representation of this state in oneself. Whereas the former most likely relies on one's own representation of a given feeling state in oneself (limbic structures), the latter probably relies purely on mentalising capacities (pre-frontal and temporal structures).

4 years

Mentalising abilities develop about the age of four and are probably based on the development of the mPFC and temporal structures. Thus the basic capacity for mentalising seems to be clearly in place long before the complete maturation of the neuro-circuitry sub-serving it. This suggests that not only empathising but also mentalising abilities may change in nature from early childhood to adolescence. Similar to emotional contagion preceding more complex forms of implicit and explicit empathy, explicit forms of mentalising abilities are preceded by processes allowing implicit attribution of intentions and other mental states, e.g., the ability of an infant to direct its attention/gaze towards the attentional focus of the mother (joint attention) already develops around the age of 12-18 months or even earlier.

6–10 years

First order (attributing a belief to another person — develops c. 4 years) and second-order beliefs (attributing a belief about another person's belief) develops between the six to ten years.

¹⁰² Interestingly, while mentalising is associated with later developmental structures in brain ontogeny these structures appear to succumb to old age before earlier developed empathising structures (limbic, para-limbic). This suggests higher vulnerability to 'structures which develop later and are phylogenetically younger (e.g. pre-frontal cortex). It may therefore be that empathic responses are preserved up to very old age whereas mentalising abilities show earlier decline.' See Singer, p. 862.

¹⁰³ *On Empathy*, p. 111.

¹⁰⁴ It has been shown by one study that neurons in the orbito-frontal cortex encode value. See, Camillo Padoa-Schioppa, John A. Assad, 'Neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex encode economic value', *Nature*, Vol. 441/(11 May 2006), 223–227.

¹⁰⁵ F. de Vignemont, T. Singer, 'The empathic brain: how, when and why?', p. 436.

Jean de la Rochelle's Formulation of the Distinction between Being and Essence

Denise Ryan

ABSTRACT

The distinction between 'being' and 'essence' arose in the elaboration of the theory of universal hylomorphism, defended by the Franciscans, which maintained that there is a composition of matter and form in all beings other than the First cause. This paper focuses on a formula which Jean de La Rochelle (1190/ 1200–1245) borrows from Boethius (c. 480-524) to explain how the 'being' of the soul is distinct from the 'essence' of the soul. It concludes by raising the question whether Jean's formulation anticipates that of St Thomas Aquinas's (1224–1274) in his early writings on *De Ente et Essentia*.

Introduction

Jean de La Rochelle's *Summa de Anima* is testament to the growing interest in the new Greek-Arab sources which were made available in the thirteenth century. This paper is part of my on-going doctoral research into the *Summa de Anima* of Jean de La Rochelle, critically analysing its philosophical content and translating the text (288 pages) into English.¹ The aim of this paper is to set out Jean de La Rochelle's position on being and essence in the context of the debate between those who defended the theory of universal hylomorphism i.e., the theory that all of created being is composed of matter and form and those who, like Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274), rejected the doctrine which attributed a composite nature to the soul.

I

Jean raises the question in chapter 13 of the *Summa* 'What is the soul according to essence'? First he considers the origin of the soul which is understood in two ways, namely, that which concerns causality and that which concerns duration or time. Regarding causality Jean investigates the soul according to the four Aristotelian causes; with regard to the origin in time Jean sets out to prove that not all souls were created at one time, an issue which was vigorously debated in medieval philosophy.

When referring to the formal cause of the soul in chapter 17 of the *Summa* Jean employs the concepts of '*quod est*' and '*quo est*'. These have been called the 'forgotten formulae of Boethius', which, as Crowley notes, were re-introduced by Philip the Chancellor (d.1236).² Philip's work, entitled the *Summa de Bono*, is frequently the theological reference point for Jean in the *Summa*. The *quod est*, as interpreted by Jean, refers to the 'being' of the soul, the *quo est* refers to the essence of the soul. The 'being' of the soul has two modes, (1) essential being, as when we say that human beings are rational and (2) accidental being, as when we say that a person is just or wise. This distinction between *quod est* and *quo est* has

been variously interpreted by philosophers throughout the Middle Ages. Boethius (c.480–c.525) introduced the distinction in his treatise *De Trinitate* where he argues that the Divine Substance is form without matter and is its own substance. Jean quotes from the *De Trinitate*³ (the first of Boethius's five treatises known as the *Opuscula Sacra* which survived into the Middle Ages) in support of the view that created being is of a composite nature whereas divine being is of a simple nature. In the third treatise, *Quomodo substantiae in eo quod sint bonae sint cum non sint substantialia bona* (How substances are good in virtue of their existence without being substantial goods) Boethius deals with being and goodness. He poses the following problem: if everything is good in that 'it is', and if everything receives its goodness from God, is everything, therefore, identical with God? Boethius's solution is contained in the distinction between *id quod est et esse*: 'Being and the thing that is are different. For simple being awaits manifestation, but the thing that is "is" and exists as soon as it has received the form which gives it being.'⁴

Jean states that the constitutive principles *quod est* and *quo est* are to be found in everything below the First cause since everything below the First is a being through participation. Therefore, the 'being' or the 'subject' (*quod est*) of an essence is different from its 'nature', the latter being that through which it is an essence (*quo est*). If we say that God is good through his essence, since by our understanding he is good, 'to be' and 'to be good' are the same for him. With regard to anything below the First cause, however, a creature is good because it is ordered toward the highest good. With regard to the soul it is a created 'being' (*quod est*) created by God out of nothing, the nature of the soul (*quo est*) is understood as an 'essence' received from God. In addition to their composition of matter and form which 'is a receptive and passive potential in a creature',⁵ human beings, therefore, have this second composition, that of 'being and essence'.

Jean asks whether there are specific differences between the soul and an angel even if it can be said that they share the same formal cause of their being. In so far as it can be a part of an angel's composition 'that through which' an angel exists is 'intellectuality' and 'that which it is' is an intellectual substance; in the case of human being 'that through which' it is a human being is rationality and 'that which it is' is a rational substance. Jean accounts for a number of differences according to species and according to essence, e.g., the angelic intellect is not directed towards sensation whereas the human intellect begins at this level and it is so directed. An angel has being as a person, a soul has being as a form and a perfection. An angel is like God in its intellect and according to act because from the beginning of its condition it has the forms imprinted on it for the purpose of knowing the nature of things. In contrast Jean holds that the human soul is like a clean writing tablet which contains possibilities for the forms but not the acts. Jean wants to present an argument for the formal cause of the soul in a manner which is acceptable to Christians but in admitting composition of *quod est* and *quo est* Jean seems to deny the simplicity of the soul.

It is interesting to note that according to Burrell it was philosophers in the Arabic tradition who were the first to distinguish 'what constitutes the individual, namely its existing, from what makes it the kind of thing it is',⁶ but as we have seen these speculations were already familiar to medieval thinkers, 'especially from the ninth century when they first aroused interest.'⁷ According to Parviz Morewedge, however, it is a matter of contention as to whether Aristotle made a distinction between essence and existence.⁸ He acknowledges the monumental

work of A-M. Goichon⁹ and N. Rescher¹⁰ who refer to a passage¹¹ in Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*. In the same work Goichon also mentions several passages in Plato's dialogues where the essence-existence distinction is supposedly upheld. As part of my studies I am interested in finding out to what extent Avicenna's theory shaped Jean's thinking on the essence-existence distinction which was 'enormously important in post-classical Islamic intellectual history',¹² but, at present, it is suffice to note that Avicenna, as Wisnovsky remarks, 'laid down a limited number of positions on the distinction, positions that would eventually form the core of a radically expanded spectrum of positions.'¹³

II

Avicenna's famous 'flying man' argument is quoted verbatim at the beginning of Jean's *Summa* — it is called an argument but it is a thought-experiment in which man finds himself floating in the air or in a void in such a way that he is not conscious of his physical body and yet he is aware of the existence of his own essence, a dualistic perspective which, at first, appears to be similar to Descartes's *cogito*, but the similarity turns out to be superficial because as Wisnovsky points out both the context and the purpose of the 'flying man' thought-experiment are very different to those of the *cogito*. Avicenna's argument is a claim about essence, that nothing grasps a thing without grasping its own essence as grasping. Augustine, in a similar vein, states that infants have an 'implicit self-knowledge of themselves',¹⁴ the soul never ceases to know itself, just as in memory we retain things even when we are not paying attention to them. While Descartes' *cogito* was written in the context of his search for first principles his doctrine of innate ideas has much in common with Augustine with regard to knowing the self as non-bodily. According to Descartes we have already received the 'ideas' of things through our capacity to think, imagine, feel, or experience but our 'ideas' with regard to God, the self and self-evident truths, these are already present in the baby in the womb. Descartes's theory is far more complicated than can be stated here but it would be more correct to say that Descartes's *cogito* is closer in meaning to Augustine than to Avicenna's thought-experiment. Avicenna's objective is, according to Hasse, to point to the independence of the soul and that the other theses pertaining to the existence of the soul, the self-awareness of the soul and the substantiality of the soul, are only implied.¹⁵

Despite his dualism Avicenna holds that there are close connections between the soul and the body. Describing Avicenna's psychology of the soul Deborah Black states that the body is the instrument of the soul and is a 'necessary condition for its creation and individuation'.¹⁶ An angel or a separate intelligence (i.e., separated from matter) is a species unto itself but man belongs to a single species which is common to many individuals and is, therefore, composed of matter and form. As Black further states, Avicenna places the creation of human souls within the context of his theory of emanation. Where the conditions are present in the sublunary world, i.e., when a human embryo is conceived, the agent intellect (Avicenna's separate Agent Intelligence) creates a human soul to inform that body. Soul and body are thus made for each other, with the soul having a special attraction to its own body.

One of a number of positions on the distinction is that between 'thing and existent'. Existence or being 'is recognized by reason itself without the aid of

definition or description. Since it has no definition, it has neither genus nor differentia because nothing is more general than it.’¹⁷ According to Thérèse-Anne Druart, Avicenna ‘centered his own metaphysics in his work entitled the *Shifā* on the distinction between existence and essence’.¹⁸ For Avicenna the term ‘existence’ has many meanings, such as, for instance: the reality of something, the fact that it exists, the particular existence of something; but, it is clear that he means that the object is, i.e., that it is an existent. In *Metaphysics* 1.5 of the *Shifā* Avicenna uses the word ‘thing’ as an attribute of ‘being’ rather than essence, and so, ‘thing’ and ‘existent’, as Wisnovsky puts it, are ‘extensionally identical but intensionally different’,¹⁹ that is to say, ‘thing’ and ‘existent’ are co-implicated but they have different meanings. Avicenna explains what he means by this mysterious ‘thing’ by stating that there are three primary concepts, ‘being’, ‘thing’ and ‘necessary’. Following Black’s account priority is given to ‘being’: ‘thing’ is a substitute for the Platonic one, an attribute of being which she states is not in Aristotle. Wisnovsky and Black both argue that this concept is borrowed from *kalām* (Islamic doctrinal theology) ‘and used by Avicenna to ground his distinction between essence and existence’.²⁰ Black states that ‘thing’ is not synonymous with essence, but whatever is a thing has an essence or *quiddity*. This distinction applies to all other beings and explains their contingency (upon a First Cause). In God alone there is no distinction between his essence and existence. Avicenna’s third notion, that of the ‘necessary’ being, introduces his most original contribution to Islamic philosophy, namely, the distinction between necessary and possible existence. Everything is either necessary, possible or impossible, a concept which leads to Avicenna’s famous proof for the existence of God.

Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274) in *De Ente et Essentia* is especially indebted to Avicenna’s remarks made on essence and existence, for, Thomas too argues that in God alone there is no distinction between essence and existence, ‘no becoming, no potency, because he is pure existence without contingency or finiteness.’²¹ He rejects the form–matter composition in non-bodily substances and, instead, ascribes the essence–existence composition to them. Thomas restricted hylomorphic composition to corporeal bodies while Bonaventure (1217-1274) held the opposite view — that angels must be hylomorphically composed ‘otherwise they would be pure act and God alone is pure act’.²² Bonaventure appealed to the doctrine of seminal reasons in order to explain how forms are imparted to matter in two modes: in one mode, the primary cause is God, but in a secondary manner we see that parents produce new life through their activity. There is, then, for Bonaventure, as one commentator puts it, ‘something in matter, a seed, like an acorn which becomes an oak tree — *illud potest esse forma et fit forma, sicut globus rosae fit rosa* — the agent gives to the essence already present in matter a new form of existence, transforming an essence really existing in matter from a potential to an actual form.’²³ ‘This then,’ Bonaventure concludes, ‘is our position: that no created agent produces any essence, be it substantial or accidental, but rather brings about a situation where an essence changes from one situation to another.’²⁴ While the souls of animals and plants arise entirely from seminal reason, the human soul enters the body after it has gone through a process which is explained in terms of the celestial bodies and the four elements. Thus the human body is a composite of many forms. Thomas, however, argued against this position in the debate on the plurality of forms which provoked lively discussion in the thirteenth century. For Thomas, form is ultimate, there is only one form of

the living human being, its soul, and as Gilson remarks there is no form of the form.²⁵

Arguing for his position regarding angels Thomas appealed to the distinction between potency and act as something which runs through the whole of creation and as such he can claim that angels display potentiality in their performance of acts of will and intellect. There is a further distinction which he can make between God and a separated spirit, i.e., that no finite being exists necessarily; ‘it has or possesses existence which is distinct from essence as act is distinct from potentiality’.²⁶ For Thomas, an angel is form alone but existence is that by which a form is. Therefore, there is composition in an angel, namely, composition of form and existence. In substances composed of matter and form, however, there is a double composition of act and potentiality, the first is a composition of matter and form, the second a composition of the latter with existence. This second composition is called by Thomas the *quod est* and *esse* or the *quod est* and the *quo est*.²⁷ In a chapter of the *De Ente et Essentia* entitled ‘The Compositeness of Intelligences’, Thomas makes use of the formula *quo est et quod est* as he states ‘so some people say such things are composed of that which and that by which, or from that which exists and existence as Boethius says’.²⁸ However, the editors of the Leonine edition of the *De Ente et Essentia* point to a variant reading of the line in question and to its authenticity.²⁹ According to Etienne Gilson, there is great confusion regarding the use of Boethius’s terminology in its Thomistic meaning.³⁰ In Gilson’s view, ‘the very precision of his [Boethius’s] formulas was to make it more difficult for his successors to go beyond the level of substance up to the level of existence,’ however, as Gilson also notes and continues, ‘but they helped those who succeeded in doing [so] to formulate their own thought in strictly accurate terms.’³¹ In fact, this formula is used by Thomas in thirty-six cases throughout his many works.³²

III Conclusion

In some instances Thomas acknowledges two sources and two formulations, they are: *id quod est et esse*, attributed to Boethius; and that of *quod est et quo est*, the source of which is attributed to ‘*quidam*’ or in another case to ‘*alii*’ (translated respectively as ‘certain persons’ and ‘others’). Considering the dates of two of the works in which Thomas employs the formulae indicates he maintained the distinction throughout most of his works, one example, which I have already referred to, is the *De Ente et Essentia*, written between 1252–1256, the second work, the *Quaestiones Disputatae de Anima* which was written in the year 1269.³³ However, if we examine some quotes from Jean’s *Summa*, we see clearly that he had already made this distinction with regard to immaterial substances. Take, for example, in chapter 17 where he writes: “‘that which exists’ and ‘that through which it exists’ is different in created being,³⁴ and again, ‘therefore it is clear that ‘that which exists’ and ‘that through which it exists’ namely the essence differ in the soul’,³⁵ and further, ‘therefore one should say that spiritual beings and the rational soul have a composition made from the essential parts, which are the parts ‘that which exists’ and ‘that through which it exists’.”³⁶ Thus Jean’s *Summa*, written between 1235–1236 may have been the source for Thomas’s position in *De Ente et Essentia*. Further evidence which connects the two authors can be

found in the preface to an edition of Thomas's *Quaestiones Disputatae De Anima*. The editor, B.C. Bazan, states that without doubt it was Jean's *Summa* which influenced Thomas's structure of the disputed questions on the soul. He points to Chapter 36 of the *Summa* where Jean explains the structure of his work in terms which anticipates the structure of Thomas's questions.³⁷ Jean's work was, therefore, well known to Thomas and it is testament to the quality of his work that it influenced Thomas in his writing on the soul, the question is to what extent; this will become clearer as my work progresses.

NOTES

¹ Jean de La Rochelle, *Summa de Anima*, ed. by Jacques Guy Bougerol (Paris: Vrin, 1995).

² Theodore Crowley, *Roger Bacon: The Problem of the Soul in Philosophical Commentaries* (Louvain & Dublin: Duffy & Co. Ltd., 1950), p. 81.

³ *Summa de Anima*, p.68: 'Hoc videtur per Boecium, in libro De Trinitate: "In omni eo quod est citra Primum, est hoc et hoc".'

⁴ Boethius, *De Trinitate*, ed. Steward-Rand, *Loeb classics*, vol. 74, ch. 2, p. 41: 'Diversum est esse et id quod est; ipsum enim esse nondum est, at vero quod est accepta essendi forma est atque consistit.' This distinction would appear to be echoed in Heidegger's meditation on the 'ontological difference' and the latter's famous attempt to raise anew the question of 'the meaning of Being (*Sinn von Sein*)' in its difference from 'that-which-is (*das Seiende*)'.

⁵ *Summa de Anima*, p. 70: 'Secundum primum modum, est in creatura potencia receptiva et passiva; iuxta secundum modum, potencia activa.'

⁶ David B. Burrell, 'Aquinas and Islamic and Jewish thinkers', in *The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas*, ed. by Norman Kretzmann & Eleonore Stump (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 60–84 (pp. 64–65).

⁷ David Luscombe, *Medieval Thought* (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 21.

⁸ Parviz Morewedge, *The 'Metaphysica' of Avicenna (Ibn Sinā)* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), p. 182.

⁹ A.-M. Goichon, *La distinction de l'essence et de l'existence d'après Ibn Sinā (Avicenna)* (Paris: de Brouer, 1937), p. 132, cited in Morewedge, p. 183, n. 56.

¹⁰ Nicolas Rescher, *Studies in Arabic Philosophy* (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 1967), p. 73, cited in Morewedge, p. 185, n. 62.

¹¹ Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* (92 b 8): 'But further, if definition can prove what is the essential nature of a thing, can it also prove that it exists? And how will it prove them both by the same process, since definition exhibits one single thing, and what human nature is and fact that the man exists are not the same thing?'

¹² Robert Wisnovsky, 'Avicenna and the Avicennian Tradition', in *The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy*, ed. by Peter Adamson & Richard C. Taylor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 92–136 (p. 114).

¹³ *Ibid*, p. 110.

¹⁴ Richard Sorabji, *Self: Ancient and Modern Insights about Individuality, Life, and Death* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), p. 216.

¹⁵ Dag Nikolaus Hasse, *Avicenna's De Anima in the Latin West* (London–Turin: The Warburg Institute & Nino Aragno Editore, 2000), p. 81.

¹⁶ Deborah L. Black, 'Psychology: Soul and Intellect', in *The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy*, pp. 308–326 (p. 310).

¹⁷ Morewedge, p.15.

¹⁸ Thérèse Druart, 'Metaphysics' in *Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy*, pp. 327–348 (p. 337).

-
- ¹⁹ Wisnovsky, p.108.
- ²⁰ Druart, p. 337.
- ²¹ Luscombe, p.101.
- ²² Frederick Copleston, *A History of Philosophy* Vol 2. (New York: Image Books, 1962), p. 49.
- ²³ Michael Dunne, 'The Three Ways of St Bonaventure', *Milltown Studies*, 45 (2000), pp. 16–43 (p. 21).
- ²⁴ Bonaventure, *In II Sent.*, d. 7, p. 2, a. 2, q. 1, ad 6.
- ²⁵ Etienne Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (London: Sheed & Ward, 1955), p. 376.
- ²⁶ Copleston, p. 51.
- ²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 52.
- ²⁸ Thomas Aquinas, *De Ente et Essentia*, in *Aquinas Selected Philosophical Writings*, ed. by Timothy McDermott (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 105.
- ²⁹ Sancti Thomae de Aquino, *Opera Omnia, De Ente et Essentia*, Tomus XL111. Editori di San Tommaso, Roma, 1976. p. 351 ch. 4. line. 165: '[componi ex quo est et quod est, vel ex quod est et esse ut Boethius dicit] Au lieu de *quod*, les anciens – sauf $\beta \gamma$ – ont *quo*: cette leçon de l'archétype ne peut se recommander ni de Boèce, qui écrit: "diversum est esse et quod est" (PL 64, 1311 B); ni de saint Thomas, dont l'autographe du *Contra Gentiles* 11, 54, lieu parallèle de celui-ci, porte exactement: "quibusdam dicitur ex quod est et esse, vel ex quod est et quo est". (ms. Vat. lat. 9850, fol. 42 vb).
- ³⁰ Gilson, p. 421.
- ³¹ Gilson, p. 105.
- ³² A search in the *Index Thomisticus* at <<http://corpusthomisticum.org/it/index.age>> [accessed 5 September 2007] revealed this result.
- ³³ Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones Disputatae de Anima*, ed. by B. Carlos Bazán. *Opera Omnia*, t. XXIV, 1, Rome, Paris, Commissio Leonina-Ed. Du Cerf (1966), p. 51: 'Et hinc est quod Boethius dicit in libro ebdomadibus, quod in aliis que sunt post Deum diiffert esse et quod est, vel, sicut quidam dicunt, quod est et quo est, nam ipsum esse est quo aliquid est, sicut cursus est quo aliquis currit.'
- ³⁴ *Summa de Anima*, p. 69: 'Et ideo erit differens in ente creato quod est et quo est.'
- ³⁵ *Ibid.*: 'Patet ergo quod differt in anima quo est, scilicet essencia et quod est.'
- ³⁶ *Ibid.*: 'Dicendum est ergo quod spiritualia et anima rationalis compositionem habent ex partibus essentialibus que partes sunt quod est et quo est, quia sunt a Deo et de nichilo.'
- ³⁷ Bazán, 'Preface', in Aquinas, *Quaestiones Disputante De anima*, p. 102: 'Saint Thomas a structuré soigneusement la série de questions disputes sur l'âme unie au corps: sept questions consacrées à l'essence de l'âme; sept questions consacrées à l'âme unie au corps; sept consacrées à l'âme séparée du corps. Cette structure lui a été suggéré, sans doute, par la *Summa de anima* de Jean de La Rochelle. En effet, dans le chapitre 36 (XXXIV) de la première partie de cette somme, Jean de La Rochelle explique la structure de son oeuvre dans des termes qui rappellent la structure des questions de saint Thomas: "Dicto de anima secundum esse absolutum [...] secunda de modo essendi in corpore; tercia de esse post separacionem a corpore" (ed. Bougerol, p. 114).'