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CONTENTS

FACULTY

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

IN MEMORIAM
FR PAUL LYTTLE
1968-2005

Foreword

It gives me great pleasure as General Editor to write a few words by way of a Foreword to this new number of *Maynooth Philosophical Papers*. I would like to convey my warmest congratulations, as well as my thanks for their participation, to all my colleagues and to the postgraduate students who are here represented, and especially to Michael Dunne, the Issue Editor.

In the past year, there has been much cause both for rejoicing and sorrow within our Department. The former is mainly the result of Michael Dunne's obtaining a permanent lecturing post with us in 2005. Michael is a first-rate scholar as well as an inspiring teacher, and his presence will enrich the Department greatly over, I hope, many years to come. Michael has an exciting research agenda which will extend and complement our interests and competences, and as a medievalist he is a worthy successor to James McEvoy, who held the Chair of Philosophy in Maynooth with great distinction until 2004.

It would be impossible to gauge the peerless contribution made by James McEvoy to the Department, and indeed to the discipline, of Philosophy over his years here in NUIM. An unrivalled scholar with an international reputation, he was also a friend as well as a colleague, and to be in his company was to be educated, not only in philosophy but also in the good, in virtue, and in the nuances and subtleties of art, of music, and the joy of living. Although Jim's move to QUB was for us a very great loss, we wish him every joy and success in his Professorship there.

Much sadness was caused by the untimely death of our colleague Paul Lyttle, who died unexpectedly at the age of thirty-six, to whose memory this volume is dedicated and whose work is represented here, and also by the tragic deaths of two undergraduate students, Michael Walsh and Darragh Haskins. They will always occupy a place in our hearts, and we know that Paul, had he lived, would have made a worthy contribution to the discipline. We express our sorrow and condolence to all the bereaved, to the families and friends of Paul, Michael and Darragh.

Maynooth Philosophical Papers is meant to showcase the range of the research interests of the staff and postgraduates in Philosophy at NUIM, and to be a record of the current research achievements of the participants. I think it fair to say that, on the evidence of the present volume, Philosophy is a lively, interesting and developing discipline in Maynooth, and one which is both willing and able to play an important part in the evolution of our University and its striving for ever-greater excellence.

Thomas A. F. Kelly,
General Editor, *Maynooth Philosophical Papers*,
Acting Head of Department, 2004-2006.

Editor's Introduction

Some time ago, Dr Thomas Kelly asked me to become guest editor for the third volume of *Maynooth Philosophical Papers* with the special theme of Medieval and Scholastic Philosophy. I was very glad to accept and had a very good response from colleagues and research students. It goes without saying that the MPP is an extremely valuable showcase of ongoing research within the faculty and a vital means of communicating this to a general audience.

I would like to acknowledge the indispensable help which I received from the referees. It is important to stress that the MPP is an internationally peer-reviewed publication. I wish to thank each referee since they gave generously (and anonymously) of their time for the good of the academic community at Maynooth.

Each year brings its own happiness and sorrow. A year ago, our colleague, Fr Paul Lyttle died all too young. He was at the beginning of what would have been a distinguished academic career. At an initial stage he had asked me to read each of the two articles printed here as possible pieces for inclusion in the MPP. Since he was unable to complete the articles as he might have wished, I have made the editorial decision to include them as he left them. I think that each reader will be struck by the simplicity and powerfulness of each piece of writing. Ar dheis Dé go raibh a anam dílis.

Finally, I would like to thank each author for their contribution and above all for their patience.

Michael Dunne

Magister Riccardus de Ybernia: Richard fitzRalph as Lecturer in early 14th Century Oxford

Michael Dunne

Introduction.

I wish, in this article to take the opportunity to present some of the preliminary results of my preparatory investigations towards a first edition of Richard FitzRalph's Commentary on the Sentences. FitzRalph later became famous (or infamous) because of his criticism of the incursions of the religious orders into what he regarded as the proper preserve of the secular clergy. Much of the attention of scholars has concentrated upon the figure of *Armachanus contra omnes*, and little has been devoted to his university career. The work of G. Leff was rather negative regarding his originality as a lecturer; he depicted our 'Ybernicus' as a traditionalist, as someone who ignored or was unaware of new ideas. In fact, the truth is rather different: FitzRalph was an extremely successful and influential lecturer. A close reading of his Commentary on the Sentences shows him not only to be one most representative of the Oxford tradition of the late 1320s but also to be one of its foremost protagonists.[1] For this reason, my concern here will be with his earlier 'scholastic' work and, in particular, with the philosophical themes which he developed in the course of the surviving records of his teaching as a lecturer in Oxford.

Life and Background.

Richard Rauf was born at Dundalk in the north-east of Ireland around 1300 to an Anglo-Norman family. It must be surmised that although his family were respectable that they were not initially well off but that they achieved social preferment later, not least through Richard himself. This was perhaps something which was felt by the young Richard as he progressed in life, changing his name by 1325 to the more impressive FitzRalph, perhaps inspired by some real, or wished for connection with one or other branches of the FitzRalph family in England. There were FitzRalphs who held large estates in both Essex and Suffolk in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries as well as those in Exeter. The details of his early life are few and far between. He tells us that some of his relatives were members of the Franciscan order in his hometown of Dundalk. It must be supposed that he received some form of elementary education in Dundalk and since the Franciscan friary was the only religious house in the town, it may have been there. In a sermon of 1349, preached in the Franciscan Church at Avignon on the Feast of St. Francis, 4th October, (listed as Sermon 80 by A. Gwynn in *The Sermon Diary* ..., p. 56) FitzRalph refers to his kinsmen who belonged to the Franciscan order: "for this order alone has a house in the town where I was born; and there have been always several of my family in this convent, though we are of lowly birth". A frater J. Radulfi is mentioned as the Franciscan Provincial Minister at the Kilkenny Chapter of May 1332; and it is probable that he was one of the Archbishop's family.[2] On the other hand, there is definite evidence, for the later Middle Ages at least, that the principal towns of County Louth such as Ardee, Dundalk and Drogheda, were provided with well-established chantry schools. However, his studies must have been restricted because he did not seek a dispensation in favour of previous studies in philosophy when he came to Oxford.

 Maynooth Philosophical Papers 3 (2006), pp. 1-20.

Despite the fact that he is often called 'Ybernicus', there is no doubt that FitzRalph's family were of English, or Anglo-Norman origin. Although he might have accepted the title 'de Ybernia', it is quite unlikely that he would have identified with the 'Hibernici', as Brendan Smith puts it: "… the English in Louth considered themselves to be English and were treated as such by the King of England. They did not assimilate with the indigenous population of the area.[3] His English ancestors had settled in County Louth or Oriel possibly not more than one or two generations before the date of his birth. Despite the fact that his family was not of noble rank he was related to the Brisbon and Dowdall families in Dundalk. Whereas the name of Rauf or FizRauf disappears from the records about the time of the Archbishop's death in 1360, the Dowdall family continued to prosper. Indeed, it was an Archbishop Dowdall who attempted the canonisation of Archbishop FitzRalph as "Saint Richard of Dundalk" during the reign of Henry VIII.[4]

The lack of any institute of higher education in Ireland at the time meant that it was necessary for students such as FitzRalph to travel to other centres in Europe. There is plenty of evidence of Irish students, Gaelic as well as Norman, at both Oxford and Paris as well as in other centres. A century beforehand, Peter of Ireland had studied and travelled as far as Italy where he held a chair in logic and natural philosophy at the University of Naples. (Indeed, it would be a very much desired task for someone to compile a bio-bibliography for such students and teachers – the pioneering work of Richard Sharpe already a makes such a work readily achievable). Oxford, however, remained the centre of choice for most Irish students. Firauf, as he is called by his student contemporaries (FizRauf by Bishop Grandisson) came to Oxford as a secular student in arts, (presumably) aged 15 or thereabouts, as was the custom of the time. He was a fellow of Balliol College where by 1322 he would have incepted as master in arts, having completed the seven liberal arts and the three philosophies (natural, moral and metaphysics)[5]. In July 1325, Richard 'filius Radulfi' was obliged to resign his fellowship since Balliol was reserved for students in arts and whereas FitzRalph may have been lecturing as regent master in arts to students, he was, it seems, pursuing his studies in theology at the same time.

Indeed, this is our first glimpse of Richard FitzRalph at Oxford and comes from an early deed of Balliol College.[6] On the feast of St. Margaret Virgin, July 20th, 1325, a meeting of all of the fellows of "the house of the scholars of Balliol" was held in the presence of the two external masters (or visitors of the foundation), Master Robert of Leicester, a Franciscan professor of theology, and Master Nicholas of Tyngewycke, who is described as a doctor of medicine and bachelor of theology. The meeting had been called to decide a disputed point in the foundation deed of the house, which had been founded by John Balliol, Lord of Galloway, and his wife the Lady Dervorguilla, two generations previously. John Balliol had been ordered to do penance by the Bishop of Durham, and his penance, which included a public scourging, required him also to set aside certain sums of money for the support of poor students at Oxford. This was in 1260. Balliol died in 1268, and his widow, the Lady Dervorguilla, took an interest in those students who were dependent upon her husband's endowment. Her intention, as expressed in a charter deed of 1282, seems to have been to found a house of studies for poor students in

the faculty of arts. No restriction was placed on the selection of these students, so far as their place of origin was concerned; but they were to live together, elect a principal from among their own number, obey him according to certain approved customs and statutes, and be subject to the authority of two extern masters who had the rights of visitation over this small community. In the deed which was made out at the end of the inquiry held by Robert of Leicester and Nicholas of Tyngewycke, it was ruled definitively that in future no scholar was to reside in the house of Balliol who is hearing lectures in any faculty other than the faculty of arts; in other words, students in the faculty of theology were declared ineligible as members of the community.

After this, as a student in theology he seems to have gone to University Hall which is now University College. Extra financial support was secured in April 1326 when he was collated to the church of Athboy in the diocese of Meath by Edward II[7].
When FitzRalph was a student, no school was more famous than that of the Franciscan Convent – the *opus Oxoniense* of John Duns Scotus was already a classic. In fact, FitzRalph quotes Scotus more frequently than any other scholastic work, not excluding the *Summa Theologiae* of St. Thomas Aquinas. The Franciscan school had always been more prominent at Oxford than the rival Dominican School; and the teaching of St. Thomas in particular had failed to acquire that predominance at Oxford which it had finally won at the University of Paris. Oxford thought lay mainly under the influence of the University's best known chancellor, Robert Grosseteste. Thus, thinkers such as FitzRalph remained loyal to the tradition of Augustinism, while Paris, in common with many European centres, responded quickly to the influence of Peripatetic philosophy.[8]
Opposition to Thomas came from a variety of quarters, besides the condemnations of two Archbishops of Canterbury, (the Dominican Kilwardby in 1274 and the Franciscan Pecham in 1284), there was Henry Harclay, an English secular theologian who, when he was *magister regens* in 1311-1312, was noted for his uncompromising hostility to the Dominicans. And yet Oxford produced two notable defenders of St. Thomas in Thomas Sutton O.P. and Nicholas Trivet O.P. The latter was still at the height of his reputation and influence at the time when FitzRalph came to Oxford. Trivet had been brought back to Oxford as *magister regens* in 1314 with a view to restoring the prestige of the order. While opposition to Aquinas in such a writer as Harclay seems nearly to be an anticipation of the nominalism of Ockham, Durandus of Saint-Pourçain was similarly challenging central Thomistic positions at Paris – criticism that was soon to pass on to scepticism. Ockham lectured on the *Sentences* during the years 1322-24, but he probably made his name as a lecturer in the faculty of arts around the time when FitzRalph was a student.

During the winter of 1326-27 all England was thrown into confusion by the intrigue which led first to the fall of Edward II's favorites, the Dispensers, then to the abdication of Edward II, the accession of Edward III, and the murder of the former king. Edward III was crowned at Westminster Abbey on January 29th, 1327 and peace was restored. Oxford had also suffered – the book of the chancellor and proctors contains a series of statutes from the year 1327 in which violent gatherings that had disturbed the peace of the university are noted[9].

Although Irish students were normally classified as Southerners for the purpose of University administration, FitzRalph seems to have developed links with the northern church and the Mertonians from an early stage. Crucial, however, will be his association with Bishop John Grandisson[10]. John de Grandisson was born in Ashperton in Hertfordshire in 1292 of a noble Burgundian family who had settled in England some forty years before. He began studying in Oxford in 1306 and studied theology at Paris under the Cistercian Jacques Fournier (later Pope Benedict XII) between the years 1313 and 1317. A few years later (by 1322) he was in Avignon as chaplain to Pope John XXII. Around 1326-27, he appears to have been studying at Oxford again. Grandisson was consecrated at Avignon on October 8th, 1327 and he crossed to England and did fealty to Edward III at Eltham on March 9th, 1328. He then attended parliament at Nottingham, and left the town for Exeter on March 16th where he was enthroned as Bishop in August 1328. On his way across the midlands he visited Oxford, where, as Bishop of Exeter, he had the right of visitation in Stapleton's Hall, later Exeter College. There he visited his nephew John Northwode[11] and found him a tutor in Richard FitzRalph.

Meeting with Grandisson was a stroke of good fortune for FitzRalph, whose prospects for promotion in the Church were immediately altered. From the point of view of our knowledge of FitzRalph at this stage, it is also fortunate, for Grandisson throughout his life was a methodical administrator, who kept his registers remarkably well,[12] and kept copies of his letters, both official and private.[13] Contained in these registers are a series of letters which throw valuable light on the details of the various steps by which FitzRalph completed his course of studies at Oxford and made his first progress up the ladder of ecclesiastical promotion.

Walsh has established from Grandisson's correspondence that FitzRalph was *bachalarius in sacra pagina* after August 1328 and that he had completed his lectures on the *Sentences* before October 1329. Absent in Paris as tutor to Grandisson's nephew from 1329-30, his inception as doctor seems to have taken place in the summer of 1331. It should also be noted that according to the statutes a *bachalarius* was not allowed to respond in any of the lecture halls of the University for a full year after completing his lectures on the *Sentences* (*Statuta Antiqua*, p. 51). Thus, FitzRalph would have been free to leave Oxford for a year, and so chose this free year for a first visit to the great University of Paris.

Information regarding the stay of FitzRalph and Northwode has recently been uncovered by William J. Courtenay.[14] Courtenay has recently edited a *computus* or financial record of a tax levied on the members of the University of Paris in the academic year 1329-1330. This *computus* contains the names, financial level, and addresses of the majority of masters and most prominent students of the University and thus provides us with a rich source for the social history of the most important *studium generale* in Europe. The document is the earliest surviving record of a *collectio* or *collecta* of money from the masters and students due to the fact that a certain Jean le Fourbeur was accused of raping a certain Symonette of Bar-sur-Aube, a village to the east of Troyes, in the Champagne region. The suspicion was that the parents of Symonette were trying to force a 'shotgun wedding'. Rape was a serious crime in medieval society especially if the person involved

came from a good family. The fine imposed was that of £400 Parisian which le Fourbeur paid and then appealed given that, as a member of the corporation of the University of Paris, he had papal immunity from monetary fines. The University rowed in behind him not to approve his conduct but to defend its privileges. The tax upon the masters and students was to pursue the legal case and in the end the money was returned. In recording the names of the masters and students, we find that lodging in the very up-market rue de Sorbonne, was a certain, 'Richardus filius Rodulfi cum discipulo suo'. FitzRalph, now a *baccalaurius formatus* in theology (i.e. one who has now completed his obligations with regard to lecturing) is entitled to be accounted as a *magister* within the university and to have students. He had probably acquired such prestigious lodgings, belonging to the Collège de Sorbonne, thanks to the friendship between Pierre Roger and Grandisson. Roger, Archbishop of Sens, provisor of the Sorbonne, was at that time resident in Paris as adviser to Philip VI and later became Pope Clement VI (1342-1352).[15] FitzRalph and Northwode probably arrived in Paris around the middle of October 1329 and had returned to England by the summer of 1330 when FitzRalph incepted in theology.

In September 1331 FitzRalph was instituted to the prebend of Crediton near Exeter, one of the wealthiest and most important benefices in that diocese, whereas in the previous May, Grandisson had made FitzRalph the grant of a pension.[16] In 1331 Grandisson petitioned Pope John XXII, asking permission to provide Richard FitzRalph, as well as his nephew John Northwode, with canonries in the diocese, as soon as they should fall vacant. Grandisson's attempt to provide FitzRalph with a canonry led to a violent quarrel between the bishop and the Dean of the diocese, Richard Coleton. Coleton appealed to first to Canterbury and then to Avignon. The quarrel ended with Coleton's death on August 4th, 1335, on his way home from Avignon to Exeter; but it is doubtful whether FitzRalph ever entered into possession of the canonry. In the meanwhile he had become Chancellor of the University of Oxford in 1332, and later found his own way to the Papal curia at Avignon.

These dates are important, as they enable us to argue backwards to the earlier period of FitzRalph's residence in Oxford. By statute a master of arts was required to study theology for seven years before he was allowed to lecture on the *Sentences* as a *bachalarius*. This gives us 1321 as the probable year in which FitzRalph began his course of theology. Another statute, however, required a master in any faculty to lecture for at least two years in the University and in that faculty. At the time of his inception as a master of arts, the young lecturer (aged around 21) had to take an oath that he would lecture in the faculty for at least two years. He was not considered a member of the university until he had kept his word, otherwise he was regarded as a perjurer.[17] FitzRalph may thus have spent two to three years lecturing in the faculty of arts before he began the higher course in theology; alternatively, he may have begun to study theology while he was still lecturing as a master of arts. Since the course in arts extended over a period of about four years, we must conclude that FitzRalph came to Oxford not later than 1315, and possibly even earlier, but no fixed dates can at present be given for these early years.

So far as we can calculate the years of his youth, FitzRalph must have been a young boy of fifteen or sixteen when Edward Bruce landed in Ireland. He may have already been in Oxford before the sack of Dundalk and the massacre of June 29th, 1315 which seemed to threaten the very survival of the English colony in Ireland. The tide began to turn, however, when another decisive battle was fought near Dundalk on October 14th, 1318. In the end Edward Bruce was killed by a citizen of Drogheda and the dream for a joint Gaelic kingdom of Scotland and Ireland was at an end. Thus, the date of Richard Rauf's birth can be fixed at ca. 1299-1300.

The *Lectures on the Sentences*.

Although FitzRalph later belittled his time as a lecturer[18], his lectures on the *Sentences* have turned out to be of greater importance than might have at first been realised by authors such as G. Leff.[19] According to the regulations at the time, the bachelor began by commenting on the *Sentences*, whereas at Paris this was the task of a doctor in theology. The requirement to lecture on the four books of Lombard had by this stage been relaxed and so commentators were free to specialise during the one year that was allotted to them. The recent edition of the *quaestio biblica* by J.-F. Genest[20] serves to place FitzRalph's contribution in a proper context and bears witness to his capability of adaptation to new literary forms, that of the *conclusiones*. Indeed, the importance of FitzRalph's Commentary cannot be underestimated, since it is the point of reference for the discussion of a number of major thinkers when Oxford became the centre of theological speculation.

The *Introitus Sententiarum*.

The Oxford MS Oriel College 15. uniquely contains FitzRalph's inaugural speech on the *Sentences*. Oriel College Ms 15 describes this work as a '*sermo in opus*' and the tendency would be to translate this as a 'sermon'. This translation would also be suggested by the fact that, as Walsh points out,[21] this *sermo* was, in all likelihood given in the University Church of St. Mary the Virgin.[22] FitzRalph at this stage was probably a priest. In his earliest letter to FitzRalph, Bishop Grandisson refers to his invitation to Exeter, apparently with a view to his coming ordination.[23]

Now as tutor (*curator*) to the bishop's nephew John Northwood, FitzRalph went with him to Paris in 1329 where both of them perhaps attended some lectures.[24] While they were away, Grandisson writes a letter from his residence at Chudleigh on December 5th, 1329[25] to Richard Retford – the same who had to leave Balliol in 1325 and go with FitzRalph to University Hall. In the letter the bishop thanks Retford for having notified him of a volume of St. Augustine's sermons which was for sale in Oxford. Richard FitzRalph, as we learn from the letter, had told Retford that the Bishop was looking out for books that would be useful in his library at Cudleigh. Grandisson ends his letter by asking Retford to search for any rare old theological works that were for sale, including volumes of old sermons, even if they were not divided into *themata*.

It is this latter point which interests us here, the literary form of a public address in the Middle Ages. As is now well documented there were two principal forms of public address normally given by preacher in a liturgical context. Firstly, there was the older form, the homily, in which the preacher would explain the significance of the Gospel reading for that day, drawing out whatever doctrinal or moral lessons he deemed appropriate. In other words, the homily bases itself upon a work of exegesis of the sacred text. It seems that this homily form was still used in Italy well into the thirteenth century but by the early fourteenth century, it was clearly an anachronism as Grandisson's letter implies. The Wycliffite sermons of the late fourteenth century returned to the ancient homily form.

From about 1200 on, a new style of public address developed which is normally called the sermon form. It was distinguished from the older homily form, as Grandisson's letter suggests, by the style of taking a theme (*thema*) and developing it in the course of the speech.[26] It is difficult to find an appropriate name for this new, 'modern' sermon form. Sometimes it is called the 'university sermon' since this new style originated at the major universities. It is also known as the 'thematic sermon' since it develops out of a phrase, normally of scripture,[27] the *thema*. S. Wenzel prefers the term 'scholastic sermon' since, as he says,[28] this both suggests the period (post 1200) and the milieu – the university, as well as certain formal structures – "a constant urge 'to prove' everything either through reference to scripture or to the fathers".

As with the *disputatio*, the scholastic sermon form was a challenge. It relied upon the rhetorical skill of the speaker to develop a speech from a single phrase.[29] It was also an assessment of the speaker's education and training. It required quite strict adherence to certain rhetorical conventions which were laid down in a host of popular treatises, known as the *artes praedicandi*. It was, as Wenzel points out,[30] an art form which its audience found both entertaining and aesthetically pleasing because of, and not in spite of, its formal structure. It took skill to develop a speech out of a single phrase, to put forward a structure to be followed (the *divisio thematis*), to 'inflate' the text (the *modus amplificandi*), and finally to tie everything together at the end (the *unitio*)[31] and to finish up with a *commendatio* or prayer.

Present in the *sermo* are the *rimes léonines* which is a rhyming stylistic feature also known as the *collatio*. [32] Cousins points out that this poetic device is already present in the *sermo* of Peter Aureoli (1318) to his *Commentary on the First Book of the Sentences*[33] as well as in John of Ripa's *Lectura* on Book I in 1357, as well of course in that of Peter of Candia of 1358.

Although the sermon form originally began out of a liturgical setting, by the thirteenth century at least, it was no longer confined to such a setting. The classical ideal of education included a training in rhetoric and this continued as a normal part of the medieval curriculum. Thus, whenever one spoke formally in public certain conventions were followed, whether this was in Church or in the setting of a formal inaugural speech as is the case here. As K. H. Tachau points out, the root meaning of *sermo* is simply a speech,[34] and that of *praedico* is to speak in public. Thus, *sermones* or speeches were not

confined to liturgy, nor even to the theology faculty.[35] Wenzel has edited a 'sermon' in praise of philosophy, and the same style is used for inaugural speeches in the faculties of law and of medicine, for concluding speeches (the *sermo finalis*)[36] and for graduation speeches.[37]

In the context of FitzRalph's inaugural speech, a certain confusion is to be avoided with regard to the difference in practice between the Universities of Paris and Oxford.[38] FitzRalph's speech is not an inception speech, a *principium*, such as might be given by a new master in the University of Paris. In Oxford, the student beginning his lectures on the *Sentences* was still a bachelor in theology and so perhaps the more accurate term would be that of an *introitus Sententiarum*[39]. Indeed, very few examples of this kind of speech, the *introitus Sententiarum* at Oxford have survived. Apart from a few in the thirteenth century, there are (as far as I am aware) apart from that of FitzRalph, those of Holcot, Hopeman and Wyclif in the fourteenth century, and the five edited by Wenzel from the fifteenth century.[40]

The Oxford course in theology at this time was long and difficult. Students were admitted to the degree of *bachalarius* after seven years of theological studies. They were then expected to lecture on the *Sentences* for a year and after this to lecture on some book of the Bible, as well as attending a certain number of public disputations in which the young *bachalarius* was expected to appear as a *repondens* in the schools of the various regent masters of the year. Two full years had to go by after the completion of the lectures on the *Sentences* before the candidate could be admitted to the doctorate.[41]

This was, in fact, one of the points in which the course followed at Oxford differed from the Continental tradition as exemplified in that of the University of Paris. At Paris the young *bachalarius* was expected to lecture on the Bible before attempting his course of lectures on the *Sentences*. In Oxford, on the other hand, Biblical studies were held in special reverence.[42] This may be due, in some respect, to Grosseteste and the polemic over the introduction to Oxford of the custom from Paris of lecturing on the *Sentences* towards the end of the first half of the thirteenth century which my colleague J. McEvoy has discussed in his recent book on Grosseteste. Moreover, the University of Oxford had always insisted, sometimes in the face of considerable opposition from the mendicants who were more attuned to the custom of the University of Paris, that the lectures on the *Sentences* must come before those on the Bible since the former were regarded as being of less importance.

A list of the known works from FitzRalph's time as lecturer in Oxford:

1. The Logical Treatises:

a) *De distinctionibus et formalitatibus* (contained in Pisa Bibl. Caterina 159 ff. 11r-55v, Roma, Biblioteca Angelica 563 (F.3. 15) 49-81) and

b) *Tractatus de propositione per se nota* (contained in Pisa Bibl. Caterina 159, ff. 121r-128r and Roma, Bibl. Angelica 563 (F.3. 49-15), 49-81.

2. A Commentary on the Physics (now lost but referred to by FitzRalph himself – something of it may be possible to reconstruct from references by contemporary

authors such as Kilvington, or a flavour gained from his own later comments on infinity, motion, etc.)

3. The Commentary on the Sentences (give a list of the *questiones* as we now have them; give a list of the MSS; mention something about the 'long' and the 'short version'; mention that all of what survives is from the *opus correctum* and not the original *lectura*, nor was an *ordinatio* ever completed; that none of the manuscripts is a copy from an exemplar but probably all are extracts made from individual quires since no one manuscript contains all of the text; how is the order of the questions to be determined.)
4. A tractatus *De ymagine Trinitate* referred to by Wodeham is in reality part of the Sentences commentary circulating as a separate work.
5. The *Questio Biblica* which was given immediately after the *lectura* before FitzRalph left for Paris and later incorporated (by him, or others) as part of the *opus correctum*.
6. *Quaestiones disputatae* contained in Vienna, Osterreichische Nationalbibliothek, CVP 5076, ff. 65r – 69r, as noted by Walsh and repeated by R. Sharpe. The questions are as follows:

- Queritur utrum creatura racionalis clare videns Deum necessario diligat ipsum.
- - Queritur utrum dampnati in inferno ante iudicium videntes gloriam beatorum post iudicium omni luce privati penitus excecentur.
- Queritur utrum essenciam proportionatam caritatis (vie) succedit pro premio proportionaliter magnitudo gloriae.
- Queritur utrum persone divine in mentes proprias ad sanctificandum eas invisibilis missio sit operacio propria emitatur.

The problem here, however, is that whereas these quaestiones follow on frm some sermons of FitzRalph, the first seems to be attributable to Adam Wodeham and the second is identical to material contained in the Augustinian Library of Klosterneuburg and attributed to Petrus de Pirichenwart and dating from 1424.

7. The *determinationes Ybernici* (given after he returned from Paris when he was regent master in theology) and are referred to by Adam Wodeham. A number of *determinationes* are contained in a manuscript in Florence. There are seven *determinationes* which follow FitzRalph's *lectura* in Firenze, Conv. soppr. A.III.508. At the bottom of f.109vb: *Hic incipiunt determinationes ybernici*. They followed by a table of contents of the lectura on f. 138vb which finish: *Expliciunt tituli questionum ybernici siue phyraph.* They are:
   1. f. 109vb *Utrum cuiuscumque actionis meritorie sit caritas principium effectivum*.
   2. f. 113va *Utrum per omnem actum meritorium augmentatae caritate minuatur caritas*.
   3 f. 120ra *Utrum ammitata caritate necessario minuatur cupiditas*.
   4. f. 120vb *Utrum cupiditas possit augeri*.
   5. f. 121ra *Utrum per omnem actum augmentandem caritatem minuatur cupiditas*.
   6. f. 121vb *Utrum caritas et cupiditas in eadem anima possint simul augeri*.
   7. f. 129ra *Utrum sit possibile antichristum fore bonum pro omni tempore quo conversabitur in terra.*

List of MSS of Commentary on the Sentences:

‘Full text’:

F^1= Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale, Conventi soppr. A.III.508, saec. XIV, ff. 1r-109v..

F^2 = Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale, Conventi soppr. A.VI.611 (S. Croce 611), saec. XIV, ff. 1r-109v..

P^1 = Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, lat. 15853, saec. XIV, ff. 1ra-191va.

V^1 = Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, lat. 11517, saec. XIV, ff. 1ra-175va.

‘Shorter text’:

O^1 = Oxford, Oriel College MS 15, saec. XIV (1389), ff. 1-114.

T = Troyes, Bibliothèque municipale, MS 505, saec. XIV, ff. 1r-70v.

W^1 = Worcester, Cathedral Library MS Q.71, saec. XIV, ff. 1r-168r..

Extracts:

M = Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek CLM 8943, ff. ff. 81va-83rb, 87rb-89va (32v-34r?).

O^2 = Oxford, Magdalen College MS 16, ff. 109r-113r.

P^2 = Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, lat. 6441.

V^2 = Vatican City, Ottoboni 179, saec. XIV/XV, ff. 59ra-67rb, 69vb-87vb.

V^3 = Vatican City, Ottoboni 869, saec. XV, ff. 60r-130r.

W^2 = Worcester, Cathedral Library MS F.65, ff. 63-92.

Attested copies:

- a text of xiv s. at O.F.M. in Todi
- a text of xiv s. at O.S.A. in Oxford.
- a text seen by Bale at Ramsey (See, Bale, *Scriptorum Illustrium maioris Brytannie Catalogus*, Basle 1557, p. 443 -similar to O)
- a text “Questiones amachani super sentencias”, among the books listed in an “Inventory of Books at Canterbury College, Oxford in 1524”. See, M.R. Jones, *Ancient Libraries of Canterbury and Dover* (1903), p. 167.
- Cambridge, Gonville Hall, seen by Leland (*Collectanea*, 4. 20)
- Syon (MSS D. 31, D. 42)
- York, Austin Friars (219)

Table of Quaestiones.

Order of questions and articles in FitzRalph's Commentary on the *Sentences* (based primarily upon MS. Latin 15853, Bibliothèque Nationale, Parisand as suggested by Leff (1963, pp. 194-197) with some corrections and additions). As will be noted, however, P

is not a perfect text as evidenced by the fact that it omits material which is definitely authentic such as the question *Utrum unicus actus intellectus vel voluntatis sit respectu diversorum distinctus*, which is only found in W.

Principium or Introitus Sententiarum: *Fluminis impetus letificat ciuitatem dei* [f. 1a][43].

Prologus.

[1] Q. 1 *Vtrum possibile sit viatori scire demonstratiue deum esse*.

Art. 1 Vtrum deum esse sit per se notum.
Art. 2 Vtrum fides et sciencia eiusdem rei possint simul esse in eodem.
Art. 3 Ad questionem.

[2] Q. 2 *Vtrum theologia sit sciencia speculatiua vel practica*.

Art. 1 Numquid theologia sit sciencia.
Art. 2 Vtrum vita contemplatiua sit melior quam actiua.
Art. 3 Vtrum aliqua sciencia dicitur speculatiua vel practica.
Art. 4 Ad questionem.[44]

Book I

[3] Questio 1 *Utrum sola trinitate incommutabi1i sit fruendum.*

Art. 1 Utrum fruitio dei sit homini possibilis.
Art. 2 Utrum sit possibile aliquem frui una persona non fruendo alia vel essentia dei absque persona.
Art. 3 Utrum voluntas libere libertate contradictionis fruatur ultimo fine.
Art. 4 Ad questionem.

[4] Questio 2 *Utrum beatitudo sit actus intellectus vel voluntatis*.

Art. 1 Utrum voluntas sit potentia nobilior quam intellectus.
Art. 2 Utrum passiones intellectus et voluntatis distinguantur.[45]
Art. 3 Utrum delectatio sit beatitudo.
Art. 4 Ad questionem principalem.

[5] Questio 3 *Utrum unicus actus intellectus vel voluntatis sit respectu diversorum distinctus*

[6] Questio 4 *Utrum in divina essentia sit trinitas personarum.*

Art. 1 Utrum cum simplicitate divine essentie stet pluralitas personarum.
Art. 2 Utrum omne quod dicitur de deo ad se sive absolute dicatur singulariter de tribus personis.
Art. 3 Utrum divina essentia sit gignens vel genita.
[Art. 4 An sit aliqua distinctio a parte rei formalis vel aliqua inter attributa.][46]
Art. 5 Responsio ad questionem principalem.

[7] Questio 5 *Utrum spiritus sanctus procedat a patre et a filio.*

Art. 1 Utrum posito quod spiritus sanctus non procederet a filio distingueretur ab eo.
Art. 2 Utrum spiritus sanctus mittatur sive detur a patre et filio.
Art. 3 Ad questionem.

[8] Questio 6 *Utrum mens humana sit ymago trinitatis increate.*

Art. 1 Utrum memoria, intelligentia et voluntas distinguantur ab invicem realiter.
Art. 2 Utrum in spiritu rationali sit aliquis habitus cognitivus.
Art. 3 Utrum actualis cogitatio distinguatur realiter a specie in memoria.
Art. 4 Utrum cognitio et volitio sint idem realiter.
Art. 5 Utrum partes ymaginis create sint equales.
Art. 6 Ad questionem principalem.

[9] Questio 7 *Utrum mens ipsa et ceteri habitus sibi presentes sint principia in memoria respectu sui.* No articles, but the reply to the question given as 'Ad articulum.'

[10] Questio 8 *Utrum ex presentia speciei in memoria sequatur necessario cogitatio actualis per illam.*

[11] Questio 9 *Utrum intellectus agens sit aliqua pars ymaginis.*[47]

[12] Questio 10 *Utrum amor procedat ab aliqua notitia.*

Art. 1 Utrum voluntas sit activa respectu sue actionis vel passiva.
Art. 2 Utrum actus voluntatis fiat subito vel in tempore.
Art. 3 Utrum ex actuali notitia alicuius obiecti sequatur necessario amor sive volutio.
Art. (4) Ad questionem principalem.

[13] Questio 11 Utrum appetitus contrarii vel passiones contrarii possint[48] esse in voluntate. [Not determined].

[14] Questio 12 *Utrum caritas possit augeri.*

Art. 1 Utrum intensio forme accidentalis fiat per additionem alicuius.
Art. 2 Utrum caritas potest minui per actum demeritorium.

[15] Questio 13 *Utrum sit ponenda alia caritas in anima quam spiritus sanctus.*

[16] Questio 14 *Utrum deus sit prescius omnium futurorum.*

[17] Questio 15 *Utrum deus possit revelare creature rationali futura contingentia.*

[18] Questio 16 *Utrum creatura rationalis possit prescire in verbo aliquod futurum contingens.*[49]

[19] Questio 17 *Utrum deus sit immutabilis et incircumscriptus.*

Art. 1 Utrum quilibet spiritus sit circumscriptus in loco.
Art. 2 Utrum angelus vel anima humana possit moveri subito et per se.
Art. 3 Utrum aliquis spiritus creatus possit per se moveri localiter successive.
Art. 4 Ad questionem.

[20] Questio 18 *Utrum Deus sit omnipotens.*

Art. 1 Numquid potest probari ex puris naturalibus deum esse infinite potentie in vigore.[50]
Art. 2 Numquid Aristoteles et commentator Averroys hoc senserunt.[51]
Art. 3 Ponendo quod ex puris naturalibus possit convinci deum esse potentie infinite numquid convinci possit quod sit omnipotens et agens infinitum.[52]
Art. 4 Numquid voluntas Dei sit prima causa rerum.
Art. 5 Ad questionem principalem.

Book II

[21] Questio 1 *Utrum deus in principio temporis creavit mundum de nihilo.*

Art. 1 Utrum includit contradictionem deum produxisse mundum ex nihilo.
Art. 2 Utrum motus et tempus distinguantur realiter.
Art. 3 Utrum creatio vel aliqua relatio sit aliud a suo fundamento.
Art. 4 Utrum creatio soli deo conveniat.
Art. 5 Ad questionem principalem.

[22] Questio 2 *Utrum angeli peccaverunt per libertatem arbitrii.*

[23] Questio 3 *Utrum omnes angeli confirmati sint in statu merendi.*

[24] Questio 4*Utrum angeli habeant cognitionem distinctam omnium creaturarum.*
Not determined.

[25] Questio 5 *Utrum angeli cognoscant per species.*

[26] Questio 6 *Utrum angeli fuerunt creati in caritate.*[53]

[27] Questio 7 *Utrum quilibet homo concupiscentialiter propagatus concipiatur in peccato originali.*

Art. 1 Utrum quilibet homo habeat aliquid de corpore Ade.
Art. 2 Ad questionem principalem.[54]

Book III

[28] Questio 1 (unicus) *Utrum in voluntate sit aliquis habitus allectivus vel inclinativus ad actionem.*

Book IV

[29] Questio 1 *Utrum in sacramento altaris sit corpus Christi sub speciebus vini et panis.*

Art. 1 Utrum accidentia in sacramento altaris sint ibi sine subiecto.
Art. 2 Recitabo opiniones doctorum.[55]
Art. 3 Ad questionem.[56]

[W in its *tabula* (made from the loose quaterni of the present text when in a different order from the present) includes a *quaestio* which is not found elsewhere, nor is it now included in the present codex, namely "*Utrum suffragia Ecclesie prosint defunctis in purgatorio*".]

The Order of Quaestiones in some of the principal manuscripts:[57]

Full text:
P^1: 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, (missing: 1, 2, 5).
F^1: 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 (missing: 1, 2, 5, 18).
V: 3, 4, 6, 7, 14, 16, 19, 20, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 (missing: 1, 2, 5, 15, 17, 18).

Shorter Text:
T: 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 8, 11, 28, 12, 19, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 21, 24, 25, 27, 26, 22 (missing: 1, 2, 5, 13, 18, 23, 29).
O: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8*, 12, 9, 10, 8*, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 21, 20, 19, 22, 26, 24, 25, 23, 27 (missing: 5, 13, 18, 28, 29).
W: 14, 15, 6, 7, 19*, 21*, 3, 26, 17, 27, 12, 23, 4, 5, 21*, 22, 20*, 10, 11, 8, 28, 29, 25, 24, 18, 20*, 16, 19* (missing 12, 9, 13).

Extract:
P^2: 17, 12, 4, 14*, 15, 14*, 3, 21, 19, 20*.[58]

Conclusions

What can one conclude from this analysis? Both Gwynn and Leff identified P^1 as being the best and most reliable copy of the text. P^1, however, cannot be a copy from an exemplar or finalised text since it omits at least one certainly authentic question which is only contained in W. W is one of the most chaotically ordered copies and yet it is the only MS. to contain Q. 5 and a full copy of Q. 18 (the *Quaestio biblica*). Again, P^1 and W differ inasmuch as P^1 contains the 'full text' and W the 'shorter text'. P^1, T, V, O, W, are all independent witnesses, not depending on each other, whereas F^1 seems to depend upon a source common to itself and P^1, but not upon P^1 itself since it omits Q. 18. P^1 was left to the Sorbonne by Jean Gorre in 1360, and F^1 is a later copy; again, F^1 is the only

one to contain the "determinationes Ybernici sive phyraph". O, which was copied by a monk of Glastonbury in 1389, also contains material which is not to be found elsewhere, while omitting other material. In fact, no one manuscript can be said to contain the 'full text'.

Indeed, it would seem that the distinction between complete texts and 'extracts' may be an artificial one since all of the MSS. may contain extracts to a greater or larger extent. The situation is complicated by the fact that we have a 'full' text and a 'shorter' text – and yet an early 'shorter' text such as that of Troyes (copied 1335-50) and originally belonging to the Abbey of Clairvaux, contains 'shortened' paragraphs which are not to be found in a so-called 'full' text such as that of P^1. Troyes called the text a *reportatio* but as W.J. Courtenay has shown from an analysis of Adam Wodeham's quotations from FitzRalph, none of the texts which survive are from the original lectures given in 1328-29, rather all would seem to be from FitzRalph's *opus correctum*, an incomplete revision of his lectures, made by the author in 1330 and never turned into an *ordinatio*. This is clear from the fact that sometimes articles promised in the introduction to the question are not given; single *quaestiones* , or rather *articuli*, float without being incorporated into their relevant *quaestio*; a *Queastio biblica* is included which goes against the author's opinion as put forward in his *lectura*.

What can one say regarding the order of the *quaestiones* – the situation seems to be fairly chaotic. I propose a possible explanation and a solution. The explanation was suggested to me by a remark of the scribe in the MS. Oriel 15. A colophon which was erased but rediscovered with the use of UV reads:

> This book was written through the diligence of Brother Nicholas Fawkes, monk of Glatonbury, in the year of the Lord 1389, at which time it was hard to find many questions of Holcot's work.

Holcot was a slightly younger contemporary of FitzRalph; a Domincan, he lectured on the *Sentences* during the years 1331-32 during FitzRalph's regency. And yet, over fifty years later his work was still circulating in unbound quires – the same may well have been true of FitzRalph's work. It would seem that scribes made copies from what was available, or made selections from what was available, or (more likely again) made selections depending upon their own interests (the marginal notes in O made by Fawkes seem to have been made by way of preparation for his own Commentary on the *Sentences* – he had incepted in theology by 1395), and presumably the order in which the material became available as it was returned by borrowers, etc. Apart from W, the various gatherings would seem to be in the original order because of the extensive use of catchwords and alphabetical numbering of quires. How then are we to solve the problem of the *quaestiones*? It may be that some help may be given by the text itself where it refers to the text of Lombard. There is no problem with the *principium* and the first two *quaestiones* since they deal with introductory material. As regards the first book:
[3] and **[4]** (and perhaps **[5]** as well) refer to the first distinction of the first book.
[6] refers to the third distinction.
But **[7]** could refer to either the 7^{th}, 11^{th}, or 33^{rd} distinction.
[8], [9], [10], [11], [12] refer to dist. 3.
[13] and **[14]** refer to dist. 17.

[16] and **[17]** to dist. 35.
[18] was associated by Wodeham with III, dist. 14.
[19] refers to dist. 18.

Obviously, here again there are problems – only when the transcription of the text is at an advanced stage will we (perhaps) be in a position to establish the order of the *quaestiones* regarding Lombard's text – presuming that FitzRalph followed that order!

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[1] See, Jean François Genest, "Contingence et révélation des futurs: La *questio biblica* de Richard FitzRalph" in *Lectionum Varietates: Hommage à Paul Vignaux (1904-1987)*, ed. J. Jolivet, Z. Kałuza, A. de Libera, pp. 199-246. Paris: J. Vrin, 1991, p. 199.

[2] See FitzMaurice-Little, *Materials for the History of the Franciscan Province of Ireland* (Manchester, 1920), p. 135.

[3] See, B. Smith, *Colonisation and Conquest in Medieval Ireland. The English in Louth 1170-1330*. Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 8.

[4] George Dowdall was Archbishop of Armagh during the critical years of Henry VIII's reign and during the reigns of Edward VI and Mary I. It was he who as Archbishop of Armagh instituted an annual ecclesiastical feast in honour of his famous kinsman, St. Richard of Dundalk.

[5] Works attributed to FitzRalph may have survived from this time, the *De distinctionibus et formalitatibus* (contained in Pisa Bibl. Caterina 159 ff. 11r-55v, Roma, Biblioteca Angelica 563 (F.3. 15) 49-81) and *Tractatus de propositione per se nota* (contained in Pisa Bibl. Caterina 159, ff. 121r-128r and Roma, Bibl. Angelica 563 (F.3. 49-15), 49-81.

[6] See, *Oxford Deeds of Balliol College*, ed. Salter (Oxford Historical Society, 1913), p. 285.

[7] See, Walsh, p. 4.

[8] This is not to underplay the continuing influence of Augustinism at Paris, particularly in the combined form of Augustinism and Aristotelianism in such a figure as St. Bonaventure. Indeed, Grandisson's Augustinian tendency may relate to his time at Paris.

[9] See, *Munimenta Academica*, ed. Anstey, vol. I, pp. 119-125.

[10] Many writers have explored the relationship between Grandisson and FitzRalph, especially in the recent excellent study by M. Haren. It is not my intention here to comment upon this influence in FitzRalph's latter career and the background to the anti-mendicant controversy as this has already been dealt with by Haren. I would in the context of the present work point out the very Augustinian nature of the sources which FitzRalph uses in his *intriotus Sententiarum* and also throughout the *Sentences Commentary* – an Augustinianism which he shared with Grandisson. Another influence of Grandisson upon FitzRalph may perhaps be traced to one of the introductory articles, found only in the Oriel manuscript, which deals with the nature of the active life over the contemplative, and especially with the role of a good pastors and bishops. This second question is entitled *Vtrum theologia sit scientia speculativa vel practica* and the second article *Vtrum vita contemplativa sit nobilior quam activa*. The conclusion is that the mixed life of action and contemplation which is that of good pastors and prelates in the most meritorious kind of life *in statu viatoris* and is superior to the religious life. Another influence of Grandisson's? An anticipation of a future stance on the part of FitzRalph?

[11] Northwode acquired an MA by 1334, probably from Oxford and was a DTh by May 1345, when he was elected chancellor of the University of Oxford.

[12] Grandisson's Register is better kept than most but there are still some gaps and discrepancies (particularly in the latter part of the pontificate).

[13] *Exeter Diocesan Registers: The Register of Bishop John de Grandisson (1327-1369)*, 3 Vols., ed. F.C. Hingeston-Randolph (London 1894-99) which also contains sources for the life of Grandisson in the preface to Vol. III, pp. v-lxxviii, referred to hereafter as *Reg.* .

[14] See, W.J. Courtenay, *Parisian Scholars in the Early Fourteenth Century – A Social Portrait*. Cambridge University Press, 1999.

[15] It is interesting to note FitzRalph's ease of access to the Papal Court from the time of John XXII who was interested in his Commentary on the Sentences regarding what he had written on the Beatific Vision; to both Jacques Fournier (Benedict XII, 1334-1342) and Peter Roger, the first being the teacher and the latter

the friend of Grandisson. Perhaps the change in FitzRalph's influence came with the accession of Innocent VI?

[16] In a letter dated May 24th, 1331 , Grandisson addresses FitzRalph as *magistro Ricardo nato Radulphi, sacre theologie bachalario, clerico nostro familiari* and tells him that he has decided to make him an annual pension of five pounds sterling '*donec de competenciori providerimus*' (*Reg*., II, p. 616) Clearly, FitzRalph has not yet incepted but in bishop's register of the following September which instituted him to the prebend of Crediton he is described as a doctor of theology (*Reg*., III, p. 1286).

[17] See J.A. Weisheipl, "The Curriculum of the Faculty of Arts at Oxford in the early Fourteenth Century", *Mediaeval Studies* 26 (1964), pp. 143-185; p. 147.

[18] See, the autobiographical prayer edited by L. L. Hammerich, *The Beginnings of the Strife between FitzRalph and the Mendicants*...p. 20.

[19] See G. Leff, "Richard FitzRalph's Commentary on the Sentences", *Bulletin of the John Ryland's Library* 45 (1963), pp. 390-422; *Richard FitzRalph Commentator of the 'Sentences': A Study on Theological Orthodoxy*, Manchester, 1963.

[20] Jean François Genest, "Contingence et révélation des futurs: La *questio biblica* de Richard FitzRalph" in *Lectionum Varietates: Hommage à Paul Vignaux (1904-1987)*, ed. J. Jolivet, Z. Kałuza, A. de Libera, pp. 199-246. Paris: J. Vrin, 1991.

[21] Walsh, p. 56.

[22] The religious setting was, however, also used for 'secular' activities as well. Lectures were given quite normally in the Church and it was used for court cases and so on.

[23]*Reg*, i, 173. Haren in *Sin and Society* ..., p. 61 points out that Grandisson following an investigation conducted by him on the point, dismisses a reservation that he had held regarding FitzRalph's suitability for orders. Nothing further is known as to the date and place of FitzRalph's ordination to the priesthood; but the fact that some twenty years later he chose Exeter as the place of his episcopal ordination, and Grandisson as the ordaining prelate, suggests that it was Exeter, most probably in the summer or autumn of 1328, that he had been ordained to the priesthood in the partially built Exeter Cathedral of the time.

[24] Grandisson's nephew seems to have given his uncle some cause to worry about him. In a number of letters Grandisson seems to have been concerned as to whether his nephew will succeed in keeping within what seems to have been a very generous allowance from a prebend at Stoke (see, *Reg*., I, 192-193).

In a letter in Grandisson's regsister, dated from his manor at Chudleigh on October 4th, 1329 (*Reg*., I, p. 233), in which he introduces his nephew and his nephew's tutor to an unnamed prelate or doctor of the University of Paris. According to Courtenay (Parisian Scholars …, p. 15), this was probably Pierre Roger, the future Pope Clement VI, whom Grandisson had known since their days as theology students in Paris. The Bishop speaks first of his nephew, whom he commends to his friend:.

> He is going to the *studium* of Paris for the first time and we beg you most earnestly, knowing well your great kindness, to look after him, for he has neither friends nor experience. Receive him as a father would receive an adopted son; guard him with the strong arm of your protection during the time of his stay with you; and I beg you also to find friends among the masters and scholars of the University whom you are able to recommend, and especially among the members of your household.

On his nephew's tutor, the Bishop writes as follows:

> We ask you also to show the same fatherly kindness to his tutor (*curator*), Master Richard FitzRalph, the bearer of these letters. He is a man of distinguished scholarship and honest conversation; and we commend him all the more willingly since he is a master of arts and bachelor of divinity, and is recognised among all the scholars and lecturers of the University of Oxford as exceptionally able and sharp of intellect. Experience will no doubt teach you and your students the truth of my words.

We have no means of knowing how long FitzRalph and Northwode spent at Paris, nor what lectures they heard there. Many years later, when he was preaching to his people as Archbishop of Armagh (April 10th, 1356), FitzRalph was able to recall an episode which is most probably to be connected with this first visit to Paris. While expounding the law of charity to the people of his Episcopal residence at Termonfechin near Dundalk, he insists (following the Catholic doctrine) that in moments of extreme necessity where there is a question of life or death, that private property loses its claim as against the common good of humanity: *in tali tempore sunt cuncta communia*. And the Archbishop then goes on to tell his hearers what he had himself been told in Paris: that a beggar if caught in the act of stealing, had his pockets searched. If he was

found with money sufficient to buy the bread he had stolen, he was promptly hanged; but if he was found to be penniless, he was allowed to go free. The text is to be found in Bod. MS 144, f. 76v in Sermon 55 as listed by Gwynn, "The Sermon Diary ...", p. 53 and described as '*Sermo eiusdem in vulgari in ecclesia de Tarmfechym dominica in passione*.

[25] *Reg.*, I, p. 240.

[26] It seems that this practice of taking a theme and developing it began in Northern Europe in the twelfth century. See L.-J. Bataillon, "Approaches to the Study of Medieval Sermons …," pp. 28-29.

[27] Though not exclusively so, the style was not restricted to scripture but was also used in philosophy, law, graduation ceremonies, etc.

[28] S. Wenzel, *Preachers, Poets and the Early English Lyric*, (Princeton University Press, 1986), p.62. For a description of the scholastic sermon, see J.J. Murphy, *Rhetoric in the Middle Ages* (L.A. and London 1974), pp. 269-355; J. Longère, *La prédication médiévale* (Paris, 1983); S. Wenzel, *Macaronic Sermons: Bilingualism and Preaching in Late Medieval England* (Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1994), pp. 74-75, and B. Mayne Kienzle et al., *The Sermon*, Typologie des sources du moyen âge occidental (Turnhout, 1988).

[29] It should be noted that the sermons which survive are mainly *reportationes*, only the essential has been retained by the reporter – and sometimes not even that! What we have is certainly not the text of the sermon as given. For example, the *commendatio* would have usually been said at the end of the protheme, where a prayer was recommended or required to be said in order for the audience to settle down but this has not been preserved in our case.

[30] S. Wenzel, *Preachers, Poets and the Early English Lyric*, (Princeton University Press, 1986), p.62.

[31] As Wenzel points out, pp. 73-74, English preachers quite charmingly called this the 'knot' of the sermon.

[32] E. H. Cousins, "Peter of Candia's Sermons in Praise of Peter Lombard", in *Studies Honoring Ignatius Charles Brady, Friar Minor*, (Franciscan Institute Publications, Theology Series No. 6), edited by R..S. Almagno and C.L. Harkins, The Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure, N.Y., pp. 141-197; pp. 142-145.

[33] Petri Aureoli, *Scriptum super Primum Sententiarum* (Franciscan Institute Publications, Text Series, 5: St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1953, pp. 127-131.

[34] K. H. Tachau, "Looking Gravely at Dominican Puns: the 'sermons' of Robert Holcot and Ralph Friseby", *Traditio* 46 (1991), pp. 337-345; p. 339: … there can be no philological objection to reading the fourteenth century Latin term *sermo* as 'speech' rather than sermon.

[35] See S. Wenzel, "A Sermon in Praise of Philosophy", *Traditio* 50 (1995), pp. 249-259; p. 254: … by the fourteenth century the scholastic sermon form had acquired the status of a rhetorical genre that could be used for occasions beyond the normal environment for preaching.

[36] The concluding speech of Robert Holcot's lectures on the *Sentences* has been edited by J. Wey, "The *Sermo Finalis* of Robert Holcot", *Medieval Studies* 11 (1949), pp. 219-223.

[37] On Wenzel, see note above and see also "Academic Sermons at Oxford in the early Fifteenth Century", *Speculum* 70 (1985), pp. 303-329. N. K. Spatz is editing a inaugural speech in law contained in Naples MS VII B 31. See also, C.C. Schlam, "Graduation Speeches of Gentile da Foligno", *Medieval Studies* 40 (1978), pp. 96-119; P. Osmund Lewry, "Four Graduation Speeches from Oxford Manuscripts (c. 1270-1310)", *Medieval Studies* 44 (1982), pp. 138-80; B. Mayne Kienzel, et al., *The Sermon*, Typologie des sources du moyen âge occidental (Turnhout, 1998).

[38] The statutes of the University of Oxford at this time required a *bachalarius* to begin his course by lecturing for a year on the *Sentences*. See, *Statuta Antiqua Universitatis Oxoniensis*, ed. Strickland Gibson (Oxford, 1931), p. cx; and pp. 48-50. See also, A.G. Little and F. Pelster, *Oxford Theology and Theologians* (Oxford Hist. Soc., 1934), pp. 25-29.

[39] The contemporary use of the term *introitus* is attested in a number of manuscripts. It is the term favored by S. Wenzel in "A Sermon in Praise of Philosophy", p. 249 and in "Academic Sermons at Oxford in the Early Fifteenth Century", p. 307.

Such inaugural speeches could also be given on each book as was the custom elsewhere, although given the brief treatment of FitzRalph to the books of the *Sentences* other than the first, it is unlikely that he gave further inaugural speeches. Final speeches were also given, the *sermo finalis* of Holcot edited by Wey is evidence of the fact. These may, however, have been restricted to the religious orders – if FitzRalph ever gave one it has not, it seems, survived.

By the middle of the fourteenth century the statutes at the University of Paris required every graduate student in the faculty of theology to give a solemn introduction to their commentaries on each book of the *Sentences* (see, *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, nos 1188-1189, pp. 691-704).

Requirements seemed to be less stringent at Oxford – perhaps only on the first book. At Bologna the statutes held that the introductory speech to each book of the *Sentences* should be in praise of theology or of Peter Lombard's *Sentences*. See F. Ehrle, *I più antichi statuti della facoltà teologica di Bologna* (Bologna 1932) and also S.F Brown, "Peter of Candia's Sermons in Praise of Peter Lombard", in *Studies Honoring Ignatius Charles Brady Friar Minor* (St. Bonaventure, N.Y. 1976), pp. 142-197; p. 141. The stylistic device of rhyming various phrases in the text as given, for example, on p. 169, is also to be found in FitzRalph's speech.

On the requirement to give a speech in praise of Peter Lombard, see G. Leff, *Paris and Oxford. Universities in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries: An Institutional and Intelectual History* (N.Y. 1968), pp. 160-177. See also, P. Glorieux, "L'Enseignement au Moyen-Âge. Techniques et méthodes en usage à la faculté de théologie de Paris au XIIIe siècle", *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, 35 (1968), pp. 65-186.

[40] See, S. Wenzel, "Academic Sermons at Oxford in the early Fifteenth Century", pp. 308-309. It is interesting to note that a century after FitzRalph gave his inaugural lecture similar stylistic conventions were being observed in those speeches edited by Wenzel.

[41] See K. H. Tachau, Introduction to *Seeing the Future Clearly. Questions on Future Contingents by Robert Holcot*. Edited by Paul E. Streveler and Katherine H. Tachau, p. 3. Some texts have survived from FitzRalph's time as regent master. The first of these, a *questio biblica* has been edited by Jean François Genest, "Contingence et révélation des futurs: La *questio biblica* de Richard FitzRalph" in *Lectionum Varietates: Hommage à Paul Vignaux (1904-1987)*, ed. J. Jolivet, Z. Kałuza, A. de Libera, pp. 199-246. Paris: J. Vrin, 1991. A number of *determinationes* are contained in a manuscript in Florence. There are seven *determinationes* which follow FitzRalph's *lectura* in Firenze, Conv. soppr. A.III.508.
At the bottom of f.109vb: *Hic incipiunt determinationes ybernici*. They followed by a table of contents of the lectura on f. 138vb which finish: *Expliciunt tituli questionum ybernici siue phyraph*. They are:
1. f. 109vb *Utrum cuiuscumque actionis meritorie sit caritas principium effectivum*.
2. f. 113va *Utrum per omnem actum meritorium augmentatae caritatae minuatur caritas*.
3 f. 120ra *Utrum ammitata caritate necessario minuatur cupiditas*.
4. f. 120vb *Utrum cupiditas possit augeri*.
5. f. 121ra *Utrum per omnem actum augmentandem caritatem minuatur cupiditas*.
6. f. 121vb *Utrum caritas et cupiditas in eadem anima possint simul augeri*.
7. f. 129ra *Utrum sit possibile antichristum fore bonum pro omni tempore quo conversabitur in terra.*
Much of the content would seem to be a reply to the Ockhamist theory regarding the intensification and remission of forms. See, M. McCord Adams, *William Ockham*, Vol. II, (Notre Dame, Indiana, 1987), ch. 17 "Intensification and Reduction of Forms", pp. 697-740.

[42] The first *Sentences* commentary at Oxford which we have is that of Fishacre (d. 1248) from the 1240s. See, R. James Long, "The Science of Theology According to Richard Fishacre: Edition of the Prologue to the *Commentary on the Sentences*", *Medieval Studies* 34 (1972), pp. 71-98; pp. 72-73: In 1246 the Bishop of Lincoln had written to the regent masters at Oxford that the Old and New Testaments should be their only textbooks in theology and that courses on the latter be held in the morning hours, the time appointed for the 'ordinary' lectures. However, between the years 1245 and 1247 an "*epistola secreta*" was issued from the court of Innocent IV, addressed to the Bishop of Lincoln in which the Pope commands that "Frater R. de ordine Praedicatorum" presently teaching in the theology faculty at Oxford, be not prevented from lecturing *ordinarie* on the *Sentences* but rather that he be encouraged in every way.

[43] On the right hand margin is the heading in the copyist's hand: Sermo in opus armachani.

[44] The introitus sententiarum and the two introductory *questiones* are only given in O they end on f. 4c and are then immediately followed by the third questio, which is I, q. 1 in the Paris MS.

[45] This is the article treated in the text although in the *divisio textus* it is given as: Utrum gaudium vel delectatio sit ipsa voluntas (f. 12vb).

[46] This article is not given in the text.

[47] Note, however, that O treats qq. 7-9 as articles of Q. 6 which, perhaps, is more correct.

[48] *recte* sint?

[49] This question: was omitted as spurious by Leff but has been recently been established as authentic and edited by J.-F. Genest as FitzRalph's *Quaestio biblica*, given in 1329 before he left for Paris. In style, it is different from the rest of the text, adopting the more 'modern' method of *conclusiones*. The full text is

only found in W and part of it in P. It is uncertain as to whether it was included by FitzRalph in his *opus correctum* or by the anonymous compilators of W and P.
[50] Not treated in P, V, F^1, F^2.
[51] Only in O.
[52] Not treated in any manuscript.
[53] Qq. 2-6 seem as if they could have been arranged into articles of a single *quaestio* on angels but that they remained unedited by the author.
[54] This includes the dubitatio, 'quomodo originalis iniustitia sive peccatum originale dicatur pcccatum', trcatcd in MS. 0 as a separate article (No.2).
[55] Not treated as distinct from Art 1.
[56] Not reached in text, which breaks off at reply ad 8m argumentum of Art. 1.
[57] An asterisk indicates the material normally found together in a single *quaestio* is to be found divided up in one or more parts in this codex.
[58] But this codex also contains two further *quaestiones* which may or may not be authentic: *Utrum Deus possit facere infinitum in actum; Utrum voluntas creata teneatur se conforme ultimo fine*.

Anselm's Cosmological Argument for God's Existence: An interpretation of *Monologion* Chapter Three

Thomas A. F. Kelly

Introduction

The reader might be forgiven for thinking that the title of our paper is a typographical error, for the words 'Anselm' and 'cosmological' tend not to be used together; it is more normal to credit Anselm with the invention of the so called 'ontological'[1] argument for God's existence. Let us define our terms then. Anselm's so-called ontological argument, or perhaps better, arguments, to be found in *Proslogion* Chapters Two and Three, seek to establish the existence of God on logical grounds alone. This means that what Anselm is there trying to establish is that the proposition 'God exists' is necessarily true, or that 'God does not exist' is inconsistent—he has distinct versions of the argument to support each of these positions, even though to prove the one would be to prove the other. Anselm's *insipiens*, who says in his heart that there is no God, is a fool, therefore, precisely because he believes an inconsistency to be true, and because he (equivalently) takes a necessarily true proposition to be false.

Be that as it may, that is not the argument, or the kind of argument, which I want to examine here. I want to look at the earlier work of Anselm, the *Monologion*, in particular its third chapter. This earlier work was, even in Anselm's own time, somewhat eclipsed by the very daring later work, and even up to our own time has received nothing like the attention which has been lavished, at least on the second and third chapters, of the later work. It is to this rather neglected earlier work that I wish to draw attention, and at the outset, I want to make two points about its composition and relation to the later work, the *Proslogion*.

First, Anselm himself was not entirely satisfied with the earlier work. Why was this the case? The answer is important not only because it reveals an important aspect of his own attitude to his earlier work, but also because it indicates something about how Anselm understood the task of thinking. In the Preface to the *Proslogion* he writes:

> After I had published… a certain short tract… reflecting that this work was made up of a connected chain of many arguments, I began to wonder if perhaps it might be possible to find one single argument that for its proof required no other save itself, and that by itself would suffice to prove that God really exists, that he is the supreme good needing no other and is He whom all things have need of for their being and well-being, and also to prove whatever we believe about the Divine Being.[2]

It would seem that for Anselm, the earlier work was just not simple enough: in it was a plurality of arguments doing their various jobs, rather than one argument doing them all. It is no wonder that Anselm's work is so attractive to mathematicians, for his work

 Maynooth Philosophical Papers 3 (2006), pp. 21-34.

resembles theirs not least because of his love for simplicity and parsimony. Anselm felt compelled to rework the, to him, inelegant argumental patchwork of the *Monologion*, and to replace it with a single principle which would suffice to generate all we need to know, compelled, that is, to produce a deductive structure not only characterised by consistency and completeness, but one which could define the contour of logical space and possible meaning: the case of the *insipiens*, after all, is the paradigm of what it is to fall outside the limits of meaningfulness, to *be* inconsistent. Consistency, the very lifeblood of reason, is at the same time for Anselm the ground of our knowledge of God, and his *Proslogion* argument, by means of the principle *id quo maius cogitari nequit*, is meant to be a device for extracting from consistency its own true significance. Having one, and only one, simple principle which accomplishes this, and thereby contains implicitly all we need to know, can be seen to be desirable for that very reason: this then, is his conception of his task, and his dislike of patchiness is far from being a minor aesthetic consideration.

But note what Anselm does *not* say. His concerns are structural and formal, not material: he retracts nothing of his previous conclusions, nor does he express any loss of confidence in the probative value of the earlier arguments, despite their collective inelegance. He thinks he has done the job; he just needs to find a way to do it better.

The second point is this. Anselm, as he tells us in the prologue to the *Monologion*[3], wrote the earlier work, at the behest of his students, and with 'nothing whatever to be argued on the basis of the authority of Scripture, but by the constraints of reason …to prove…the conclusions', as his students had asked. In other words, the conclusions are to be arrived at by philosophical reason alone, and without appeal to faith. This is a very important point, and neglect of it can mar an attempted interpretation of Anselm. Neglect of it leads to such profoundly mistaken ideas as that Anselm was some kind of fideist, that he was not really arguing, that faith for him is meant to do all the work, to supply what reason cannot, or the like. Such beliefs as these infect, to a greater or lesser extent, the work of such exegetes as Karl Barth and Jean-Luc Marion, for example, and to that extent their works' value is diminished.

Anselm was arguing philosophically, and expected his arguments to be taken in that way. Anselm is neither a fool nor a knave: he did not dishonestly disguise faith as philosophy, and he believed that reason was capable of proving God's existence and of vindicating what we already believe about God. Reason for Anselm is guided by faith; it is not usurped by faith. Admittedly, he begins the *Proslogion*, a word which means 'allocution', with a prayer, and, in the manner of Augustine in the *Confessions*, continually addresses his reflection to God. By contrast, the earlier work, the 'soliloquy', is a straight, third-personal investigation. But this allocutory character must be understood in the context of the earlier *Monologion*, where, as we have seen, he thinks he has already succeeded in proving God's existence, and has already vindicated our understanding of what God is. He is not using the second-personal style to undermine the function of reason. As we have seen, the move from the earlier to the later work is occasioned by a need for doing more efficiently and with greater clarity and elegance what had already been done, and so he feels himself entitled to assume the conclusion as already proved, though not in as clear or as elegant a fashion as the later work is meant to allow. But the allocutory style

nonetheless brings something to the work which perishes when the work gets translated into the third-personal. This has to do with the nature of God, not merely as supreme good, but as personal, as *Thou*, and with the human relation to this Thou, and with the nature of human existence as dialogue with this, the world's Thou, my Thou.

The point about the celebrated phrase *fides quaerens intellectum*, which was the title originally intended by Anselm for the *Proslogion*[4], is that faith could not seek reason unless reason had something uniquely its own, and uniquely good, to contribute to faith, namely anchorage in human understanding, without which faith becomes, precisely, unintelligible. Understanding is the product of reason. Faith seeks, because it needs, understanding. Were it to invade the realm of reason, faith would be depriving itself of any possibility of being understood, thereby cutting its own throat. This means, in sum, that faith must allow reason to be itself, must allow it the space it needs to work, and must not interfere, by invasion or usurpation, in reason's workings.

Reason's being guided by faith, on the other hand, does not necessarily involve reason's overthrow. Faith is meant to suggest direction to reason, and more profoundly, to posit a truth for reason which, though ostensibly beyond what reason alone can discover, is in reason's own language, and reveals to reason a new and otherwise unsuspected depth in itself and in its proper world, a widening and deepening of its goals and of its essence. This acceptance by reason of what at first appears to be reason's very opposite coheres with the scriptural warning that life can be saved only if lost, and with Anselm's own discovery that the principle for which he seeks as source of understanding is at the same time a delineation of the contours of sense, outside of which is desert where sense is lost, and where the *insipiens* is condemned, or perhaps has condemned himself, to live.

This, I take it, is Anselm's own view of the matter. Anselm was not a Lutheran, still less a Kierkegaardian, for whom, there is and can be, no intellectual justification for faith—to seek one would be impious; for Anselm by contrast, we need, in every sense, reason in faith and faith in reason: this is what I take the phrase *fides quaerens intellectum* to mean.

So much by way of preamble. Now, while the argument in the *Proslogion* is purely analytic, namely one which attempts to discover the significance of consistency itself using the principle[5] as instrument, what we have in the *Monologion* is, by contrast, a cosmological argument. The question therefore becomes, how does a cosmological argument differ from what we may call such an Anselmian argument? A cosmological argument takes some feature of the world and tries to show that this feature cannot but have a Divine origin, and that therefore God, as origin of this feature, is proven to exist. For example, arguments from design, which qualify as cosmological arguments, try to infer the existence of a designer of some sort from the apparent teleological structure of the universe, or at least that of living beings; they try to show that such design is unintelligible unless there exists a designer; put another way, that the universe, or at least living beings, can only be a product of intelligent contrivance.

But, to my mind, a far more interesting kind of cosmological argument takes as its starting-point the sheer existence of the universe. What such an argument purports to

prove is the following proposition: if God does not exist, the world does not exist. Put another way, the proposition that the world should exist while God does not exist, is inconsistent.

Certain points are to be noted, regarding what such an argument claims and what it does not claim. It does not claim that God's existence is *per se notum*, that is, logically necessary, or vindicated on logical grounds alone. This is the kind of argument which the Anselmian argument is, and this is why Aquinas objected to it. Rather, the kind of cosmological argument I have in mind here claims that we know that God is, and thereby to an extent what God is, only because something other than God exists. The logical structures occurring in the argument, such as the *modus tollendo* for example, are to be sure tautologous, and the argument does rely on the analysis of certain concepts, such as causality and temporality. But, the argument does not consist entirely of tautologies; it makes use of one contingent premise, namely that something exists. Since, as Kant points out, the denial of something's existence is never a contradiction, the assertion of anything's existence is never necessary: thus all assertions of existence are contingent. That something (i.e., non-divine) exists is a proposition asserted in the argument, but not deduced from anything else: this makes it the *datum* of the proof. The analysis of this existential given by means of the tautological and analytic structures used in the argument justifies, if the argument works, another existential assertion, namely to the effect that God exists, where the word 'God' turns out to mean something like 'factor which explains how the original existential assertion can be true' or 'factor which alone can rescue the original existential assertion from counting as a breach of the principle of causality, or equivalently, as an inconsistent proposition'.

This means that the assertion that God exists, from the perspective of the cosmological argument, remains contingent: for all we know, there might have been no God and no world, but, since there happens to be a world, we know, given the argument works, that God exists.

We also know that God cannot but exist, for only something which cannot but exist could be the kind of explanatory factor whose existence the argument vindicates, as we shall see. That is, we know that, because the world *happens* to exist, a factor which cannot but exist also *happens* to exist, (and, since it exists, would have, even if the world did not). Thus, it is still possible to suppose God's non-existence without falling into contradiction: there might have been no God, though in that case there would be no world. *That* is what the cosmological argument, if successful, vindicates. In sum, God's having to exist is in itself no evidence that God *does* exist: the direction of inference is, 'if God exists, God cannot but exist' (where 'God' means 'explanatory factor…' as above), and *not* 'since "God" means "something that cannot but exist", it follows that God does exist'.

If the Anselmian argument amounts to the excluded limb of the last sentence, then it is a fallacy, but it is not up to us to decide here what status it enjoys. At least its divergence from the cosmological argument is, I hope, tolerably clear. The Anselmian argument invokes no existential statement, although it culminates in one. It bases its inference on

the meaning of the word 'God', and not on the existence of the world. It consists, or is supposed to, in tautologous structures alone. Moreover it tries to vindicate that the proposition 'God does not exist' is a contradiction, and equivalently, that 'God exists' is self-assertive.

From the cosmological perspective we never discover why God exists, so that the question 'why is there something rather than nothing at all?' proves unanswerable. The Anselmian argument gives the impression at least of being nearer to an answer, but either this impression is spurious or the insight which that impression points at can be integrated into the perspective of the cosmological argument. But what the cosmological argument does claim to be able to do is to provide an analysis of the nature of the entities which constitute the world such that it is proven that they cannot be at all unless a cause of their existence, a cause we call God, makes them be. The argument is as much about the nature of the world as it is about the existence and nature of God, and what is known of God is inferred from what, and that, the world is.

Moreover, either argument permits us to give some meaning to the word 'God' which is not a purely theological one, although any such theological usage must, I would suggest, include it. Each argument claims, this is what the word 'God' means, either as premise or as conclusion, a meaning which is presupposed and developed in revelation. Although the Hebrew *ayah asher ayah* may not appear to be a claim to necessary existence on the part of the Deity; and although the Hebrew phrase may seem *prima facie* to have meanings incompatible with such a claim, such as 'I will be what I will be' (so don't ask) or 'I will be there for you', and although it may be argued that God did not intend to give the chosen people a metaphysics lesson but to rescue them from the house of slavery, nevertheless, the only way that God can be sovereignly and supremely present to and for his people, to set them free and do judgement upon the gods of Egypt, and be truly understood (at least by us) to be so present, is *this* way, the way indicated by these arguments. Certainly even if the Anselmian argument fails, and no existential conclusion is warranted by its principle, *id quo maius cogitari nequit*, remains a high-water-mark in the long history of our thinking about God, and in this way at least, is not incompatible with the perspective of the cosmological argument.

What is Essential to the Cosmological Argument

Before going on to discuss *Monologion* 3, I must provide an interpretive background against which its meaning can be construed. My task in this part of my paper is not, strictly speaking, exegetical. There are two elements to it, a consideration of causality and a consideration of temporality. Let's look at causality first.

One approach to the nature of causality which has become representative of a whole historical attitude to it is that of David Hume.[6] For Hume, the soul of causality is to be found in the necessary connection between cause and effect, such that if event A happens, another event, B, must happen. What Hume effects in his analysis is nothing less than a deconstruction of the notion of cause. For him, we cannot see the cause over and above the movement of the interacting objects, and he denies that we have any insight into what

Locke called ‘the internal, real, constitution of things’ when it comes to causality, and concluded that the necessary connection is nothing more than an expectation on our part, generated in us by a large number of previous experiences, and so is a mere psychological habit, and not an ontological principle.

Clearly, this account of causality is both useless in itself and for the purposes of the cosmological argument. The question therefore becomes, can we replace it with anything better? Fortunately, the answer is ‘yes’. Consider for a moment the notion of possibility. To say that something is possible is clearly insufficient for us to conclude that it is actual. That’s common sense. But, we can also offer a demonstration that this is the case. Assume the opposite, namely that possibility is indeed sufficient for actuality. This means that if some situation x is possible, then x is actual. But if x is contingent, that is, not necessarily the case, it then follows that not-x is possible. But if not-x is possible, then, since possibility is sufficient for actuality, not-x is also actual. Thus, on the assumption that possibility is sufficient for actuality, both x and not-x, where x is any given situation, are both actually the case.

This means that the original proposition, namely that possibility is insufficient for actuality is not only commonsensical, but actually necessarily true, for, as we have just shown, its denial is inconsistent. Now, if it is true that that possibility is insufficient for actuality, it follows that there must be an item, itself actual, which is sufficient to account for the actualisation of any possibility, if that possibility is to be realised at all. But, an item, itself actual, which is sufficient to account for the actualisation of any possibility, is what the word cause means.

What is the significance of this argument? If my analysis is correct, the notion of a causeless event amounts to a self-actualising possibility, and that, as I have shown, is an incoherent notion. Put it this way: no possible world can contain a self-actualising possibility, just as no possible world can contain a square circle, and for the same reason. Thus, the necessity of causality is a logical necessity. We can build no coherent picture of the world which incorporates a denial or neglect of it.

The significance of this result for the cosmological argument is brought out when we consider the nature of time, or rather, time in relation to existence. The famous Aristotelian definition of time as the measure of motion according to before and after from the *Physics* is of no use to us here. I would suggest rather that temporality is not a measure, but a way of being. The way I would put it, in sum—and I shall have to unpack this—is that existence supervenes temporally. I should add here that time is impossible without change, and that the measurement of time consists in the co-ordination of changes with one another.

Consider the following. To say of something that it exists is to say that it exists for a duration. Or, to say of something that it exists for no time at all is to say that it does not exist. This means that existence is durational. Let us consider the nature of this duration. Take any situation, and you will see that that situation can be resolved in any number of ways. Take the example of my sitting here. I could either stay here or cross the room.

Moreover I could, within certain limits, set off in any direction. To complicate matters, I could stop anywhere on the way. Thus even so uncomplicated a situation as my sitting here could be resolved in a vast number of ways, and the same goes for any situation. 'Could be resolved', I said. 'Could be' is the operative phrase. All of these resolutions of the situation are not yet realised, are thus in the future, indeed, all these possibilities face the situation as its future. In sum, the future is possibility, the present actuality.

But what of the past? The past, I suggest, is past, is perished. The flow of time consists in the actualisation of possibility, the replacement of current actuality by newly realised possibility, which thereby becomes a new current actuality, to be replaced in its turn… and so on. And on. This means that the future is never present, never actual, because it is always distant as possibility. Actuality thus takes on the meaning of realised possibility. Every 'now' is a moment in which equally, a situation perishes to be replaced by a newly actualised possibility. Indeed the perishing of the one *is* the coming into being of the other. Every moment is therefore end and beginning, and stasis is but the remaining constant of something over some duration. Heraclitus of Ephesus was right after all: *panta rhei kai ouden menei*: everything flows, nothing stays. Lasting is not the absence of time, but the remaining constant of some actuality over time.

This may seem a little strange. But I can offer a metaphor which may help to take the strangeness from it. Think of a line of melody. The melody never exists as a whole—if it did you would have cacophony—its essence is to exist note by note. Each note is fulfilment of what went before, which has now perished, and promise of what is yet to come. Each note taken individually exhibits this structure, for each note is the remaining constant over some duration of conditions of pitch and timbre. No one mistakes a note for a chunk—each note is a process as the whole melody is a process, and our appreciation of musical form is dependent on our memory of what has perished and our anticipation of what is to come.

A couple of further remarks. We usually think of time as a line, or even as a geography, in which we pass events, much as the spatially bound traveller passes features of the landscape she travels through. The movement of the stationary objects is only an artefact, due to the movement of the traveller. An analogous conception of time however, is impossible. Events cannot occupy time in the way that objects occupy space, all together, simultaneously. Why not? Because the idea is inconsistent. My being seven involves my not being seventy, and vice versa. Thus these two situations cannot occur together, though they can occur at different times; that indeed is the point. There are certain analogies between time and space, but this is where a disanalogy occurs. All that ever exists is the present moment, the past is perished, the future a possibility. Of course our consciousness is able to transcend this by memory of the past and anticipation of the future, as it does in the perception of music. But even consciousness is rooted in the now, exists only in the now.

Moreover it is clear that this is a picture to which causality is indispensable. Vital to time is the realisation of possibility, this is the essence of time; this turns out, as we have seen,

to be the essence of causality also. Temporality and causality are not two distinct topics; they are the same topic, viewed from different angles.

Now, this gets interesting when we apply it to existence. I started out by saying that something which exists for zero duration does not exist, so that anything which exists exists for some duration. But this duration is the actualisation of a possibility, namely, that of the thing in question's existing. I shall exist in the future; the force of the 'shall' is that I do not exist there already, but shall continue to exist into the future. That is, the possibility of my continuing to exist shall be realised in the future, precisely, when that future becomes present. My existence too is temporal, the realisation of a possibility over a duration, that is to say, as I put it above, existence supervenes *temporally*, that is, from moment to moment.

But now we come to a central point: there is no property which any entity can have which is sufficient to realise the possibility of its existence, and therefore which is sufficient to realise that possibility for any duration. Something which realises the possibility of something's existing is, according to our showing above, the cause of that thing's existing. And nothing can be the cause of its own existence, of its own existing over any duration. This is what I meant by the word 'supervenes' when I said that existence supervenes temporally. To supervene is literally 'to be added from outside' that is, what exists enjoys its existence but not as its property, but as coming to it from beyond itself.

This turns out to be a familiar point, one usually included in the arsenal of criticism deployed against the argument in question. The point is best made by Kant, who argues that although we would involve ourselves in contradiction were we to posit a tri-angle and go on to deny that it has three sides, we would not contradict ourselves by denying the existence of the tri-angle along with its three sides *tout court*. That is, there is no property which necessitates the existence of something, or which implies the existence of something in an absolute sense. Of course, if the tri-angle exists, so must its three sides—having three sides is an essential property of the triangle; the triangle cannot exist and lack it—but having three sides does not make the positing of the triangle necessary. The triangle, along with its three sides, can exist or fail to.

What this means is that any assertion of existence is contingent, and to say a proposition is contingent is to say that its contradictory is logically possible. Of course, some *denials* of existence are logically necessary—that of a square circle, for example—but that nicely exemplifies what I am explaining, because the denial of existence to the square circle is necessary precisely because its existence is impossible, that is, the assertion of its existence is a contradiction. But as Kant points out, we never contradict ourselves when we *deny* something's existence, and so actual existence cannot be inferred unconditionally from any essential property—if x exists, it cannot but be y; certainly—but from that it doesn't follow that x exists.

Thus in sum, the existence of things is always the realisation of the possibility of their existing over a duration, and this possibility, like any possibility, is insufficient to realise itself, because no possibility is sufficient to do that: the very idea of a self-realising

possibility is a contradiction. So, to be clear: things exist over durations, and the possibility that a thing shall exist (or not exist) is what that thing's future consists in. But the thing itself is insufficient to actualise *that* possibility, namely that it shall exist. In effect, that means that a thing remains incapable of realising the possibility of its existence *for as long as it exists*, over the duration of its existence. Not only do things need to be brought into existence, they are insufficient of themselves to keep on existing. So how does a thing continue to exist throughout time, if it itself is insufficient to realise its existence from moment to moment?

Since if a possibility is to be realised there must be an item itself actual which is sufficient to realize it, and since in the case of a thing's continued existence, the thing itself is never sufficient to do so, it follows that at least one cause of the existence of that thing must itself exist, and as distinct from that thing. Now since this is true for each and every entity which exists in time, it follows that there must be a cause or, as we should say for thoroughness's sake, at least one cause of existence as such.

What must such a cause be like? We must now make explicit the implications of this discovery. To say that something is sufficient for existence is to say that it is sufficient for its own as well as that of others; that in turn is to say that its own existence is guaranteed by what it itself is. This is not to say that it is a self-actualising possibility: as we have it in the traditional formulation**,** it is identical to its own existing. This means that its existence is never mere possibility, but is always actual. It therefore cannot but exist. Another way to put this is to say that what it is, is what it is to be, in the full sense. Here we find the beginning of the Divine supremacy, for to say that God is x, whatever x may be, is never to say that God is a mere example of x but rather, is what x is, is identical to x. God is not merely good, one good thing among others. God is what goodness is. The paradigm case of this is, of course, that of being, God is what it is to be in the full sense.

In the terms of contemporary logic, we may use the *is of existence* of God, and the *is of identity*, but never the *is of predication*: an example of the *is of predication* is 'Susan is intelligent'. This could be interpreted to mean, 'Susan is an example of what an intelligent person is'; but this is not the same as saying 'Susan is what intelligence is'. God is never a mere example of anything, but, as we have just shown, is identical to the property asserted in such a way that there could be no higher instance of it. This indeed is what the famous phrase from the *Proslogion* actually means. It has nothing to do with what we may or may not happen to be able to think. It is characteristic of a creative genius like Anselm that he should lack the vocabulary to express his thoughts. The phrase 'that than which no greater can be thought' means 'that than which no greater can be' or 'that than which no greater is possible'; Thus the phrase is equivalent to not, the greatest thing you or I could think of, but rather, the greatest possible. We shall return to the sense of *greater* for Anselm at the end of this discussion.

We must be clear that, despite all this, we are not able to assert the existence of this cause of existence on logical grounds alone, but must have the evidence supplied by the insufficiency of the temporal for existence. What Aquinas's main objection to Anselm's

Proslogion argument amounts to is this: that even if we grant that God is the sort of thing that cannot but be, this only amounts to saying something like, if x is Divine, x cannot but be; but of course, we cannot *then* go on to infer that x *therefore* exists, on no other evidence. We can indeed say that since God exists, there exists something which must exist; but it is only the insufficiency of the temporal for existence which allows us to infer a cause for that existence. This is this argument's difference from the kind of argument usually associated with Anselm, and which we find in the *Proslogion*.

We must also note some further points. We have shown, in sum, that something exists which doesn't merely happen to exist, and therefore is identical with what it is to exist as it is identical with all of its other attributes. This implies uniqueness; we had above referred to the cause or causes of existence for the sake the sake of thoroughness; but we see now that our pluralism is uncalled for. Being this kind of cause entails being supreme in the manner we have suggested, as indeed is any such cause. Thus between any two putative causes of existence, no difference can obtain; but as Leibniz points out in his Principle of the Identity of Indiscenables, if there is no difference between any two things, such that what is true of one is true of the other, then there is only one thing in question, and not two. Being able to cause the existence as such of any one temporal being however, is to be *the* unique cause of existence, and the cause of the existence of *all* temporal beings.

Moreover, we should advert to the fact that anything which can actualise possible existence in this way meets the definition of being all-powerful, for this latter term simply means being able to make actual any logically possible situation. Being able to make real the actual world means being capable of making real all possible worlds.

Another point is that we have no need to have recourse to the infinite regress argument which Aquinas uses more than once in the Five Ways. For Aquinas, an infinite series of dependent entities, each of which relies upon a previous, is impossible. We, however, note that the hallmark of the cause of existence as such is to be sufficient for its own existence. Such a thing cannot therefore be dependent upon anything else for its existence. A temporal thing, which is no more in the end than a successively realised possibility, is insufficient for its own existence, and hence is insufficient for the existence of another. The notion of an intermediate giver of existence, one, that is, which receives its existence from beyond it, because it is insufficient for its own existence, but which gives existence to another, and is thus sufficient for that other's existence, and must therefore be sufficient for its own, is obviously contradictory. Thus, whatever is caused to exist is so directly by God, and not through any putative mediator, or chain of mediators.

In sum then, if this argument if successful, it demonstrates the existence of a single, unique cause of existence as such, identical to what it is to exist and to any and all properties which it may have, and is thereby supreme. It would now be appropriate to employ Aquinas's phrase and say 'and this is what the word God means'.

Anselm's Argument

What I have done so far is to make explicit, insofar as the space available allows, what a successful cosmological argument, based on the temporal nature of the world's existence, would be like. I now turn to Anselm's text to show that what I have argued for is to a great extent implicit there. To vindicate Anselm's cosmological argument, what we need to do is to map his rather terse statements onto a more explicit analysis, such as the one which I have tried to provide. Let us begin by quoting his argument in full:

> Furthermore, not only is it the case that that all good things are good, and all great things great, through one and the same thing, but also it would seem to be the case that whatever is, is thorough one thing. For everything that exists, exists either through something or through nothing. But nothing exists through nothing. For it is impossible even to conceive of something existing through nothing. Whatever exists, then, exists only through something.
>
> Now since this is the case, there is either one or more than one thing through which all existing things exist. If there are more than one, then they are either themselves reducible to some one thing through which they exist, or each of them exists individually through itself, or they all exist mutually through one another. Suppose then, first, that they exist through some one thing, then all the existing things do exist through one, and not more than one, thing—that one thing through which the more than one exist. Suppose, then, secondly, that each of them exists individually through itself. In order for each to exist through itself, there must of course be some single power-to-exist-through-oneself (or some single nature-of-existing-through-oneself) that each possesses. And then, doubtless, they would exist through one thing—that through which they possess the capacity to exist through oneself. It is therefore closer to the truth to say that all existing things exist through this one thing, than to say that they exist through things which, without it, are incapable of existing. The third possibility, that they should exist mutually through one another, defies reason. For the notion that something could exist through that to which it gives existence, is just irrational….Truth therefore rules out altogether the possibility that there is more than one thing through which everything exists. Therefore there is necessarily some one thing through which all existing things exist.
>
> Therefore, since all things exist through this one thing, beyond a shadow of a doubt this one thing exists through itself. Therefore all the other things exist through something other than themselves, while this alone exists through itself. But what exists through something other than itself, is less than that through which all other things exist, and which alone exists through itself. Therefore, that which exists through itself, exists most of all. There exists, therefore, some one thing, which alone of all things most exists and exists supremely. But that which exists most of all, that through which whatever is good is good, whatever is great is great, and indeed through ehich whatever exists exists—this is necessarily supremely good, supremely great, and is of all the things that exist, the supreme.

What he intends to prove is that 'whatever is, is through one thing'. This indeed is an elegant statement of the relation between the Divine and the temporal, and he precedes it with the idea that 'all good things are good, all great things are great through one and the same thing'. To my mind he recognises that for things to be great or good, they must exist, and that which makes them be**,** at the same time awards them all the goodness which is proper to their natures. So this then, is what he has to try to establish.

His next move is the following: 'whatever exists exists either through something or through nothing. But nothing exists through nothing. For it is impossible to conceive of something existing through nothing. Whatever exists, then, exists only through something.' This, in effect, is a statement of the principle of causality, for we are talking here of something existing 'through' something, that is, by that thing's agency. We have stated this principle in terms of the necessity of a cause for actuality, and this has allowed us to perceive that it is indeed impossible to conceive of something existing through nothing, through the agency of nothing, or better through the agency of its own being possible, for a self actualising possibility is an inconsistent notion.

Thus, Anselm is able to conclude that whatever exists exists only through something. Above, we referred to the cause or causes of being, for the sake of thoroughness, and we find Anselm doing the same. He writes, 'there is either one or more than one thing through which all existing things exist'. His attempt will be to show that the latter alternative is untenable. He goes about it in an interesting way. He places before us a trichotomy: 'if there is more than one thing through which all things that exist exist, then either 1) they themselves are reducible to some one thing through which they all exist, or 2) each of them exists individually through itself, or 3) they all exist mutually through one another.'

Let's look at each of these in turn. Number one says they themselves are reducible to some one thing through which they all exist. We can take this to mean the following: if there is more than one thing through which all things that exist exist, then those existing things themselves are reducible, or equivalently, can be led back to, that is, can be shown to be dependent on, can be shown to be the effects of, some one thing through which they all exist. This means that the first alternative collapses as an independent alternative, and is equivalent to saying that there is only one thing through which all existing things exist, and this is equivalent to the thesis which he wishes to establish.

Now let's look at the second element of the trichotomy, namely that, if there is more than one thing through which all things that exist exist, then each of them exists individually through itself. At first sight Anselm seems to give this alternative short shrift, for he asserts, 'In order for each to exist through itself, there must be some single power-to-exist-through-oneself that each possesses. …but then they would all exist through this one thing', and we are back to the thesis which he wants to prove, namely that there is one such something. Now, this looks like cheating. But let's look a little closer.

What Anselm seems to be suggesting is that maybe each thing that exists has a power of self-existence, that is that each existing thing has as part of its nature and belonging to it,

such a power. We find ourselves asking, why can't they? After all each person thinks with her or his own intellect, so that, intellect is indeed one in the sense that the same description of it covers all possible cases, but there are nevertheless an indefinitely large number of such cases. Why can there not likewise be an indefinitely large number of cases of the power to exist through oneself. Anselm seems just to reject this possibility without adequate argument.

Anselm's text remains unclear, or perhaps too sparse, I'm afraid at this point, but, in terms of what we have said above, his claim seems eminently reasonable. What Anselm appears to be missing here is just the sort of argument we have supplied above. We have tried to show that being sufficient for one's own existence implies supremacy, and hence uniqueness. In effect, the assumption that there are many ontologically self-sufficient entities, if our analysis is correct, turns out to be equivalent to the assumption that there are as many divinities as there are existent beings. But this is nonsense, since it is logically impossible to have more than one divinity: there can be no difference between two putative divinities, that is, causes of existence, and thus there cannot be more than one.

So let's look at the third alternative. It goes like this: all things that exist exist mutually through one another. Anselm condemns this possibility as contrary to reason, that is, as inconsistent, and it is easy to see why. Possibility as such can't cause anything: possibility is not an odd kind of something, it is nothing at all. Thus, if one possibility must wait on another mere possibility to obtain actuality, they must both wait for ever, for there is no source within either for actuality to intrude.

The same is true even of those possibilities which achieve actuality as the temporal entities we know and are. Each of these is incapable of actualising its own (future) existence, as we saw, and so is incapable of actualising the existence of any other temporal entity.

In this way, only one of the alternatives survives, namely that there is one and only one thing through which all things that exist exist, and through which all the greatness and the goodness which belong to their existence accrue to them. And this is what the word 'God' means. Thus we can conclude that if Anselm's at times too terse text is sufficiently glossed, he can claim to have originated what would appear to be a successful cosmological argument for the existence of God.

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[1] The word 'ontological' used to describe this style of argument so closely associated with Anselm, in which the conclusion 'God exists' is inferred from some notion of God, dates back only to Kant. Some would hold that to use the word 'ontological' to qualify Anselm's argument is misleading. At any rate, the kind of argument that Kant criticised so devastatingly under this title is ultimately not, or not directly, of Anselmian provenance, and moreover, of a vastly inferior type compared to that actually put forward by Anselm.

[2] *Anselm of Canterbury: The Major Works*, Edited and with an Introduction by Brian Davies and G. R. Evans. Oxford: OUP, 1998, p. 82. This is the version I shall refer to throughout.

[3] Davies and Evans, p. 5

[4] Davies and Evans, p. 83. The original title of the *Monologion* runs *An Example of Meditation on the Meaning of Faith.*

[5] That is, the principle *id quo maius cogitari nequit.*

[6] See *Treatise,* I, II, XV: where Hume gives 'rules by which to judge of causes and effects'; the most important of these are: '(1) The cause and effect must be contiguous in space and time. (2) the cause must be [temporally] prior to the effect. (3) There must be a constant union betwixt the cause and effect. 'Tis chiefly this quality that constitutes the relation.' See also *Treatise,* I, III, XIV. All references are to the Selby-Bigge edition, Oxford, 1967.

KNOWLEDGE AS PARTICIPATION IN SCHELER AND AQUINAS

Patrick Gorevan

Cornelio Fabro, the Thomist scholar, spoke in his famous work on participation of Max Scheler's theory of 'immediate knowledge'[1] and saw it as part of his inheritance from St. Augustine, and remarks that while St. Thomas and Scheler owed much of their notion of participation in knowledge to St. Augustine, both had extended the idea, and in differing directions: St. Thomas towards an *intentional* presence of the object through the species, and Scheler towards a *real* presence.[2]

This essay compares these two approaches to knowledge of essence. In the first section Scheler's phenomenological theory of essential knowledge as complete self-evidence is dealt with, his exclusion of sense knowledge from essential knowledge and his view that personal factors such as a 'moral upsurge' of the person permit a level of participation in knowledge which leads to a *real* identity between knower and known. It then turns to Aquinas' version of essential knowledge, his more positive view of the senses' role in achieving it and the fact that Aquinas too believes in an identity between knower and known, influenced by Aristotle's principle that the knower in act *is* the known in act due to a *formal* identity between what is conceived in the mind and the reality which is thus known.

Phenomenology and Self-Evidence in Scheler.

In Scheler's view, Phenomenology is an 'attitude of spiritual seeing' in which one can see or experience something which otherwise remains hidden, namely a realm of facts of a particular kind.[3] This notion of a realm of facts, somehow awaiting discovery by the phenomenologist, is also developed in his essay 'Lehre von den drei Tatsachen.'.[4] Scheler called on phenomenological experience to furnish phenomenological or 'pure' facts which come to givenness through an immediate intuition (the other two kinds of facts are the natural and the scientific ones). The contents of this phenomenological experience are essences and essential connections.[5]

Scheler does not allow for a medium between the knower and the known, since knowledge is a complete, immediate and evident state of participation of knower in known. Scheler was to rely on this test or mark of self-givenness and of evidence as the touchstone of the validity of his phenomenological enquiries. In the following text he defends his position and also links the various moments in the process of phenomenological awareness:

> For me the principle of self-evidence, rightly understood, is constituted by the fact that an intentional object, whether entity or value, is clear to the mind in its essential *thus*ness ... when there is an utter *congruence* among the contents of all noetic acts which are possible with reference to *that* object.[6]

Scheler's aim is to bring the basic essence (*Das pure Wesen*) of things to light. This essence or 'whatness' is an ideal unity of meaning which is given in itself, as the content of an immediate intuition.

 Maynooth Philosophical Papers 3 (2006), pp. 35-42.

> 'What' this intuition gives cannot be given to a greater or lesser degree, comparable to a more or less exact 'observation' of an object and its traits. Either this 'what' is intuited and, hence, self-given, (totally and without subtraction, neither by way of a picture nor by way of a symbol), or this 'what' is not intuited, and hence, not given.[7]

This is related to his concern with the *immanence* of phenomenological experience and knowledge of essences (*Wesen*): 'One of my principal theses is that in every case the nature of a being ... can in principle be immanent to and truly inherent in knowledge and reflexive consciousness.'[8] While Scheler believes that the *existence* of an object always transcends the mind, *essences* of really existing things do not: it is untrue to say (as Critical Realists do) that knowledge merely possesses a copy of the essence.[9]

Scheler always distances himself from what he calls the 'criteria question,' wherever it may originate.[10] The critical philosopher, who always wants to place some yardstick or criterion of judgement between himself and what he knows has forgotten that the yardstick can only emerge from direct contact with living reality and truth. In fact 'the meaning of the antithes[is] "true-false" ... must be phenomenologically clarified.'[11] He warns us against looking for a criterion for this evidence, from psychology for example. There is just no feeling or experience which will recur when truth is present. How could one ask for a criterion or symbol of self-givenness? The idea is absurd. How can one mediate immediacy? Scheler does not permit a medium between the knower and the known, since knowledge is a rather complete, immediate and evident state of participation of knower in known.

The role of sense-data in Scheler's theory

The result of the phenomenological intuition is a series of 'pure facts'. Each of them, Scheler claims, is an *Etwas*, an identity which does not change, in spite of all the variation that goes on in our sense-knowledge. Phenomenology is an *a priori* doctrine, as much as those of Kant or Plato, not a psychological one, based on sensations or on sense data.[12] Sense-data and sensations cannot be of interest to the phenomenologist because they are not, strictly speaking, 'given.' In an important section of *Formalism* he claims that sensation is not capable of furnishing contents to intuition. Both Hume and Hobbes were wrong, he claims, when they started off with sensation and selfish drives as though they were the primary given.[13]

The operation of setting aside the bearer of qualities and the subject of the act of knowledge must be performed if we are to reach the place where the given is revealed in intentionality. 'If I see a cube, I might ask what is given. It would be incorrect to reply that a perspectival side of the cube is given, or that sensations of it are given. The given is the cube as a whole.'[14] Sensation, on the other hand, is not a datum: 'there is nothing we have more difficulty in bringing to self-givenness, even indirectly, than just that "sensation" with which this pseudo-empiricism (*Scheinempirismus*) so blithely starts off, as if it were the primary given.'[15] *It*, the cube, is not split up into sides, or perspectives. *It* is not made up of atomic sense impressions. What, then, is given in sensation? Not colour or sound, or equivalent 'sensibles.'[16] When we talk of sensation, according to Scheler, we are never referring to anything that is given, or to what determines the content of givenness, but only to a manner,

a way and a route by which that which *is* given can be presented. 'These concepts tell us only *how* any definite content, whether given directly or symbolically, reaches us as men, through seeing, hearing, tasting, etc. However the manner in which they do so can never be found in the content itself.'[17] Sensation is, thus, neither a determinate object, nor a content of intuition, but rather

> a *direction of variation* of the outer (*and*) inner world of appearances when it is experienced as *dependent* on a *present lived body* of an individual. This would be the *essence* of 'sensation' and everything that can vary in this direction is de facto 'sensation'.[18]

He goes on to say that the job of philosophy is not to isolate the contents of eidetic intuition, by some abstractive process, out of sensation. It would be closer to the truth, he believes, to say that philosophy's task lies in a purification of the intuitive contents through an *elimination* of the organic sensations which accompany them.[19]

In this way, Scheler sets his face firmly against essential knowledge of an **inductive** kind, which would see the essence, the whatness (*Das pure Wesen*), as a more or less accurate reflection of some common features which experience has provided. But there is also a further exclusion: of all knowledge of an *abstractive* kind, because it would involve a representative mediation and a transformation of the object of knowledge.

Scheler attacks a kind of essential knowledge which would not be capable of grasping the *res* in a direct and immediate contact, or which would need to 'copy off' (*abbilden*) some form of the thing. While both he and Husserl speak of abstraction at key moments – Husserl of 'ideational abstraction,' and Scheler himself of 'eidetic abstraction'[20] – there is every evidence to confirm that they use the term as a synonym of *intuition*, with perhaps, as an added shade of meaning, a reference to the leaving aside of existential realities.[21] This 'leaving aside,' however, does not have any positive part to play in knowledge in Scheler. It is a purely negative operation, which enables knowledge proper to occur subsequently.

Knowledge as identity in Scheler

With this rejection of representative mediation and abstraction, Scheler turns to the notion of *participation* in order to find a way of reaching the object in its thisness. He is not, of course, the first philosopher to look on knowledge in this way; to see it as a sharing in the reality of the other. But for Scheler there is no room for half-measures here: a content is either completely given and known or there is no knowledge at all.

> We say: knowledge is an ontological relationship, one which presupposes the ontic forms of whole and part. It is a relation whereby a being participates in the essence [*Sosein*] of another, which is not thus changed in any way. The 'known' becomes 'part;' of the knower, without however being displaced or altered. This is a non-spatial, non-temporal and non-causal relationship. [22]

A key moment in this argument is Scheler's affirmation that the other, in whose essence we participate, is not thus changed in any way. In this way, Scheler asserts a strict *identity* between the essence as it is found in reality and the content of our thought. How can one being (the knower) participate so intimately in another (the object of knowledge)? Scheler seeks the answer in the self-transcending action of love:

> The basis for the performance of these sharing actions can only be that self-transcending participation which we call love in the most formal sense. Knowledge only occurs when the essence is identical *extra mentem* (*in re*) and also *in mente*, as an *ens intentionale* or 'object'. Without this tendency in a being, which is able to go out of itself to share in the being of another, there is no knowledge at all. For me there is no other name for this tendency but 'love' [23]

The 'transformation' involved in knowledge is completely on the part of the knower: the process of preparation for knowledge becomes a quasi-ascetical one, carried out by and within the knower, rather than a process which alters, abstracts or works on the object of knowledge. The phenomenological reduction requires a preparation known as 'moral upsurge.' This upsurge makes possible the leap of self-transcendence in order to participate in the being of the other.[24] It consists of such factors as self-effacement and humility in the face of what is 'given,' and, above all else, love. It is just not enough, Scheler argues against Husserl, to 'set aside the factor of reality' or merely to 'set aside the existential judgement.' This is child's play.[25] It is necessary to put out of operation, also, the human functions which furnish us with the factor of *reality* - in particular, the will. This requires a quasi-ascetical moral exercise in humility, which is the true nature, in Scheler's mind, of the phenomenological reduction.

This refusal to grasp and possess allows essences to be present to us in a new way. The door to participation and essential knowledge lies open. At this point, the whole man is ready for that 'love-determined movement of the inmost personal self of a finite being toward participation in the essential reality of all possibles'.[26]

Knowledge as participation in Aquinas

Aquinas' ambitions for knowledge are no less optimistic than Scheler's. He claims that the human mind is able to understand things in an immaterial and objective way. Some people understand things better than others do, but this reflects only on differences between the knowers' perspectives and on other factors which may increase or lessen people's ability to grasp something (*Summa Theologica* (ST) 1 q 85 a.7 c). The human mind has as its proper object the natures or essences of things (ST q. 84 a 7, c). Aquinas also holds that there is an identity between the knower and the known: 'the species of the thing actually known by the intellect *is* the species of intellect itself.'[27]

Aquinas, however, does not seek this participation through a process of moral preparation of the knower. He sees a process at work in both intellect *and* things known, by which things come to be known in act and the intellect itself – a potency for forms – now

actually is in-formed by one. In this process the senses are not excluded but subsumed into the workings of the intellect.

The role of the senses in essential knowledge

Aquinas's view of the senses and their role in achieving essential knowledge differs markedly from Scheler's. He believes that intellectual knowledge is derived from sensible things. In fact, for Aquinas our intellect's proper and proportionate object is the nature of sensible things (ST I, q. 84 a.8 c); not only *what* we know but also *how we know it* is bound up with material reality and the work of the senses, for sensible knowledge is in a way the material cause of intellectual knowledge (ST I, q. 84, a. 6).

For essential knowledge to emerge from our exposure to material reality, Aquinas, following Aristotle, posits a dialogue of potentialities: the potency of the reality to be known, and that of the knower to achieve knowledge. The two potencies are i) essential to the process and ii) must be overcome for the process to achieve its goal. The essences of material reality are capable of being known but only if they can be seen from a point of view different from that of their materiality and singularity; the mind for its part is capable of knowing the essence of a material thing but only if it can be formed by that essence. In the mutual overcoming of the moment of potency, an identity is forged between the reality and knower: the knower in act *is* the known in act. (ST I, q. 85, a.2 ad l).

This overcoming involves the work of the senses:

> Wherefore the nature of a stone or any material thing cannot be known completely and truly, except in as much as it is known as existing in the individual. Now we apprehend the individual through the senses and the imagination. And, therefore, for the intellect to understand actually its proper object, it must of necessity turn to the phantasms in order to perceive the universal nature existing in the individual. (ST, q. 84 a.7 c)

and it also involves some process of going beyond the senses, and the phantasm, their product:

> since the kinds of things we know exist in matter, and are thus … not actually intelligible; it follows that the natures of forms of the sensible things which we understand are not actually intelligible. Now nothing is reduced from potentiality to act except by something in act …. We must therefore assign on the part of the intellect some power to make things actually intelligible, by abstraction of the species from material conditions. (ST, q. 79 a. 3, c)

This differs from Scheler's view that sense knowledge is quite devoid of intentionality, being merely a route through which knowledge of essences may arrive or a site at which it may occur. It differs even more from his view that we know the thing itself directly, as it is, without needing to engage in a process of abstracting. This approach might well fall under Aquinas' well-known criticism of Plato's view that the form of the thing known

must of necessity be in the knower in the same manner as in the thing known.[28] At any rate Aquinas is convinced that some sort of process, affecting both knower and known, is required in order to move from the way that forms exist in reality to the way that they exist as known in our minds. In Scheler's thought, as we saw above, the process refers only to the knower, who becomes morally enabled to burst through his own identity to share in that of the object, which remains unchanged in its being when known.

Knowledge: a case of *formal* identity

This structure of abstraction, providing us with a species or image mediating between the intellect and the object of knowledge, is quite compatible with Aquinas' interest in achieving an identity between the knower and the object.

For Aquinas, *formal* causality – the notion that form which structures the object known can also structure the intellect knowing it – offers a way of providing this identity between object and knower. When the Aristotelian-thomistic tradition claims that the knower and the known are 'the same' it is referring to a formal causality rather than to any supposed real identity or absorption of mind into object or vice versa.[29]

As mentioned above, we also need to think of the role of *potency* in the transaction. Both Aquinas and Aristotle state that the knower *in act* and the known *in act* are the same. This is the reason for the process which begins with the knowledge of the senses and the imagination: neither the known nor the knower is actually so until something has brought them from potency to act, since the *known* may not be known in its material state and the *knower* becomes so when informed and thus made actual by the form if its object.

Once this has been done, and there is a formal unity/identity, the concept and the thing known are in a sense (the formal sense) one and identical. Knowledge does not have to engage in a sort of inference from one *thing* to another thing, for example, deducing one's way from the content of one's mind to essences outside it. Aquinas puts this point as follows: 'when the cognitive power is not borne by separate acts to the medium by which it knows and to the thing known then there is no discursive movement in cognition.'[30]

This is an evident and participative knowledge of the essence, and the mediation of a species or of a concept does not set up the concept as a separate entity (a third thing), to which the mind is first borne, and only subsequently (and of course problematically) to be referred from it to the real essence. There is only *one* act of knowledge, not several, and the functions of abstraction and the subsequent illumination of the mind, enabling it to express the concept, do not stand alone and independently of one another, or of some supposedly subsequent inference which would then be called knowledge in the strict sense. There is only one action here, not two, one essence, not two.[31]

That which is known primarily, that is to say the entity which is non-inferentially known, is the object transcending the knower:

> It transcends the knower in its being because its being is not that of the knower: it does not transcend knowledge because it is formally one with that species or similitude which immanently determines the cognitive act[32]

Conclusion

St Thomas observes that what things themselves are known, and not their images.[33] Between concept and object there is formal identity amidst existential diversity, and for St Thomas this identity is sufficient for the correspondence that must obtain between knowledge and reality.[34] It is not the *real* identity which Scheler demands from knowledge, since it respects the difference between the essence as it exists in reality and as it exists in the mind, but it does offer a *formal* identity which guarantees that our thoughts are linked to what they are about.

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1 Max Scheler (1874-1928) was one of the central figures in the early phenomenological movement, a disciple (though independent-minded) of Husserl and an influential thinker, whose brilliant lecturing in particular impressed Edith Stein, Romano Guardini, Karl Adam and Dietrich von Hildebrand. His central achievement was the development of an ethics which overcame the Kantian formalist presuppositions in favour of a content-based ethics founded on values in Formalism in Ethics and Non-formal Ethics of Values (see note 7 for details).

2 Cf. Cornelio Fabro, La nozione metafisica di partecipazione, (Turin: S.E.I., 1950) p. 283.

3 'Phenomenology and the Theory of Cognition,' in Max Scheler. Selected Philosophical Essays, trans. by David Lachtermann (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 137.

4 This was originally to have formed part of 'Phenomenology and the Theory of Cognition' but was also only published posthumously (cf. Max Scheler. Selected Philosophical Essays, trans. by David Lachtermann (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973) xxxii-iii, and see pp. 202-87 for the English translation, 'The Theory of the Three Facts').

5 Cf. 'The Theory of the Three Facts,' p. 202 .

6 On the Eternal in Man, author's preface to the 2nd edition, English translation by Bernard Noble, with foreword by August Brunner (London: SCM Press, 1960), pp. 22-23.

7 Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, trans. by Manfred S. Frings and Roger Funk (Evanston: Northwestern University Press), p. 48.

8 'Idealism and Realism,' trans. by David R. Lachtermann in Selected Philosophical Essays, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 289.

9 Cf. 'Idealism and Realism,' pp. 288-90 and 'Erkenntnis und Arbeit' in G.W.-Gesammelte Werke (Coll. Works) (Bonn:Bouvier 1954-1979), VIII, pp. 226-28.

10 'Phenomenology and the Theory of Cognition,' p. 139 (G.W. X, pp. 381-82)

11 'Phenomenology and the Theory of Cognition,' pp. 139-40 (G.W. X, p. 382).

12 Cf. 'Phenomenology and the Theory of Cognition,' p. 141.

13 The object of Formalism was to show that an ethics based on value would not necessarily be based on states of sensible pleasure. It was important, therefore, to show that the intuition on which the ethics of value was based did not have sense data as its object. It should not look out upon the chaos of sensation and pleasure-seeking drives of which Hume and Hobbes had spoken, but on an a priori world of value and meaning. In Scheler's words, only 'Hume's notion of nature required a Kantian Understanding, [only] Hobbes' notion of man required a Kantian practical Reason' (Formalism, p. 66).

14 Ibid., p. 56 (G.W. II, p. 75).

15 'Phenomenology and the Theory of Cognition,' p. 141.

16 'Sinnlich ist doch nichts, was in der Farbe, im Tone läge' (Der Formalismus, G W. II, p. 74 - English translation, p. 55).

17 ‘The Theory of the Three Facts,’ p. 233.
18 Formalism., p. 59.
19 Cf. ibid., p. 59.
20 Cf. ibid., p. 378 (G.W., II, p. 378).
21 Cf. Antonio Lambertino, Max Scheler. La fondazione fenomenologica dell'etica dei valori (Florence: La Nuova Italia 1977), p. 499.
22 ‘Die Formen des Wissens und die Bildung’ in Philosophische Weltanschauung (G.W. IX, pp 111 (my trans.))
23 ‘Die Formen des Wissens und die Bildung’ in Philosophische Weltanschauung (G.W. IX, pp 111-113 (my trans))
24 Cf. On the Eternal in Man, p. 95.
25 ‘Idealism and Realism,’ pp. 316-7.
26 On the Eternal in Man, p. 74.
27 "Species igitur rei intellectae in actu est species ipsius intellectus" (In De Anima, lib. 3, lect. 9, n. 5).
28 Cf. ST I, q. 84 a. 4. c.
29 Cf. In De Anima, III, 5, 740-741. John Haldane, in a discussion on the role of form in contemporary thought concerning mind compares this kind of causality rather favourably to efficient causality, which is so various –there are so many causal links between knower and known: On the other hand, he suggests, if we turn to formal causation, the field narrows quite a bit. Form exemplified naturally makes the dog to be a dog. Form exemplified intentionally makes my thought of a dog to be a dog-type thought. The efficient causing that goes on between me and the dog ends up in formal structures, which structure the object, the thought, and the movement between them. (‘A Return to Form in the Philosophy of Mind’, Ratio (new series) XI (1998) 253-77 (p. 267)).
30 De veritate, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3.
31 "In the essence of the interior word which is the intention understood there is this: that it proceeds from the one understanding in accord with his act of understanding, since it is, so to say, the intellectual term of the operation. For, in the act of understanding, the Intellect conceives and forms the intention or the essence understood, and this is the interior word." Summa contra gentes, IV, ch. 11
32 Douglas Flippen, "Immanence and Transcendence," The New Scholasticism, 53 (1979), 324-46 (p. 346).
33 "[I]psa cognita per intellectualem visionem sent res ipsae et non rerum imagines." De veritate, q. 10, a. 4,ad 1
34 Cf. John Peterson, ‘The Real and the Rational: Aquinas’ Synthesis’, International Philosophical Quarterly 38 (1997), 189-202 (p. 193).

AN ARISTOTELIAN-THOMISTIC PERSPECTIVE ON THE PHENOMENON OF GRIEF.

Paul Lyttle†

On hearing of the death of his friend Patroclus at the hands of Hector, Achilles is said to have "rolled in dust, and yielded to an ecstasy of grief." He avenged the death of his friend but, "still consumed by grief, rose every day at dawn to drag Hector's body three times round Patroclus's tomb."[1] In the Old Testament we hear David's heart-wrenching, lament on learning the death of Jonathan:

> O Jonathan, in your death I am stricken, I am desolate for you, Jonathan my brother. Very dear to me you were, your love to me more wonderful than the love of a woman.[2]

And the young Augustine was plunged into a veritable dark night of the soul due to the death of his unnamed friend: "At this grief my heart was utterly darkened; and whatever I beheld was death.[3]

Such experiences of grief, of course, are not the prerogative of well known historical personages. The experience of grief will visit every one of us at some stage in our journey through life. The question is, are we prepared for it?

> People often liken the loss of a partner to 'losing a limb,' showing how, in intimate relationships, the death or departure of one person deeply affects the 'wholeness' of the other.[4]

One woman described her husband as having been the "witness" of her life's days, and said that she felt "wiped off the human map" in the months following his death.[5]
How are we to understand such grief? What is it about human relationships that can provoke such sorrow? Is it because deep within themselves Achilles, David, Augustine, and all those who have lost a loved one, know that, in a certain sense, the death of their beloved one entails the cutting of their own Ariadne's thread, their lifeline to a more profound understanding of their existence? From his grief over the death of his unnamed friend, Augustine has bequeathed to us a depth of sorrow perhaps unrivalled in literature:

> For I felt that my soul and his soul were one soul in two. bodies and, therefore was my life a horror to me, because I would not live halved.[6]

In his grief Augustine uncovered one of the truly great wonders of the human person. To truly *be,* to be *fully alive,* to be *whole,* I have need of another, of a friend. Only in and through friendship can I become a *truly human person;* only in and through friendship can I discover and fulfil my *human potential.* When the splendour of this insight has impressed itself upon us, then we can begin to understand the darkness of grief. Death creates a vacuum in a person's life because the loved one now departed was so intensely a part of one's self. Speaking of the death of her husband one woman said:

 Maynooth Philosophical Papers 3 (2006), pp. 43-46.

> The feeling of almost invisibility wouldn't go away for a while. The nearest I can come to explaining it is that when his eyes closed, something of me closed down too. A vision of me vanished, because no one else saw me as he did. To anyone else I wasn't beautiful. I was just an ordinary woman.[7]

I believe this widow's sentiments show that in grieving the loss of a loved one, one is also, in a certain sense, grieving for one's self. This might appear to be selfish but I think we will see that it is actually perfectly natural, and it will allow us to understand why Aristotle did not want his friend to become a god.[8]

Aristotle does not want his friend to become a god because he does not want to suffer the loss of that friendship. Is this selfish? I really don't think so. Aristotle was very attentive to the distinction between selfishness and self-love. In the *Politics* he goes as far to say that love of self is a feeling implanted by nature and not given in vain.[9] It is a feeling given to us to aid the development of the full potentiality of our nature, that is, to attain *eudaimonia*. So Aristotle is making the point that *eudaimonia* is impossible without friendship, and friendship is impossible without self-love. In this light we can therefore begin to understand why one does not want one's friend to become a god, because one does not want to suffer the loss of that friendship and the accompanying phenomenon of grief that makes one feel "unwhole". The phenomenon of being "unwhole" has been wonderfully articulated by C.S. Lewis:

> To say the patient is getting over it after an operation for appendicitis is one thing; after he's had his leg off it is quite another. After that operation either the wounded stump heals or the man dies. If it heals, the fierce, continuous pain will stop. Presently he'll get back his strength and be able to stump about on his wooden leg. He has 'got over it'. But he will probably have recurrent pains in the stump all his life, and perhaps pretty bad ones; and he will always be a one-legged man. There will be hardly any moment when he forgets it. Bathing, dressing, sitting down and getting up again, even lying in bed, will all be different. His whole way of life will be changed. All sorts of pleasures and activities that he once took for granted will have to be simply written off. Duties too. At present I am learning to get about on crutches. But I shall never be a biped again.[10]

C.S. Lewis is allowing us to enter into the "unwholeness" that he himself experienced on the death of his wife. Perhaps it is the fear of experiencing such unwholeness that causes Aristotle not to wish that his friend becomes a god. Is this selfishness, or is it more a testimony of one's love for one's friend?

The Aristotelian dilemma is further explicated by C.S. Lewis when he speaks of how he longed for the return of his deceased wife, ''as an ingredient in the restoration of my past."[11] He wanted his wife back in order to be whole again. But he himself recognised the selfishness of such a desire:

> Could I have wished for anything worse? Having got once through death, to come back and then, at some later date, have all her dying to do over again? They call Stephen the first martyr. Hadn't Lazarus the rawer deal?[12]

C.S. Lewis' sentiments are perfectly understandable on the basis of an Aristotelian anthropology. What I want to do is show how St. Thomas Aquinas's reflections on friendship give us a deeper insight into the phenomenon of grief and allow us a means of overcoming Aristotle's dilemma that he does not want his friend to become a god.

Aristotle's dilemma is that he does not wish that his friend become a god, even though being a god is a good thing, because he does not wish to grieve the loss of his friend. St. Thomas overcomes this dilemma by means of what he calls the *potentia obedientialis, which allows him to develop the distinction between amor concupiscentiae* and *amor amicitiae* in a way that Aristotle could not have envisaged.[13]

For Aquinas, *amor concupiscentiae,* although natural insofar as it remains within the bounds of reason, is a love that never attains to love of the good as good. There is a loving involved but it is a love that ultimately returns to one's self. It is love of the good but only insofar as the good refers, ultimately, to one's self and not to one's friend. *Amor concupiscentiae* is the reason why I cannot will that my friend becomes a god, because it stops me from willing for him the good as good in itself.

In *amor concupiscentiae* I have the desire to be with my friend because I enjoy his company. This is a perfectly rational and natural desire. However, in not wishing my friend to enjoy complete beatitude, my *amor concupiscentiae* ceases to be rational and becomes selfish. It ceases to be rational because wishing that my friend enjoy complete beatitude is simply to wish that he attains the fullness of his human nature, and whatever that entails cannot be contrary to reason. Our reflections have shown us that the complete beatitude of man lies in friendship with God, and so my love for my friend must be such that I can wish he reach that complete beatitude, even though this means that I will lose the pleasure of his friendship. In so wishing this for my friend my love for him ceases to be *am or concupiscentiae* and becomes *amor amicitiae*.

In true love, in *amor amicitiae,* I can wish for the good as good for my friend, that is, I can wish that he attains complete beatitude. In Aristotelian terms, I can wish that he becomes a god. However, from a Thomistic perspective what I am really wishing for is that he attains the fullness of his humanity, that is, that he becomes the friend of God. For St. Thomas, *amor amicitiae* means I can take the step that Aristotle could not. *Amor amicitiae* means that I can really wish the good for my friend, so that while mourning his absence I can still be happy for him. I can wish, not that he becomes a god, but that he can become the friend of God because only by being the friend of God can he attain the complete beatitude that is proper to his own human nature. And this I can will for him from a Thomistic perspective, while still grieving the loss of him.

As a result of these reflections I think that St. Thomas has incorporated into his thinking a very Augustinian perspective. St. Augustine has said: "What madness to love man as something more than human."[14] For Augustine, as for Aquinas:

> The injunction will indeed be to love *homines humaniter* - but to love them in God, who is never lost and in whom all that is real, true and good subsists and will be preserved everlastingly.[15]

For St. Thomas, it seems to me, to love someone as a human being is to love him or her in the utmost realisation of his or her human nature. It is to love that person, not as someone called to be a god, but as someone called to be a friend of God. No wonder St. Thomas pondered well these words of St. Augustine:

> Blessed are those who love you, O God, and their friends in you and their enemies for your sake. For they alone will never lose those who are dear to them, for they love them in one who is never lost.[16]

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[1] Robert Graves, *Greek Myths* (Cassell Ltd., 1980), pp. 670-71.
[2] II. *Sam.* 1:26.
[3] St. Augustine, *The Confessions,* (Everyman's Library, 1913), IV, 4, 9. For the references to *The Confessions* throughout this paper I am indebted to Professor James McEvoy's article, "Liberty, Finitude, and Transcendence" in *At The Heart of the Real: Philosophical Essays in honour of Archbishop Desmond Connell* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1992), pp. 373-80.
[4] Carol Lee, *Good Grief Experiencing Loss* (London: Fourth Estate, 1994), pp. 7-8.
[5] Ibid., p. 6.
[6] St. Augustine. *The Confessions.* Op.cit.
[7] Carol Lee. Opt cit., p.7.
[8] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics,* I 1059a4-9.
[9] Aristotle*, Politics,* 1263bl.
[10] C.S. Lewis, *A Grief Observed* (Faber & Faber, 1961), pp. 45-46.
[11] Ibid., p. 36.
[12] Ibid.
[13] By *"potentia obedientialis"* I mean the "capacity" that the human person has for becoming the friend of God without contradicting human nature itself. C.f. Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae.* llIa, II, I. Also, J. O'Mahony, *The Desire for God in the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Oxford University Press, 1929), pp. 148-154. For an insightful understanding of the distinction between *amor concupiscentiae* and *amor amicitiae* I refer the reader to Professor James McEvoy's article, "The Other as Oneself: Friendship and Love in the Thought of Thomas Aquinas" in *Thomas Aquinas: Approaches to Truth.* Ed. James McEvoy and Michael Dunne (Four Courts Press, 2002), pp. 16-37.
[14] St. Augustine. *The Confessions.* IV, 7.
[15] James McEvoy, "Liberty, Finitude, and Transcendence" in *At The Heart of the Real,* p. 376.
[16] St. Augustine. *The Confessions.* IV, 9.

NEWMAN ON FRIENDSHIP.

Paul Lyttle†

"There is something awful in the silent restless sweep of time - and, as years go on, and friends are taken away, one draws the thought of those who remain about one, as in cold weather one buttons up great copes and capes for protection."

John Henry Cardinal Newman is a man whose life reveals a rich tapestry of friendship. All his life he enjoyed the cradled atmosphere of intimate friendship, although the years spanning his conversion to Catholicism until the publication of his *Apologia* did see him separated from many of his Anglican friends, "the loss of whom was the greatest trial of my change of religion." The visit of one such friend, Frederic Rogers, whom he had not seen for twenty years, occasioned great emotion. As they talked together they realised with "sad pleasure" the number of matters on which they agreed: "It was almost like two clocks keeping time."

Newman himself admitted in 1876, "I always said, 'No one has ever had such friends as I have had!'" Unfortunately he was also forced to concede that "the penalty" of living well into old age is "to lose the great props of life." The will for his burial arrangements, drawn up on July 23rd, 1876, stated:

"I wish, with all my heart, to be buried in Fr. Ambrose St. John's grave - and I give this as my last, my imperative will."

Even in death he sought the company of a friend.

Unfortunately it is difficult to find in all of Newman's voluminous writings a systematic treatment of his theory of friendship. The closest I could come to it was a homily in his *Plain and Parochial Sermons,* on "Love of Relations and Friends," preached on the Feast of St. John the Evangelist. In what follows I will attempt to set out what seems to me to be the cardinal ingredients of Newman's philosophy of friendship.

The friendship between Christ and St. John the Evangelist.

Newman presents St. John as "one of the three or four who always attended Our Blessed Lord, and had the privilege of the most intimate intercourse with Him." John, in Newman's opinion, was "more favoured" than Peter, James and Andrew, and was indeed the "bosom friend" of Christ. This is exemplified at the Last Supper when John "took his place next Him, and leaned on His breast." The level of intimacy of converse that John enjoyed with Christ is teased out by Newman when he speaks of "the other three," namely Peter, James and Andrew, communicating "between the multitude and Christ," while John "communicated between Christ and them," (that is, Peter, James and Andrew). For Newman, this level of intimate converse is again seen when Peter, not daring to question Jesus himself, bids John to inquire as to who it is who will betray Him.

 Maynooth Philosophical Papers 3 (2006), pp. 47-54.

And so Newman concludes that, "St. John was the private and intimate friend of Christ." This is further evidenced when:
- Our Lord entrusted the care of His mother to St. John while dying on the cross and,
- When He revealed to St. John in visions, after His departure from this earth, the fortunes of His Church.

From this portrayal of the friendship that Newman sees as existing between Christ and St. John, four characteristics seem to emerge as constitutive elements of an intimate friendship: [1]

- Time must be spent with one's friend. St. John was "one of the three or four who always attended Our Blessed Lord."
- One should always be able to speak freely with one's friend about the things that are important to us. St. John "had the privilege of the most intimate intercourse with Him." St. John could ask him the question that Peter felt he couldn't ask. St. John liased with Him on behalf of the others.
- One should be able to demonstrate one's affection for one's friend. St. John is described by Newman as being, "more favoured than Peter, James and Andrew," I and, at the Last Supper St. John *"took* his place next to Him, and leaned on His breast."
- One should be able to entrust to one's friend that which is most precious to one's self. Christ entrusted the care of His mother to St. John; He also entrusted to him "visions" concerning the fortunes of His Church.

The friendship between Christ and St. John was something natural.

Newman refers to the friendship between Christ and St. John as "remarkable." I think he uses the word "remarkable," not in relation to the friendship itself, but in reference to those who might think that "the Son of God Most High could not have loved one man more than another;" or that He could only love men in proportion to their holiness. Newman rejects both positions and simply states that "we find our Saviour had a private friend." For Newman, Christ's friendship with St. John shows us "how entirely He was a man, as much as any of us, in His wants and feelings." If Christ should experience the need for intimate friendship why then should we consider a similar experience in our own lives as nothing less than natural? Christ's friendship with St. John shows us "that there is nothing contrary to the spirit of Christian love, in having our affections directed in a special way towards certain objects, towards those whom the circumstances of our past life, or some peculiarities of character, have endeared to us."

I think it somewhat illuminating that Newman should say "that there is nothing wrong in having our affections directed in a special way towards certain objects." I cannot help but think of that episode in his life when he visited Sicily in 1833. There he fell very ill and he himself believed he would have died had it not been for the faithful attentions of his Neapolitan servant, Gennaro. When the time came for them to part the faithful Gennaro hinted that he would like as a parting present an old blue cloak that had been in Newman's possession since 1823. Newman himself later reflected that it was "a little

thing for him (Gennaro) to set his services at - at the same time a great thing for me to give for I have an affection for it. It had nursed me all through my illness; had even been put on my bed, put on me when I rose to have my bed made. . . I had nearly lost it at Corfu - it was stolen by a soldier but recovered. I have it still. I have brought it up here to Littlemore, and on some cold nights I have it on my bed. I have so few things to sympathise with me, that I take to cloaks." Such was Newman's attachment to this old blue cloak that he held on to it despite all that Gennaro had done for him.

Newman also had a profound attachment to Oxford. Littlemeore was an oasis of serenity for him as he deliberated his conversion to Catholicism, and when the time came for him to leave he recounts, " I quite tore myself away - and could not help kissing my bed, and mantlepiece, and other parts of the house."

On loving all men equally.

Newman believes he has demonstrated the naturalness of intimate friendship and now he moves to refute what he considers two erroneous positions concerning Christian love. The first one he sets out as follows:

"There have been men before now, who have supposed Christian love was so diffusive as not to admit of concentration upon individuals; so that we ought to love all men equally."

Newman thinks that the example of Christ Himself makes this opinion untenable.

Newman then considers those who, "without bringing forward any theory, yet consider practically that the love of many is something superior to the love of one or two; and neglect the charities of private life, while busy in the schemes of an expansive benevolence, or of effecting a general union and conciliation among Christians." These are the men who, so to speak, would build a house without first digging the foundations. In response to this Newman argues that "the best preparation for loving the world at large, and loving it duly and wisely, is to cultivate an intimate friendship and affection towards those who are immediately about us." We will return to this argument later.

Love of God and Neighbour is natural.

Newman says explicitly that, "It has been the plan of Divine Providence to ground what is good and true in religion and morals, on the basis of our natural feelings." And he concretises this further when he says, "What we are towards our earthly friends in the instincts and wishes of our infancy, such we are to become at length towards God and man in the extended field of our duties as accountable beings." For Newman, "to honour our parents is the first step towards honouring God," and "to love our brethern according to the flesh the first step towards considering all men our brethern." The biblical call to "become like little children" could be interpreted as a call to return to an appreciation of the natural instinct to love. Newman goes on to give examples of virtues, which he considers to be Christian in nature, as founded on "natural feeling":

"What is Christian high-mindedness, generous self-denial, contempt of wealth, endurance of suffering, and earnest striving after perfection, but an improvement and transformation, under the influence of the Holy Spirit, of the natural character of mind which we call romantic? On the other hand, what is the instinctive hatred and abomination of sin (which confirmed Christians possess), their dissatisfaction, and caution, but an improvement, under the same Spirit, of their natural sensitiveness and delicacy, fear of pain, and sense of shame?"

What Newman is saying is that just as the great Christian virtues have their roots in "natural feelings," so too the call to love all men has its roots in something natural, indeed the love of all men is "the love of kindred and friends in a fresh shape." The love of kindred and friends is "the natural branch on which a spiritual fruit is grafted."

How can we love all men?

On attempting to answer this question Newman draws on an analogy with "religious duties." He begins with an obvious but pertinent observation. He says that the "great difficulty" with regard to religious duties "is their extent," and that such duties become all the more difficult for those "who have neglected religion for a while." The analogy is this: just as the extent of religious duties may seem an awesome task even for one well disposed towards God, we can only try to imagine how much more awesome it must appear to one who has neglected his religion. Similarly, the task of loving all mankind must seem an awesome task, even for one already well disposed towards relations and friends. For one not in possession of such a disposition the challenge of the task is all the greater.

So how is this task, that of loving all mankind, to be accomplished? Well, just as a parent will not expect a child to run before it can walk, so too God will not expect us to love all men until we have first learned to love a few. Therefore, "God's merciful Providence has in the natural course of things narrowed for us at first this large field of duty." The "large field of duty" is love of all mankind, and God has "given us a clue" as to how we are to go about it:

"We are to begin by loving our friends about us, and gradually to enlarge the circle of our affections, till it reaches all Christians and all men."

On what it means to love all men.

Having established that love of all men has its beginning in love of our friends, Newman now wants to explain just what it is that he means by love of all men. Again, his realism is refreshing.

He says, "it is obviously impossible to love all men in any strict and true sense":

"What is meant by loving all men, is, to feel well-disposed to all men, to be ready to assist them, and to act towards those who come in our way, as if we loved them."

Although we cannot love all men in the way that we love our private friends, nevertheless, we can extend to all men the kindness that we show to our friends, and that is why the love of our personal friends is such an important preparation for loving all men.

For Newman, the reason why we cannot love all men "in any strict and true sense," is because "we cannot love those about whom we know nothing." He does qualify this remark by saying that we can love all men in Christ, as objects of his atonement. But, for Newman, knowledge of the person is obviously a precondition for the type of love we find in personal friendship. In fact, for Newman love is a habit, and like any habit it "cannot be attained without actual practice."

Love of all men as a habit would be, in my understanding, impossible for Newman, but one can be lovingly disposed towards all men.

Those who speak wrongly of loving all men.

Perhaps we are now in a better position to see why Newman is highly critical of those who "talk magnificently about loving the whole human race with a comprehensive affection, of being the friends of all mankind, and the like." This is not just a theoretical criticism, it has its roots also in a practical criticism of such individuals:

"Such vaunting professions, what do they come to? That such men have certain benevolent feelings towards the world, - feelings and nothing more; - nothing more than unstable feelings, the mere offspring of an indulged imagination, which exist only when their minds are wrought upon, and are sure to fail them in the hour of need. This is not to love, it is but to talk about love."

This stinging rebuke is delivered because Newman will not tolerate talk about love where no practice of love itself exists:

"The real love of man must depend on practice, and therefore, must begin by exercising itself on our friends around us, otherwise it will have no existence."

The practical ways in which one can love.

Love, for Newman, is a habit and so it cannot be attained without practice. And Newman, ever the practical thinker, is not shy about offering ideas on how love can become a habit. He suggests the following:

- we begin by trying to love our relations and friends;
- we submit to their wishes, even though contrary to our own; - we bear with their infirmities;
- we overcome their occasional waywardness by kindness; - we dwell on their excellences and try to copy them.

If we try to do the above Newman believes that "thus it is we form in our hearts that root of charity, which, though small at first, may, like the mustard seed, at last even overshadow the earth."

Newman's argument is that the man who tries to live out the practical implications of love in his private life will not base his love for all men on mere feeling, and so he will be ready to act when called on. He will know how to love instead of merely knowing how to talk about love. Such a man will stand in sharp contrast to the "vain talkers about philanthropy," who "show the emptiness of their profession, by being morose and cruel in the private relations of life."

The "enlightened sympathy" of St. John the Evangelist.

Newman delightfully contrasts the "fictitious benevolence" of the "vain philantropher" with the "enlightened sympathy for all men" possessed by St. John. He quotes the well-known passage of Scripture where St. John writes:

"Beloved, let us love one another, for love is of God. If we love one another, God dwelleth in us, and His love is perfected in us. God is love, and he that dwelleth in love dwelleth in God, and God in him."

Having quoted the passage Newman then poses the following question with reference to St. John: "Did he begin with some vast effort at loving on a large scale?" The reply will not surprise us:

"Nay, he had the unspeakable privilege being the friend of Christ. Thus he was brought to love others; first his affection was concentrated(?), then it was expanded."

Here Newman demonstrates once again the consistency of his thought: love of the many begins first in loving a friend. As he so eloquently puts it: love is first concentrated, then it is expanded.

For Newman, "enlightened sympathy" is another way of expressing a love that is "intelligent and discriminating." Returning to the theme we touched on earlier, that is, those who speak wrongly of loving all men, Newman is critical, firstly, of the man "who would fain begin by a general love of all men." Newman's insights are worth pondering here. Because such a man puts all men "on a level," in his relations with others:

- instead of being cautious, prudent and sympathising in his benevolence, he is hasty and rude;
- he does harm when he means to do good;
- he discourages the virtuous and well-meaning; - he wounds the feelings of the gentle.

Then we have those men whom Newman considers to be "of ambitious and ardent" mind. They are "desirous of doing good on a large scale," but because of this they are

"especially exposed to the temptation of sacrificing individual to general good in their plan of charity." Finally, we have the individuals that Newman calls the "ill-instructed men. These are those men "who have strong abstract notions about the necessity of showing generosity and candour towards opponents," but who "often forget to take any thought of those who are associated with themselves; and commence their (so-called) liberal treatment of their enemies by an unkind desertion of their friends."

For Newman, these three classes of individuals will consistently fail to achieve their objectives because they do not begin their task from the secure basis of personal friendship. On the contrary, those who will succeed in such objectives are those who "cultivate the private charities, as an introduction to the more enlarged ones." Newman, with the picturesque terminology so typical of him, speaks of the need of a "social amiableness." Man is, after all, in Aristotelian terminology, a "political animal."

The plight of the man with no ties.

This is an intriguing insight into Newman's philosophy of friendship. He considers the "cultivation of domestic affections as the source of more extended Christian love," and concludes that "nothing is more likely to engender selfish habits (which is the direct opposite and negation of charity), than independence in our worldly circumstances." Just as there may be some deprived of the experience of "private" friendship, and are impoverished as a result, so also, for Newman, there are:

"Men who have no ties on them, who have no calls on their daily sympathy and tenderness, who have no one's comfort to consult, who can move about as they please, and indulge the love of the variety and restless humours which are so congenial to the minds of most men. . . .

For Newman, men who know nothing of domestic and "private" friendship, and whose only purpose is to indulge their "restless humours," are far from being or becoming virtuous men.

And so it is interesting to note that for Newman: - it is better to live with others than to be alone;
- married life is a very exalted state of living with someone else;
- "private" friendships are in some cases the highest state of living together. , In this latter case Newman distinguishes between three types of friendship:

- The friendships of young people. For Newman, young people "readily love one another, for they are cheerful and innocent." Because of this he believes that they "more easily yield to each another, and are full of hope." However such friendships tend not to be permanent because "their tastes change."
- The friendships of grown people. Newman observes that "grown persons go on for years as friends," but it would seem to be to their advantage that they do not live together:

- " . . . if any accident throws them into familiarity for a while, they find it difficult to restrain their tempers and keep on terms, and discover that they are best friends at a distance."
- The friendship of religious persons. For Newman, it is only religion that can hold true friendship together:

" . . . what is it that can bind two friends together in intimate converse for a course of years, but the participation in something that is Unchangeable and essentially Good, and what is this but religion?"
And why? Because, he maintains, "religious tastes alone are unalterable."

Final remarks.

Beginning with the friendship between Christ and St. John, Newman has explored the nature of friendship as he understands it. Intimate or, as he calls it, "private" friendship is a natural inclination, and so such friendships are not contrary to the spirit of Christian love. The assumption that to love all men is superior to loving one's relations and friends is considered by Newman to be false. Indeed the latter is a prerequisite for the former.

Newman actually looks upon the love of all men as "the love of kindred and friends in fresh shape." Love must first be "concentrated" before it can be "expanded."

[1] The role of intimacy with regard to friendship is discussed by Aristotle *NE* VIII, 7, 1158a15.

Brentano's Modification of the Medieval-Scholastic Concept of 'Intentional Inexistence' in *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (1874)

Cyril McDonnell

Brentano is perhaps most famously renowned for his re-deployment of Scholastic terminology of 'intentional act' and 'intentional object' in the elaboration of his novel science of 'descriptive psychology' in the mid-1870s and 1880s. In this re-deployment, however, Brentano adapted the original Scholastic meanings of both of these terms. Thus Brentano advanced not one but two descriptive-psychological theses of intentionality.[1] These theses, however, are often not properly distinguished, and consequently they are more often confused. Nevertheless, once the two theses are distinguished, Brentano's basic descriptive-psychological tenet of the intentionality of consciousness is more readily understandable on its own terms. Whether Brentano's descriptive-psychological tenet is entirely acceptable philosophically, or not, of course, is another matter but this presupposes understanding in a straightforward sense what Brentano's doctrine is. In this article, I will be concerned mainly with Brentano's re-introduction of 'what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object' in *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (1874),[2] even though it is Brentano's (second) thesis on 'intentional act', one that he developed after his 1874 publication, that is more generally well known and examined. While acknowledging that many versions of 'Brentano's thesis', as it is usually (and loosely) referred to by commentators today, have been re-worked in modern philosophy of mind, this article focuses attention on some of the main points of convergence and deviance between the original Scholastic concept and Brentano's 'new' concept of intentionality in *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*.

1.1 Introduction

In a reference to Brentano's concept of the intentionality of consciousness, Husserl tells us that 'his [Brentano's] conversion (*Umwertung*) of the scholastic concept of intentionality into a descriptive root-concept of psychology constitutes a great discovery, apart from which phenomenology could not have come into being at all'.[3] This article will not examine Husserl's advancement of Brentano's descriptive-psychological concept of intentionality because in order to address this matter, one would need to present a detailed study of the development of Husserl's thought from his earliest descriptive-psychological investigations in his *Philosophy of Arithmetic* (1891), through his extensive descriptive-eidetic-psychological analyses in the two volumes of *Logical Investigations* (1900–1901), to his turn towards transcendental idealism in *Ideas: Book* I (1913), and to his later writings. Fortunately, Theodore De Boer, in his masterful study *The Development of Husserl's Thought*, has undertaken both an extensive and a meticulous examination of the unfolding of the concept of intentionality in Husserl's thought from his earliest writings, through his well-known *Logical Investigations*, and to his transition to transcendental idealism (around 1907–1908) that was later made known through Husserl famous and celebrated 'reduction' of the natural standpoint to the transcendental-phenomenological standpoint in *Ideas I* (1913).[4] Rather, in this article, I

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wish to draw attention back to Brentano's initial 'revaluation' (*Umwertung*) of the Scholastic concept of intentionality in order to determine some of the main features which Brentano accepts, rejects and adapts from the Scholastic account in the elaboration of his new concept of intentionality. An assessment of the originality of 'Brentano's thesis' of intentionality, therefore, is the main focus of this article.

§1.2 Background: Disagreement Over Interpretations of 'Brentano's Thesis'

Commentators and critics today *still* disagree among themselves about the originality (or lack of originality) of Brentano's concept of intentionality. And they disagree about the originality (or lack of originality) of Brentano's concept in respect to *both* the scholastic concept *and* the Husserlian concept of intentionality.[5] No doubt, the fact that Brentano employs scholastic terminology in a new context (i.e. in 'descriptive psychology') is one the main sources that has evoked much hermeneutic disagreement and difficulty. Another potent source of hermeneutic confusion lies in the fact that several of Brentano's own immediate students and 'followers' (e.g. Meinong, Höfler, Twardowski, Husserl, Sartre, Chisholm, to mention but a few), all developed their own versions of 'Brentano's thesis of intentionality', whilst maintaining that each of their respective versions either adhered to or (critically) advanced 'Brentano's thesis', even though *such versions themselves* are notoriously different from each other.[6] All of this complicates considerably the task of interpreting, understanding and assessing the historical and philosophical innovation of *Brentano's* thesis.[7] *Whose* thesis and *which* thesis of intentionality that one is addressing and evaluating are important questions to bear in mind when dealing with this matter.[8] Nevertheless, it is generally acknowledged that it is principally due to Brentano and to his students in the 1880s, and in particular to Husserl and to his extensive development of the tenet of the intentionality of consciousness in the elaboration of his idea of phenomenology in the 1900s, that the medieval-scholastic terminology of 'intentional act' and 'intentional object' re-gained widespread currency in philosophical circles in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.

1.3 Brentano's Revaluation of the Scholastic Concept of Intentionality

Husserl first became acquainted with Brentano's doctrine of intentionality whilst attending Brentano's lectures at Vienna University from 1884–1886.[9] Brentano, however, had re-introduced (and modified) the Scholastic concept of intentionality some ten years previously, in his unfinished study of *Psychology from and Empirical Standpoint* (1874),[10] and had developed his thesis of intentionality in his lecture-courses on 'Descriptive Psychology' in the 1880s and in the early 1900s.[11] A characteristic of Brentano's thought, therefore, as Husserl correctly remarks, is that 'it never stood still'.[12] Indeed, before Brentano began teaching in Vienna University in 1874 and before the publication of his *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* in the same year,[13] Brentano had earned for himself a significant reputation as an Aristotelian scholar on the basis of two published works on Aristotle: namely, his 1862 doctoral dissertation *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle*, published in the same year, and his 1866 *Habilitationsscrift*

The Psychology of Aristotle, In Particular His Doctrine of the Active Intellect, published in 1867.[14] Hence Brentano's familiarity with Scholastic terminology.[15]

By the time Husserl began to attend Brentano's lectures in philosophy in Vienna University, therefore, Brentano's thinking had undergone several changes. First, Brentano had moved away from his original interest in Aristotle's metaphysics and psychology, in the 1860s, and towards matters of concern pertaining to the new budding natural science of empirical psychology, in the 1870s. Second, he was both advancing and applying his idea of 'descriptive psychology' to the founding of the normative disciplines of Ethics, Logic and Aesthetics in his lectures in the 1880s. Since it is in the context of 'descriptive psychology' that Brentano develops his new concept of intentionality, some general remarks about Brentano's novel idea of 'descriptive psychology' will be necessary.

1.4 Brentano's Distinction Between Descriptive and Genetic Psychology

According to Brentano, the natural science of empirical psychology can be divided up into two separate but component parts, namely, a 'descriptive psychology' and a 'genetic psychology'. The main task of 'descriptive psychology' is to describe clearly the phenomena for the science of empirical psychology. The main task of the 'genetic' part of the science of empirical psychology would be to then explain causally, by employing the method of the natural sciences, how such phenomena came into existence and went out of existence. Brentano borrowed this model of division from similar occurrences in the development of other natural sciences e.g. descriptive anatomy and physiology, geognosy and geogony (geology), and even coined the term 'Psychognosie' for the descriptive part of the science of empirical psychology.[16] Brentano takes 'psychical phenomena' to be the main subject-matter of empirical psychology, and by 'psychical phenomena' Brentano means all conscious-act experiences (*Erlebnisse*) and their features as they occur in 'the mentally active subject'. Thus the class of 'psychical phenomena in general' constitutes a very broad range of 'phenomena' for Brentano, such as, for instance, sensing, willing, thinking, judging, understanding, misunderstanding, loving, hating, fearing, hoping, taking an interest in an object, taking no interest in an object (indifference), acts of disinterest, and so forth. However, Brentano tells us in 'Book II Psychical Phenomena In General' of *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* that he found do much 'confusion' and 'even self-contradiction among eminent psychologists' over their very use and meaning of the terms 'physical and psychical phenomena' that the corresponding natural sciences of physics and psychology that deal with these two basic 'classes' of phenomena could not hope to advance as separate but definitive natural sciences of 'physical and psychical phenomena' respectively unless such confusion was removed.[17] Thus Brentano declares at the beginning of 'Book II Psychical Phenomena in General' that 'our aim is to clarify the meaning of the two terms "*physical phenomena*" and "*psychical phenomena*", removing all misunderstandings and confusion concerning them.'[18] In order to address this task, Brentano believed that the only way open to him was to return to the origin of the meaning of the terms 'physical and psychical phenomena' in our experiences of such phenomena themselves and to focus on and

hopefully arrive at *a priori* evident items of knowledge about 'physical and psychical phenomena' in order to rule out any possible misunderstanding of the meaning of these two central terms. Only in this way could 'complete clarity' between psychologists and other natural scientists be reached, and the 'confusion' over the domains of enquiry for psychology and other natural sciences, in particular the science of physics that has established itself as the science of 'physical physical phenomena [as] they manifest themselves in a pure state', removed.[19] The method of analysis that Brentano advocates for the descriptive part of the science of psychology, then, is essentially different to the method of observation, hypothesis and experimentation that is characteristic of the method of the natural sciences. *A fortiori* Brentano's descriptive method is essentially different to the genetic part of the science of empirical psychology. Instead of seeking empirically verifiable knowledge-claims that are both generally and hypothetically true for the most part about 'matters of fact', the science of descriptive psychology seeks to establish a unified system of intuitively grounded, *a priori* self-evident knowledge-claims about pure psychical-act experiences themselves.

Sometime after 1874, however, Brentano believed that his 'descriptive method' could be used to found the meaning of basic concepts employed in the normative sciences of Logic, Ethics and Aesthetics. This becomes the second function of descriptive psychology; one that is not tied to the preparation of the subject-matter for the empirical science of psychology.[20] Rather, the task now is to clarify the origins of our normative concepts in and through descriptive *a priori* analyses of consciousness since the method of the natural sciences, which concerns itself with 'matters of fact', as Hume would put it, is clearly inappropriate to accomplish this task. Laws of norm, Brentano insists, are to be sharply distinguished from laws of fact. In this regard, Brentano joins in the 'back to Kant' movement that emerged in Germany in the 1880s. It was at this time, then, when Brentano was developing further his idea of applying his 'descriptive method' to matters concerning the normative disciplines of Logic, Ethics and Aesthetics that Husserl attended his lectures.[21]

1.5 Brentano's Descriptive-Psychological Modification of the Scholastic Concept of Intentional Act

The particular 'revaluation' of the scholastic concept of intentionality, which Husserl alludes to in his 1931 Author's Preface to the first English translation of *Ideas* (1913), concerns Brentano's adaptation of the scholastic theory of the object-relatedness of acts of the will into a basic descriptive-psychological tenet regarding the object-relatedness of *all* psychical-act experiences (*Erlebnisse*) that are characteristic of human consciousness. About this adaptation, Brentano himself remarks in *The Origin of our Knowledge of Right and Wrong*, which was a lecture that Brentano delivered before the Vienna Law Society on January 23, 1889, and which he published in the same year:

> The common feature of everything psychological often referred to, unfortunately, by the misleading term 'consciousness' (*Bewußtsein*), consists in a relation that we bear to an object. The relation has been called *intentional*; it is a relation to something which may not be actual but which is presented as an object. There is no

> hearing unless something is heard, no believing unless something is believed; there is no hoping unless something is hoped for, no striving unless there is something that is striven for; one cannot be pleased unless there is something that one is pleased about; and so on, for all the other psychological phenomena.[22]

In a note about his use of the term 'intentional', which Brentano added to the published text of the above lecture, Brentano informs us: 'The expression "intentional", like many other of our more important concepts, comes from the Scholastics.'[23] Indeed, Brentano is correct to note that the term 'intentional', when it designates the directedness of the activity of the human will towards its objectives (*in aliud tendere*), is employed by the Scholastics in their theory of the will. This theory of *intention* is probably best captured by St Thomas in his well-known definition: '*intentio est proprie actus voluntatis*'.[24]

The Scholastics, however, as Brentano well knew, did not hold the view that *all* of our *acts* of consciousness (or *all* of our psychical-act experiences (*Erlebnisse*) as Brentano prefers to name them) are characteristically 'intentional' acts. In Scholasticism, acts of knowledge, for example, are not regarded *per se* as intentional acts, though clearly reliant, generally speaking, on the will of the knower to engage in such acts (though involuntary knowledge is not denied by Scholastics); rather, acts of the intellect are regarded as abstractive acts by nature. That is to say, in cognition, intelligibility is elicited from data presented by the knower through the exercise of the agent intellect. In this way, the knower becomes a knower of such things in and through his or her acts of understanding. This results in a modification of the knower's potential to know that-which-is-knowable. Thus before, during and after this process, both knower and that which is potentially intelligible retain their specific natures and their ontological integrities. The *immanent* 'striving' or 'impulse after' achieving its own ends or goals that is characteristic of the dynamic of the will, then, is characteristically *not found* in acts of the intellect. What is found characteristic of acts of knowledge, however, is the abstractive activity of its operations because of the discovery (*in-venio*) dimension in acquiring items of knowledge that is the hallmark of (genuine) knowledge in Scholastic epistemology.

The Scholastics did not regard acts of sensation as intentional acts either. Such acts occur without the will or the intelligence of a human being. Rather, when a human being comes into contact with 'physical things' in the external world, the potencies of the sensitive soul (*anima sensitiva*) of that living being are activated. This encounter between 'physical things in the external world' and 'the embodied sensitive soul of the human being', as Brentano points out in his 1866 study of Aristotle's psychology, demonstrates for Aristotle and the Scholastics the corporeal nature of the sensitive soul (in man). This also explains why the modern problematic of bridging the gap between consciousness and the external world does not appear in Scholasticism, nor in Brentano's 1866 study, for sense *knowledge* is founded in the actual sensation of *physical things in the external world*. Brentano himself both examines and defends the intricacies of the co-operation between acts of sensation and acts of cognition, that were analysed by Aristotle and the Aristotelians, in his 1866 habilitation thesis on *The Psychology of Aristotle, in Particular His Doctrine of the Active Intellect*.

Brentano's descriptive-psychological view in 1889 that *all* of *our* psychical-act experiences—however we are to account for their appearance (and their differences) in consciousness—can be called 'intentional acts', therefore, clearly deviates not only from Scholastic theory of cognition and from Scholastic theory of volition but also from the clear distinctions that the Scholastics drew between acts of sensation, acts of cognition (where sense-knowledge of 'physical things' is one form of knowledge, and quite a low form of knowledge at that) and acts of volition. Indeed, Brentano's expansion of the Scholastic term 'intentional act' in the elaboration of his new science of descriptive psychology and the very 'choice of the words "act" and "intentional" led to his being grouped with the followers of Schopenhauer as a "hormic" psychologist, for whom "objects" are purposes, or ends, and "acts" are the impulses which strive towards those ends'.[25] Brentano, however, clearly means no such thing. Rather, Brentano's point is a straightforward point but it does require that we pay attention to the way psychical-act experiences (in consciousness) present themselves as acts specifically directed towards *their* objects. This 'thesis' or descriptive-psychological 'tenet', therefore, is verifiable and *only* visible on the *methodological* basis of inner reflection on the nature of such psychical-act experiences themselves of a mentally active subject. What this thesis concerning the 'intentionality' of consciousness amounts to philosophically, in terms of realism and idealism, however, can be set aside for the moment. One thing is certain, nevertheless, the arrow of intentionality, as understood by Brentano in his 1889 lecture, does not extend *outside* of consciousness but remains within the modern principle of immanence as defined and defended by Descartes and Locke. In other words, for Brentano, as it was for Descartes, Locke and Hume before him, access to consciousness through 'inner perception', by which Brentano really means inner reflection, is 'peculiarly direct and certain as compared with our knowledge of anything else'.[26]

Setting aside the major *difference* between the meaning of the term of 'intention' when it refers to the Scholastic-volitional concept of intentionality and Brentano's descriptive-psychological concept of the intentional relation of all psychical-act experiences, it is quite clear that in his 1889 lecture Brentano is stressing the point that what is characteristic of 'consciousness'—notwithstanding his reservation about using the 'misleading' term '*Bewußtsein*'—is the *peculiar kind of relation* that acts of consciousness bear to their objects, one that can be called '*intentional*'. This, then, appears to be why Brentano believes that he is justified in borrowing the term 'intentional' from the Scholastics as a way of describing consciousness because all psychical-act experiences that occur within consciousness, from within a descriptive-psychological perspective, bear an *immanent* relation (a directedness) to their objects. Thus Brentano believes that he is not deviating in any significant sense from *the meaning* of the term 'intentional' in *his use* of this term to describe the directedness (or the referential characteristic, or 'aboutness' of consciousness, as it is sometimes called) of *psychical-act* experiences towards their objects as exhibiting an *intentional* relation (*intentionale Beziehung*). Nevertheless, for Brentano, the meaning of this term, as it employed in descriptive psychology—as with all terms employed therein—must be checked against intuition itself; that is to say, in this instance, against the experience of one's own actual psychical-act experiences themselves, and not against the Scholastic

theoretical concept, or against any other theoretical construction. This is the descriptive method to which Brentano commits himself. Such a view of intentionality, then, does not mark any epistemological 'realist turn (Scholastic or otherwise)' towards the 'object'. Rather, it is a descriptive-psychological thesis about the nature of the acts themselves. In sum, for Brentano, the object-relatedness or directedness of the activity of intentional consciousness towards its objects in consciousness really depicts the (passive) possession of consciousness of *its* objects or *its* contents.

1.6 Brentano's Descriptive-Psychological Concept of Intentional Object

When Brentano first re-introduced the Scholastic terminology of intentionality in *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (1874), however, he did not deploy the term 'intentional' as an adverb, qualifying the activity of the *relation* of consciousness to its objects, rather he employed the term intentional as an adjective, qualifying the *object* in consciousness. Here, in what is probably one of the most quoted passages from *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, Brentano famously remarks:

> Every psychical phenomenon is characterised by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction towards an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every psychical phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love [something is] loved, in hate [something is] hated, in desire [something is] desired and so on.[27]

The above 1874 passage has evoked an immense amount of discussion and disagreement among commentators and critics concerning what exactly Brentano is saying, what he is not saying, what he means to say, what he does not mean to say, what is meant in the passage, and what is not meant in the passage.[28] Without endeavouring to unravel such controversy, it is fairly easy to grasp what *Brentano himself* believes he is saying in the 1874 passage, even if what he says is put in a somewhat cumbersome manner.

In the 1874 passage Brentano appears to say the following. The defining characteristic of 'psychical phenomena' (i.e. of actual acts of sensing, thinking, judging, desiring, loving, hating, willing, fearing, etc.), when compared to 'physical phenomena' (by which Brentano means actual sensorially perceivable qualities of outer sense perception, such as colours, sounds, odours, etc., as well as all intended objects of all psychical-act experiences i.e. thought-objects, loved objects, logical concepts! etc.,) is that each and any psychical-act experience that occurs for a mentally active subject refers to that object or to that content, or is inextricably directed towards that object or towards that content, and that *that object or that content* can be described as having mental or intentional or immanent inexistence. Such an object or content is not to be understood as having any kind of real, substantial existence outside (independently) of the mind, nor, indeed, as

having any kind of real, substantial-objective existence inside the mind (or in the brain). Rather, it is to be understood as an immanent objectivity of the psychical-act experience itself, and so it can be described—and here *Brentano believes that he is concurring with Scholastic usage*—as having 'intentional', that is to say, 'mental inexistence', in comparison to any kind of 'real', 'actual', 'substantial' (in)existence in the mind or 'real', 'actual', 'substantial' existence outside of the mind.[29]

In the 1874 passage, then, Brentano defines psychical-act experiences, employing no less than 'five typifying expressions'.[30] Every psychical phenomenon is characterised by (1) the intentional inexistence of an object, (2) the mental inexistence of an object, (3) an immanent objectivity, (4) reference to a content, and (5) direction towards an object. Expressions (1), (2) and (3), as De Boer notes, 'are fully synonymous'. These expressions all point to the fact that psychical-act experiences 'include a content' and that 'this content is more precisely defined as intentional or immanent or mental'.[31] All of these expressions, then, point to the mental immanence of objects in any given (temporal) psychical-act experience.

Expressions (4) and (5) are different aspects of psychical-act experiences. They are concerned with the directedness or relation (*Richtung*, *Beziehung*) of psychical-act experiences towards a content or an object. In the 1874 passage, expressions (4) and (5) are understood by Brentano to be describing the same thing, namely, the object-relatedness of psychical-act experiences.[32] Thus Passmore is correct to note that Brentano takes 'these phrases [i.e. (4) 'direction towards an object' and (5) 'relation toward a content'] to be synonymous'.[33] However, according to Brentano himself, out of all the characteristics of the psychical expressed in the 1874 passage, it is the fact that a psychical-act experience *contains an object intentionally within itself* that enables us to positively identify and clearly distinguish 'psychical phenomena in general' (i.e. sensing, thinking, willing, hoping, desiring, fearing, understanding, remembering etc.) from 'physical phenomena in general' (i.e., colours, sounds, odours etc.). Brentano makes this very clear in the passage immediately following the 1874 passage, when he declares:

> This intentional in-existence is characteristic exclusively of psychical phenomena. No physical phenomena exhibit anything like it. We can, therefore, define psychical phenomena by saying that they are those phenomena which contain an object intentionally within themselves.[34]

What is characteristic *exclusively* of psychical-act experiences is that they contain the intentional in-existence of an object in them. In a later passage, Brentano re-iterates this claim informing us,

> in the first place [...] the term 'consciousness,' since it refers to an object which consciousness is conscious of, seems to be appropriate to characterise psychical phenomena precisely in terms of its distinguishing characteristic, i.e., the property of the intentional in-existence of an object, for which we lack a word in common usage.[35]

And,

> we use the term 'consciousness' to refer to any psychical phenomenon, insofar as it has a content.[36]

In his 1874 study, it is quite clear that the intentional object is understood by Brentano to be the directly *intended* object of an actual act, and that it is an object that remains *completely within* the specific psychical-act experience for the mentally active subject. What consciousness is a consciousness of ('*von welchem das Bewußtsein Bewußtsein ist*'), then, is an immanent or intentional or mental object.[37] Brentano, therefore, does not write about *die intentionale Beziehung* in this 1874 publication of *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, as many commentators intimate, but about '*die intentionale (auch wohl mentale) Inexistenz eines Gegenstandes*'. Thus 'intentional inexistence of an object' and 'psychical indwelling (*psychische Einwohnung*) are synonymous expressions denoting the particular mode of mental existence of the object in any given psychical-act experience of a mentally active subject. However, Brentano does speak about *die intentionale Beziehung* in his 1887 lectures on *Descriptive Psychology*. Nevertheless, in his 1874 study and in his lecture courses on *Descriptive Psychology* in the 1880s and early 1890s, the activity of the directedness of consciousness towards its objects is understood by Brentano in terms of a passive possession of intentional objects immanent to consciousness itself, and certainly not the 'sense-bestowing' activity (*Sinngebung*) of intentional consciousness that Husserl developed in his theory of constitution nor is it the theory of an 'intentional stance' that I adopt towards the real world as elaborated later by Dennett.

Nevertheless, after 1874, Brentano came to stress intentional consciousness as the direction of consciousness towards its object. This second thesis gained widespread dissemination through Husserl's deployment and elaboration. Indeed, *this* thesis of intentionality became so well known, that we find Heidegger both instructing and maintaining to his students in his 1927 lecture courses on *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* that,

> Comportments have the structure of directing-oneself-toward, of being-directed-toward. Annexing a term from Scholasticism, phenomenology calls this structure *intentionality*. Scholasticism speaks of the *intentio* of the will, of *voluntas*; it speaks of intention only in reference to the will. […] Franz Brentano in his *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* (1874), under the strong influence of Scholasticism, and especially of Thomas and Suarez, gave sharper emphasis to intentionality and said that the sum total of all psychical experiences could be and had to be classified with regard to this structure, the manner of directing oneself towards something.[38]

While it is philosophically true that Brentano emphasised the point that all psychical-act experiences could be and had to be arranged following *the way in which* such acts directed themselves towards their objects, the Scholastic term that Brentano actually annexes from Scholasticism in *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* is not the term

of '*intentio voluntatis*' but (a version of) the Scholastic metaphysical-epistemological concept of the abstracted form existing intentionally in the intellectual part of the knower's soul. The above Heideggerean reading of Brentano's thesis of intentionality, following the emphasis laid on it by Husserl in terms of intentional *act*—and one followed by several commentators today—omits and overlooks, however, the extensive re-working of the Scholastic metaphysical-epistemological concept of 'intentional (in)existence of an object'—and thus the implications of that re-working—in Brentano's *first thesis* of intentionality.

1.7 Brentano's First Thesis of Intentionality

About Brentano's 'first thesis' of intentionality, Herbert Spiegelberg, in his very influential article 'Intention and Intentionality in the Scholastics, Brentano and Husserl', remarks that,

> 'intentional' for Brentano refers to the property of an object which is immanent in consciousness in a way analogous to that in which the species are immanent in the Thomistic-Aristotelian theory of knowledge, with which Brentano had concerned himself a good deal.[39]

It is true, historically speaking, that in his early student days of philosophy, Brentano had concerned himself a good deal with Thomistic-Aristotelian theory of knowledge, as evidenced by his 1866 *Habilitationsschrift* on *The Psychology of Aristotle*. Again, it is true, textually speaking, that Brentano appended a footnote to the 1911 re-issued edition of *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, re-iterating what he took to be a point of agreement between his use of the concept of intentional inexistence in his 1874 passage and the original Scholastic epistemological doctrine of the intentional inexistence of an object *qua abstracted form* in the soul of the knower. In this footnote (which Spiegelberg draws our attention to, as do many commentators), Brentano complains about the reception, misinterpretation, and misunderstanding of the meaning of the concept of the intentional inexistence of an object immanent to consciousness which he had re-introduced. Brentano remarks,

> This expression had been misunderstood in that some people thought it had to do with intention and the pursuit of a goal. In view of this, I might have done better to avoid it altogether. Instead of the term 'intentional' the Scholastics very frequently used the expression 'objective'. This has to do with the fact that something is an object for the mentally active subject, and, as such, is present in some manner in his consciousness, whether it is merely thought of or also desired, shunned, etc. I preferred the expression 'intentional' because I thought there would be an even greater danger of being misunderstood if I had described the object of thought as 'objectively existing,' for modern-day thinkers use this expression to refer to what really exists as opposed to 'mere subjective appearances'.[40]

Brentano is quite correct to insist that, as he uses the Scholastic concept of the 'intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object' in the 1874 passage, the term intentional does not carry with it any connotation *whatsoever* of the meaning of the term intention when used to denote the conscious pursuit of a planned end. The characteristic feature of all psychical acts is not that they are purposive or aim at something. Such a meaning of intention, which is employed in Scholastic theory of the will and in ordinary everyday discourse, is clearly *not the one* that Brentano uses *at all* in the 1874 passage. Rather, the stress, as Brentano tells us himself, lies on his deployment of the Scholastic metaphysical-epistemological concept of intentional (or objective) being in thought. And Brentano uses this term in order to distinguish the way objects thought, sensed, desired, willed, known, or shunned exist in some manner (i.e. intentionally, mentally) in the consciousness of a mentally active subject (as subjective appearances) in contrast to the way objects really exist independently of consciousness, or extra-mentally as the Scholastics had held. In another footnote to his use of the term 'intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object' in the 1874 passage, Brentano confirms for us that here he believes himself to be in agreement with Aristotle.

> Aristotle himself spoke of this psychical indwelling (*psychische Einwohnung*). In his books on the soul he says that the sensed object, as such, is in the sensing subject; that the sense contains the sensed object without its matter; that the object which is thought is in the thinking intellect.[41]

The above self-interpretation and specific emphasis by Brentano concerning both his use of and adherence to the Scholastic epistemological concept of 'intentional in-existence of an object' in the consciousness of a mentally active subject would seem to corroborate and confirm Spiegelberg's interpretation that the concept is being employed by Brentano to mark primarily an ontological characteristic of immanence of objects known in the knower, in an analogous fashion to the way in which the *intentio* or *species* is used in Scholastic theory of knowledge. The objects of immediate sense and of thought do not have real existence but intentional existence (in the mentally active subject).[42] Indeed, Chisholm's characterisation of this part of Brentano's doctrine of intentionality as an 'ontological thesis' reinforces such an interpretation. According to Chisholm, what Brentano's doctrine emphasises is that any object of thought, or of sense, or of whatever, when considered as such, has 'a mode of being (intentional inexistence, immanent objectivity, or existence in the understanding) that is short of actuality but more than nothingness'.[43]

Brentano's self-interpretation, Spiegelberg's commentary and Chisholm's explication of Brentano's use of the Scholastic concept of intentional inexistence, however, overlook significant differences between the way in which the intentional object of sense-knowledge, *qua species*, is said to be intentionally present in the soul of the knower in Thomistic-Aristotelian epistemology and the way in which Brentano in the 1874 passage now regards the presence of the intentional object of sense (and *a fortiori* of any intentional object) as an immanent content residing in consciousness. For brevity, I will draw attention only to two main points of difference between Brentano's 'new' concept of 'intentional (in)existence of an object' and its original birth certificate concept in

Scholastic philosophy. This should lead one to recognise, beyond any doubt, the 'originality' of Brentano's first thesis of intentionality.

First, in Thomistic-Aristotelian theory of sense knowledge, the *intentio* or *species*, or *imago*, when considered as the abstracted form of sense residing intentionally and immanently in the soul of the knower, is precisely *not the object that is directly known as such*.[44] Rather, it is through such 'instruments' that we know the real object. In Scholastic epistemology, it is 'physical things in the external world', to use Brentano's terminology from his previous 1866 study of Aristotle, which are the direct and real objects of acts of sense knowledge. From an Aristotelian-Thomistic perspective, what the knower knows first and foremost is not the immanent contents (or activities) of one's own outer perceptual-sense experiences, the 'sensed object as such' as Brentano puts it in 1874, but 'physical things in the external world' as he had put it in 1866. And in Scholasticism, 'abstracted forms', *qua phantasmata*, are not '*physical* phenomena'. Brentano's new view that the object of outer perceptual-sense experience is an intentional object agrees with the original Scholastic concept of *species* as abstracted form in the sense that it is mind-dependent for its very existence on the actuality of consciousness, and this intentional object of sense *as such*, as Brentano stresses, *must not be confused with the real thing (res) existing outside of the mind*. However, unlike the Scholastic account, this intentional object of outer sense perception is *the end term* of outer sense perception for Brentano. For Brentano, then, 'physical phenomena' (colours, sounds etc) exist intentionally (mentally) and only intentionally (mentally) in relevant acts of sensation and are known as such in these acts. This is a completely unScholastic-Aristotelian position. And since, according to Brentano, we take colours and sounds to be existing 'naturally' in 'real objects' that are given to outer sense perception but such colours and sounds do not *in fact* 'really and truly' exist like that at all when we are not aware of them, as demonstrated by natural scientists, because they exist as atoms, light-rays, light particles, sine waves etc. then outer sense perception is *literally and inherently mis-leading* (*Falsch-nehmung*). Brentano's view that outer sense perception is naturally and indelibly misleading is a completely unScholastic-Aristotleian epistemological position. All of this, however, is to be explained by the fact that by 1874 Brentano has relinquished *entirely* any Aristotelian theory of abstraction and, in its stead, adopted some version of direct mental (Cartesian) representationalism against a background acceptance of the 'facts' discovered by the theoretical standpoint adopted by the natural sciences. The crucial link in scholastic-epistemological theory between the intention (understood as the abstracted form of sense) and the real object existing extra-mentally, therefore, is completely severed in Brentano's account. Brentano's 1874 doctrine on the immediate object of outer sense perception as that-which is *known* as such and as existing intentionally in the consciousness of the knower marks a significant deviation from any Thomistic-Aristotelian Scholastic epistemological realist theory of *adaequatio rei et intellectus* or of *adaequatio intellectus ad rem*.

For Brentano, then, the phrase 'intentional inexistence' in his 1874 passage means one thing and one thing only, namely, the mental indwelling of objects immanent to acts of consciousness. Like the Scholastics, Brentano uses this metaphysical designation to *oppose* the way such intentionally (mentally) existing objects are in consciousness in

comparison to the way things are naturally and really exist as independent substances outside of one's actual powers of sensation and cognition. In scholastic theory of knowledge, 'physical things', such as matches, match-boxes, water and jugs, really exist in the world independently of our actual conscious activity and of our particular powers and capacity for knowledge. And such things can really exist in each other, e.g., 'matches in a match-box', 'water in a jug'. However, in the 1874 passage, Brentano does not quite follow the distinction and opposition that is set up in Scholastic theory of metaphysics between the intentional order of (in)being, *(in)esse intentionale*, and the natural order of one real substance existing really in another real substance, *esse naturale* or *esse naturae*.

For the Scholastics, the order of *(in)esse intentionale* is opposed to the real order *esse naturale* and is thus a general metaphysical distinction. The way a real thing can be said to be in another real thing—a match in the matchbox—denotes how one real thing can be in another real thing. On the other hand, the way one thing exists fluidly and incompletely in another thing but not really in that thing—the Sun is intentionally present in the light of day—denotes *(in)esse intentionale* (and not 'inexistentia intentionale'). However, 'intentional (in)existence' (as Brentano calls it), is discernible throughout the cosmos, for the Scholastics, e.g., daylight contains the Sun intentionally within itself, all cases of instrumental causality, where the agent is present in the instrument used, involves intentional union.[45] For the Scholastics, however, *(in)esse intentionale* is not an exclusive feature of the psychical. In Scholastic epistemology, the intentional in-dwelling of the abstracted form or intelligible species residing intentionally, as opposed to really, in the soul of the knower is *just one instance* where an 'intentional union' takes place between knower and real object that is known in the world, as Stein, Hayen and De Boer have all correctly reminded us. Indeed, the Scholastics appealed to this concept of intentional union in their theology as a way of 'understanding' the mystery of the triune God where the love of the Father for the Son and of the Son for the Father is manifested in and through the intentional indwelling of the Holy Spirit. Such an account retains the notion of 'three persons' 'in' the 'one substance' (but not three real substances in one substance or in one another). Brentano himself draws our attention to this very deployment of the concept of intentional in-dwelling by St Augustine and the Scholastics in an extended footnote, explaining the historical origins of the concept of 'intentional inexistence of an object' which accompanies the 1874 passage. In sum, in Scholasticism, 'intentional indwelling' denotes a relationship of incomplete identity between the object and the object in which the object is present, and it is a feature discernible throughout the cosmos.[46]

If we turn to Brentano's actual 1874 passage, however, we find that Brentano declares 'intentional inexistence' to be *exclusively* a characteristic of the indwelling of an object in any given psychical-act experience of a mentally active subject. Since such 'intentional (in)existence of an object' is understood by Brentano to be exclusively a feature of objects of consciousness, that is to say, of mental objects or mental contents, then the expressions 'intentional inexistence', 'psychical indwelling', 'mental existence', 'immanent objectivity' are all synonymous expressions for him. Such is not the case in Scholasticism. For the Scholastics, the way the sun is contained intentionally in daylight is not a 'psychical phenomenon', nor is the intentional indwelling of the woodcutter in

the axe used to cut down the tree a mental phenomenon. In the 1874 passage, therefore, Brentano *literally modifies and reduces* the scope and application of the Scholastic cosmic-metaphysical concept of intentional inexistence in an effort to describe the contents of acts of consciousness. Intentional inexistence in the 1874 passage means one thing and one thing only for Brentano, namely, the possession of immanent contents in psychical-act experiences. (Some modern philosophers of mind think that this is the only concept of intentional being in Scholasticism too.) With this *modification*, the feature of intentionality noted in the Scholastic general metaphysical concept of *esse intentionale* drops out in the elaboration of Brentano's modern philosophy of mind in the 1870s and from thereon. However, part of the *original* scholastic-metaphysical distinction that opposes intentional indwelling of abstracted forms (mind-dependent-existence) to the *actuality* of things existing really and truly in their own right, is still present in Brentano's 1874 passage, and most notably this opposition continues in Husserl's celebrated reduction of the natural standpoint to the transcendental-phenomenological standpoint in *Ideas* (1913) where the world that is given (known) to acts of outer perceptual-sense experience is famously, or infamously described by Husserl as having *only* an *intentional* mode of being (mind-dependent-existence) *for* consciousness in comparison to one's own actual consciousness which has absolute existence in its own right.

Part of the *new* meaning that Brentano attributes to the intentional object of sense in his descriptive psychology, and one that is *not found at all* in Scholasticism, nevertheless, is as the directly *intended* object of sense perception. Indeed, since all objects of any acts are regarded by Brentano as the intended objects *of those acts*, then all of the *actual* objects of sensation, volition, cognition, love, hate etc, from a descriptive-psychological perspective, are to be regarded *analytically* by Brentano as the *intentional* objects of those experiences, and *vice versa*, the intentional (intended) objects are the actual objects, something that is not possible in Scholastic philosophy but something that is not only possible but actual in all of Husserl's writings, and in Heidegger's coupling of '*intentio*' and '*intentum*' in his early lectures on phenomenology in the 1920s. This is also, however, something that invited both realist and idealist and 'neutral' interpretations of 'Brentano's thesis'.

1.8 Conclusion – The Scholastic Thesis and Brentano's First Thesis

The main purpose and function lying behind the Scholastic epistemological concept of '*intentio*' as the abstracted form of sense residing intentionally in the soul of the knower is to explain how the human being could know, i.e. abstract and possess, or take in the form of real objects existing extra-mentally, without becoming those objects. When I touch a stone lying on the beach and become cognoscent of the fact that it is a stone (and not a sea-shell as I originally believed), I do not thereby become a real stone because the abstracted form of sense, *through which* I know the stone, resides intentionally, and not really, in the intellect of the knower. Nevertheless, this transparent 'intention' or 'representative' makes possible an inner bond between the knower and the thing (the stone) in the external world, without either of these two terms in the relation losing their respective ontological identities and natures in the process of *adaequatio rei et*

intellectus. The knower thus becomes what he knows, *in a manner of speaking*, through an intentional union, not through a real union. In the 1874 passage, however, Brentano is clearly not attempting to defend or to elaborate upon any such Scholastic epistemological position, however much his own self-interpretation and historical allusions intimate.

Although Brentano would like us to believe that he concurs with the original meaning of the medieval-scholastic concept of 'intentional in-existence of an object' in the 1874 passage, this, in fact, is not the case. He deviates considerably from the meaning that this concept occupies in Scholastic metaphysics and epistemology. Indeed, the more commentators draw our attention to original the meaning which this concept of '(*in*)*esse intentionale*' and of '*intentio*' (*qua* abstracted form) may have had in ancient Greek and Medieval-Scholastic philosophical traditions, and the more we compare such accounts to the meaning that Brentano subscribes to in his employment of the concept of 'intentional inexistence of an object' in his 1874 publication of *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, the more we see a lack of agreement between Brentano's *concept* of the intentional in-existence of a object in the mentally active subject and the original Scholastic *concept*.

We cannot agree, therefore, with Sorabji's general approach to Brentano's thesis of the relatedness of the mind to intentional objects that 'it was the work of commentators, whether Christian, pagan, or Muslim [...] who made possible Brentano's interpretation and who lent authority to his important new proposal for the philosophy of mind'[47] because Brentano employs the term in a different context from that which it occupied in medieval scholasticism. The testimony of 'inner experience' and 'inner perception' is the final court of appeal for Brentano and for the meaning that he gives to the term intentional object in his 1874 psychology. Nor can we agree with Caston's alternative suggestion that if Brentano had read (properly) what the ancient Greeks had to say about intentionality, then he would have discovered that 'the ancient Greeks did have something to say about this topic, and their differences are both philosophical and relevant'.[48] Nor can we agree with Moran's suggestion that 'Brentano's views as a whole are best understood as a continuation of the Scholastico-Cartesian tradition', unless we prise apart exactly which features are Cartesian and which features are Scholastic-Aristotelian.[49] Rather, as Husserl had noted and re-iterated several times throughout his career, '(H)e [Brentano] presented to the modern era the idea of Intentionality, which he derived out of consciousness itself in immanent description.' Thus 'I [Husserl] see in the [Brentano's] transformation of the Scholastic concept of Intentionality a great discovery.'[50]

The 1874 passage, therefore, wherein Brentano re-introduces 'what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object', is best understood and better interpreted as an attempt by him to engage in descriptive-psychological analysis, that is to say, it reads like this: if we pay attention to any object that arises immediately within one's own intuitive sense of consciousness, one can evidently see that the object that is given or presented to such an experience is the intended object of such an actual psychical-act experience. Whether the intended object of a given psychical-act experience is a real object existing in like manner outside of the

mind is to be 'bracketed', to use Husserl's metaphor, in any descriptive-psychological investigation into the nature of psychical acts and their intended objects.[51] From a descriptive-psychological perspective, therefore, by the intentional inexistence of an object Brentano really means the intended object of any actual psychical-act experience that arises for a mentally active subject. All of this, as Husserl quite rightly points out, is 'derived out of consciousness itself in immanent description', and marks a major 'transformation [by Brentano] of the Scholastic concept of Intentionality.' And all of this, as Husserl also realised, though much later in his own career, *evades* rather than addresses any epistemological viewpoints on the question of either realism or idealism.[52]

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[1] According to Herbert Spiegelberg: 'It is true that when he [Brentano] uses the adjective "intentional" [in his 1874 *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, qualifying the kind of existence characteristic of the objects of consciousness, as is evident from the context] he still betrays traces of the scholastic doctrine about the immanence of the object known within the soul. But it was this very doctrine about the immanence of the object of knowledge in the soul which Brentano came to reject during what Brentano scholars call the crisis of immanence ("*Immanenzkrise*") of 1905.' *The Phenomenological Movement: a Historical Introduction* (3rd revised and enlarged edition, with the collaboration of Karl Schuhman, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994), p. 48, note 19. Thus it is possible for Brentano, whilst rejecting the immanent object theory of intentionality, to still defend the 'intentional acts' of consciousness after 1905, though 'as far as I [Spiegelberg] can make out, even the term "intentional" disappears from Brentano's psychological vocabulary (ibid.).'

[2] *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, trans. by Antos. C. Rancurello, D. B. Terrell & Linda L. McAlister (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973; Routledge, 1995), p. 88—henceforth abbreviated as *PES* in notes; *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* (Leipzig, 1874).

[3] Edmund Husserl, 'Author's Preface to the English Edition' of *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*, trans. by W. R. Boyce Gibson (London: Unwin & Allen, 1931), pp. 5–22 (p. 16–17); *Ideen* I, (1913), Husserliana vol. III/1; III/2 (1977). The significance of Brentano's initial discovery of the intentionality of consciousness, therefore, clearly cannot be underestimated, at least in Husserl's eyes, in any evaluation of the elaboration of his idea of phenomenology.

[4] Theodore De Boer, *The Development of Husserl's Thought*, trans. by Theordore Plantinga (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978); *Die ontwikkelingsgang in het denken van Husserl* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1966).

[5] For a defence of the Scholastic credentials of Brentano's 1874 thesis, see Ausiono Marras, 'Scholastic Roots of Brentano's Conceptions of Intentionality', in *The Philosophy of Brentano*, ed. by Linda L. McAlister (London: Duckworth, 1976), p. 128, note 4. What Marras successfully defends in his paper, however, is the Scholastic account, and not Brentano's account. Thus the major discrepancies between the Scholastic account and Brentano's 'new' thesis are not noted or discussed in his paper. Cf. also, Dale Jacquette, 'Brentano's Concept of Intentionality', in *The Cambridge Guide to Brentano*, ed. by Dale Jacquette (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) pp. 98–130. The merit of this more recent account is that it focuses on Brentano's Scholastic notion of 'immanent objectivity', however, no discussion of its scholastic credentials and the modification in meaning that Brentano actually makes to this concept is addressed in Jacquette's account. Jacquette seems to approve of Marras' treatment of Brentano's thesis. Cf. Jacquette, note. 5, p. 125. Thus the actual modification that Brentano introduces to the scholastic meaning of intentionality does not feature in Jacquette's paper.

[6] Cf. Dermot Moran, 'The Inaugural Address: Brentano's Thesis', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* Supplementary vol. LXX (1996), pp. 1–27. This commentator believes that Brentano's more immediate students (Twardowski and Husserl are named together) interpret Brentano's thesis more faithfully than modern day commentators who follow R.M. Chisholm's 'influential account' (p. 2).

[7] In his new 'Introduction' to the re-print of the English translation of Brentano's *PES* (Routledge, 1995), Peter Simons is of the opinion that it is Brentano's students, rather than Brentano himself, who are responsible for the unScholastic conception of 'intentional act' in modern late-nineteenth and early twentieth century philosophies of consciousness. Spiegelberg makes a similar judgement in the 1960s in his famous and widely consulted and re-issued study *The Phenomenological Movement: a Historical Introduction* (first edition, 1960, second edition, 1968, 1971 and 1976, third revised and enlarged edition,

Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994) that 'it was certainly none of Brentano's doing that this new wholly unscholastic *conception* [of intentional act] came to sail under the old flag of "intentionality" (1994, p. 37).' Spiegelberg believes that 'it is only in Husserl's thought that the term "intentional" acquired the meaning of directedness toward an object rather than that of the object's immanence in consciousness (p. 97).' This is not our view. See note 22 *infra*.

[8] After quoting in full Brentano's famous 1874 passage from *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, Moran, in his paper on 'Brentano's Thesis', immediately quotes a passage from Twardowski's 1894 study *On the Content and Object of Presentations*, as a gloss on Brentano's passage, and then proceeds to discuss and unpack Brentano's 1874 passage in light of elements that Twardowski distinguishes in his 1894 book between 'relation to a content' and 'direction to an object', a distinction which Brentano does not operate in his 1874 book, and in light of Twardowski's *1894 interpretation and understanding of intentionality*. Thus it is not 'Brentano's Thesis', as the title of this author's paper suggests, that is being elaborated and evaluated by this commentator, as it is Twardowski's thesis, which, in effect, returned Brentano's new thesis to its original Scholastic mould, as de Boer has remarked.

[9] Husserl tells us that these lectures led him to choose philosophy as 'my life's career'. Edmund Husserl, 'Reminiscences of Franz Brentano', in *The Philosophy of Brentano*, ed. by Linda L. McAlister, (London: Duckworth, 1976), pp. 47–55, (p. 47).

[10] Originally, Brentano had intended to write six books for *PES* but he only completed and published the first two 'Book I Psychology As a Science' and 'Book II Psychical Phenomena in General', in 1874. Nor did he return to writing the other four books. This incompleteness is significant, however. It marks Brentano's development of his idea of descriptive psychology towards clarifying the basis of concepts employed in the normative sciences of Ethics, Logic and Aesthetics, a task which he did not foresee in the mid 1870s as part of his new science of descriptive psychology.

[11] Cf. Franz Brentano, *Descriptive Psychology*, trans. and ed. by Benito Müller (London: Routledge, 1995); *Deskriptive Psychologie*, ed. by Roderick M. Chisholm & Wilhelm Baumgartner (Hamburg: Meiner, 1982). Brentano first delivered this lecture-course in Vienna in 1887–1888, and in the following two years 1888–1889 and 1890–1891. Hence Husserl never actually attended a lecture-course called 'Descriptive Psychology'. Müller informs us that '(E)ven though Husserl left Vienna by the time the present lectures were read by Brentano, he was in possession of a transcript (by Dr Hans Schmidkunz) of the 1887/8 lectures which is kept in the Husserl Archive in Leuven, Holland *viz* [Belgium] (call number Q10).' Introduction, Part I, *Descriptive Psychology*, p. xiii, footnote 14. Husserl does tell us in his 'Reminiscences of Franz Brentano' that the lecture courses wherein Brentano was developing descriptive-psychological analyses of concepts employed in Logic, Ethics and Aesthetics were the most memorable.

[12] Husserl, 'Reminiscences of Franz Brentano', p. 50. This explains the many reputations that followed Brentano, some of which were far from complementary. It also explains the various, different groups of students that departed from Brentano's teaching at different times in its evolution. The same can be said of Husserl's own thought. Different students and 'followers' developed his ideas at different times and in different directions in its evolution. However, few, if any of Husserl's students, actually followed Husserl on *his* path of thinking towards and in transcendental idealism.

[13] Brentano (1838–1917) had secured a full professorship of Philosophy at Würzburg University, in 1872, where he had been teaching philosophy since 1866. Disputes over papal infallibility and personal religious doubts about his vocation in the Roman Catholic priesthood in the 1870s, however, resulted in Brentano leaving the priesthood and his teaching post. He found it difficult to obtain a teaching post but he managed to obtain one in Vienna University in 1874, where he remained actively teaching for some 20 years. He retired as Privatdozent from the University of Vienna in 1895 but continued active in research and publication, up to the time of his death on March 17, 1917.

[14] Franz Brentano, *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle*, trans. by Ralph George (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975); *Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles*, (Freiburg, 1862), (doctoral dissertation, 1862); *The Psychology of Aristotle, In Particular his Doctrine of the Active Intellect*, trans. by Ralph George (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1977); *Die Psychologie des Aristoteles, insbesondere seine Lehre vom* νους ποιητιχος (Mainz, 1867), (*Habilitationsschrift*, 1866)

[15] Husserl informs us that when he arrived at Vienna University in 1884, he went to Brentano's lectures 'at first merely out of curiosity, to hear the man who was the subject of so much talk in Vienna at that time, but whom others (and not so very few) derided as a Jesuit in disguise, as a rhetoritician [*viz*], a fraud, a Sophist,

and a Scholastic' ('Reminiscences of Franz Brentano, p. 47). However, Husserl tells us that he was 'soon fascinated and then overcome by the unique clarity and dialectical acuity of his explanations, by the so to speak cataleptic power of his development of problems and theories. […] (M)ost impressive was his effectiveness in those unforgettable philosophy seminars. (I remember the following topics: Hume's *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, and *Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*; Helmholtz's lecture *Die Tatsachen der Warhnehmung* (*The Facts of Perception*); and Du Bois-Reymond's *Über die Grenzen des naturerkennens* (*On the Limits of the Knowledge of Nature*)' (p. 48). This is why John Passmore can remark, and all in the same breath, that 'Brentano was an Aristotelian, a scholastic-trained priest, as well as the continuator of Hume's *Treatise*; and his *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (1874) reinstated the objectivity characteristic of Aristotle and certain medieval philosophers.' *A Hundred Years of Philosophy* (London: Duckworth, 1957; Penguin Books, 1968; 1980) p. 176. Brentano, Passmore also notes, 'was an admirer of the British psychologizing tendency in philosophy, of Mill in particular, and a warm advocate of the view that psychology is the fundamental science' (p. 175–176).

[16] Cf. Brentano, *Descriptive Psychology*, Section 1 'Psychognosy and Genetic Psychology', pp.3–11, and Brentano's letter to his friend and former student Oscar Kraus' in 1895, published in Appendix to *PES*: 'My school distinguishes between *a psychognosy* and *a genetic psychology* (in distant analogy to geognosy and geology).' (pp. 369–370, trans. mod.) Cf. also, Spiegelberg *The Phenomenological Movement* (1994), p. 34.

[17] Cf. *PES*, Bk II, Section V 'A Survey of the Principal Attempts to Classify Psychical Phenomena', p. 77.

[18] *PES*, p. 77.

[19] *PES*, p. 77 and pp. 98–99.

[20] Cf. Theodore de Boer, 'The Descriptive Method of Franz Brentano: Its Two Functions and Their Significance for Phenomenology', in *The Philosophy of Brentano*, ed. by Linda L. McAlister, pp. 101–107.

[21] The significance of this development in Brentano's thought for Husserl's initiation and formation in philosophy is lucidly presented in de Boer's short but excellent article mentioned above.

[22] Brentano, *On the Origin of our Knowledge of Right and Wrong*, trans. by Roderick M. Chisholm & E. Schnerwind (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969) p. 14; *Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis* (Leipzig,1889). Towards the beginning of an earlier lecture in his lecture-course on 'Descriptive Psychology', courses that he first delivered in Vienna University in 1887–1888 and repeatedly in the following two years, Brentano made the same point to his students, remarking, and this time without any reservation about the term consciousness: 'the peculiarity which, above all, is generally characteristic of consciousness, is that it shows always and everywhere, i.e. in each of its separable parts, a certain kind of relation, relating a subject to an object. This relation is also referred to as 'intentional relation'. To every consciousness belongs essentially a relation.' *Descriptive Psychology*, p. 23.

[23] Ibid., p.14, note 19.

[24] The term 'intentio' is also, however, employed in Scholastic theory of knowledge and has an entirely different meaning to the one employed in their theory of the will. H. D. Siminon has undertaken a meticulous research of *both* uses of this term in St Thomas, and notes that St Thomas himself never confuses the two meanings of the one term when employed in either the cognitive or conative order. Cf. H. D. Siminon, 'La Notion d'"*intentio*" dans l'oeuvre de S. Thomas d'Aquin', *Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, 19 (1930), 445–463.

[25] John Passmore, *A Hundred Years of Philosophy*, p. 178.

[26] Ibid.

[27] *PES*, p. 88.

[28] Commentators have found any number of theses defining the psychical in this 1874 passage, from one to four. Victor Caston maintains that Brentano offers no definition at all of intentionality in this passage. Rather, Caston believes and stresses the point that 'Brentano does not attempt to *define* intentionality. Instead, he appeals to medieval terminology to indicate what he is talking about and then, by way of explication, offers three glosses of his own: (i) possessing content, (ii) being directed upon an object, and (iii) having the object present in the act. All three are metaphorical—in fact, the first appeals to the very same metaphor as the third.' V. Caston, 'Towards a History of the Problem of Intentionality Among the Greeks', in *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy*, Vol. IX, 1993, ed. by John. J. Cleary and William Wians (New York: University Press of America, 1995), 213–245 (p. 217).

[29] According to one recent commentary, 'Brentano held a model of the intentional relation, which may be illustrated as follows: psychic act – intentionally relates to – immanent objectivity (may or may not be real

thing).' Dermot Moran, *An Introduction to Phenomenology*, (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 57. This formula misconstrues Brentano's view, however. Whatever about the controversial issue concerning the ontological status of such mental immanent objectivities or, indeed, the very existence of such objectivities in the mind, Brentano never considered them to be ever 'real things'. Nevertheless, this model of understanding Brentano's thesis is still prevalent, as the following example illustrates. 'In its simplest form, Brentano's intentionality thesis describes an intentional relation projected from an act of thought to its intended objects. […] An act of thought about an apple is directed toward an apple. The desire for a houseboat aims at or is directed toward a houseboat […] built or yet to be built.' Dale Jacquette, 'Brentano's Concept of Intentionality', in *The Cambridge Guide to Brentano*, (2004) pp. 98–130 (p. 101).

[30] De Boer, *The Development of Husserl's Thought*, p. 6.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Passmore, *A Hundred Years of Philosophy*, p. 178. This blurring of the distinction was both a subject of dispute and a point of departure between Kasimir Twardowski's later version of intentionality elaborated in his 1894 publication *On the Content and Object of Presentations. A Psychological Investigation* (trans. R. Grossman) and Brentano's 1874 position.

[34] *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, p. 88–89.

[35] Ibid., p. 102.

[36] Ibid., p. 138.

[37] Such an intentional object, in Brentano's understanding, can be a 'physical phenomenon', such as a colour (as presenting in an act of outer sense perception) or a psychical-act experience (such as, an act of thinking, sensing, willing, hoping etc.). Hence all such relations are clearly understood by Brentano to be intra-psychical.

[38] Martin Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, trans. by A. Hofstader (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982) (*Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, Summer Lecture Course, Marburg, 1927), p. 58.

[39] Herbert Spiegelberg, '"Intention" and "Intentionality" in the Scholastics, Brentano and Husserl', in *The Philosophy of Brentano*, ed. by McAlister, (1976), pp. 109–127 (p. 122). Spiegelberg originally published this article in 1933/ 34 in German as 'Der Begriff der Intentionalität in der Scholastik, bei Brentano und bei Husserl'. It was revised without major changes in 1969, and translated into English in 1976 as 'Intention and Intentionality in the Scholastics, Brentano and Husserl'. It is referred to as 'the classic article' by Sorabji in his paper, 'From Aristotle to Brentano: The Development of the Concept of Intentionality', in *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, ed. Julia Annas (1991), *Supplementary Volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition*, ed. by H. Blumenthal and H. Robinson, pp. 227–259 (p. 247–248, note 116, though unfortunately, it is mis-titled in this note as '"Intention" and "Intentionality" in the Scholastics, Brentano and [*viz.*] Hegel'). Caston, in his paper 'Towards a History of the Problem of Intentionality among the Greeks' (1993) refers to Spiegelberg's article as 'a pathbreaking article of 1936' and that 'His [Spiegelberg's] results have so far been challenged only on points of detail; his overall approach, to the best of my knowledge, has not.' (p.218) I would like to draw attention, once again, to De Boer's study *The Development of Husserl's Thought* (1966 in Dutch, 1978 in English) which challenges many major and fundamental *points of detail* (and the approach) upon which Spiegelberg's influential interpretation of the concept of intentionality in the Scholastics, Brentano and Husserl rests.

[40] *PES*, footnote, p. 180–181 Cf. Spiegelberg, '"Intention" and "Intentionality" in the Scholastics, Brentano and Husserl', p.120–121.

[41] *PES*, p. 88, footnote, (English trans. modified: footnote on p. 125 of German text).

[42] According to Brentano in *PES*, there are two, and only two classes of phenomena, namely, physical and psychical phenomena that are given to two and only two corresponding forms of perception, namely, inner and outer perception. Psychical-act experiences are objects of inner perception (he really means the direct content of inner reflection) and physical phenomena (colours, sounds, odours etc.) i.e. sensorially perceivable qualities are objects of outer (sense) perception. Hence Brentano has no option, in his scheme of things, but to regard 'The thinking of a general concept', to use Brentano's example, as a 'physical phenomenon' because the concept cannot be an act itself. Setting this matter aside, I will confine my remarks to the Scholastic theory on intentional objects of sense because Brentano himself argues that all objects of psychical-act experiences, such as, for instance, colours, sounds, odours, as well as putatively grasped objects, such as, 'the thinking of a general concept' (p. 79), willed objects, shunned objects, loved

objects, and so on, exist univocally in consciousness in the same way as abstracted forms of sense are said by the Scholastics to exist intentionally or objectively in the intellectual part of the human soul in the process of obtaining knowledge about physical things in the external world. Husserl, however, prefers to distinguish the two types of phenomena that Brentano identifies as the 'primary object' and the 'content of reflection'. Cf. De Boer, *The Development of Husserl's Thought*, p. 18–19 note 2.

[43] R. M. Chisholm, 'Intentionality', *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, (1967), p. 201. According to Chisholm, 'There is a distinction between a man who is thinking about a unicorn and a man who is thinking about nothing; in the former case, the man is intentionally related to an object, but in the latter case he is not. What, then, is the status of this object? It cannot be an actual unicorn, since there are not unicorns. According to the doctrine of intentional inexistence, the object of the thought about a unicorn *is* a unicorn, but a unicorn with a mode of being (intentional inexistence, immanent objectivity, or existence in the understanding) that is short of actuality but more than nothingness and that [...] lasts for just the length of time that the unicorn is thought about (p. 201).

[44] I will confine my remarks to their theory on intentional objects of sense for reasons outlined in note 42 *supra*.

[45] Cf. James S. Alberston, 'Instrumental Causality in St. Thomas', *The New Scholasticism*, 28 (1954), 409–435.

[46] Cf., A. Hayen, *L'Intentionnel dans la philosophie de St. Thomas*, (Paris, 1942). Quoting St Thomas, Hayen remarks, 'Instrumentalis virtus [...] est fluens et incompleta in esse naturae.' Hence, as Hayen comments, 'La *virtus instumentalis*, ensuite, ne possède qu'une réalité fugitive, '*fluide*', mouvante, et pour ainsi dire 'spirituelle' au sens primitif du mot, qui oppose l'inconsistance d'un souffle aérien à la solidité du corps robuste et résistant (p. 98).' Intentional indwelling, then, denotes both a flowing and incomplete presence of the nature of one being in another being. The woodcutter who uses the axe to cut down the tree, for example, does not exist solidly, or naturally, or really 'in' the axe. Nor does the axe in use exist solidly, or naturally, or really 'in' the woodcutter, in the same way in which water exists naturally and really in a glass tumbler. Both the woodcutter standing beside the tree and the axe lying on the ground, in their natural order of being, are really distinct and separate realities. However, when the woodcutter picks up the axe and fells the tree, there is an intentional union (*unio intentionalis*) of both woodcutter and axe in each other. The woodcutter is now said to be present intentionally in the axe used and the axe is intentionally present in the woodcutter. Of course the woodcutter is also intentionally doing the action but this volitional concept of *intentio* as *tendere in aliud* is completely different and unconnected to the metaphysical concept of intentional (in)being.

[47] Sorabji, 'From Aristotle to Brentano: The Development of the Concept of Intentionality', p. 248.

[48] Caston, 'Towards a History of the Problem of Intentionality among the Greeks', p. 245.

[49] Moran, 'Brentano's Thesis', p. 27.

[50] Husserl, *Ideen III*, p. 59, quoted by J.C. Morrison, 'Husserl and Brentano on Intentionality', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 31 (1970), 27–46 (p. 27).

[51] This descriptive-psychological *epochē* must not to be confused with or identified as the transcendental-phenomenological *epochē* i.e. the cancelling of an erroneous belief in the thesis of the natural standpoint in Husserl's celebrated reduction.

[52] See previous note.

ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF *PHILIA*, ITS ACHIEVEMENTS AND ITS LIMITATIONS

JAMES MCEVOY

The greatest and most complete surviving ancient discussion of human relations may with profit be related to many themes of Aristotle's own philosophy. *Philia* is placed by Aristotle himself in relationship with a surprising number of other terms central to his thought. Only a few of these connections can be explicitated here, but enough to suggest the centrality and the richness of the account of affection, community and friendship given in the ethical writings (*Nicomachean Ethics; Eudemian Ethics;* the *Magna Moralia*).[1]

Achievements

Aristotle uses the noun *philia* (affection; fondness; devotion; friendship) and the verb *philein* to signify all the different kinds of relationships in which feelings and attitudes with regard to others receive a positive expression: among members of the same *deme*, or the same city; among fellow-soldiers or fellow travellers; between spouses and among members of the same family; between the king and his subjects; and between and among chosen friends—the strongest sense of *philia*. Although he appears to regard procreation as the ultimate source of all positive affection or *philia,* Aristotle chooses to speak of *erôs* only tangentially and by way of contrast with *philia;* indeed, *erôs* seems not to interest him save in its purely biological and procreative dimension. This option has the consequence of differentiating very sharply Aristotle's study of human relationships from Plato's with the latter's exaltation of the '*daimôn erôs' (Symposium, Phaedrus).* One is entitled to suppose that the distance taken by the former via-à-vis his teacher represented a deliberate option.

Life in the city-state presupposes that each citizen has a positive friendly disposition with regard to all his fellows, or in other words that legal justice can count upon a community of friendship as its own foundation. Aristotle shows that the different good and bad forms of constitution (*politeiai*) have each an immediate incidence upon the quality of communitarian *philia;* democracy, for example, has the decided advantage of favouring equality and trust, whereas under a tyranny trust is next to impossible (NE VIII 10, 1160a31-b24).

The lengthy digression on political constitutions is presented by its author as an instructive detour that leads back to the study of the family (*oikia*), bringing to the latter an enlighteningly macrocosmic perspective. Aristotle is firmly convinced that the family is the unchallengeably primary and basic unit of society. He gives a perceptive and differentiated analysis of the structures and functioning of *philia* within it (NE VIII 3, 1161b12-12, 1162a34).

Affection and friendship are structured by the various kinds of good they realise in an association of two or more people; hence the analysis of the types of *philia* is carried out with reference to the finality that is specific to aiming at something useful, or something pleasant, or simply at the good (the friendship of virtue) (VIII 2, 1155b25 ff.). Finality is therefore just as prominent in the discussion of friendship and of human relations as it is in all the other aspects of Aristotelian moral and political theory.

 Maynooth Philosophical Papers 3 (2006), pp. 75-80.

Friendship between people of virtue (*epieikoi, spoudaioi*) is presented in NE VIII and IX as being the highest moral achievement of humans, and as including both pleasure and advantage (NE VIII 3, 1156b22-25). Friendship is intimately associated with virtue; vice, on the other hand, renders it impossible. Aristotle at no point describes *philia* as being one moral virtue among others (justice, temperance, prudence...), instead he expresses his conviction that 'good people seem actually to become better by putting their friendship into practice. . . "Noble deeds from noble men"' (IX 12, 1172a14).

Even though the vicious are incapable of friendship, *philia* remains in the eyes of Aristotle a universal expression of the natural sociability of man: 'Man is a "political" being and designed by nature to live with others' (NE 9, IX 1169b16). That humans have a natural, positive affective inclination towards each other is a principle of his ethical science, that is to say, an ultimate and indemonstrable presupposition, one which casts its own intelligible light upon human behaviour in general, and in particular on the appropriateness (*to oikeion*) which is expressed in all right and good relationships that come about between or among people.

Philia has a strong relationship to nature (*physis)* from which it derives an inherent note of generosity or giving. It is a singular and significant feature of Aristotle's thinking that he refers on three occasions to the example of the affection between mother and child, for a sort of paradigm of 'friendship'. Recourse is had to this, the most natural form taken by *philia* (by 'natural' he means the affection that has the deepest physiological and psychological resonances in both), in order to show that *philein* (in this context, 'to be fond of'', 'to cherish'), consists essentially more in loving than in being loved, or in other words that love consists more in giving than in receiving (VIII 8, 1159a28; cf. 12, 1161b27 and IX 7, 1168a25). The example that underpins this thesis, that of mother and child, is undoubtedly meant to convey the more general truth that all expressions of *philia,* all manifestations of love and friendship, are rooted in a profound natural capacity, the capacity to give affection to others.

Aristotle presents justice and friendship as being co-extensive, which means that both apply to the same group of people, i.e., all fellow-citizens (VIII 9, 1159b25). It is through the idea of equality that justice and friendship are related to each other. Admittedly, friendship in its highest achievement tends even to surpass equality by producing a sort of identity between friends—a truly similar consciousness. Empathy, the spontaneous experiencing of the *same* joy or the *same* sorrow, is the counterpart on the emotional level of the identity that is forged on the intentional level by the joint pursuit of the same thing (drinking or dicing together, or exercising, or hunting, or philosophising together, as the case may be (IX 12, 1172a4-5). In the proverbial terms which Aristotle admires, friends are 'one soul' (NE IX 8, 1168b7-8), and each friend is an 'other self' to the other(s) (NE IX 4, 1166a32; EE VII 12, 1245a30; MM II 15, 1213a12-13).

The development of friendship requires time, because intimacy (*synêtheia)* cannot be commanded but is of slow growth even in lives that have shared much experience (*suzên)*. The quality of lastingness over time is a criterion of true friendship, because of course good

character (*aretê*, virtue) is a lasting acquisition. People cannot be friends before they have eaten the proverbial 'peck of salt' together, Aristotle maintains. He has in mind a huge salt barrel out of which a pinch or two would be taken each time the friends dined together.

There cannot be friendship unless the 'friends have something in common', as Pythagoras had claimed—for community (*koinônia*) is created by the goods, or the pursuits, or the thoughts, which friends share; and community is what makes friends to be friends (NE VIII 9, 1159b31-35).

Freedom, in a double sense of the word, is of fundamental importance for friendship, in that we make, as mature adults, a deliberate choice of friends; and friends have and employ a freedom with each other (*parrêsia*) that is capable of offering truthful correction, spoken on the basis of intimate knowledge and trust. Well-judged action, and of course the self-knowledge on which that is founded, are the beneficiaries of the word spoken by a friend, who in certain respects knows one better, or at least more objectively, than one can know oneself, since one's judgement of oneself can easily be clouded by favour or underestimation. We can only see our own face only in a mirror; and we come to know ourselves better through the 'mirror' of a friend (*Magna Moralia* II 15, 1213a20-23).[2]

The more virtuous one is, and the more one becomes a friend of wisdom, the more will one need friends (or at least a friend) who know(s) one and to whom one can be generous: this is Aristotle's answer to the hesitation which troubled the Greek mind before him, as to whether the truly good man will be independent (*autarkos*) or whether some kind of dependence is compatible with full human self-realisation. As Aristotle sees things, we will require friends if we are to made progress on the roads of the knowledge of ourselves and of the love of others (NE IX 9, 1169b9-14). That double need, he believes, is not a weakness in the good man, even though it would most certainly be so in the case of a god.

People who love themselves (*philautoi*) merit contempt (IX 8, 1168a27); yet if one does not love oneself one cannot love others as one should. How is this paradox to be resolved? Aristotle argues that the self, considered as an object of love, is an equivocal entity. Self-love can be—will be—base and vicious if it consists only in indulging the lower, sensual self; on that level there can be no true perception of the other save as the complement of one's own desires, and as the indispensable means of assuaging them. On the other hand, if we love the better part of what we are as intellectual and moral beings, then our love is capable of meeting the other individual at the same high level, and of loving in that other person what we love in ourselves (IX 4). In other words, the quality of love which we extend to that other will be the same as the quality of the love we give to ourselves. 'A friend is another self', means that we love the friend as we love ourselves. Our good will towards our friend(s) will be the same as the willing of the good in regard to ourselves. It is only thus that renunciation is possible; one friend can cede to another advantages and honours because there is no competiton between them for things like that. And renunciation can lead a human being to sacrifice his own life in a glorious moment of heroic action, for the safety of his friends and fellow-citizens (IX 8, 1169a18-27). In this way self-love that is due and virtuous enables us to love another for that person's own sake, and so to will for that person the same

good things, generically speaking, that we wish for ourselves. To love a friend, in other words, is not a love different in kind from that by which one loves oneself.

Diogenes Laertius wrote: 'To the question how we should behave to friends [Aristotle] answered, "As we should wish them to behave to us"' (*The Life of Aristotle*, 5.21). This is, of course, nothing less than a form of the Golden Rule of love and good will.[3] The formula recorded by Diogenes is not to be found in the ethical writings of Aristotle himself. The restriction should be noted: reciprocity in the actions of good will *is expected of friends and is due to them only*. In friendship, Aristotle insisted, good will is mutual and is mutually known; it is exercised through acts and wishes of reciprocal beneficence. Hence it would not be surprising if this saying were authentic, since reversibility of direction follows immediately upon the idea of equal, mutual good will: friendship at its height can take the attitude and action of either party as the noble norm regarding the other—since mutual good will, together with mutual awareness of goodwill, stipulates equality of regard and likeness in generosity on either side.

Aristotle's philosophical probings, when they are at their most scientific, seek to delimit by appropriate demarcations the object of the particular discusssion in which he is engaged. As we might expect, this methodological requirement has left more than one trace in his enquiry into human affection and friendship. Early on in NE VIII he refuses to consider the cosmological use of *philia* which Democritus had sought to establish, on the grounds that ethics is the science of human action only (VIII 1, 1155b2-10). Later on in the discussion the motif of distance enables him to achieve further delimitations of his enquiry. That extreme distance makes friendship impossible is seen: (a) metaphysically, in the strict impossibility of there being a friendship between a god and a human (VIII 7, 1159a5); (b) socially, in that no friendship is possible with a slave qua slave (NE VIII 11, 1161b38-8); and (c) geographically, since notable separation, if prolonged, makes friendship unsustainable, by excluding all the active exchange in which the *energeia* of friendship consists (VIII 5, 1157b10-13). Proximity of some kind, and even similarity, are prerequisites of friendship.

Diogenes Laertius informs us that Aristotle stood at the fountainhead of Greek paroemiography with his lost work *On Proverbs*. He maintained that proverbs were relics of early philosophy which survived the disasters that have periodically disrupted civilisation. Thus they are carriers of higher thought in simple form. Friendship and kindred themes find a place in the proverbial wisdom of every people, and Aristotle relied heavily on them in his discussions of friendship, quoting ten proverbs in the NE and four more in EE as well, as quasi-proverbial sayings from the poets. He endeavoured to raise up traditional sayings such as 'one soul', 'friendship is equality', 'what friends have is in common' and 'the friend is another self', to the high level of his own philosophical thought. In doing so he granted a kind of authority *sui generis* to popular, pre-philosophical wisdom, while trying to raise the latter to the level of universality and causal explanation he required of philosophical discourse.

In the last analysis, if we posit an equation between the practice of philosophy and the highest communion of friendship that is attainable by man, we rejoin the perspective of Aristotle himself. The word *philia* is, after all, a constituent part of the name *philo-sophia,*

and the latter is nothing other than the highest human virtue, *theôria* or speculative achievement, in the course of being actualized. It is perhaps only by means of this equation between friendship and philosophy that we are enabled to recover the deepest underlying sense of the dictum with which the discussion of friendship opens: 'Friendship either is virtue or involves it' (NE VIII 1, 1155a2). It should not be forgotten that in the NE, at any rate as we have the work, the discussion of *philia* is located between that of the moral and social virtues and pleasure, on the one hand, and that of speculative virtue or the contemplation of truth, on the other. This suggests that friendship is a sort of school of ethical goodness, and at the same time the appropriate setting, the intimate daily presupposition and accompaniment of life within the school of philosophy.

Limitations

Aristotle succeeded in offering an account of human affective relationships, one in which he had no predecessor in terms of method, completeness and overall unity, and which in many respects was not to be surpassed in antiquity. Granted the historical and hermeneutical distance we have gained from it we can perhaps detect the real limitations that surround the greatness of his achievement.

The limitations which I have in mind concern principally the range of the kinds of 'otherness' that are thematized in the Aristotelian discussion of *philia*. I shall attempt in what follows to provide the most cursory possible synopsis of these.

The notion of others as members of the same species lies behind Aristotle's use of the term *oikeion* to designate the spontaneous recognition that each one has of his affinity with any other *anthrôpos*. Man has this perception even more strongly than do the members of the other animal species, and *phil-anthrôpos,* Aristotle tells us, is a term of commendation for particular people who have more of kindly feeling for their fellows than do most. The limitation that holds this idea firmly down is of course the biological reference to the species; *the other* is thought of here as being *the same* as ourselves in the shared, physical characteristics of what makes us human. Stoic *philanthrôpia* on the other hand will be directed by the sage to the other who possesses the same *humanity*, all men being equally participants in the one divine Logos; but the moral content and the universal implications of *philanthrôpia* lie outside of Aristotle's anthropological horizon—largely because it transcends the city-state with its definite but limited range of relationships, and does so furthermore in virtue of the Stoic metaphysics of unity (one divinity, one humanity).

Woman, the sexual 'other' of the man, is appreciated at the strictly moral level of spouse and mother. Human realisation may be found equally in both husband and wife, at the level of moral virtue (NE 12, VIII 1162a16-34). However, the perception of otherness that would admit the woman as the equal of the man in the things of the mind and spirit (i.e. intellectual virtue) is wholly absent from Aristotle's study of *philia*.

The difference constituted by the generations and by the degrees of kinship within the extended family structure (father and child; mother and child; brother and sisters among themselves; cousins) is well brought out (NE 12, 1161b2-1162a34). The other as citizen of

the same *polis* is given due consideration. However, the slave as such ('a living tool') is thought of as the opposite of the free man, and only secondarily as another human being. Again, god is so totally 'other' in relationship to man that no exchange, no unity or community, is possible between them—no mutual friendship, no alliance, no intimacy (NE VIII 7, 1159a5-6). A further kind of 'otherness' is that which opposes, morally speaking, the virtuous and the vicious, and which makes equality or similarity impossible as between them.

The 'otherness' of other Greek peoples is of course thematized in the *Politics*. However, the non-Greek tribes and peoples (including the Celts) are presented there as being so different from the Greeks, and so lamentably lacking in civilisation, that we are left to suppose that there could be no form of human community that would be capable of containing them both.

Even Aristotle, then, got so far but no further in the exploration of the difference that vitally constitutes each type of relationship between the self and the other.

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[1] The author of this article wishes to express his thanks to Mr Hugh O'Neill for the attention he paid to it in draft form.

[2] The example of the mirror is found only in MM, a brief work which does not enjoy the same high authority as the two greater Ethics. However, the substance of its teaching is Aristotelian and the example does not appear to distort the Stagirite's genuine thought.

[3] Jeffrey Wattles has useful things to say about the passage in question; see his *The Golden Rule*, Oxford U.P., New York/Oxford, 1996, pp. 37-39.

The Theory of Evolution from Darwin to Post-modernism.

J. Haydn Gurmin

Introduction:

The theory of evolution focuses much reflection on the ontological and metaphysical origins of creation. It is a theory which, according to Darwin and many leading neo-Darwinists, eradicates the need to look to a transcendent origin for our existence. In this regard the publication of the *Origin of the Species* in 1859 marks an anthropological turning point. Humanity is no longer viewed as 'a special act' of creation set apart from all other animals and held in being by a benevolent Creator. The Scholastic *analogia entis* loses its vertical stature. Humanity and all other animals evolve from the early 'pool' of life sharing this one common 'image and likeness'. This is a stark reality - a reality which has been debated since before the publication of the *Origin* up to the present Post-modernist era.

Engaging with the debate I shall primarily consider some of the historical developments which lead to the emergence of the theory of evolution in order to situate the theory within a social, cultural and scientific context. The historical developments of the emergence of the theory of evolution chronologically call for us to outline:

i) the scientific theories in existence prior to the publication of the theory.
ii) Darwin's realisation of the possibility of 'transmutation' which takes place on the Voyage of the *Beagle*.
iii) The publication of *On the Origin of the Species* in 1859.
iv) The current neo-Darwinian developments.

Having situated the theory and its developments, I shall outline the varying points of contention that exist in relation to the veracity of the theory itself. Moreover, the theory of evolution has been posited as a world-view by a number of neo-Darwinian academics – a world-view which calls for the end of belief in Providence and a transcendent Creator. Post-modern criticisms come to bear on this movement from evolution as a biological theory to evolutionism which manifests itself as an 'ideological creed to account completely for the coming into existence of all living things.'[1]

Finally, some concluding remarks will be made with regard to the ongoing debates and the success or otherwise of the neo-Darwinian claim that the theory of evolution explains the metaphysical 'why' of being.

Historical Considerations:

i) The nineteenth-century Scientific World-View

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The scientific community of Charles Darwin's era were in many ways wedded to a theocentric world-view where the cosmology of *Genesis* and a belief in the literal historicity of Scripture held sway. Many of the leading scientists of the day were debating the impact of the flood of *Genesis* on the earth's geological composition. One of the more interesting questions to be raised was how various animal species had reached remote regions of the world after such a universal catastrophe.[2] It is perhaps surprising to note that little over a hundred years ago the vast majority of scientists were completely at ease intellectually with a paradigm of the past which required innumerable miraculous or supernatural events.

However, this consensus in favour of *Genesis* was not universal. There were a number of intellectuals who questioned this world-view. The possibility of the transmutation of the species had been considered by the French biologist Buffon in the mid-eighteenth century and later by another French biologist, Jean-Baptiste Lamarck. Lamarck published his *Philosophie Zoologique* in 1809. His work described how creation is in a constant state of advancement. However, the most famous aspect of Lamarck's theory consists in his belief in the inheritance of acquired characters which can be passed on from the phenotype to the genotype. Another, eminent dissenter from the *Genesis* view was Darwin's grandfather Erasmus, described by many as being a flamboyant physician, botanist and poet. Erasmus had contemplated the 'common ancestor' hypothesis in his work *Zoonomia,* he states 'would it not be too bold to imagine...that all warm blooded animals have arisen from one living filament?'[3]

Charles Lyell's publication of the *Principles of Geology Being an Attempt to Explain the Former Changes of the Earth's Surface by Reference to Causes now in Operation* set about to explain how the geological composition of the earth may have developed by small changes occurring over a vast periods of time. This theory of how the geological record was composed became known as the theory of uniformitarianism. While many geologists viewed this publication as heretical, Charles Darwin became convinced of the logic and descriptive analysis outlined by Lyell. *The Principles of Geology* became a *vademecum* for the young Darwin during his voyage on the *Beagle.*

For Darwin the *Beagle:*

> proved [to be] the turning point of his life, a liberating journey through time and space which freed him from the constraining influences of *Genesis* […] we know that Darwin had Lyell's *Principles of Geology* with him on the voyage and that it exerted a powerful influence on his thinking as the journey progressed. [4]

The twin concepts of gradualism and immense time are central to the thesis of Lyell's work on the geological record and strikingly are also fundamental to the idea of biological evolution. Many biologists have 'acknowledged [that] geological uniformitarianism, more than anything else, eased their way for the acceptance of evolution.'[5]

ii) The Voyage of the *Beagle*:

It was on the *Beagle* that Darwin first reflected on the possibility of evolution when he observed fourteen species of Galapagos finches. He noted that they were undoubtedly closely related with all the species exhibiting exactly the same display and song pattern and all belonging to the same sub-family of finches. Darwin noted in a much quoted letter to Joseph Hooker on 11th January, 1844:

> I was so struck with the distribution of the Galapagos organisms […] and with the character of the American fossil mammifers […] that I determined to collect blindly every sort of fact, which could bear any way on what are species…At least gleams of light have come, and I am almost convinced (quite contrary to the original I started with that species are not (it is like confessing a murder) immutable). [6]

Although the Voyage of the *Beagle* was originally published in 1845, Darwin did not hastily attempt to develop and publish his theories on transmutation. In fact, the keen observational and reflective mind of Darwin bore the reality of transmutation heavily. Darwin in his youth had been convinced of the argument of design as outlined by Paley. His belief in a transcendent Deity had afforded him the knowledge that existence was purposeful and life would continue after death through the hope of the *kerygma*. However, Darwin's observations of transmutation and Lyell's position on the geological record stood in stark conflict with the biblical literalism of that time. Both Darwin and Lyell had been educated to believe that creation was enacted in six 'literal' days. This tension eventually resulted in the collapse of Darwin's faith. It was a profoundly difficult time for Darwin and his wife Emma and in some ways might explain Darwin's delay in publishing his findings on transmutation. As McEvoy notes:

> that collapse [of faith] was […] painful for him ('It felt like killing one's own father', he confessed), and he held back for years from occasioning a like pain on the widest public scale, through the publication of his views. He felt compelled to circulate his ideas only after the youthful Alfred Russell Wallace wrote to him, putting forward theories strikingly similar to Darwin's own.[7]

iii) The Publication of the Theory of Evolution:

Having been spurred into action by Wallace's letter Charles Darwin hastily assembled his writings and published his theory under the title: *On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life* in 1859. This was fourteen years after his insights on the Voyage of the *Beagle*.

From the moment of publication Charles Darwin's fundamental hypothesis 'inspired intense reactions ranging from ferocious condemnation to ecstatic allegiance, sometimes tantamount to religious zeal.'[8] Victorian England was divided in the wake of the publication. Darwin had realised the *Origin* would cause much controversy. The early part of the nineteenth century bore witness to the 'Great debate' and Darwin's theory was

to be shaped by the ongoing squabbles which saw the publication of six editions of *On the Origin of Species* by 1872.

Darwin's theory of evolution was simple to articulate and this allowed the theory to be understood by non-specialists. *The Origin of the Species* recalls Darwin's observations of the morphological adaptations of the Archipelago finches and his contemplations on the historical flow of time. As Darwin wrote in the *Origin:*

> I can see no limit to the amount of change, to the beauty and complexity of the co-adaptations between all organic beings, one with another and with their physical conditions of life, which may have been affected in the long course of time through nature's power of selection, that is by the survival of the fittest. [9]

Given the vast amount of time that has passed from the origin of the earth[10] it was conceivable according to Darwin that life forms could have evolved from unicellular amoeba to complex organisms such as *homo sapiens*. The process of transmutation revolved around the possibility of small adaptations being passed on to the next generation if they proved to increase the chance of survival of an organism. If the adaptations prove to be beneficial for the organism they were more likely to be favoured by natural selection. If this process continues from generation to generation, there will in theory be a gradual transformation of the population, such that there will be an overall increase of the characteristics which are related to the greater 'survival ability' of an organism through time.

As we noted many had contemplated transmutation prior to Darwin but they all lacked an objective approach to explaining the possibility of transmutation. Yet, Darwin had enormous difficulty in explaining how the adaptations could be passed on, even though Mendel had published a report in 1866 describing many features of the mode of inheritance which Darwin was seeking. The significance of Mendel's work was not realised until the beginning of the twentieth century.[11] At that stage the theory of evolution underwent significant updating and by the latter part of the twentieth century, socio-biology was given over to the the promotion of the theory as a world-view. The neo-Darwinistic framework represents the current reflections on the theory of evolution.

iv) Current neo-Darwinian developments:

One of the leading academics in the field of neo-Darwinian studies is Prof. Richard Dawkins. In 1976 his publication of *The Selfish Gene,* while remaining true to 'orthodox Darwinism', inverted the theory to take account of the 'gene'. Dawkins' account of evolution moves away from Darwin's original conception of the:

> species struggling for existence [whereby] the individual seems best regarded as the pawn in the game to be sacrificed when the greater interest of the species as a whole requires it…to the level of the gene.[12]

Dawkins came to the conclusion that the 'most imaginative way of looking at evolution, and the most inspiring way of teaching it', was to see the entire process from the perspective of the gene. The genes, for their own good, are 'manipulating' and directing the bodies that contain them and carry them about.'[13]

> Life is just bytes and bytes of bytes of digital information. Genes are pure information – information that can be encoded, recoded and decoded, without any degradation or change of meaning…We – and that means all living things – are survival machines programmed to propagate the digital database that did the programming. Darwinism is now seen to be the survival of the survivors at the level of pure, digital, code.[14]

Interestingly, Dawkins begins the 1976 edition of *The Selfish Gene* by posing the question 'Why are People?'. The opening chapter title plays on the teleological 'why' which usually accompanies a religious view of creation. Dawkins has taken the question of evolution theory and applied its theories to explain existence…it attempts to explain the 'ontological why' of being and he endeavours to do this in relation to the 'how' of evolution. As the opening lines of *The Selfish Gene* highlight:

> Intelligent life on a planet comes of age when it first works out the reason for its own existence. If superior creatures from space ever came to visit earth, the first question they will ask, in order to assess the level of our civilisation, is 'Have they discovered evolution yet? [...] Darwin made it possible for us to give a sensible answer to the curious child whose question heads this chapter. We no longer have to resort to superstition when faced with the deep problems: Is there a meaning to life? What are we for? What is man? After posing the last of these questions, the eminent zoologist G. C. Simpson put it thus 'the point I want to make now is that all attempts to answer this question before 1859 are worthless and that we will be better off if we ignore them completely. '[15]

The gene's eye view of evolution has been received very favourably by the scientific community. However, Dawkins' theory as outlined has not been confined to the scientific realm, it has been developed through a number of his publications into a world-view. [16] Dawkins believes that the theory of evolution outlines how humanity came to be. The numerous 'why' questions that are posed about our origins is answered by Darwin and the theory of evolution. We developed 'step-by-step' through the long process of time to become human beings. It is a simple statement with immense impact. Dawkins' world-view has no place for the cosmologies of *Genesis* or other religious accounts of creation. This position of Dawkins has placed him at odds with the varying Christian denominations especially those that continue to believe in a literal account of *Genesis*. To believe in the theory of evolution or to remain faithful to its tenets requires one to be an atheist according to Dawkins. Thus many of Dawkins' later works are devoted to

justifying his opinion that religion is essentially a fairytale and the only credible possibility of maximising our human intellect and potential is to be atheists.[17]

Criticisms of Evolution: Language.

One of the first philosophical criticisms focused at Dawkins' neo-Darwinian position came from the philosopher Mary Midgley. The concept of the 'selfish gene' as a phrase disturbed Midgley who believed that it was open to 'definitonal vagueness'. Genes, [according to Midgley] 'cannnot be selfish or unselfish, any more than atoms can be jealous, elephants abstract or biscuits teleological.' [18]

The basic concern expressed by Midgley was that the attribution of 'selfishness' to genes represented a form of anthropomorphism - by which genes are personified to possess human qualities and vices. Genes themselves cannot be selfish from Midgley's point of view, the term 'selfish gene' can only really be applied meaningfully to an organism who is capable of behaviour.

However, Dawkins would be at pains to outline that he does not mean that the genes are selfish themselves:

> This strategic way of talking about an animal or plant, or a gene, as if it were consciously working out how best to increase its success […] has become commonplace among working biologists. It is a language of convenience which is harmless unless it falls into the hands of those ill-equipped to understand it. Or over-equipped to misunderstand it?[19]

Dawkins is refering in particular to Mary Midgley for not understanding the language of biologists and behaviourists. A much more developed critique of Midgley's article was published under the title of 'In defence of Selfish Genes' by Dawkins. In that article he outlined that:[20]

> An entity…is said to be altruistic if it behaves in such a way as to increase another such entity's welfare at the expense of its own. Selfish behaviour has exactly the opposite effect. "Welfare" is defined as "chances of survival", even if the effect on actual life and death prospects is…small. It is important to realize that the above definitions of altruism and selfishness are *behavioural,* not subjective. I am not concerned here with the psychology of motives…that is not what this book is about. My definition is concerned only with whether the *effect* of an act is to lower or raise the survival prospects of the presumed altruist and the presumed beneficiary.[21]

This is a restatement of his undertakings in the opening chapter of *The Selfish Gene*. Dawkins once again accuses Midgley of not being *au fait* with how the term 'selfish' is

employed from a behaviourist point of view and thus has totally mis-understood and unfairly criticised his use of the term 'selfish gene'. [22]

Thus for Dawkins his usage of the term 'selfish gene' is to be viewed within the context of a particular discipline of studies, namely, socio-biology. The 'gene' doesn't have any anthropomorphic qualities that endows it with freedom to chose to be selfish or altruistic – the genes merely behave in a particular way that are described as having an altruistic or selfish dimension. Dawkins believes genes basically do what they do and as such genes are neither selfish or altruistic. Gordon Graham outlines that Dawkins' 'talk of [the] ruthlessness' of the gene is thus out of place:

> The gene does what it does (unless, as in the case of a lot of genetic material, it does nothing), on its own behalf and through the medium of the phenotype, its 'survival machine' and what it does may well be describable as 'selfish' in this technical sense. But it does not do what it does 'ruthlessly' as opposed to doing the same thing in some other way. [23]

Thus it appears that in the above context Midgley's complaints about Dawkins are not without particular foundation. However, notwithstanding the definitional vagueness of 'selfishness' Dawkins also faces another challenge with regard to his definition of 'gene'.

Defining the gene:

Alister McGrath highlights in his work *Dawkins' God* that the gene is a difficult concept to define. The term presents itself as an omniplex entity given that it is possible to define or visualise the gene in a number of distinct ways:

> In a classic paper, Seymour Benzer offered an essentially molecular definition of the concept, which attempted to bridge the gap between the classic view of the gene as an indivisible unit of genetic information, and the newly discovered physical structure of DNA, which showed that the molecular basis of genetics consisted of a sequence of nucleotides. [24]

Dawkins defines his concept of the gene as 'any portion of chromosomal material that potentially lasts for enough generations to serve as a unit of natural selection' [25]This definition is taken from George C. Williams. It is a functional definition of the gene which is deemed acceptable with 'grumblings from population geneticists.'[26] McGrath notes that Dawkins' definition '[…] lead[s] to a troubling degree of circularity, in that it makes it almost true by definition that the gene is the unit of selection.' [27]

Further to this McGrath outlines that:

> Williams himself wasn't completely happy about this definition. Dawkins, he argued, defined a replicator in such a way that it had to be conceived 'as a physical entity duplicating itself in a reproductive process. […] Williams

> suggested that Dawkins was misled by the fact that genes are always identifiable with DNA. For Williams, it was of [particular importance to note] that the DNA molecule was the medium, not the message: the gene is 'a package of information, not an object.' Williams emphasised that not all genes are evolutionary, if one defines an evolutionary gene as 'any inherited information for which there is a favourable or unfavourable selection bias equal to several or many times its rate of endogenous change.' [28]

What becomes apparent from McGrath's point of view is that the definition of a 'gene' is not as clear as Dawkins outlines it to be in his work on *The Selfish Gene*. Genes are not in themselves stable entities and they are variably expressed. The genes in this sense translate into proteins which can be identified as having a particular purpose within an organism. Only by observing the effects of the proteins that the genes translate into is it possible to work back and understand the function of the gene itself.

Interestingly, some genes don't perform any particular function – these genes therefore are not understood because they don't translate into protein. Dawkins proposed that the surplus DNA was perhaps 'parasitic or [a] harmless but useless passenger, hitching a ride in the survival machines created by other DNA.'[29] However, Dawkins' definition of the 'gene' which lies at the heart of his theory of *The Selfish Gene* is not so clearly demonstrable. Again, the idea of replicating information on this reductionist level may lead one to ask why is the 'gene' the best place to stop at and not the sub-atomic units which make up the atoms of the genes or otherwise? These sub-atomic particles are themselves encoded with information just like the gene.

Genes and homology:

While we previously noted that genes reveal themselves through their function, it is important to highlight that genes are very rarely confined to one particular process. In fact there are many dimensions to the reach of the gene, in this regard the gene is described as *plieotropic*. Denton devotes a chapter in his book on evolution to the discussion of the *plieotropic* nature of genes and the effect of the multi-functional dimension of genes on homology. Homology takes into account the structural similarities among organisms. The pentadactyl limb is often displayed as an example of homology between the structure of the fin of a whale, the hand of a human and all such forelimbs of mammals. Since 1859, Denton states:

> The phenomenon of homology has been traditionally cited by evolutionary biologists as providing one of the most powerful lines of evidence for the concept of organic evolution. [30]

Homology had provided Darwin with evidence that organisms had evolved from a common source or ancestor. Denton notes that the phenomenon of homology has remained the mainstay of the argument of evolution right down to the present day. [31] Of

course Darwin was dependent mainly on morphological techniques to draw conclusions of a common ancestor. The development of studies in genetics have advanced the possibility of drawing such a conclusion but Denton starkly outlines that:

> The validity of the evolutionary interpretation of homology would have been greatly strengthened if embryological and genetic research could have shown that homologous structures were specified by homologous genes and followed homologous patterns of embryological development. Such homology would indeed be strongly suggestive of 'true relationship; of inheritance from a common ancestor.' But it has become clear that the principle cannot be extended in this way. Homologous structures are often specified by non-homologous genetic systems and the concept of homology can seldom be extended back into embryology. [32]

Denton gives an overview of the homological structure between mammals during embryonic development. The fertilised egg cells of mammals go through the 'blastula' and 'gastrula' stages. The 'blastula' period is an early stage in the development of a fertilised egg, it is when the egg changes from a solid mass of cells (morula) to a hollow ball of cells (the blastula), containing a fluid-filled cavity. The 'gastrula' is a later period of development that opens the way for the development of the ectoderm, mesoderm and endoderm. Denton notes that 'no one doubts that gastrulation and the gastrula are homologous in all vertebrates [yet] the way the gastrula is formed and [in] particular the positions of the blastula of the cells which give rise to the germ layers and their migration patterns during gastrulation differ markedly in the different vertebrate classes.' [33] In fact, in the egg cell, the blastula and gastrula stages in the various vertebrate classes are so dissimilar that, if it were not for the close resemblance in the basic body plan of all adult vertebrates, it seems unlikely that they would have been classed as belonging to the same phylum.

Because of the dissimilarity in the development of embryos outlined above - the organs and structures considered homologous in adult vertebrates cannot be traced back to 'homologous cells' or 'regions' in the earliest stages of embryogenesis. [34] What is made clear here is that homologous structures in the adult vertebrates must be arrived at by different methods.

One further consideration of homology leads us to the question of genes and their role in the production of homological structures. Denton again offers no token of support to Darwin's theory by presenting the fact that 'the evolutionary basis of homology is perhaps even more severely damaged by the discovery that apparently homologous structures are specified by quite different genes in different species.'[35]

Denton highlights the multiple effects of one particular gene in the domestic chicken and various other species of vertebrate. A mutation in that one particular gene is then analysed and the effects of the mutation is compared in a variety of systems, what is noted is that the mutation causes developmental abnormalities in a variety of systems:

> Here is a gene that is involved in the development of some structures unique to birds – air sacs and downy feathers – and of other structures such as lungs and kidneys, which occur in many other vertebrate classes. This can only mean that non-homologous genes are involved to some extent in the specification of homologous structures. [36]

Denton quotes De Beer as stating that 'homologous structures need not be controlled by identical genes and homology of phenotypes does not imply similarity of genotype. [37] Denton goes on to further state that:

> a convincing explanation for the mystifying 'unity of type', the phenomeon of homology that Darwin thought he had so adequately explained by descent from a common ancestor, is probably still a very long way away. With the demise of any sort of straightforward explanation for homology one of the major pillars of evolution theory has become so weakened that its value as evidence for evolution is greatly diminished. The breakdown of the evolutionary interpretation for homology cannot be dismissed as a triviality and casually put aside as a curiosity.[38]

The position of homology presents itself as paradoxical and highly intriguing. As Denton notes in his conclusion to his chapter on homology, 'the same facts of comparative anatomy which proclaim unity also proclaim division; while resemblance suggests evolution, division, especially where it appears profound, is counter-evidence against the whole notion of transmutation.'[39]

The findings of mirco-biologists have in general supported the process of evolution but with regard to homological structures mirco-biology as Denton outlined above has little to offer in terms of support. Most scientists have been convinced of evolution from observations on the micro level but the question of macro evolution still remains a controversial one.

Micro/Macro Evolution

Macro-evolution has been defined as 'a change in the underlying form, the very prototype of the organism'[40] This type of evolution is a transformation which constitutes a leap from one of the major taxonomic groups to another. It is evolution above the species level. Instances of this type of evolution can be 'apparently' seen from the evolution of apes into man. As much as the reality of micro-evolution can command assent based on the scientific facts, the fact of macro-evolution has not hitherto been proved. The *onus probandi* continues to rest in the hands of the proponents of this theory. Indeed, Ernst Mayer quotes an ardent proponent of Darwinian theory, T. H. Huxely admitting that:

> 'No animal breeder had ever succeeded in producing a new, reproductively isolated species by selection. And the most aberrant races of dogs and pigeons

> were called 'pathological' by Kolliker, who quite rightly insisted that they would never be able to maintain themselves in nature.'[41]

However, Mark Ridleyy notes that 'most of the evidence of large-scale evolutionary change ([…] macro-evolution) comes from the fossil record. Only in the fossil record can we watch evolution for long enough to be able to detect large-scale patterns.' [42] Ridley's justification for macro-evolution depends upon a reading of palaeontological evidence.

Palaeontology

Turning to the discipline of palaeontology, Steven Stanley in his publication *Macroevolution* notes that:

> The known fossil record fails to document a single example of phyletic (gradual) evolution accomplishing a major morphological transition and hence offers no evidence that the gradualistic model can be valid.[43]

Further to this, Niles Eldredge strikingly admits that palaeontologists were drawn in to state that the fossil record supported macroevolution when in fact the palaeontologists realised that such a position was at odds with the findings they were privy to in their discipline. Eldredge states that palaeontologists:

> Proffered a collective tacit acceptance of the story of gradual adaptive change, a story that strengthened and became even more entrenched as the [neo-Darwinian] synthesis took hold. We palaeontologists have said that the history of life supports this interpretation, all the while really knowing that it does not.[44]

To try and account for the absence of transitional forms in the fossil record Stephen Jay Gould and Niles Eldredge developed a thesis which they termed punctuated equilbrium. [45] Punctuated equilibrium sees evolution developing through bursts: 'long periods of changelessness or *stasis*-equilibrium-interrupted by sudden and dramatic brief periods of rapid change-punctuations.'[46] This certainly would account for the lack of inter-mediate layers.

Punctuated equilibrium marks a particular turning away from classical Darwinism. Dennett devotes a chapter of his book on *Darwin's Dangerous Idea* to discussing why punctuated equilibrium is a 'hopeful monster' rather than a credible view of how evolution occurs. Dennett along with Dawkins wishes to keep to 'orthodox Darwinism' that holds true to the dictum *natura non facit saltum* – nature does not make leaps.

Natura non facit saltum:

As stated, Darwin, Dawkins and Dennett wish to highlight that adaptation happens slowly over a long period of time (*natura non facit saltum)*. However, if we isolate this particular part of the theory and consider such complex mechanisms as the blood clotting system in the human body, we are compelled to ask how could a slight variation be beneficial without the development of other factors in conjunction with it? Again if we think of the human body – how do organs come to exist without existing systematically (as in the digestive system, the endocrine system, the circulatory system, the nervous system and indeed the system of interdependent organ systems)? Purcell outlines that the mathematician, Murray Eden, found with the aid of a computer simulation:

> [that] if it required a mere 6 mutations to bring about an adaptive change, this would occur by chance only once in a billion years – while if two dozen genes were involved, it would require 10,000,000,000 years, which is much longer than the age of the earth.[47]

Michael Behe brings the interaction of the blood clotting system to our attention. The components of the system are fibrinogen, prothrombin, Stuart factor, and proaccelerin …

> [N]one of the cascade proteins are used for anything except controlling the formation of a blood clot. Yet in the absence of any one of the components, blood does not clot, and the system fails … The clotting cascade depends critically on the timing and speed at which the different reactions occur. An animal could solidify if thrombin activated proconvertin at the wrong time; it could bleed to death if proaccelerin or antihemophilic factor were activated too slowly … The formation, limitation, strengthening and removal of a blood clot is an integrated biological system.[48]

The neo-Darwinists would hold that each characteristic of the entire system must come about on its own 'as an individually occurring mutation, which is then retained through natural selection, and in the course of time is gradually added to by the chance occurrence of another, and then another (and so on) […] Michael] Behe argues [….] that the gradualism to which Darwinian theorists are indissolubly wedded could not possibly account for the irreducible complexity, wherein all parts of the system must function simultaneously.'[49]

Behe defines an irreducibly complex system as:

> […] a single system composed of several well-matched, interacting parts that contribute to the basic function, wherein the removal of any one of the parts causes the system to effectively cease functioning. An irreducibly complex system cannot be produced directly (that is, by continuously improving the initial function, which continues to work by the same mechanism) by slight, successive modifications of a precursor system, because any precursor to an irreducibly complex system that is missing a part is by definition non-functional.[50]

The work of Behe outlines that if Darwinian theory insists on the gradual production of what he calls 'irreducibly complex systems' such as the human cell then the theory of evolution does not work. As Behe notes 'biochemistry has pushed Darwin's theory to the limit. It has done so by opening the ultimate black box, the cell, thereby making possible our understanding of how life works. It is the astonishing complexity of subcellular organic structures that has forced the question, How could all this have evolved?'[51]

Behe goes so far as to outline that irreducibly complex systems point to the existence of a designer.[52] It certainly seems thus far that there are a great number of problems with the theory of evolution that doesn't seem to be known outside of academic circles. Behe has drawn our attention to the complexity that exists at the level of the cell – the varying organelles that compose the cell were unknown to Darwin or to scientists of his day. Most thought the cell was made of protoplasm and were unaware of the numerous organelles that make up the complex microcosm of the cell.

Entropy:

While microbiologists and paleontologists are finding various problems with the theory of evolution physicists are also debating the theory with regard to the First and Second Law of Thermodynamics. Henry Morris notes that:

> The word "evolution" is derived from a Latin word meaning "out-rolling". The picture is of an outward-progressing spiral, an unrolling from an infinitesimal beginning through ever broadening circles, until finally all reality is embraced within.[53]

While Morris translates Entropy as; 'in-turning' coming from the two Greek words *en* (meaning 'in') and *trope* (meaning 'turning')

> The concept is of something spiralling inward upon itself, exactly the opposite concept to 'evolution.' Evolution is change outward and upward, entropy is change inward and downward.[54]

The problem as Morris sees it is the principles of evolution and entropy are both believed to be universal principles and yet they are mutually contradictory. He notes two authoritative definitions:

> There is a general natural tendency of all observed systems to go from order to disorder, reflecting dissipation of energy available for future transformation—the law of increasing entropy.[55]

As far as evolution is concerned, Morris tells us the classic definition of Sir Julian Huxley is as follows:

> Evolution in the extended sense can be defined as a directional and essentially

> irreversible process occurring in time, which in its course gives rise to an increase of variety and an increasingly high level of organization in its products. Our present knowledge indeed forces us to tile view that the whole of reality is evolution—a single process of self-transformation.[56]

What Morris notes is the paradox that on the one hand 'all observed systems ... go from order to disorder, while on the other 'the whole of reality ... gives rise to an increasingly high level of organization in its products.'

Dawkins states that the law of increasing entropy is subject to misunderstanding, he explains all too often people personify the Second Law; to invest the universe with an inner urge or drive towards disorder and it is partly due to this that people have been lead to accept the foolish notion that evolution is a mysterious exception to the law. Moreover Dawkins highlights that there is no mystical urge towards disorder it is just a matter of appearance – as he states:

> Far from there being any mystical urge towards disorder, it is just that there are vastly more ways of being recognized as disorderly than of being recognized as orderly. So, if a system wanders anywhere in the space of all possible arrangements, it is almost certain – unless special […] steps are taken – that we shall perceive the change as an increase in disorder.[57]

While Dawkins doesn't really deal with the question of entropy in an in-depth fashion several articles have been produced to account for how evolution and entropy can exist side by side. Rod Swenson's article is of particular interest where full treatment is given to updating the Second Law of thermodynamics. In this article it is outlined how entropy gives rise to order, highlighting how 'spontaneous order can appear in open systems.'[58] Yet if entropy gives rise to order, does not the process of 'chance', which Darwinian theory is founded upon decrease?

Morris believes evolutionists are being confronted by the truth of entropy and this has compelled them to start publishing papers to 'harmonise' the concept of evolution with entropy. Accordingly, these processes of harmonisation are viewed as futile by Morris, who thinks the attempt to wed deterioration with development as being an impossible task [59]

The question of entropy undoubtedly remains open and controversial – it will probably be debated for some time to come within the varying polemic camps that have resulted from the theory of evolution. However, the final criticism that will be considered in relation to the theory of evolution will be given over to Gilson.

Origins:

In his epic work on evolution Gilson asks a very pertinent question about the whole enterprise of Darwinism, he notes that:

> From the beginning, a serious imprecision was introduced into the definition of the very object of the book [*The Origin*], for at no time did Darwin undertake to clarify the issue of the origin of the existence of species. He did not ask himself how it came about that there were species but rather given their existence, how it came about that there were such as they were.'[60]

The question of existence even in the framework of an evolutionary biology continues to remain open. The causal networks at work in the process of evolution while they can explain the 'how' of origination (if indeed they are true) of existence they cannot explain the origination of existence *per se*. Many continue to believe in the creative power of a Divine entity who brought all things into being as the explanation for existence. However, as was noted earlier the invocation of a Divine being to account for existence is severely castigated by neo-Darwinists. The neo-Darwinian view has in effect developed the theory of evolution into an ideological position which shapes our current world-view.

Post-modernism and the Darwinian World-view

For Dawkins:

> Darwin's' theory of evolution – as developed in the light of Mendelian genetics and our understanding of the place of DNA in the transmission of inherited information – is more than a scientific theory. It is a worldview, a total account of reality. Darwinism is a 'universal and timeless' principle, capable of being applied throughout the universe.[61]

Most evolutionists would hold that Darwinism offers a *description* of reality while Dawkins on the other hand insists that evolution offers more than just a mere *description* - it is an *explanation*. In this regard Darwinism is a worldview, what McGrath calls a metanarrative or a totalising framework, by which the great questions of life are to be evaluated and answered. [62]

Dawkins' world-view has evoked various responses from Post-modern writers. Metanarratives whether Marxist, Freudian, or Darwinian are not accepted within the Post-modernist framework according to McGrath and as such they are to be resisted as a matter of principle. [63] There undoubtedly is a tendency in Post-modernism to move towards relativistic positions where positions on universal truths are fiercely criticised.

Dawkins outlines the Post-modern impact on science and his response to the critique in his work *A Devil's Chaplain*:

> A scientist who has the temerity to utter the t-word ('true') is likely to encounter a form of philosophical heckling which goes something like this: There is no absolute truth. You were committing an act of personal faith when you claim that

> the scientific method, including mathematics and logic, is the privileged road to truth. Other cultures might believe that truth is to be found in a rabbit's entrails, or the ravings of a prophet up a pole. It is only your personal faith in science that leads you to favour your brand of truth.[64]

Dawkins notes that the Post-modern problem concerns 'a half-baked philosophy' which goes by the name of cultural relativism - a (as he states) *Fashionable Nonsense* (emphasis in original). However, Science should not fear criticism from cultural relativism because:

> Science boosts its claim to truth by its spectacular ability to make matter and energy jump through hoops on command, and to predict what will happen and when.[65]

It is through these 'predictions' and 'abilities' that science 'regularly persuades converts to its superiority' while people are loyal to other belief systems because they have been basically 'brought up that way, and they have never known anything better.'[66] The tension here may be seen in relation to the 'objective' road of science versus the cultural admixture of 'religious' formation which diminishes the intellect toward its full realisation of truth.

While the tension between science and religion has been dealt with explicitly in a number of Dawkins' publications it is to the tension between philosophical schools and evolution that he turns to in *A Devil's Chaplain*. Turning to Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn, Dawkins notes that 'a different type of truth-heckler prefers to drop the name of Karl Popper or (more fashionably) Thomas Kuhn:

> There is no absolute truth. Your scientific truths are merely hypotheses that have so far failed to be falsified, destined to be superseded. At worst, after the next scientific revolution, today's 'truths' will seem quaint and absurd, if not actually false. The best you scientists can hope for is a series of approximations which progressively reduce errors but never eliminate them. [67]

This problem in science has arisen because of Einstein's movement beyond Newton's worldview. However, Dawkins doesn't directly address this particular problem before criticising the philosophic method of Popper. All that is stated is 'it is true that Newton's inverse square law has turned out to be an approximation, a special case of Einstein's more general formula. If this is the only piece of scientific history you know, you might conclude that *all* apparent truths are mere approximations, fated to be superseded (emphasis added).'[68]

There is a concession that one 'apparent truth' has indeed been superseded by Einstein's more general formula. Incidentally, Einstein himself continued to search for a more elaborate theory, fearing that his initial theory would require advancement and ultimately be replaced. So, while we can note from Dawkins' text that not *all* 'apparent truths' are mere approximations we can conclude the *some* 'apparent truths' are indeed

approximations. The question therefore is how do we distinguish any 'particular apparent truths' from those 'universal' set of truths housed in science itself?
If Dawkins wishes to establish or outline a world-view it must be clear as to how this view is universal. Universal principles are difficult to define especially in relation to the criticisms of relativism. While it is difficult to define what Post-modernism as a movement is, one of the tenets of the era is distrust of totalising principles. Perhaps the philosophical systems at play in the last World War lead to the fear of such principles. Hannah Arendt in particular developed a philosophy which moved away from the prospect of universal principles.

However, returning to the question of Popper. Dawkins' world-view comes under considerable threat from Popper's theory of *falsification*. Popper's seminal achievement has been described by many as his ability to offer an acceptable solution to the problem of induction. In essence, Popper's theory of *falsification* replaces the traditional scientific method which had come into question because of its reliance on induction. Einstein's theory raised questions about such a system after his theories surpassed, expressed and captured Newton's theories. As Popper noted – a whole generation of people had been raised in the Newtonian world-view – and the world had been simply wrong in believing that all the various untold evidence *proved* Newton's theory. Popper realised after Newton no theory could ever be relied on to be the final truth. The most we can say is that it is supported by every observation so far, and yields more, and more, predictions than any other known alternative. It is replaceable by a better theory.[69]

Of course this is a problem for Dawkins who wishes to highlight that Darwinism is a universal truth – a final truth that will not be surpassed by any other theory. Popper outlines that one ought not to assume a theory is a final truth but one needs to be open to the process of development of the theory through the method of actively seeking *falsification*:

> one ought not to systematically evade refutation, whether by introducing *ad hoc* definitions, or by always refusing to accept the reliability of inconvenient and experimental results, or by any other such device and that we formulate our theories as unambiguously as we can, so as to expose them as clearly as possible to refutation. On the other hand Popper also outlines that we should not abandon theories lightly, for this would involve too uncritical an attitude toward tests, and would mean that the theories themselves were not tested as rigorously as they ought to be. So although Popper is what we might call a *falsificationalist* at the level of logic – he is a highly critical *falsificationalist* at the level of methodology.[70]

Popper's challenge in general to the scientific method makes it hard to imagine how any theory in science could ever be considered universal. Within this framework Dawkin's position on *The Selfish Gene* may in fact be totally in error. Thus, to believe in the Darwinian world-view takes a leap-of-faith. It's a leap to believe in something credible 'at this present time' through the light of reason given all of the varying hypotheses.

Conclusion:

The question of our existence is a particularly challenging question. The theory of evolution does provide a framework for understanding our creation but it still does not outline the cause that caused creation or the purpose of our being. Dawkins will say that there is no point in asking these type of 'why' questions and all such theories about our origins should be consigned to the cosmic dustbin before the arrival of the theory of evolution in 1859. This is a rather remarkable position to hold – to discard thousands of years of philosophic reflection on the origin of being and the purpose of existence. Early myths provided a framework of understanding origins for our ancestors. These early cosmologies developed through reason to provide us with what might be termed scientific cosmologies that continue to inform our world-views. Some of the philosophical reflections on existence, from Aristotle to Pascal, constitute a rational approach towards the apprehension of the transcendent. The theory of evolution or evolutionism offers little in terms of reflection on the ontological reality of existence and the experience of the metaphysical which has been conveyed through the work of varying philosophers through the centuries.

We have looked at a number of the debates that continue to unfold within the theory of evolution. It was noted in effect that the process of macroevolution has never been proven despite more than a century of intensive effort on the part of evolutionary biologists. The large gaps in the fossil record still remain. Indeed, as Denton highlighted the developments in microbiology serve to draw attention to the divisions within the theory of evolution opening up further gaps rather than providing conclusive support for the theory itself. Some of the supporting evidence for the theory is yet to be realized and that has been the position of the lack of evidence since 1859.

The biological sciences need to remain open to a paradigm shift and to seek, as Popper outlines, all methods available to test a theory through the process of *falsification*. Biology needs to be aware of the philosophical issues at stake given the movement of the theory of evolution into a world-view. Evolutionism sets itself up, according to a number of neo-Darwinists, to explain the 'metaphysical origins' of existence which is beyond the scope of the *Origin of the Species* – this was a critical critique expressed by Gilson – that at no time does Darwin explain the 'origin' of the species *per se*.

Belief in a Creator and believing in evolution from the above discussion is not incompatible – the theory of evolution is a theory of biology that outlines how life began. The *metaphysical* cause is not answered. Of course that is not to say that reason will not be able to answer such a question in the future, an answer which may or may not throw more light on the existence of a Divine Being. As far as the present evidence goes the theory of evolution does not constitute a philosophical or scientific theory which in any credible way proves that there is no God. What the theory of evolution did serve to highlight was the various errors of biblical literalism which constrained intellectual thinking in the 1800s. The theory along with Lyell's work on geology created a new

awareness of the importance of history and the immensity of time. Dawkins' criticisms of religion are not without foundation – religions have at times stifled the power of reason due to fear. But Dawkins' radical insistence that the theory of evolution answers the question of our metaphysical origins can and is confronted by the claims of believers who argue that the process of evolution (like all the other natural causes of the world) came into being due to the creative force of the Creator:

> Nor is it superfluous, even if God can by himself produce all natural effects, for them to be produced by certain natural causes. (Aquinas: *Summa contra Gentiles,* III, 70).

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[3] (http://darwin.baruch.cuny.edu/biography/erasmus_darwin/zoonomia.html) accessed 12/12/2005
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[6] Charles Darwin, *The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin,* 3 Vols, ed. F. Darwin: http://charles-darwin.classic-literature.co.uk/more-letters-of-charles-darwin-volume-i/ebook-page-28.asp
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[16] See Richard Dawkins, *The Blind Watchmaker, River out of Eden, A Devil's Chaplain*
[17] See Richard Dawkins, *River out of Eden,* pp. 173-179
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[19] Richard Dawkins, *The Selfish Gene,* p. 278
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[25] Richard Dawkins, *The Selfish Gene,* p. 28
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[27] Alister McGrath, *Dawkin's God,* p. 39
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[29] Richard Dawkins, *The Selfish Gene* p. 45
[30] Michael Denton, *Evolution: A Theory in Crisis* p. 143
[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid. p. 145 – Denton is drawing upon Sir Gavin de Beer's work *Homology, an Unresolved Problem* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1971)

[33] Michael Denton, *Evolution: A Theory in Crisis* p. 145
[34] Ibid. p. 146
[35] Ibid. p. 149
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[53] Henry Morris, 'Evolution, thermodynamics and Entropy (3) http://www.icr.org/index.php?module=articles&action=view&ID=51 accessed 21/12/20005
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[62] Ibid.
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The Metaphysics of Evil

Stephen McGroggan

Either God is justified in allowing all the evil that exists or not. Either choice stands in need of justification. This is the problem which evil poses within the philosophy of religion. The disagreement is not over what is physically the case; it is over what is the justification for what is physically the case, and such disagreements about moral value are metaphysical. Therefore, no amount of probing of physical causes will deliver the desired 'result'. The distinction drawn here between physical facts and moral categories is the same one Einstein draws more generally between science and religion.

> Science can only ascertain what is, but not what should be, and outside of its domain value judgments of all kinds remain necessary. Religion, on the other hand, deals only with evaluations of human thought and action: it cannot justifiably speak of facts and relationships between facts.[1]

Thus circumscribing the distinct realms of science and religion doesn't circumvent the problem, however. It still leads Einstein for one to question the reality of any kind of *personal* God.

> Nobody, certainly, will deny that the idea of the existence of an omnipotent, just, and omnibeneficent personal God is able to accord man solace, help, and guidance; also, by virtue of its simplicity it is accessible to the most undeveloped mind. But, on the other hand, there are decisive weaknesses attached to this idea in itself, which have been painfully felt since the beginning of history. That is, if this being is omnipotent, then every occurrence, including every human action, every human thought, and every human feeling and aspiration is also His work; how is it possible to think of holding men responsible for their deeds and thoughts before such an almighty Being? In giving out punishment and rewards He would to a certain extent be passing judgment on Himself. How can this be combined with the goodness and righteousness ascribed to Him?[2]

The idea of a personal God is thus cast into doubt, and is the genesis of the problem of evil for traditional faith in a God. It would be illegitimate to assume blithely the existence of a God in trying to prove he exists. Therefore, the nature of evil and how it may be interpreted without an immediate reference to the personality of a God must be initially the locus around which our philosophical inquiry should continue. The interpretation of evil inevitably transcends experience, however it must also begin there; this is the case even if the interpretation one arrives at is that evil is simply an arbitrary fact of life with no additional purpose, for such a belief is also metaphysical.

Dilthey's assertion that the understanding and expression of experiences is contextually dependent seems impossible to refute, and the context of any evil always involves objective and subjective elements. Therefore the necessary starting point for any informed judgement on the meaning of evil is to look dispassionately at the phenomenon itself within such an experiential context.

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Evil as necessarily involving the experience of suffering

Evil is a concept that places an extreme negative value upon a specific experience, event or person. A subjective pain or negative emotion is what is required for anything to be identified as an evil, which means that it involves suffering at some point. Although pain is transitory, it is often protracted and at the harshest moment of pain such moments can seem to last forever. When suffering pain we tend to reason much differently from how we do normally. Jane Austen gives us a good example of the vacillating nature of reason due to the influence of pain in the character of Elizabeth Bennet in *Pride and Prejudice*. She reflects on the emotional pain being suffered by her broken-hearted sister and vicariously by herself, only to oscillate back a few moments later, after her sister is reunited with her true love.

> At that instant she felt that years of happiness could not make Jane or herself amends for moments of such painful confusion.[3]
>
> … the misery, for which years of happiness were to offer no compensation, received soon afterwards material relief from observing how much the beauty of her sister rekindled the admiration of her former lover.[4]

There is something compelling about the influence that pain holds over mental attitudes; and yet this hold can be fickle, changing with the vicissitudes of circumstance. The pleasure of relief which is described above and which Socrates experienced in a physical way at the start of the *Phaedo* when his shackles were removed provides for an interesting reflection.

> What a queer thing it is, my friends, this sensation which is popularly called pleasure! It is remarkable how closely it is connected with its conventional opposite, pain. They will never come to a man both at once, but if you pursue one of them and catch it, you are nearly always compelled to have the other as well; they are like two bodies attached to the same head.[5]

We may consider that Socrates' is not justified in such a wide sweeping generalisation on the head of this one instance, and simply qualify it for the moment to say that, at the very least, as far as the specific pleasure of relief is concerned, this pleasure is unimaginable without the pre-existence of pain. While this pleasure is somewhat more than the negative pleasure of Schopenhauer's 'freedom from suffering' that shares a lot in common with Buddhism, there are still more positive pleasures than simply pleasures of relief, for example, the aesthetic appreciation of a work of art.

It would be absurd, however, to consider reducing the problem of evil to a mere question of whether pleasure outweighs pain in the world. Schopenhauer explains why eloquently.

> A quick test of the assertion that enjoyment outweighs pain in this world, or that they are at any rate balanced, would be to compare the feelings of an animal engaged in eating another with those of the animal being eaten.[6]

And at some point in time we are all going to be the animal that is being eaten, at least eventually by time. His point seems so convincing as to be trivial. In terms of pleasure, as well as in terms of pain, a notion of merely comparing quantities seems absurd. This is the reason why utilitarianism, in its simplest form, is so problematic. Suffering is an essentially solitary experience, and so is not measurable in any exact way. It would be problematic to say one situation of suffering or evil was, strictly speaking, 'worse' than another. In such cases, comparisons are odious, but distinctions, at least, can be made. It seems obvious to suggest that some types of suffering or evil trouble us more greatly than others. For example, it is harder to imagine a more difficult instance than the loss of a loved one at death. If the existence of evil is acceptable at all, death is central and crucial as a specific case.

The experience of pain, whether emotional or physical, can seriously shake our belief in the meaningfulness of life, which can be crudely defined as a sense that life is worth the while. However, it would be a bald assertion to claim that life can definitely have no purpose or worth simply due to this existence of suffering. That said, for evil in the form of suffering to be intelligible there must be some way to interpret it other than what appears to us from the surface view, which simply constitutes the most brutal of all brute facts. For meaning in life to survive such an experience, there must be some redeeming quality about suffering.

Certainly suffering and evil are not synonymous. For example, suffering may be inflicted medically in the course of saving a life. What would otherwise be evil is here made understandable and thereby loses the full force of its name. What distinguishes evil from suffering is the lack of such a redeeming purpose allowing the pain to be interpreted as merely necessary suffering. The justification of a motivation can change the seemingly senseless into the heroic. For example, self-starvation can be seen as an outright, self-inflicted evil until the notion of the politically motivated 'hunger strike' is introduced as one such justifying motivation. The cause one 'hungers' for is then the crucial factor. If it is for peace, as it was in the case of The Mahatma Gandhi, then we can interpret the action rightly as a noble deed. Within the context of experience, the problem of evil transforms into: Either there is a meaning behind all of the pain we suffer or not.

The French say '*tout comprendre, tout pardonner*', to understand everything is to forgive everything. However, when the evil is so cruel and on such a scale as, for example, the Holocaust, even motive does not succeed in putting this evil in an understandable light. It seems that such an event is only ever morally permissible to view as evil, and never as some kind of 'understandable suffering'. It seems to remain always mysteriously unintelligible by the magnitude of its horror, but it too is an experience that must be examined if the question is to be dealt with in an exhaustive way. Even here some of those who suffered tried to make the leap to the level of understanding this evil, of searching to place it within some context of meaning. We will focus on attempts at such intelligibility later.

Unintelligible evil

The only alternative to evil being understood within an intelligible framework is that it is in some way needless and purely arbitrary. This is obviously a bleak alternative from an existential point of view, but cannot be for that reason objectionable. What is more damning to the notion of meaning in life than that suffering is simply there, a fact that would which expose life as absurd? Schopenhauer is, indeed, the exponent par excellence of such a view.

> If the immediate and direct purpose of our life is not suffering then our existence is the most ill-adapted to its purpose in the world: for it is absurd to suppose that the endless affliction of which the world is everywhere full, and which arises out of the need and distress pertaining essentially to life, should be purposeless and purely accidental. Each individual misfortune, to be sure, seems an exceptional occurrence; but misfortune in general is the rule.[7]

Schopenhauer goes on to suggest that this is exactly the situation in which man finds himself in the world. Jean-Paul Sartre also agrees that this absurdity is actually the situation. However, rather than merely accepting one's fate stoically, or with complete disillusionment as Schopenhauer does, Sartre suggests that we must give the arbitrariness of the world our own meaning by the choices that we make within it. In a sense, we are providing our own context from which suffering and all else is given any meaning at all. It is interesting to note that Sartre's way out of the predicament is through the concept of the individual freedom of the person.

Schopenhauer relieves a God of the blame by also relieving him of his existence since he views the world as being so terrible that a God could not be supposed to have created it.

> …two things cry out against any such view of the world as the successful work of an infinitely wise, infinitely good and at the same time infinitely powerful being: the misery of which it is full and the obvious imperfection of its most highly developed phenomenon, man, who is indeed a grotesque caricature.[8]

Such atheistic attempts at living with the arbitrariness of evil, however, are the most poignant testament to the unsatisfactory nature of this thesis. Viktor Frankl in his autobiographical story of his time in Auschwitz, *Man's Search for Meaning,* testifies to the need for the camp prisoner to have some hope of redemption from evil to continue to have the will to live.

> The prisoner who had lost faith in the future – his future – was doomed. With this loss of belief in the future, he also lost his spiritual hold; he let himself decline and became subject to mental and physical decay. … Usually it began with the prisoner refusing one morning to get dressed and wash or to go out on the parade grounds. No entreaties, no blows, no threats had any effect. He just lay there hardly moving. If this crisis was brought about by an illness, he refused to be

> taken to the sick-bay or to do anything to help himself. He simply gave up. There he remained, lying in his own excreta, and nothing bothered him any more.[9]

The demand from the depths of the soul shared amongst theists and atheists alike that life must have some meaning to be acceptable at all is the strongest argument that one is required. The search for an explanatory reason is the definition of every rational endeavour. When an impasse is reached in science, hands are not thrown in the air and everything given up as arbitrary. We seek for a refinement to theory, or sometimes entirely new theories whenever we find something that no longer allows the world to make sense as a whole. But it is apposite to remember that the realm we presently inhabit is the realm of the metaphysical and not the physical. And science will always be abused if it is used to attempt to argue conclusively for or against the arbitrariness of suffering.

The *method* of science, however, is a fair object of *analogy*. The debate about whether things in general can happen arbitrarily on the level of causation, as opposed to the metaphysical level, is one that rages in the heart of physics. That arbitrary events exist is presupposed rather than proved by some of the exponents of quantum physics, such as Niels Bohr, which position Einstein himself could not countenance, according to whom God does not play dice. The reason that arbitrariness is not to be allowed in the sciences is that the whole project of the rational understanding of nature presupposes a desire for an existing truth that is profoundly believed in and seen essentially as underlying principles of order. So, is there a genuine alternative to seeing the pain that is the constant companion of the lineaments of nature and of our inner worlds ultimately as merely arbitrary evil? One reason for believing there may be is that the term 'arbitrary evil' strikes the mind's ear with the tone of an oxymoron, and jars as one pronounces it. Evil just is. It doesn't seem possible for anything ever to be accepted as a justification of that which 'just is'? It is at the point of 'just is' that the mind falls dull and the tongue silent. But while we may fall silent in the face of evil, we do not refrain from action. We respond, even if only to accept that it is beyond us to do anything. Frankl addresses this explicitly when he says,

> … everything can be taken from a man but one thing: the last of the human freedoms – to choose one's attitude in any given set of circumstances.[10]

We may choose vengeance, or to seek justice. We may attempt to shoulder the burden stoically and nobly, or even to try to forgive our persecutors. But whatever we do is down to our own responsibility, and it communicates something about us as human beings and indirectly about how we intellectualise our suffering.

Intelligible evil

We have some hope of finding an acceptable intelligible context for evil for the reason that to use the word 'evil' is already to step away from the purely given world of the physical into the metaphysical realm of morality. To believe in a universal moral code is as much a leap away from the realm of the arbitrary into the world of the purposeful, as is a search after a justification for evil. So as evil is pain without a context that will allow it

to become intelligible, let us examine the phenomenon of pain or suffering in more detail, and the context we most often give it through our actions.

Action as Communication

It is human to rejoice in our own good fortune, and to pity our own misfortune. But it is also human to rejoice in another's joy and to suffer pain at another's pain. To the extent that this is a common emotional reaction, we say that this is something of a 'natural' virtue that it is just right that a person should have. Someone who has never felt empathy in any way is a deficient human being.

The normal response to pain is to try to limit it in whatever way is possible depending on the situation. However, whenever the pain is due to grief, there is a common sense that there really is nothing that one can say. But that is not to say that we also believe that there is nothing that we can do for the person in grief. Indeed, we tend to do very similar things. We do not leave them to grieve on their own if they are a close loved one. We stay with them and we hope to help them by our mere presence. We hold their hand and hug them. But all of these things, though unspoken, are so many forms of communication expressing something that is too sensitive to discuss.

What it communicates is that we are 'there for them' and reminds them of the relationship we share together. In the expression of our loving relationship, it may help them to remember their lost loving relationship with the person over whom they now grieve. This memory of love may console to a little degree the pain of loss. This seems to be a truth that is too important to trust to words to express. In this physical response of people to those who grieve, it seems that the value of relationship is simply being shown, rather than talked about. Indeed, to state it seems inappropriate as it suggests that there might have been some doubt about the matter. By not saying anything and by rather taking the initiative to do, we testify to the quality of the established relationship already existing between us.

What this response to the grief of another seems to suggest is that what makes evil acceptable, if not palatable, is that it is in some way associated with the value of love. It seems impossible to imagine loving another without recognising that often this will lead to pain of some description. It may eventually lead to the greatest pain possible of losing a loved one. It also seems impossible to imagine wanting to lead a life where we are so cut off from others that we are never in danger of experiencing any sort of pain, either from their hands or because of them. There seems to be a choice associated with the pain of death. Do we decide that life is not worth such pain and lose the will to carry on? Or do we decide that the only thing that makes such pain acceptable within a life is the fact of the love that we share with others, and which is the instrumental cause of our suffering? To reject pain in such a situation seems to mean something for our relationship with the other we have lost, tantamount to rejecting *them*. Perhaps, it is only in accepting the pain of the loss of a loved one that we can conceive and therefore remember having loved them, let alone continuing to love them still. Simone Weil states that 'love needs reality'.

> What is more terrible than the discovery that through a bodily appearance we have been loving an imaginary being? It is much more terrible than death, for death does not prevent the beloved from having lived.[11]

Is there something to read between the lines of these situations involving such pain? Theological discourse suggests yes, but so too does scientific theory, psychological therapy, and evolutionary political philosophy such as Marxism. Appearances are never self-explanatory, and so we are systematically stuck with projecting the order that we discern, as Kant contends. But that is not to say that a warranted belief regarding what is behind our experience is impossible.

However, while suffering is hard to accept as being purely arbitrary, it is possibly even harder to accept as having a meaning which is only instrumentally good. What loss can lead to is compassion for others, and eventually then naturally on to the care and respect of others. But grief is never desirable, even to make us deeper characters in some way, which would involve a somewhat egoistic rationale. It seems that there needs to be some sense that suffering is *necessary* for it to be acceptable. Could we not live in a world with love and respect without the need to suffer this pain of loss at all?

An interesting outcome of my teaching in tutorials on which to reflect is the response made by pupils when given the example of Robert Nozick's 'experience machine'. Imaginatively, the machine is such that it can hypothetically fulfil every desire, with two caveats - that we would be linked up to it for our entire lives, and that it would be understood that none of the experiences we experience had any real objective referent. When this machine was compared to the harsh realities of the 'real world' and the students were then given the opportunity to choose between them, the students almost unanimously chose for the vicissitudes of the real world. I interpret this experience to mean that 'reality' carried with it a value that was known to be missing in the 'experience machine', that is, the possibility of transcending the self and making genuine contact with others. If the appearance of reality was enough, then the machine could have provided that. And indeed, for all we know all we ever have is the appearance of reality, as the few exceptional philosophers in the tutorial groups pointed out. But even so, we all tend, at least, to aspire to self-transcendence and to live in community with others. No one genuinely wants to live in a solipsistic universe; generally, we'd take slavery, so long as we had company. It is relationships involving love that make any kind of pain endurable.

Viktor Frankl proclaims that 'The salvation of man is through love and in love.'[12] When in amongst the gloom of his camp life he was able to fix upon the image of his wife in his mind's eye and this image, though he didn't know if it still belonged to a living being, gave him meaning and allowed him to transcend his terrible surroundings for a time. He reflected that,

> For the first time in my life I was able to understand the meaning of the words, "The angels are lost in perpetual contemplation of an infinite glory."[13]

This helped him to realise that we needed a fundamental change in our attitude toward life, an attitude so striking that I am compelled to give it in full:

> We had to learn ourselves and furthermore, we had to teach the despairing men, that *it did not really matter what we expected from life, but rather what life expected from us*. We needed to stop asking about the meaning of life, and instead to think of ourselves as those who were being questioned by life – daily and hourly. Our answer must consist, not in talk and meditation, but in right action and in right conduct. Life ultimately means taking the responsibility to find the right answers to its problems and to fulfil the tasks which it constantly sets for each individual.
>
> These tasks, and therefore the meaning of life, differ from man to man, and from moment to moment. Thus it is impossible to define the meaning of life in a general way. Questions about the meaning of life can never be answered by sweeping statements. "Life" does not mean something vague, but something very real and concrete, just as life's tasks are also very real and concrete. They form man's destiny, which is different and unique for each individual. No man and no destiny can be compared with any other man or any other destiny. No situation repeats itself, and each situation calls for a different response. Sometimes the situation in which a man finds himself may require him to shape his own fate by action. At other times it is more advantageous for him to make use of an opportunity for contemplation and to realise assets in this way. Sometimes man may be required simply to accept fate, to bear his cross. Every situation is distinguished by its uniqueness, and there is always only one right answer to the problem posed by the situation at hand.
>
> When a man finds that it is his destiny to suffer, he will have to accept his suffering as his task; his single and unique task. He will have to acknowledge the fact that even in suffering he is unique and alone in the universe. No one can relieve him of his suffering or suffer in his place. His unique opportunity lies in the way in which he bears his burden.[14]

Frankl invokes the dictum of Nietzsche that "He who has a why to live for can bear with almost any how." Because of this the future takes on a particular importance for Frankl, as he believes it actually does for all of us. Even though Frankl's response is conducive to the response of faith, it is not true to say that it is a view that is limited to religious faith. The meaning we have to live for may not be our faith in a God, but it may equally be for the person whom we love, or for the book that we must write. Whatever that meaning is, it is not a mere creation of the self, it is something *pulling* on one with the persuasiveness of moral force, never *pushing* one into something against one's will. It is there in life for us to detect.

Another psychologist of a different stream, Erich Fromm, also testifies to this search after meaning and that this search is one based on the ultimate importance of the capacity for love. He writes,

> Both in humanistic religious thinking and in psychoanalysis man's ability to search for the truth is held to be inseparably linked to the attainment of freedom and independence.[15]
>
> Analytic therapy is essentially an attempt to help the patient gain or regain his capacity for love. If this aim is not fulfilled nothing but surface changes can be accomplished.[16]

What we embrace is the central key to any question of meaning. In the case of the love of another person, it is the transcendence of the self in the other in such a way that the self is not lost. This transcendence of the self into a richer world of meaning is not achievable unless a proportionate level of vulnerability is accepted as the cost paid for relationship. If this cost is genuinely seen to be necessary and not just arbitrary within the context of relationships, then it is conceivable to accept the existence of evil for the greater good of empathy, sympathy, compassion and love, namely the good of personal relationships. If this love always lies implicitly within the experience of loss, then at least that kind of evil, which is the most serious and most central, is justified due to the existence of love.

However, it is perfectly possible that this cost of loss in life could be rejected and life simply anaesthetised by the adoption of an attitude that Emily Dickinson describes and evokes so beautifully through these words:

> The Heart asks Pleasure – first
> And then – Excuse from Pain –
> And then - those little Anodynes
> That deaden suffering –
>
> And then – to go to sleep –
> And then – if it should be
> The will of its Inquisitor
> The privilege to die -

For this is what feeling nothing must equate to - death. Without pain, covering whatever is unpleasing to us, we would not be able to recognise the agency of any 'other' in the world at all. We would be locked within the pseudo-solipsism of childhood where he/she expects everything to go according to their desire instantly. I say pseudo, as the moment the child cries the lie is given to it being true solipsism, for no one cries when it is thought that there is no one there to hear. This we have been taught by the experience of finding the many children terribly maltreated in Romanian orphanages who had given up the practice of crying, presumably due to its pointlessness, constituting the saddest and most philosophical of all silences.

But the cry is natural; it is due to the conditioning of experience that it becomes forgotten or distrusted. Such children need to learn to be drawn back from the world of the impersonal to the personal again. They need to be taught how to do what was once natural, and this is only possible by re-experiencing love and not by argument. A happy

day, indeed, is the day when the survivor has regained the courage and the faith to cry, for it shows that human affection is experienced and trusted once again.

We could think of that as well and good, but better not to have told such a sad story at all, better that everything was pleasure. However, at the very least if everything were equally pleasing to us, this would be the same as everything being equally displeasing, in that we wouldn't be able to differentiate between objects of our affection at all; indifference would descend to replace pleasure and pain by equal measure. Just in the same way, if everything was the same colour we would not see anything, and a subjective response to what we see would then be out of the question. At the very least we need degree in pleasure to make any sense of variety in life.

And yet the necessity of variation in pain and pleasure does not necessitate our consent to their existence. We can still deny that any external mind really has designs different to our own personal will. Solipsism is philosophically possible. Belief in others is not rationally compelling, but is a choice for reality made and continually renewed through the faculty of feeling. As Simone Weil says,

> Belief in the existence of others as such is *love*. … The mind is not forced to believe in the existence of anything. … That is why the only organ of contact with existence is acceptance, love. That is why beauty and reality are identical. That is why joy and the sense of reality are identical.[17]

Love is a capacity that can be inhibited through harsh experience, and can bloom once more with tender care, but always remains essentially a capacity latent rather than dead so long as the organism still exists, and the capacity is activated most vivaciously by the decision of the will to transcend oneself and simply to attend to, to 'see', the reality of the other.

The Danger of Overinterpretation

Etty Hillesum, a Dutch Jewess and psychologist who died in Auschwitz during World War II, recorded in her diary during those dark times that it was not real evil that was the most troubling thing about evil, but rather it was the idea of it, with all the fear of the future that it inspired. In this case, it is the intellectualisation of evil that may be to come that is also a problem for Hillesum. We may agree with this on experiential grounds in that it is often our active imagination and the forebodings that it encourages that constitute the source of much mental anguish. What Etty Hillesum highlights is the tendency to *overthink* the problems surrounding us, even the most significant and horrific (most especially these), while we feel we are doing some justice to their gravity. Levinas makes the point that consciousness contains within itself paradoxically the capacity for closing itself down in sleep, giving up vigilance for a necessary respite.

> … it is necessary to ask if vigilance defines consciousness, or if consciousness is not indeed rather the possibility of tearing oneself away from vigilance, if the

> proper meaning of consciousness does not consist in being a vigilance backed against a possibility of sleep …Consciousness is the power to sleep.[18]

Similarly we might suggest that some questions are attempts at finding a meaning where none should be found and that rationality should rest at the extent of its limit, not satisfied but with the contentment due to its humility. This is not to disparage the right of reason to question ad infinitum, but only to say that some questions are thrown up by our ideological and/or psychological background and not organically from the experience itself. If this were not true we not be able to come up with any understanding or definition of cases of paranoia at all. This argument has to be binding on any atheist, as the attribution of motivation where there is none is the basic claim against the theistic view of the universe. Thus chastened against *overinterpreting*, however, we are still bound to interpret our present suffering existence in some way. Even a refusal to think itself testifies to some primal judgement, however hasty, of the seriousness of our problems.

I have already shown that interpretation can mitigate evil above. Spinoza went one step further and believed that emotion which was suffering ceased to be actual suffering as soon as we had formed a clear and precise picture of it. However, this position does appear to be untenable. Suffering can never lose its quality of being painful without ceasing to be the same object of our attention at all. It must always be suffering. It is debatable whether we need always to attribute the epithet evil, and it seems it is this question that is a matter of forming clear conceptions. Therefore, we may observe that it is the incomprehensibility of the suffering that exists in the world that makes it intolerable and makes it continually qualify for the name of evil until we consider it acceptable for some reason or other. This is testified to on the level of experience again in relationships where a friend betrays another and this betrayal stands as an outright evil between the two until it is made amends for in some way. While the evil always maintains its reality as being what it ever was, it is no longer so much as named between the two friends who have moved on, intentionally overlooking the offence, without denying its reality, for the purpose of resurrecting the relationship.

Plato suggests that good and evil are two concepts that seem to need the other to make sense. Suffering and love are two specific examples of either generic concept. These two concepts are always connected on the existential level. It is possible to *imagine* love without pain, but not to believe of it as existing in our world. Here below each implies the other factually as an indirect consequence. Whether it implies it logically is not obvious. The painful truth is that the more we love others, the more we will suffer when we lose them. This is so profound a truth that we hardly ever want to dwell upon it. If we do choose love in life, then we must view that the existence of this love justifies in some way our acceptance of the reality of evil. Indeed, to love is to become exposed, to open oneself up to trust another. It is at this point of openness that humanity is both the most vulnerable and the most uniquely human. It is in freely limiting our power to protect ourselves that enables another to get close enough to love us, but also thereby to hurt us. Love always involves this danger. We cannot destroy one without destroying the other. Simone Weil further elaborates this connection of evil with love in the book, *Gravity and Grace*, produced posthumously. She writes,

> Evil is to love what mystery is to the intelligence. As mystery compels the virtue of faith to be supernatural, so does evil the virtue of charity. Moreover, to try to find compensation or justification for evil is just as harmful for charity, as to try to expose the heart of the mysteries on the plane of human intelligence.[19]

So my argument stands in agreement with Weil's insistence on the connection of evil with love, but differs from it when I talk of whether love justifies evil. The difference may be more semantic than material as I certainly do not mean 'justify' in the sense of outweighing in a quantitative sense, only that it is love and only love that could make the evil in the world acceptable, if not palatable, and life worth living.

However, there is a difference of level between these connected concepts. While suffering is capable of being justified by love, the concept of love stands without need of a similar need of justification, it being the most basic value which validates every other value by derivation. We might question this and respond that happiness is this ultimate value, but the evidence of the Nozick experiment argues against this. Happiness attends incidentally when love transcends in actuality. The love that takes one out of oneself due to our free decision establishes one as a fully independent individual. Love enacts personality and, as an activity, just is. It is our most basic value, without which we would not want to live.

Evil and God

It is possible now to go back to the problem of evil and to re-examine the basic judgement that is to be made, now from this experiential perspective. As the concept of love is central to the arrival at a sense of the acceptability of evil within a meaningful life, we might hope that it will prove useful to the endeavour of analysing the notion of a God, acting as a bridge between the two concepts.

All of the preceding, of course, does not yet amount to an argument for the compatibility of the notion of evil with a God. It is possible that an almighty God could have made life much easier, with fewer diseases and less intense pain. He could have created humans who always chose what was good out of pure love, but obviously did not. Any reason we might give for him doing so must be something that is quite necessary, because it wouldn't be good for a God to allow evil, unless there was no absolutely no other good alternative for him to choose.

Could God strictly control everything to be perfect materially? Of course, if he is all-powerful. However, he would no longer be lovable if he did, as no one would be free to love at all. Even an all-powerful God could not logically create a world where people were 'forced' to love each other without destroying what he was attempting to create. And even a God must at least be capable of an infinite amount of evil if he were all-powerful, even if he never exercised this power, or else he himself would not be genuinely free either. A God who was good would be one who limits himself in this way. If a God were all-powerful, then he must have this power to limit his own power. A

black-belt fighter who is forced to fight chooses to limit the use of his own skill. If humans can limit themselves, it would be unreasonable to expect that a God could not because a Creator must be at least capable of doing whatever he has allowed his creatures to do.

The only acceptable reason for a God to so limit himself, then, given our evidence of evil, is that he is a being who primordially desires love; which love demands individual freedom; that the negative consequences of physical and emotional pain are mysteriously but quite necessarily bound up with this free love; and that these consequences are a price worth paying for the beatitude of union both with others and with this God. Therefore a God limits his own power in terms of the control of evil, much as it would appear if he were entirely absent.

Cumulatively, we might put it paradoxically that the only way we can exist in such a way as to be capable of love is for a God to excuse himself from interfering in our lives.[20] Either this or he must be seen to be an entirely impersonal or a non-existent God. This conclusion would have been compatible with Einstein's cryptic belief in an *impersonal* God of whom he believed little may be said without falsehood, other than that he is subtle and not malicious; however I believe it highly unlikely that an impersonal God can be said to primordially desire love, for our experience of this activity is based on the reality of active persons. Without personality, it is hard to imagine the application of a verb in any sentence correctly applying to God. Einstein saw that, and I think that if *he* were to follow my line of inquiry, he would be committed to choosing for the non-existence of God as being preferable to claiming God has personality.

I will conclude by making *my* argument again more succinctly, which states that the existence of a God is hypothetically possible, and that it is reasonable given the fact that love is the central fact that makes life worth living. For *if* one chooses to believe that love makes life worthwhile, *then* it is reasonable to believe in a being who is ultimately responsible for creating that worthwhile life, and who is powerful and good, but who freely limits himself in allowing evil to exist because his essence is love, loving us personally just as we are created, free and capable of compassionate love. However, this conclusion is only tenable if the existence of evil is mutually implied with the existence of love, and that a God himself also lives in this truth, and therefore also suffers. That God suffers is beyond what philosophy could prove. All that it can say is that if God does exist, he must needs suffer to be identified with the redemption of evil that love may be felt to provide.

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[1] Albert Einstein, article in *Science, Philosophy and Religion, A Symposium*, published by the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion in Their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life, Inc., New York, 1941.
[2] Op. cit.
[3] Jane Austen, *Pride and Prejudice*, edition by J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1906, p. 289.
[4] ibid.
[5] Plato, *Phaedo*, 60a. The moment is just prior to his death, but he still is able to feel the positive pleasure of release from physical pain, which metaphorically prefigures the impending release of his soul.
[6] Arthur Schopenhauer, *On the Suffering of the World* in *Essays and Aphorisms* (Penguin Books, London, 1970) trans. by R. J. Hollingdale, note 1.

[7] ibid. Note 9.
[8] ibid. Note 9.
[9] Viktor E. Frankl, *Man's Search for Meaning*, trans. by Ilse Lasch (Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1964) p.74
[10] Op. cit. p.65
[11] Simone Weil, *Gravity and Grace*, trans. by Arthur Wills (University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 1997) p. 114
[12] Op. cit. p.36
[13] ibid. p. 37
[14] Op. cit. p. 77
[15] Erich Fromm, *Psychoanalysis and Religion*, (Yale University Press: Bantam edition, New Haven, 1972) p. 76
[16] ibid. p. 84
[17] Op. cit. p. 113
[18] Emmanuel Levinas, *Time and the Other*, trans. by Richard A. Cohen (Duquesne University Press, Pittsburgh, 1987) p. 52
[19] Op. cit. p. 126
[20] Petitionary prayer remains possible, but is not within the experience of philosophy.

The *Summa de Anima* of Jean De La Rochelle (c.1190/1200 – 1245).

Denise Ryan

Introduction[1]

In the introduction to the edition of the *Summa de Anima*, Jacques Guy Bougerol describes how the discovery by the bishop of La Rochelle of an important series of registers containing the notes, lists of manuscripts and transcriptions of the works of Jean de La Rochelle incited him to undertake the updating of the critical edition of the *Summa de Anima*, originally transcribed by Canon Cholet in 1856. Bougerol also provides a list of manuscripts in which the text of the *Summa* was published and which are to be found in the *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* – fifty copies are cited by him. Due to the work of analysing and collating undertaken both by Canon Cholet and Ignatius Brady and ignoring those manuscripts which were mutilated, Bougerol retained four of the fifty manuscripts in order to establish the collation with the text of Canon Cholet. This is the text which I will translate, analyse and provide a philosophical commentary on, translating as literally as possible in order to be faithful to the text.

Jean de La Rochelle was born at the end of the twelfth century and according to Bougerol's sources he belonged to the Franciscan province of the Aquitaine and was a student of William of Auxerre (1140/50-1231) in Paris. Documentary evidence points to the fact that Jean was a regent master since, Bougerol states, he was able to 'determine', that is, to publicly give his conclusions at the time of disputed questions. Jean succeeded his master and colleague Alexander of Hales (1185-1245) to the chair of professor of theology at Paris and while the date of Jean's birth is uncertain his death is recorded in a letter from Robert Grosseteste (c.1170-1253) to the minister of the English brothers, William of Nottingham - the deaths of Jean de La Rochelle and Alexander of Hales occurred on the 3rd of February and the 21st August respectively in the year 1245.

Jean worked in close collaboration with Alexander of Hales whose major work, the *Summa fratris Alexandri* contains much of Jean's theological writings and it was not until V. Doucet drafted his *Prolegomena de la Summa fratris Alexandri*[2] that Jean's huge contribution to Franciscan theology was revealed. The list of manuscripts attributed to Jean are considerable but from a philosophical perspective the interest of the treatise on the soul, according to Bougerol, lies in the mastery with which Jean outlines the debate regarding the soul in the years 1230-1235 at Paris. Jean was confronted with the new sources of knowledge on the soul, not only that of the Greek - Arabic sources of Aristotle and Avicenna respectively but he also had to consider the medical and naturalistic themes which were not handed over until around the end of the thirteenth century "to the new scientific intellectual of the medieval universities, the 'Scholastic Physician'".[3] Jean presents the first systematic account of the soul and its faculties in his work entitled the *Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae*,[4] written after 1233, a work in which he confronts the encounter of the Christian tradition with the new Greek - Arabic

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writings. The *Summa de anima* follows in the years 1235-1236 and according to Martorelli Vico it anticipates the admirable synthesis of St. Thomas Aquinas on human nature in Questions 79-83 in Part I of the *Summa Theologiae*.

Not only does Jean give us a precise insight into the prevailing doctrines on the soul at this crucial time in the history of thirteenth century philosophy but he also gives a prominent place to the *De Anima* of Avicenna; for Jean de La Rochelle "Avicenna is the philosophical authority *par excellence*, and he quotes him by name when he introduces the notion of the active intellect".[5] One of the interesting points regarding the *Summa,* according to Bougerol, lies in the fact that Jean de La Rochelle uses his sources with great precision. Augustine and Jean Damascene are 'the authorities' and it is Philip the Chancellor's work, the *Summa de Bono* which is the theological point of reference. The *Summa de Anima* therefore holds an important place in the study of human nature, both from the theological and the philosophical investigation of man.

The contents of the *Summa* – the first *consideratio*

The *Summa* is divided into two long parts – each named a *consideratio,* each part is divided up into chapters – 58 for the first part, 60 for the second. It should be noted however, that the evidence clearly shows that Jean de La Rochelle did not have titles for his chapters and that Bougerol is following the Cholet and Uppsala manuscripts for his headings, maintaining the number of the chapter and the title in brackets.

The first part of the *Summa* studies the soul in its substance. It begins with a prayer addressed to the rational soul, *Si ignores te, o pulcherrima mulierum, vade et abi post greges caprarum* etc.[6] Jean declares that he wants to consider the wonders of his soul. First he asks whether there is a soul and for this he uses the Avicennian argument known as 'The Flying Man', a thought experiment in which man finds himself floating in the air or the void in such a way that he is not conscious of his physical body but yet he is aware of the existence of his own essence. The essence of the soul is therefore distinguished from its existence. Having established the existence of the soul Jean now asks what is the soul? Seven definitions follow, very briefly, the soul is sometimes described as spirit, sometimes as soul and sometimes as soul and spirit.[7] Quoting Augustine in the *Soliloquies,* the soul is receptive of the Divine Illumination, this is a voluntary assent which is governed by the will.[8] Next the origin of the soul is considered in relation to Aristotle's four causes, the material, efficient, formal and final cause.

In relation to its being Jean establishes that the soul is an incorporeal simple substance, and that it is one in three powers, the vegetative, the sensitive and the rational. Jean follows with a lengthy discussion on the soul as an image, the three acts of memory, understanding and will in forming a circle are as a likeness to the three divine persons in one God.[9] With regard to being in the body Jean discusses the body's capacity to be united to the soul, the mediums of union and the form and mode of such unions. The question of the existence of the soul is considered under four headings, the first examines the immortality of the soul, the second its passibility, third the place or localisation of the soul and fourth the movement of the separated soul.

The second *consideratio*

I will now give a brief outline of the second *consideratio* which considers the soul according to its powers. It is asked what is the relation of the soul to its powers and what constitutes the distinction of powers? Jean, following Augustine, holds that the soul is its powers, however, its essence is not the same as its powers, that is, that by which it acts and that by which it is are not the same.[10] The study of the powers of the soul follows the teachings of Augustine in chapters 62-67, Damascene in chapters 68-81 and Avicenna in chapters 82-119.

According to Augustine the soul has powers with respect to itself and the powers by which it is united to the body are divided into natural, living and animal powers.[11] The natural power has many functions, one of which relates to the desire of those things necessary for the body; one aspect of the living power concerns the workings of the heart giving life to the body; the animal power relates to the brain controlling the senses, movement and the production of speech. These powers are dependent on the soul and body working in unison but this must be understood with respect to the acts of the powers themselves not as regards substance.[12] The powers of the soul itself are clarified in chapters 63-67, these are the cognitive and affective powers. The soul senses by means of the body, it knows the likenesses of bodies by imagination, by reason it knows the natures of bodies, created spirit by the intellect but uncreated spirit by the intelligence.[13] Jean follows Augustine in his division of the affective powers into the concupiscible and the irascible from which, he states every affection arises. He discusses two powers with respect to the good, namely, joy and hope and two with respect to the bad, namely sorrow and fear.[14]

This is followed by a detailed exposé of the division of the powers of the soul of Jean Damascene. These are divided into the cognitive powers - imagination, (chapter 69), opinion (chapter 70) memory (chapter 71) and mind (chapters 72 and 73) and the appetitive powers that are governed by our feelings such as joy (chapter 75), sadness (chapter 76), fear (chapter 77) and anger (chapter 78). This study ends with a lengthy discussion on freewill, concerning which John Damascene puts forward the question as to whether freewill is present in us and a second question regarding the powers over which we have control. This leads into an analysis of voluntary and involuntary acts, acts performed through ignorance and violence and the distinction between will and choice.

The remaining chapters follow the Avicennian psychology, 38 chapters in all, this as Hasse states "certainly eclipses that of Augustine and John of Damascus, whose sections are much shorter."[15] According to Hasse, the total absence of an Aristotelian division of faculties in Jean De La Rochelle's two works on the soul has perplexed many scholars but as Bougerol states the *De Anima* of Avicenna probably arrived before that of Aristotle. Or could it be, as Hasse states, that Avicenna was preferred because he offered more?

This may become apparent as my study progresses. What I have given here is a very rough outline of the *Summa* which, from a biological, philosophical and theological perspective has a triple interest for the study of human nature. First, it is a very deep and personal account of what in modern terms would be called an anthropological study of man; second, it enhances our philosophical interpretation of that great philosopher and theologian of this period in the history of thought, St. Thomas Aquinas; and thirdly the interpretation of the *Summa* must be highlighted as that of a master in theology who, according to Bougerol

> ….carries a vivid interest in the scientific gifts recently put to the disposition of the Latins by the Greek - Arabic translations, but whose exposition is situated in the framework of teaching and in the Faculty where it is delivered.[16]

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[1] The standard text is the *Summa de Anima*, ed. I. Brady & J.G. Bougerol, Textes Philosophiques du Moyen Age, 19 (Paris, 1995).

[2] Quoted by Bougerol, p.12. Cf. *Summa fratris Alexandri*, Tom.1V. Prolegomena, Quaracchi 1948, 211-225.

[3] Vico, Romana Martorelli, *"Virtutes et Potentiae"*: The Medical-Biological Tradition in the Formation of the Philosophical Anthropology of the Thirteenth Century. Analecta Husserliana 2002 Vol.74 / p.309.

[4] Ibid, p.311. "This work can be rightly considered the initial stage of the new cultural foundation that started to link the study of the soul to natural philosophy, distinguishing it formally from moral philosophy."

[5] Hasse, Dag Nikolaus. *Avicenna's De Anima in the Latin West*. London-Turin: The Warburg Institute and Nino Aragno Editore, 2000. p.221.

[6] Canticle 1,7. *If you do not know yourself, o most beautiful of women, go and depart after the herds of she-goats* etc.

[7] Jean de La Rochelle, *Summa de Anima*, p.52, lines 12-13. *Diffinitur autem anima racionalis aliquando ut spiritus, aliquando ut anima, aliquando ut spiritus et anima.*

[8] Ibid, p.56, lines 8-9. *Profectus enim nature est bonus, quamuis profectus voluntatis sit malus:*

[9] Ibid, p.112, lines, 40-43. *Non dicuntur sese circumincedere nisi cum sunt superioris partis racionis respectu prime veritatis, et tunc sese circumincedunt, vel cum sunt inferioris partis racionis respectu sui ipsius, que meminit se, intelligit se, et diligit se:*

[10] Ibid, p.189, lines, 106-108. *Sic ergo manifestum est unde sit distinctio virium in anima. Est enim distinctio ex seipsis, sed cognicio ipsius distinctionis est ex obiectis et actionibus.*

[11] Ibid, p.189, lines 3-4. *Vires vero quibus commiscetur, id est unitur, prima est naturalis, secunda est vitalis, tercia animalis.*

[12] Ibid, p.191, lines 39-41. *Iste vires tam anime quam corporis dici possunt, quia ab anima in corpore fiunt, nec sine utroque fieri possunt. Hoc autem intellige quantum ad actus ipsarum virium, non quantum ad substanciam.*

[13] Ibid, p.195, lines 22-24. *Sic ergo anima sensu percipit corpora, ymaginacione corporum similitudines, racione corporum naturas, intellectu spiritum creatum, intelligencia vero spiritum increatum.*

[14] Ibid, p.196, lines 5-8. *Vult ergo dicere quattuor esse affectus, duos respectu boni, scilicet gaudium et spem; sed gaudium est de presenti bono, spes vero de futuro; duos respectu mali, scilicet dolorem et metum; sed dolorem respectu presentis mali, metum repectu futuri.*

[15] Hasse, *Avicenna's De Anima in the Latin West,* p.50.

[16] *Bougerol, p.33. ....la Summa est* conçue *et écrite par un maître en théologie « qui porte un vif intérêt aux données scientifiques récemment mises à la disposition des Latins par les traducteurs du grec ou de l'arabe, mais dont l'exposé se situe dans le cadre de son enseignement et de la Faculté où il le dispense »*